What’s
been happening in Egypt this week is as important as the revolution
that overthrew the old regime almost two years ago. A new dictator has
arrived and while the Muslim Brotherhood’s overturning of democracy was
totally predictable, Western policymakers walked right into the trap.
They even helped build it.
President
Mursi has now declared his ability to rule by decree. The key concept
is that he can do everything to protect the revolution. In doing so, he
is defining the revolution—as the Iranian
revolution of 1978-1979 which was made by a broad coalition of forces
soon after became defined—as an Islamist revolution.
One
could call the Islamist strategy a short march through the
institutions. Once Islamists take power—in Iran, the Gaza Strip, and
Turkey, perhaps, too Syria—that is only the beginning of the story. They
systematically do a fundamental transformation of them.
The
media, or at least a large part of it, is tamed. The draft constitution
written by the Brotherhood and Salafists allows the government to shut
down any newspaper or television station by decree. The courts are made
impotent and judges are replaced. Mursi’s decree said he could ignore
any court decision. A few days before Mursi issued his decree, the
leading secular-oriented representatives in the constitution-writing
constituent assembly resigned, charging the new document would enshrine
Sharia law. The problem was not the statement about Sharia being the
main source of Egyptian legislation but rather later provisions making
it clear that Islamist-controlled institutions would interpret precisely
what that meant.
Scattered
secularist forces, Coptic Christians, liberals or the remnants of the
old regime, and modern-minded women do not pose a real threat to the
regime. They are not violent, not organized, and not flush with cash.
They can expect no material international support. There will be no
civil war between the moderates and the Islamists the suppression of one
by the other. The Salafists are itching for confrontation; the Muslim
Brotherhood is patient. But when Salafists harass women or stab
secularists or attack churches, the Brotherhood-controlled government
will do nothing to protect the victims.
Of
critical importance for Egypt is control over the religious
infrastructure: the ministry of Waqf that supervises huge amounts of
money in Islamic foundations; the office of qadi, the chief Islamist
jurist; al-Azhar University, the most important institution defining
Islam in the Muslim world; which clerics get to go on television or have
their own shoes; and down to appointments of preachers in every public
mosque in the country.
Many
clerics are not moderate but most are not systematic Islamists. Soon
they will be or at least talk as if they were. Revolutionary Islamism
will become in Egypt merely normative Islam. Thus is the endless debate
in the West about the nature of Islam—religion of peace or religion of
terrorism?--short-circuited and made even more irrelevant. The real
power is not what the texts say but who interprets them. And the
Islamists will do the interpreting.
While
the judges are still holding out bravely only the army has real power
to counter the Islamist revolution transforming the most important
country in the
Arabic-speaking world into the instrument of the leading international
anti-Western, anti-American, and antisemitic organization. It doesn't
matter how nicely Mursi spoke to Obama any more than say how Lenin--who
moderated Soviet policy in the 1920s to consolidate the regime and get
Western help--did in his day.
What
is going on inside Egypt’s army, the last remaining institution that
could offer resistance? We don’t really know but there are certainly
some important indications. In theory, the army is the only force that
can challenge the Muslim Brotherhood’s drive to transform Egypt into an
Islamist state. But why
should we believe the officers want to engage in such a battle?
Under
the leadership of a secret society called the Free Officers, Egypt’s
army overturned the monarchy in 1952 in a virtually bloodless coup. Yet
while Egypt was for decades thereafter ruled by the resulting regime,
the military government soon became a military-backed government.
Officers either moved over to civilian offices or if they opposed the
regime were purged.
Aside
from doing its professional duties, the new generation of officers
turned to money-making. The Egyptian army became a vast economic
enterprise, with its own farms, factories, and housing estates. It was
not a political interest group, and certainly not an ideological
organization, but an economic enterprise.
During
the more recent revolution, the army’s main concern was its own
corporate interests—especially control over the military budget, the
choice of its leaders,
and those business activities. Over and over again the Western mass
media and governments spoke as if they were dealing with a South
American army that wanted to rule the country. It was portrayed as
repressive and potentially tyrannical. By definition, all
civilians—especially the Muslim Brotherhood—were good guys against the
supposed military would-be dictators.
This
was far from the truth. The military was eager to get out of power as
long as its narrow interests were preserved. One of its biggest fears
was becoming unpopular. That’s why it didn’t crack down in 2011 on
behalf of the Mubarak regime and didn’t
do so very much when it was in the transitional military council. To
put it bluntly, the army wasn’t the bad guys but, relatively speaking,
among the good guys.
Now,
however, that moment is past. Partly under international pressure, it
gave power to an elected president without securing a single one of its
demands. So much for the tyrannical generals. Scores of top officers
resigned and they are now being replaced by the choices of one man, the
president.
Who
is Mursi going to appoint to head the new Egyptian army? Given the lack
of Islamist sympathizers at the top—there is much debate over how many
there are among more junior officers—he needs to put in place
opportunists. These would be men who in exchange for their rank and
privileges will do his bidding. That is what’s happening now; the
Islamist high command should come later.
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Lacking
any ideological orientation against revolutionary Islamism; without
charismatic leadership, not at all united, and in a sense fat and
greedy, without any foreign encouragement, and not wanting to shoot down
its own people and set off a civil war, the Egyptian army is not a
bulwark against the country becoming an Islamist dictatorship. If the
Islamists could overcome a far more coherent and ideologically
anti-Islamist military in Turkey so easily, there’s no reason to think a
similar process won’t happen in Egypt, too.
What
are the red lines for
the army? First and foremost, that nobody touch their economic empire
and cuts their budget. Mursi isn’t stupid enough to get into trouble on
that issue.
Second,
those who attack the military with guns must be dealt with harshly.
Mursi is willing to crack down on those extremely radical Salafist
groups—notably in the Sinai—who shoot Egyptian soldiers rather than just
restricting themselves to attacks on Israel.
Third,
the preservation of U.S. military aid. No worries though, there, it
would take a lot for the Obama Administration to cut off this
assistance. The regime can go far toward suppressing women and
Christians, making clear it is helping the forces seeking to wipe Israel
off the map, subvert other Arabic-speaking countries, and setting up a
dictatorship without having to worry about losing the aid.
Finally,
will the Egyptian military constantly refuse to take steps that might
entangle it in a
war with Israel? Here is the most likely hope of restraint though Mursi
isn’t eager for such a direct conflict either. The danger, however, is
not so much an executive decision to go to war but a slow slide into
conflict. Along the way, Egypt can be permissive toward those staging
cross-border attacks on Israel; allow Egyptian volunteers in large
numbers to go to the Gaza Strip to fight; and allow lots of weapons in
the Gaza Strip. Small-scale border clashes or a future Israel-Hamas war
could move things in that direction.
For
the time being, however, as indicated by the ceasefire, Egypt’s new
regime doesn’t want a
conflict either. After all consolidating its power within the country
and creating a new order that will last for decades is a big task. All
the institutions must be transformed, a constitution finalized and
adopted, billions of dollars of foreign aid begged, oppositions tamed.
As an indication, the radical nationalist regime in the 1950s spent
three years at that task before turning toward an attempt to dominate
the region.
Patience
and a practical sense of how to proceed to accomplish radical
objectives should not be mistaken for moderation. The Middle East will
still be there to Islamize, Israel to destroy, and American
influence to eliminate when Mursi is ready.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636933%22
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