Doc's Talk: The Iron Rule to understand and manage the Gaza problem

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

The Iron Rule to understand and manage the Gaza problem

There is an iron rule, every decision maker here should always remember and repeat:

MIlitary attack on Israel or on the IDF results from internal Arab causes. MIlitary attack on Israel or on the IDF results from internal Arab causes. In other words, gunfire or any belligerent activity on Israel or on our IDF evolves from the depth of inter-Arab disputes , sometimes hidden or
overt.

Israel has always served as a tool, a function, so that any Arab factor would reach its aims. This happened when Ahmad Jibril launched Katyushas on the North in 1981, in order to gain standing within the PLO, when Hezbollah fought the IDF for 18 years, to secure social mobility for the Shiites in Lebanon; and even when the second intifada broke out in 2000, when Marwan Barghouti and people of his generation actually wanted to control Palestinian politics ; and now, when rockets are fired from the direction Gaza strip controlled by Hamas.

Is the Hamas organization behind these launchings? This is in great doubt. Sederot and Israel are most of the time hit by organizations opposing Hamas: Fatah satellites, local gangs and hamullas end the Islamic Jihad, which is on chilly terms with Hamas. It is easy to fabricate the rockets, and easy to launch them, even if Hamas is not satisfied with this. To the best of my knowledge Hamas has avoided launching rockets since it took control of Gaza, except for some cases of mortar fire on the border
crossings. These attempts to manage the launching (Hamas has a problem stopping the rockets, for it is after all the anti-Israel Hamas) were not successful, and it testifies to the fact that despite the iron hand Hamas
imposed on the Gaza Strip, it has not fully succeeded in establishing its wish. Launching rockets on Israel has become almost the only way of protest against Hamas; of expressing an inter-Palestinian opinion ; holding an inter-Palestinian dialogue, which is, of course, always at our expense. What is achieved with these launchings? Money, blackmail, inter-organizational
vengeance, pressure within the framework of some negotiations, and more. But by means of rocket launchings you can first of all strive for the big prize.

If Israel undertakes extensive military action in the Gaza strip, liquidates Hamas or weakens it very much, causing it casualties, the aforementioned organizations will reap the fruit. If Israel takes the chestnuts out of the fire for them, they will benefit by it. It is Israel, which in most cases has acted as a blindfolded horse for this or another Arab side. Thus we remained in Lebanon for no less than 18 years; we sacrificed about 1,000 of our boys, for the Shiite wish to advance in Lebanese politics! Thus we acted exactly the way any Arab side expected us to act. A pity.

The instant we understood the functional use the Arab side makes of us, we joined the Middle Eastern club.

It is the precisely the Olmert Government that acted correctly a year ago, when it attacked Hezbollah, in contrast to the latter's evaluation that we would hold back. We greatly surprised the Shiite organization, but we did not run the war correctly and with the right amount of power. A pity. The beginning was right and good.

Hamas's takeover of all of the Palestine Authority in the elections of January 2006 (that is to say that that was the wish of most Palestinians), and Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza strip, all these are as good as a great achievement of Israel on the historical level. Why?

1. Hamas actually annulled the "Palestinian problem". It is already deep into the pan-Islamic problem, it linked the Palestinians to terrorism and no longer to national liberation in the general awareness, thereby turning the Palestinians back fifty years. Hamas reversed the Palestinians from David back into Goliat. From the attacked to attackers. From victims to aggressors. It is not Israel's task to again bale out the
Palestinian problem, for the Palestinians.

2. Palestinians are up to their necks in an internal confrontation, and they do not have time on their hands to fight with Israel.

3. The topic of safe transfer has been dropped and is no longer relevant to the current reality.

4. A Palestinian state is more and more perceived as a regional danger in the Arab world and world-wide. There are quiet voices in Jordan or Egypt who would prefer a permanent Israeli government on the West Bank to a Palestinian state which today would be controlled by Fatah and tomorrow by Hamas or Al-Qaeda.

5. At the same time Israel is currently perceived in the world as an island of stability, necessary for the stabilization of the Middle East. Thanks to Hamas Israel is more perceived as a solution rather than a problem. Israel's geopolitical standing has improved very much. What is this similar to? Someone who understands the blessing of good health only after he has become ill. Up to the victory of Hamas Israel was taken matter
of fact. After the terrorist takeover, the world understands how good it is that there is an Israel.

6. The victory of Hamas and the Palestinian civil war is a lesson for anyone planning a new intifada against Israel. The end of all Palestinian intifadas was a night of long knives within the Palestinian camp, self-destruction, and a national disaster. This is a historical lesson which can serve as an antibody for intifadas.

And yet, Sederot and the Gaza by-pass are bleeding. What can be done?
Until the Hamas takeover of Gaza, I sided with an large Israeli military operation + a coordinated entry of an international force into Gaza, to fill the vacuum. But this situation is less to the point at present. So what is?

1. We must finally detach ourselves from Gaza. The writer of these lines implored doing this two years ago, at the time of the detachment [disengagement], then it would have been perceived as a natural separation from Gaza, and not as a punishment, and would have achieved legitimacy. And still, nobody in the world will expect Israel to supply electrical power to Gaza, so they can there prepare the rockets used against it. The world understands that today, except the government of Israel. And just like we wrote here: It appears that it is easy to extract Israel from Gaza, but not Gaza from Israel. Note how our media are addicted to Gazan affairs: There is power,
there is no power, and so it goes all day long. This is part of the Israeli interference, the masochistic occupation with Palestinian affairs, despite the fact that it is no longer connected to us! This is interference by the sheer fact that our media loves our oversights ("Where did we go wrong?") and self-criticism, and even if reference is to pointless criticism. If there won't be Palestinians the media will invent them.

2. Transfer the burden to Egypt. Egypt has a common border with the Gaza strip, just like Israel. For decades the Egyptians demanded us to leave "the occupied lands", and so we did. Now the burden should be transferred to the Arabian brothers of the Palestinians, and this should be
the position of Israel in any forum. Egypt will have no choice, it will be drawn in to the strip. It is forbidden to give in here.

3. Pointwise daily security activity, exactly the way it is done today, against any terrorist objective. The border areas in Gaza are at present interdicted to traffic, and anyone penetrating them is putting his life in danger. This why the Palestinians use children as help in the launching activity. They try to break the Israeli method by exploiting world-wide public opinion. This atrocious method, which Khomeini used at the time against Iraq, should be exposed . Military activity should be
permanent, bothersome, going on day and night , and it should leave its marks within several weeks to some months, the way it did in the West Bank. It should be recalled: A large Israeli military action in Gaza at present is,
paradoxically, some sort of reconnection, at a time we are called upon to continue separating from Gaza, and from all what it stands for.

Thus Israel will surprise its enemies, first of all by that it won't act as expected, it will not intervene in the Palestinian civil war, which is their internal affair, and will maximize its security capabilities within the characteristic Middle Eastern trap, which as always is impossible, cruel, but also challenging. By smart management , Israel is signaling that it has already learned to familiarize itself with the Middle East and its illusions.

Zvi Sar'el, Ph.D.
972-4-6291754
zvis@macam.ac.il
zvi1927@013.net

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk