Doc's Talk: Kerry's Interim Agreement

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Kerry's Interim Agreement

Yisrael Ne'eman
US Sec. of State John Kerry is wholeheartedly brokering what he hopes will be a permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. This being unachievable we can expect he advance an extensive interim accord. There is no choice. The four major issues are security, borders, Jerusalem and refugees. When all is said and done, Israel's bottom line is "End of Conflict" – a commendable but unrealistic goal. However there is room and need for agreement on what is attainable at the moment.

The talks are being held without publicity but a few facts are known. Israeli concerns over security are the first big issue which if addressed, borders can be discussed. Economic development in the Palestinian Authority (or interim State) is of paramount importance. The Fatah/PA government compromised itself by just interacting with Israel over a two-state solution and therefore must compensate their population at least in part through material advancement. Both Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu and former Palestinian Authority PM Salam Fayyad who wrote up the draft for an independent Palestinian State in 2009 believe in an "economic peace" although the political conditions are seen in a very different light. Conflict resolution begins with what is agreed upon and tackles the tougher issues later. In essence we are speaking of Stage II in the Bush Road Map of ten years ago.

To ensure economic development there needs to be security. Everyone fears Hamas and Islamic terrorism in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) or worse, an overthrow of the ruling Fatah apparatus. Should there be a Palestinian civil war this would constitute a direct security threat to Israel, in particular by missile attack on her major cities and international airport. General Keith Dayton's US trained Palestinian police (with help from Israel if needed) are expected to be up to the job. The external security issue, Israel's presence in the Jordan Rift Valley, is just as vital to guarantee Israeli security along the natural geographic Jordan River border. Since 1967 Israel fears an overthrow of the pro-western Hashemite monarchy of Jordan just to the east by radical forces whether they be secular or Islamist. Leaks from the talks point to an Israeli-Palestinian compromise leading to a 15 year Israeli presence on the western side of the Jordan River within the framework of a multi-national force to include Palestinians. After 15 years there is to be a review, examining the future of the security arrangement. Israel consistently makes it clear that her security border is the Jordan River and not the 1949-67 armistice line between Tulkarm and Netanya some 15 kilometers (nine miles) from the Mediterranean Sea.

On the political-diplomatic level one can expect an American demand for recognition of the two-state solution by both sides. A declaration as such may be requested at the conclusion of the interim stage negotiations or drawn up and only implemented with the conclusion of a permanent status agreement. Both the Hamas/Islamists and the Israeli right wing/religious factions will find themselves with a fait accompli and in full opposition to any accord. Rumors have it that Kerry may ask for a deliberate statement recognizing Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People. The geographical contours of Palestine will be defined essentially as the West Bank and Gaza. The hope is to bring in full international diplomatic and financial support, particularly from Europe. So far they are offering billions of euros in funds provided there be a final accord. The EU needs to readjust its expectations to reality should they want to aid in the peace process. Developmental support in the wake of a wide ranging interim accord will be very helpful. The West will become the PA/Fatah patron in full putting Israel and the PA/Fatah Palestinians in the same category. One can expect billions of dollars and euros in investment for Palestinian development as compensation and incentives for state building alongside Israel.

Next are borders – a very tricky issue. To determine the exact boundaries is to arrive pretty much at a permanent status accord. As of May 2011 and Pres. Obama's declaration that Israel must withdraw to the 1967 lines with "land swaps" the border issue is more defined. Israel speaks of defensible borders and today demographics play a role when discussing Israeli settlement across the armistice lines. Most Israelis living in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) live within a few kilometers of the old lines and lands can be exchanged. For those living deep in Judea and Samaria they will be given to understand that they will not be residing in the State of Israel in the future, even if the interim borders are not finalized. Municipal funding may be cut to a minimum as happened at different times in the 1990s and 2000s when the government sought to send such a message. Certainly Israel will be asked to remove road blocks and security installations in agreed upon regions for Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinian police will take over security in these areas.

Jerusalem is a formidable stumbling block. A statement concerning the Jerusalem "region" serving as a capital for both Israel and the Palestinians may be on the table. Years ago the Palestinians were planning a parliament building in Abu Dis, a suburb to the east. Supposedly the structure was to be several meters outside the Jerusalem city limits. From the Israeli side it is unacceptable to speak of dividing the "united" capital of the State of Israel and the Jewish People. Today Palestinian Arabs make up close to 40% of Jerusalem's population when in 1967 they formed around 24%. Anyone keeping track of the demographics knows Jerusalem will have an Arab majority within a decade or so. Arab neighborhoods east and north of the city could be brought under Palestinian jurisdiction and Jewish neighborhoods would be retained by Israel in a municipal system of borough's encouraging local initiative in what would become a semi-divided city. Residents would live in Israel or Palestine yet share municipal services and development. Such a solution is being discussed for the past generation. This could be the beginning of partial agreement to move some of Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods over to Palestinian control. It is a long shot but could set a precedent for negotiations over Jerusalem. There would need to be reciprocal recognition by the Palestinians that Jewish neighborhoods across the 1967 lines are now part of Israel. The hardest nut to crack involves the Old City, Temple Mt. and holy basin spanning up to the Mt. of Olives. We can expect this to be left for the final accord. Many suggest internationalization, others to draw borders. Whatever happens there will need to be a free flow of people from one side of the city to the other.

Should all the above come true, this would be the most serious movement towards conflict resolution since Oslo II (1995) and prove the whole process is still alive. Even such a partial accord will attract much opposition, certainly from Hamas and Fatah rejectionists, but also from Netanyahu's coalition partners, the Jewish Home faction and the right wing of his own Likud party. Netanyahu might be able to bring in the Labor party to replace the Jewish Home faction and even outvote his own internal opposition but it will be a serious struggle. As for the Palestinians, Hamas and their allies will agitate for serious civil unrest and possibly an overthrow of the PA. Would the PA be able to halt civil conflict without turning it into a civil war? All will have to be nipped in the bud otherwise the Palestinians will join the instability raging in the Arab/Muslim world.

What cannot be achieved – a permanent status agreement.
First, foremost and by far of greatest significance is the fact that no one has ever prepared the Palestinian refugees and their descendents for no return to Israel proper. Israel might agree to a symbolic return of some actual refugees, those born before 1948, as a gesture of good will. Mahmoud Abbas and the PA/Fatah have never had any official policy besides demanding full refugee return. To do otherwise will have them declared "traitors" by Hamas and Fatah rejectionists and lead to an overthrow of the present PA leadership. It is doubtful whether any power could halt such an uprising. The issue is even more complicated as the Palestinian refugees are the only ones in the world where one passes down refugee status unto the furthest generations, serving as a great incentive not to seek any solution where Israel survives as a Jewish State.

On the Israeli side the Jewish Home party junior partners fully oppose a two-state solution and represent the settlement interest more than anyone. It is believed that 75-80 percent of Jews living in the West Bank can be brought into Israel through land swaps. This does not interest the solid religious and right wing factions embodied in the Likud and Jewish Home party. They believe in the Greater Land of Israel and no Palestinian State. For Netanyahu to take them on means the destruction of the coalition, his Likud party and quite possibly the end to his own political career. Israeli acceptance of a two-state solution at this stage would lead to serious civil disorder. For years the Israeli public has been notified that a two-state solution is under negotiation. The message continues to take time to sink in.

Netanyahu promised a referendum in lieu of a peace accord. But what of another interim agreement, even should it be wide ranging? On an interim accord he could hold his coalition together despite losing the right wing of the Jewish Home party. Should the entire faction leave he will need to bring in Labor. Labor and the left opposition will vote for the accord as will most of the Likud/Yisrael Beitainu senior partners. There may be a few abstentions. The centrist Yesh Atid will vote for the accord along with Tzippi Livni's Tnua party. Many in the moderate right will want to test Palestinian intentions and not take unnecessary gambles. They could go with a long term interim accord seen as bringing stability (and putting off a final agreement). With a two-state solution the declared objective the dangers of a bi-national state will recede.

If and when concluded both Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas will face enormous American and EU pressure to ratify the interim framework. It will not be easy but certainly possible.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk