Doc's Talk: Freedom Flotilla 2

Friday, July 01, 2011

Freedom Flotilla 2

The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center

Overview

1. On June 27 the organizers of the flotilla held a press conference in Athens where they announced that the flotilla would sail for the Gaza Strip in the near future. They said 327 passengers were expected to sail, 37 of whom were media personnel,2 on ten ships, two of them cargo vessels. They added the ships would carry about 3,000 tons of supplies, including medicine and concrete. According to the announcement, the ships will sail from various Mediterranean ports, unite in international waters and sail to the Gaza Strip. In an attempt to deflect the accusations brought against them, the organizers claimed that the flotilla was bringing a message of peace and was not a "terrorist flotilla." For reasons of security the flotilla organizers are vague regarding the date of departure, ports of sailing, photographs of the ship and their locations of anchorage. 2. At the press conference and afterwards the organizers said that they were experiencing delays caused by technical difficulties and Israeli attempts to obstruct the departure. Among other things, they accused Israel of sabotaging the Greek and Irish ships. However, they said they were confident they would overcome the difficulties and set sail. The flotilla is supposed to be accompanied by supporting events in the United States, various European countries and (according to postings in Facebook) possibly near Israel's borders with Arab states.

3. The various networks and spokesmen connected with the flotilla made the following statements:

1) On June 30 the organizers of the Irish Ship to Gaza claimed that Israel had sabotaged the M/V Saoirse and caused extensive damage. According to the media, the ship was anchored in Turkey (Ynet, June 30, 2011). Before that, the organizers of the Greek-Swedish ship (Greek Ship to Gaza) reported that on June 27 the propeller of the Juliano had been sabotaged. However, they said the damage could be repaired within a number of days (Websites of the Greek network and Haaretz, June 27, 2011). On the other hand, the organizers of the American ship (US Boat to Gaza) announced that preparations had been completed aboard the American ship and it was ready to sail.

2) Mazen Kakhil, ECESG spokesman, reported that all the necessary preparations had been completed and that the ships would reach the Gaza coast next week if nothing unexpected happened. He said that the flotilla would have more than 350 passengers from more than 20 countries (Al-Aqsa TV, June 29, 2011). In a different interview he said that the organizers had contacted the UN and the European Parliament, informing them they were responsible for the safety of the flotilla passengers (Radio Al-Quds, June 28, 2011).

3) According to the "Canada to Gaza" Twitter page on June 28, the Greek dockworkers' union would take care of the cargo ships as an act of solidarity. Previously, an Israeli correspondent participating in the flotilla reported that the Greek general strike might influence the departure of the American ship.

4. The flotilla organizers are currently in Athens, where the senior activists of the Free Gaza Movement (the umbrella network which plays a central role in organizing the flotilla) have set up a kind of command center ("Contact Athens"). It is staffed by the senior FGM activists Huwaida Arraf, Adam Shapiro, Greta Berlins and Ewa Jasiewicz (FGM website). The FGM also established a media center in London called the FGM Media Office ("Contact London"). Senior ECESG activists Rami Abdo and Dr. Arafat Madi Shukri are also in Athens.

Huwaida Arraf from the FGM
Left, Huwaida Arraf from the FGM, one of the most prominent figures among
the flotilla organizers, at a press conference in Athens, June 27.
The tattoo on her right arm reads "Palestine" (Picture from the ustogaza website).

5. The United States continues to express reservations regarding the flotilla. At a press briefing, a spokesman for the state department expressed concern over the participation of American citizens in the flotilla, which was liable to be "provocative" and "dangerous" (words she later repeated): "We are concerned about any of our citizens involved in a situation that could be provocative, that could be dangerous…"She said that "…if people around the world want to help the people of Gaza, we believe that the mechanisms established by both Egypt and Israel are sufficient to achieve that objective…" (ITIC emphasis). She added that Israel had the right to defend itself from weapons smuggling, but that the United States called on all parties to show restraint (United States state department website, June 27, 2011).

6. The flotilla organizers are currently in Greece, although it is unclear which of them will sail. Among them are Huwaida Arraf and Adam Shapiro, heads of the Free Gaza Movement, one of the umbrella networks organizing the flotilla. Senior ECESG figures Rami Saleh and Dr. Arafat Madi Shukri are also there.

7. The Western media expressed reservations regarding the presence of extremists among the delegations. For example, on June 28, 2011, a Dutch English-language radio station (RNW) expressed disgust with the flotilla and its participants. It "influenced two Dutch correspondents who had been planning to sail with the flotilla to cancel the participation." (A continuation of previous cancellations by media personnel.) On June 29, 2011, one of the women who had planned to join posted the reasons for her cancellation on the leftist Dutch website Joop. One of them was the involvement of senior ECESG figure Amin Abu Rashad, who claimed he had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The woman added that Abu Rashad had been present at a training session in non-violent tactics held for the Dutch group in Corfu, but had kept a low profile. Allan Sørensen, a correspondent for the Danish newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad, wrote a column on June 29, 2011 entitled "Pacifists and Black Sheep," about activists who had participated in violent demonstrations and events ("whose names can easily be Goggled"). He wrote that most of the participants belonged to the first group, but that there was a hard core of "black sheep," and it included, among others, activists with ties to Hamas.

8. In response to the media reports about the possible reception of the flotilla in the port of El Arish, "informed sources" in the northern Sinai Peninsula said that they did not know of any agreement for receiving the ships in El Arish should Israel prevent them from reaching the Gaza Strip. The sources said that there was no objection to their landing in El Arish, but they had to go through the proper channels in line with Egyptian procedure and receive authorization from the authorities. Chairman of the board of directors of the Red Crescent in El Arish added that the organization was willing to accept the humanitarian assistance carried by the ships and transfer it to the Gaza Strip (Masrawi, June 28, 2011).

The Significance of the Current Situation

9. The significance of the current situation is the following:

1) Despite the technical and logistic problems, and the bureaucratic and political difficulties, so far the flotilla organizers are apparently still determined to dispatch the ships in the upcoming days. They have repeated their intention to dispatch ten ships, but it is obvious that the number of ships (and participants) will eventually be smaller.

2) Before the ships' departure the organizers were forced to deal with a number of issues, the most pressing of which are: the withdrawal of the Turkish Mavi Marmara and cargo vessel, and to a great extent the retraction of Turkish patronage; bureaucratic difficulties in receiving permits from the Greek authorities to depart from Greek ports; Greece's precarious internal situation, expressed by the demonstrations and strikes against the government over the country's economic situation; political difficulties expressed by international reservations over the flotilla which undermine its logic and benefits (the UN, the United States, the European Union and various Western countries); technical difficulties aboard the Greek and Irish boats, responsibility for which the organizers accuse Israel.

3) The aforementioned difficulties may cause the flotilla to be smaller than originally planned, accentuating the discrepancy between their declarations and the situation on the ground. Its organizers aspired to dispatch 15 ships, later declaring there would be ten, two of them large passenger ships, with the participation of 1,500 activists from 100 countries. Originally planned, it was supposed to overshadow the Mavi Marmara flotilla, bring the campaign to new heights, and make it difficult for Israel to respond to the challenge. In reality, the number of ships will probably be far smaller than planned, there will be no large passenger ships similar to the Mavi Marmara (which became the symbol of the previous flotilla), and the number of participants is expected to be reduced to a few hundred (for expectations compared to the actual situation, see Appendix II).

4) In addition, in the fight for legitimacy, the flotilla planners are losing ground due to the reservations voiced by the international community and the denial of the necessity for a flotilla. Moreover, in the media arena the planners have been forced to take a defensive stance in view of Israeli accusations of the flotilla's potential for violence and the intention of activists to employ extreme violence. In response to the Israeli accusations, spokesmen have stressed that the flotilla is bringing a message of peace, its activists are peace activists, and it is not a "terrorist flotilla." However, despite the media spin, there is evidence of a hard core of activists ("the black sheep") who intend to violence against the IDF (in the previous flotilla as well, there was a distinct discrepancy between the public statements regarding the nonviolent nature of the flotilla and the extreme violence employed during it.) In addition, in view of both the many difficulties and the gap between the expectations of the planners and the final diluted form of the flotilla, some of the activists aboard the ships are liable to employ provocations to embarrass Israel and return the flotilla to the awareness of the international community.

5) The organizers grant great importance to the flotilla's media campaign, and there are a large number of media representatives (more than 10% of the total number of passengers, according to the organizers' expectations). During the briefings the activists received they were instructed to transmit information from the boats to the outside world until the last minute (some of the correspondents have made provisions for satellite communications). They were also instructed to hide their electronic media devices if detained for documentation and for use after release, in our assessment for propaganda and legal purposes.

Arab-Muslim and Israeli Arab Participation

10. So far the participation of an Arab ship or Arab-Muslim groups is not clear:

1) The list of boats issued by the organizers did not include an Arab ship. Moreover, ECESG spokesman Rami Abdo said that so far no Arab-Islamic ship would participate (Al-Aqsa TV, June 27, 2011).

2) On the other hand, Wa'el al-Saqa, chairman of the Jordanian LifeLine Committee, said that an agreement had been signed in Greece for the purchase of a boat which would carry 70 Arabs from five Arab countries, half of them from Jordan (Amonnews.net website, June 9, 2011). Several media, principally Arab, reported Arab participation in the flotilla. According to one source, there will be Tunisian representatives aboard the French ship (Moheet.com website, June 1, 2011).

11. Israeli-Arab participation: In an article published on June 10 in the organ of the northern faction of the Islamic Move (Sawt al-Haq wal-Hurriyeh), Ra'ed Saleh said that the monitoring committee of Israeli Arabs received an invitation to participate in the Israeli-Arab delegation. Muhammad Zaydan, chairman of the committee, told Al-Jazeera TV on June 15, 2011, that ten Israeli Arabs, heads of the committee, would participate (Aljazeera.net website). In addition, on June 10, 2011, Israeli Knesset member Hanin Zouabi, who also participated in the previous flotilla, said that she was determined to participate in this one as well (Moheet.com website). At this point it is not clear how many Arab representatives will participate and on which ships they will sail.

12. Appendices

1) Appendix I: The ships participating in the flotilla

2) Appendix II: Flotilla planning and declarations vs. flotilla reality

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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