Doc's Talk: The Illusion of "Peace in Exchange for Territories"

Thursday, April 03, 2008

The Illusion of "Peace in Exchange for Territories"

Mordechai Kedar

For years, especially since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Arab leaders have repeated the mantra that peace with Israel hinges upon a withdrawal to the pre-1967 border. Similar rhetoric followed with the Arab Summit's March 2002 decision to endorse the "Saudi peace initiative," suggesting that the Arab world's problem with Israel stems from "occupation" of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. This paper demonstrates the error of this assertion. The Arab demand for a return of all Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel remains at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this demand disguises Arab intentions to destroy Israel. The Palestinian Authority

During the rule of Fatah and since the rise of Hamas, the Palestinian Authority's (PA) official position states it will not renounce the "right of return" to greater Israel. It still remains unclear whether the Palestinians will be satisfied with a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line. Palestinian insistence on the refugees' right of return, ending the Jewish majority in the State of Israel, indicates hostile intent.

The preservation of the refugee ethos through the media and the education system is intended to prevent concession on the right of return. All Palestinian symbols and illustrations depict Palestine as the land from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. These illustrations do not show the Palestinian state as Gaza and the West Bank.

Apart from Sari Nusseibeh, whose popularity among the Palestinian public ranks lower than that of the ultra-dovish Uri Avnery within Israel, no Palestinian politician or leader has unequivocally supported relinquishing the right of return. Arafat avoided signing such a statement at Camp David in July 2000.

Syria

The Syrian regime's official message states that the Golan Heights belong to Syria and Israel must withdraw to the 1967 borders regardless of a peace agreement. The most Israel can expect to receive in return for this withdrawal is quiet from Lebanon. According to all Syrian statements, peace hinges on Israel granting "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people", based on "returning the rights of all those who are entitled". These statements, repeated in Syrian rhetoric, have a single meaning in the political lexicon: the return of the 1948 refugees (including their grandchildren and great-grandchildren born in Syria) to their original homes in Israel.

Today, there are roughly 350,000 people with refugee status in Syria. The majority of these refugees were born in the country and are descendants of the original Palestinians who left in 1948. Additional proof of Syrian demand that these refugees return to Israel was exemplified during the Madrid Conference. Hafez al-Assad halted the activities of the Multilateral Committee for Refugees when he realized the discrepancy between Israel and Syria's view of the committee. Israel understood the committee's role as finding a solution to the refugee problem in Arab states, whereas Syria believed the refugees would be repatriated into Israel.

Bashar al-Assad continued his father's rhetoric, stressing the importance of the Palestinian right of return in a speech as recent as August 2006. In Syria's view, those who did not insist on Israel's duty to accept the refugees – such as President Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan – were traitors.

Lebanon

Since 1948, each successive Lebanese government has advocated the return of all Palestinian refugees residing in the country and has denied them Lebanese citizenship. According to UNWRA, this number now exceeds 300,000. Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah supported this position in a recent speech during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war when he accused Israel of trying to force Lebanon to grant the refugees citizenship. Nasrallah and Lebanese politicians echo the words of their Arab brethren; peace with Israel is conditional on the right of return of all 1948 Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

Political factions in Lebanon oppose the resettlement of the 1948 refugees. In order to prevent their relocation, Lebanese law prohibits the refugees from working in 73 occupations and forbids them from purchasing real estate, opening businesses and receiving organized medical care. It is important to note that the Maronite Christians, Israel's "natural allies" in Lebanon, are the strongest opponents of granting the Palestinians citizenship, because the Maronites face similar demographic problems.

Additionally, Lebanon's political system is not autonomous and its Israeli foreign policy must agree with the Syrian regime. It is unclear whether Lebanon will free itself from Syrian dictation in the future. Therefore, the matter of refugees in Syria and Lebanon – numbering approximately 700,000 individuals – should be viewed as a single issue.

Jordan

Jordan signed a peace agreement without reacquiring the land it lost to Israel in 1967. King Hussein severed the connection between the West Bank and Jordan in 1988, ostensibly to make room for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), who was then leading the first Intifada. In return, he received "special standing" or status as "protector" of the Islamic holy sites on the Temple Mount; a Jordanian attempt to gain Islamic legitimacy for the Hashemite royal family.

Palestinian citizens of Jordan oppose the peace agreement signed by Hussein because it lacks the right of return clause. Yearly demonstrations held in the refugee camps exhibit the Palestinian hope that they will soon return to their houses in historic Palestine. This belief negatively impacts Israeli-Jordanian relations.

Egypt

Complete evacuation of Sinai brought formal peace with the Egyptian government, but did not eliminate Egyptian hatred of Israel. Over the years more than fifty agreements have been signed between the two countries in a large number of fields – tourism, agriculture, education, economy, industry and cultural exchange – but only a few were implemented due to Egyptian refusal. Many Egyptians view Israel as a Jewish, modern, liberal democracy; a foreign concept to the Islamic, traditional, tribal reality of the Middle East. Egypt is usually the most vociferous opponent of Israel and numerous Egyptian initiatives aim to undermine Israel's international status. In spite of the fact that Israel is a peace-seeking nation, Egypt constantly tries to depict Israel as a danger to the region by drawing attention to Israel's alleged nuclear program.

Egypt invests effort into convincing other Arab states against having relations with Israel, and its overall attitude toward Israel was and still is reflected by Egyptian apathy vis-?-vis the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives and terrorists to the Gaza strip from Egyptian soil. The Egyptian media – free as well as state controlled – is flooded with anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish propaganda, reminiscent of propaganda by the Nazi regime. One of the most popular songs in Egypt is sung by the popular Sha'ban 'Abd al-Rahim, entitled, "I hate Israel".

Egyptian hatred towards Israel continues, despite the fact that Egypt has no territorial dispute with Israel, and cannot be attributed to occupation. Negative attitudes are perpetuated by the Islamic belief that Jews do not have a right to an independent state, especially on any part of Palestinian land. In addition, the prosperity and success of the Jewish state, in comparison to Egypt, adds fuel to Egyptian jealousy.

Conclusions

According to this view of the Middle East, most Arabs – regimes as well as societies – prefer that the 1948 refugees remain in camps in order to justify hatred of Israel. They ignore the fact that Palestinian suffering is a direct function of the Arab countries' denial of Palestinian human rights.

Relations between Israel and its Palestinian and Arab neighbors are not dominated by the issue of disputed territory, but by the issue of the alleged right of return. According to Arab ethos, the 68-year-old plight of these refugees is to return to Israel proper, despite the fact that many are not even of Palestinian origin. Western negotiators and Israelis tend to brush the refugee problem under the table. To them, the refugees are faceless, landless and nameless, but for Arab societies surrounding Israel, the refugee issue is acute and personal.

Those who claim that the refugees "understand" that they will no longer be able to return to Israel cannot explain the continued existence of the refugee camps, and the refugees' prolonged residence there, under disgraceful conditions and harsh neglect. Israeli spokespeople who believe that the return of territory will bring peace must analyze and understand what is being said in the Arab media and on the Arab streets.

According to Arab public discourse, undermining the legal and moral validity of the Palestinian right of return is breaking precedent and betraying the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. In Arab politics, maintaining the hope of return enforces its validity. Closure of the refugee camps is perceived as an action against the Palestinian people and their rights. Few Arabs are prepared to accept the Israeli position regarding refugees and there is little variance of opinion between "secular" nationalist factions and religious Islamic groups. The handful of intellectuals who recognize the Israeli position usually reside in Western countries, and their influence in the Arab world is negligible.

If a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan and Judea and Samaria (including Jerusalem) were to occur, Israelis would be bitterly disappointed to discover that the main problem between Israel and its neighbors – the problem of the State of Israel's very existence – has not been solved, and will continue to constitute the focus of the conflict. If Israel insists on preserving the Jewish character of the state, peace might be unattainable. Instead of looking inward and postulating a benign Middle East, it behooves Israel to understand its neighbors, especially the Palestinian refugees, and the states and societies hosting them.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar is a lecturer in the Department of Arabic at Bar-Ilan University, and a research associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, specializing in Arab political discourse, Arab mass media, Islamic groups and the Syrian domestic arena. He served for twenty-five years in IDF Military Intelligence.

Thanks BESA

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk