US President Barack Obama at the White House Photo: Reuters
That great scholar of Islam,
Bernard Lewis, caution[ed] that America risked being seen as harmless as
an enemy and treacherous as a friend. The Obama administration seems to
have raised the thought to the level of doctrine. What has hitherto
been unclear is whether this was through design or incompetence.
– Mark Steyn, “Surrender in Geneva,” National Review, November 29.
These
sobering sentiments expressed by Steyn, an incisive conservative
columnist of Canadian origin, mirror with almost eerie accuracy those I
articulated in my previous column “Will the West withstand the Obama
presidency”, posted just one day earlier. In it I remarked: “the really
chilling aspect of the Obama incumbency is that it is genuinely
difficult to diagnose whether the abysmal results we see represent a
crushing failure of his policies or a calculated success, the product of
chronic ineptitude or purposeful foresight”.
‘Bungling stupidity cannot be ruled out’
Both
pieces were written in response to the P5+1 deal brokered in Geneva on
the Iranian nuclear program, largely under the stewardship of Obama’s
Secretary of State, John Kerry, in which Tehran won significant gains –
both economic and political – in exchange for…well, not a lot.
Given
how incomprehensibly favorable the terms seemed to be for Iran’s
tyrannical theocracy, Steyn was almost charitable in admitting that the
possible explanation might lie in the realm of the stupid rather than
the sinister. He concedes— caustically: “Certainly, John Kerry has been
unerringly wrong on every foreign policy issue for four decades, so
sheer bungling stupidity cannot be ruled out.”
This
is charitable because with the passage of time, there is accumulating
evidence that a more ominous possibility may be emerging as increasingly
and disturbingly plausible.
The Geneva accord
is so perplexingly perturbing, its terms so tenuous, so vague, so
equivocal, so given to conflicting interpretation, that even some of
Obama’s most sycophantic apologists have found themselves expressing
unprecedented heretical doubts as to the soundness of its rationale.
Some like Harvard Law professor, Alan Dershowitz, have been stridently
blunt in expressing their misgivings.
Others,
such as Jeffrey Goldberg, unkindly designated by some as Obama’s
court-journalist, seemed almost contritely embarrassed for doing so,
promising to balance his commendably well-argued censure of the deal in
“a coming post”, in which “I will do my best to represent…the compelling
arguments to be made in favor of this deal”.
But more on that later.
The ‘taqiyya’ thing
For
those unfamiliar with the term taqiyya in the title, a brief
explanation: The notion of taqiyya and its significance have been
extensively discussed in the literature on Islam, so clearly we cannot
encompass the full scholarly debate here. Accordingly a highly
compressed account will have to suffice.
Historically,
the Koranic-sanctioned practice was first codified by minority Shia
Muslims and refers to the dissemblance (i.e. the act of concealing or
disguising) of their religious faith to protect themselves from the
persecution from the more powerful Sunni Muslims.
However
today, as the well-known scholar of Islam, Raymond Ibrahim, tells us:
‘Taqiyya is not as is often supposed, an exclusively Shi’ite
phenomenon.” To make the point he cites Islamic studies professor Sami
Mukaram, author of over twenty books on Islam: ‘Taqiyya is of
fundamental importance in Islam. We can go so far as to say that the
practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam. Taqiyya is very prevalent in
Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.’ Thus, Ibrahim asserts
that taqiyya has come to be “deployed not as dissimulation but as active
deceit… deceit, which is doctrinally grounded in Islam, [and] often
depicted as being equal—sometimes superior – to other universal military
virtues, such as courage, fortitude, or self-sacrifice.’
Taqiyya (cont)
Now, while I have no intention of engaging in the ideo-theological debate over the true significance and scope of taqiyya, in general, or the scholarly merits of Ibrahim’s widely quoted interpretation of it, in particular, one thing is indisputable: There is clearly a considerable body of opinion which holds that, in the modern era, taqiyya seems to have become a means not only to defend Islam against the infidels but to advance it among them—particularly in the West.
Taqiyya (cont)
Now, while I have no intention of engaging in the ideo-theological debate over the true significance and scope of taqiyya, in general, or the scholarly merits of Ibrahim’s widely quoted interpretation of it, in particular, one thing is indisputable: There is clearly a considerable body of opinion which holds that, in the modern era, taqiyya seems to have become a means not only to defend Islam against the infidels but to advance it among them—particularly in the West.
Indeed,
in the public discourse the term has come to denote “active doctrinal
deceit” not only for the purpose of preserving religious Islamic values
but to advance political Islamic goals. It is in this sense that it has
become commonly used in the ideo-political debate on Islam and the
methods used to advance its objectives in the West.
It is in this sense I will refer to it here.
Of
course, it would be unfair to imply that subterfuge is a purely Muslim
stratagem. After all, it has been touted by non-Muslims for centuries.
For example, over 2500 years ago, the ancient Chinese military
strategist Sun Tzu wrote: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence,
when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces,
we must appear inactive.”
Indeed even the Bible
(Proverbs 24:6) prescribes that “By deception shall thy make war,”
which for a while was the motto of Israel’s external intelligence
service, Mossad.
However, in Islam, there seems
to be a far greater doctrinal sanction for a wider, unabashed and
overarching use of “active deceit” in contending with the infidel
“other”— not so much in the interests of self-preservation among them,
but of dominance over them.
Why ‘sheer stupidity’ is charitable
It
is against the backdrop of the foregoing discussion that Steyn’s
previously cited dilemma should be evaluated. For it provides the
context to judge whether the Obama administration’s penchant for making
America seem “harmless as an enemy and treacherous as a friend” is the
result of “design or incompetence”; and a criterion for understanding
why his assessment that “sheer bungling stupidity cannot be ruled out”
tends to the charitable.
For as readers will
recall from last week’s column, it is difficult to make sense of current
US foreign policy unless we accept that, as Dinesh D’Souza, director of
last year’s highest-grossing documentary, “2016: Obama’s America,”
suggests: “Obama has no interest in weakening our adversaries while he
does seem to have an interest in weakening our allies”. This is emerging
as an increasingly plausible interpretation of the
Obama-administration’s undisguised Islamo-philic propensities.
Of
course the White House has been at pains—albeit not always
spectacularly successful—to blur the nature of its true agenda. However,
this endeavor is becoming increasing difficult to maintain, as a clear
pattern emerges of intervention when this advances Islamist interests,
and non-intervention when it does not. This is particularly true in the
case of Israel, even more so in the wake of the P5+1 deal, which last
week prompted Caroline Glick to charge: “The goal of Obama’s foreign
policy is not to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power [but] to
weaken the State of Israel.”
Indeed, the deal
struck in Geneva is so implausible that is may actually prove to be a
point of inflexion for many hitherto Obama disciples and a moment of
revelation for them to grasp the ominous nature of his underlying
political credo.
Dershowitz & the case for deliberate deception
It already sparked some uncharacteristic rumblings in usually Obama-supportive quarters.
Arguably,
the most outspoken of these was Alan Dershowitz, who has authored
several works with titles that begin with the words The Case for….
Indeed, Dershowitz was so scathing in his censure of the deal with the
mullahs that one is tempted to wonder whether, in light of his vigorous
rebukes, he might not be mulling over the possibility of a new book
entitled: The Case for Deliberate Deception.
In
weekend interviews immediately following the announcement he made the
following acerbic assessment of its chances of success and the abilities
of those who “cooked it up”: “When you do a risk-benefit analysis, the
possibility that this will actually result in ending Iran’s nuclear
weapons program is probably in the range of 10%…But when you weigh that
against the 30 or 40% chance that they’re dead wrong–nuclear bomb wrong –
then it’s a very bad assessment of risk and benefits…This is first-year
negotiating theory, and this administration gets a D-minus with grade
inflation” Elsewhere, he warned that the agreement “could turn out to be
a cataclysmic error of gigantic proportions.” His concern was clearly
reflected in an article he penned, warning that “This is not a
liberal/conservative issue...
Indeed all
reasonable, thinking people should understand that ..it is a
prescription for disaster.” With evident exasperation, he asked: “Have
we learned nothing from North Korea and Neville Chamberlain?” So if the
Obama-administration’s policies appear immune to conventional reason and
impervious to historical lessons, what could possibly explain its
manner of conduct? Surely, then, the case for deliberate deception
should not be discounted? Surely, the lawyer in Dershowitz would agree?
Is revolt brewing in the court?
Perhaps
one of the most intriguing sources of criticism of the Iranian deal was
none other than Jeffrey Goldberg, rumored to be among the journalists
with the closest relations to the White House, at times even acting as a
mouthpiece to convey messages on its behalf to the public.
It is, therefore, hugely significant that he, of all people, would produce a stingingly skeptical review of the accord.
In
his very astute (seriously) “Six Reasons to Worry About the Iranian
Nuclear Deal”, posted Wednesday on Bloomberg, Goldberg gives a masterful
(seriously) critique of the agreement’s fatal weaknesses, which
virtually ensure its calamitous failure—unless of course for the authors
of the deal, failure is a not calamity, but an objective.
Here is a synopsis of Goldberg’s analysis and concerns:
1. The deal isn’t done…nothing was actually signed. The deal is not, as of this moment, even operational.
1. The deal isn’t done…nothing was actually signed. The deal is not, as of this moment, even operational.
2.
Momentum for sanctions is waning…many nations, many companies and the
Iranians themselves are seeing this agreement as the beginning of the
end of the sanctions regime.
3. The (still
unenforced) document agreed upon in Geneva promises Iran an eventual
exit from nuclear monitoring… This is not a comforting idea.
4.
The biggest concession to the Iranians might have already been made…
Essentially, Obama’s administration has already conceded, before the
main round of negotiations, that Iran is going to end up with the right
to enrich.
5. The Geneva agreement only makes
the most elliptical references to two indispensable components of any
nuclear- weapons program…Iran is free, in the coming sixmonth period…to
do whatever it pleases on missiles and warhead development.
6.
The Iranians are so close to reaching the nuclear threshold anyway—that
freezing in place much of the nuclear program seems increasingly
futile.
Was this really what well-meaning,
gullible American Jews had in mind, when persuaded by Obama’s pledge
that “I have Israel’s back,” they gave him their support— both at the
ballot and the bank?
Think ‘taqiyya’
The
Obama administration has been disingenuous in portraying virtually
every element of the deal with Iran – from its (non)compliance with half
a dozen UN resolutions, to its stipulations regarding the right to
enrich.
The accord will have far-reaching geo-political and geostrategic implications for the region—and well beyond.
Whether
these will result in a clustering of pliant client- states around a
nuclear-armed theo-tyrannical Islamist hegemon, or in a spiraling
pan-regional arms race, with Sunni Arabs and Turks scrambling to
develop—or purchase— their own non-conventional capabilities to match
that of the Shia Persians, the consequences will be bleak— especially
for Israel.
For whatever the outcome, it is
likely to find itself facing a greatly empowered Islamic menace with a
nuclear veto on any coercive action it may wish to undertake to ensure
its security from external threats (e.g. Hezbollah) or domestic
law-and-order (e.g quelling rebellion in the Galilee or Negev).
So much for “having Israel’s back.
So
for anyone struggling to make sense out of all this seemingly
inexplicable confusion, here’s some advice: Think taqiyya—and the pieces
will all fall into place.
Martin Sherman (www.martinsherman.net) is founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies.
(www.strategic-israel.org)
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