INSS Insight No. 544
According
to a number of media reports published in late April 2014, Egypt is
soon to sign a large arms deal with Russia for the purchase of 24 MiG-35
fighter jets. If the arms deal is completed, it will represent a
significant event in the Middle East strategic picture, another sign of
reduced United States involvement in the region. For Russia, this would
be a meaningful strategic achievement in its global struggle against the
West. For Israel, one or two squadrons of aircraft such as the MiG-29
would not have much tactical significance. At the same time, the
strategic significance could be decisive if the conflict between Russia
and the West escalates and Russia gains an additional foothold in Egypt.
However, the deal has not yet been signed, and there are many obstacles
to its conclusion - technical, operational, economic, and most of all, political and strategic.
Topics:
According
to a number of media reports published in late April 2014, Egypt is
soon to sign a large arms deal with Russia for the purchase of 24 MiG-35
fighter jets. Reports of contacts between Egypt and Russia have
surfaced in recent months, particularly in November 2013 following the
visit to Cairo by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense
Minister Sergey Shoygu, and in February 2014, when then-Egyptian Defense
Minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi visited Moscow.
These earlier reports spoke of a much
larger arms deal that would include air and coastal defense systems,
Mi-35 attack helicopters, and fighter jets (actually the MiG-29). In
addition, it was reported that the deals would be financed by Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.
A Russian MiG-35 in a flight demonstration in Bangalore, February 2009, AFP/Getty Images
Egypt receives $1.3 billion a year in
US aid, and since 1979, the Egyptian military has purchased primarily
American equipment. At the same time, Cairo has in fact bought some
weaponry or other defense equipment from other countries, including
Russia (from which it purchased upgrades to its outdated air-defense
systems). Moreover, relations with the United States have cooled since
the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt. In August 2011, the United States
canceled its participation in the bi-annual Bright Star military
exercise because of the political situation in Egypt after President
Mubarak’s ouster. And while in 2012, it continued to transfer in full
the annual aid to Egypt, this situation changed after President Morsi
was deposed in early July 2013. Although the United States supplied
Egypt with four F-16s that month (from a deal signed in 2010 that
included forty aircraft), the administration later announced that it was
delaying shipment of four other F-16s. In October 2013, the US
government announced its decision to “recalibrate” defense aid to Egypt
and suspend part of it because of the US law prohibiting provision of
weapons to regimes that came to power through a military coup. Inter
alia, it was decided to stop delivery of the F-16, Apache helicopters,
air defense systems, and the Abrams tank; once again the US canceled its
participation in Bright Star. However, in April 2014, Washington gave
permission for the Apaches to be delivered to Egypt – which followed the
delivery of the first the first of four Ambassador fast missile craft
to the Egyptian navy in November 2013. as planned.
The difficulty in receiving weapons
from the United States could explain why Egypt approached Russia.
Furthermore, it clearly shows that the Egyptian leadership is
dissatisfied with US Middle East policy. At the same time, the reports
on the latest deal raise a number of questions.
First, on the technical side, beyond
the fact that the MiG-35 is a model that has not yet entered production,
the Russian technology culture is totally different from that of the
United States. The Egyptian military, and the air force in particular,
has undergone a complex, lengthy, and expensive transition since the
1980s from Soviet technology and a Soviet combat doctrine to American
technology and doctrine. While Egypt continues to use a number of
Russian-manufactured systems (in particular, air defense systems), the
purchase of modern Russian aircraft will require a new logistical system
that is separate from the system used for aircraft of American
manufacture. This involves not only procurement of the planes, but also
of new, unfamiliar weapon systems (including air-to-air missiles,
air-to-ground missiles, and the like), and each such weapon system
requires its own maintenance and training system. This is a long and
expensive process, and the logic of embarking on it is questionable.
Second, since the start of the events
of 2011, Egypt’s economy has declined, and it is doubtful whether Egypt
has the ability to enter into expensive weapons deals. While it has been
reported that the deals will be financed by Saudi Arabia or the UAE,
there is room for doubt. Both of these countries have serious grievances
against the United States and its policy in the region, and Saudi
provision of aid to Egypt when the United States is threatening to stop
its aid could well be perceived as defiance of the United States.
Nonetheless, this is a far cry from Saudi willingness to fund a deal
between Egypt and Russia, which is also a source of contention for
Riyadh (especially because of Russia’s support for the Bashar Assad
regime).
Third, although there is anger at the
United States (and at President Obama in particular) and a desire to
defy it, it is doubtful that Egypt would actually be prepared to cut off
ties and give up US defense aid and weapons purchases from the United
States. And finally, as of this time, reports of the arms deal (first
published in Israel) have not been confirmed by Russian or Egyptian
sources, nor have the prominent media outlets in Europe and the United
States covered the story.
The Russian Dimension
Although the arms deal under
discussion has much economic value in its own right, the clear Russian
interest is in the political-strategic realm. This deal is a component
of Russia’s overall effort to rehabilitate its status in the Middle
East, which was greatly undermined during the Arab Spring -
in Russia’s view, with active Western assistance, as part of the
ongoing global conflict. Thus, Russia has increased efforts in the past
year at rapprochement with Middle East countries, both those with which
it had cooperative relations in the past and others as well. In the
meantime, it is clear that Moscow has returned to “arms supply
diplomacy.” There have been negotiations with Iraq for some time on
comprehensive defense procurement; in talks with Lebanon and Jordan,
Russia has even discussed the possibility of supplying Jordan with a
nuclear reactor; a large arms deal was discussed between Russia and
Saudi Arabia, despite basic disagreements between the two countries; and
there has been talk of Saudi funding of possible purchases from Russia
by other countries in the region.
Russia’s
conduct in the Middle East has recently displayed certain changes
because of the Ukrainian crisis, which is at the center of the
international agenda and the main arena for the superpower conflict. At
the same time, Russia has designated the Middle East as another front in
its global struggle against the West, partly to balance pressures on it
in Eastern Europe. In this context, increased Russian activity in Syria
and possibly also in Iran is especially notable. In addition, Russia is
expanding its operations elsewhere in the region and thus demonstrating
its challenge of the West. Russia thus has a definite interest in the
arms deal with Egypt, as it could significantly upgrade its
international standing and serve as a worthy example for the other
countries in the region for expanding cooperation.
Conclusion
If the arms deal between Egypt and
Russia is completed, it will represent a significant event in the Middle
East strategic picture, another sign of reduced United States
involvement in the region. For Russia, this would be a meaningful
strategic achievement in its global struggle against the West. For
Israel, one or two squadrons of aircraft such as the MiG-29 would not
have much tactical significance. At the same time, the strategic
significance could be decisive if the conflict between Russia and the
West escalates and Russia gains an additional foothold in Egypt.
However, the deal has not yet been signed, and there are many obstacles to its conclusion -
technical, operational, economic, and most of all, political and
strategic. The United States still has numerous tools to put pressure on
Egypt and prevent the deal from taking place. Therefore, reports should
be seen more as an alarm for decision makers in Washington than as the
herald of a substantive strategic change.
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