Doc's Talk: The "right of return", which is euphemism for destroying Israel, is taught as an academic course at Al Quds University

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

The "right of return", which is euphemism for destroying Israel, is taught as an academic course at Al Quds University

Israel Behind the News

Intent on introducing Palestine's future legal cadre to a rights-based approach to the Palestinian refugee question, Badil entered a partnership agreement with al-Quds University in the fall of 2007. Since then, Badil's course on “Palestinian refugees under international law” has been one of the courses offered to law students, with larger numbers enrolling each semester. The target group of the Badil law course is university students, particularly law students interested in human rights. It is expected that law students, as part of the student movement that has historically played a major role in the national struggle, will influence their community and contribute to the right of return movement.

This piece addresses the importance of this law course as part of the broader campaign to defend Palestinian refugee rights. It tries to assess the impact of academic teaching on the right of return movement, specifically how it can strengthen the unity of the refugee return movement and promote self-organized initiatives upholding Palestinian refugee rights.

“... for us, the inclusion of the international law course on Palestinian refugees in the academic program is a distinct step reflecting our duty toward law students, as well as our commitment to Palestine and Palestinian rights. On one hand, it provides students interested in international law and human rights law with new course material. On the other hand, it explores, through the lens of Palestinian refugee rights, the prolonged conflict from a comparative legal perspective.” (Muhammad Shalaldah, Dean of the Al-Quds University Law School, University Press Release, 19 May 2008)

Hamdi Alshaikh, one of the students enrolled in the Fall 2007 semester and himself a refugee, confirmed that he used to see the right of return as one item in a list of “sacred national rights,” together with the right to self- determination, independence and statehood, but never paid attention to the importance of the law underpinning those rights: “When I chose the course, I was expecting a historical and political overview of our plight. I did not imagine that the Palestinian refugee question could be treated legally under so many bodies of law.” For Badil and for the right of return movement, planting and fostering such understanding is essential for building and strengthening the movement promoting solutions that respond to the rights and needs of Palestinian refugees.1 After the Nakba of 1948 which resulted in the largest wave of Palestinian displacement from the homeland, the refugees' right of return was seen by Arab states, political parties and Palestinians themselves as an automatic result of the eventual liberation of Palestine, which was expected to come through the success of the armed struggle. It was then called a national and natural right, one that is inalienable, non-negotiable and one that would be automatically attained upon the liberation of Palestine. Accordingly, there was no perceived need to further explore the legal dimensions of this right, for example, by examining its human rights context or relevant sources in international law. Indeed, the need and benefit of representing the right of return as a human right enshrined in international law have been given priority only in the process of popular mobilization that came in response to the launch of the Oslo process in the early 1990s, a process that was marked by the organization of several refugee popular conferences. (2)2 Since the early 1990s, similar messages and recommendations have been reiterated by all popular conferences: political negotiators are to respect the inalienable right of return when engaging in negotiations on the Palestinian refugee question; awareness must be raised locally and internationally about the rights of Palestinian refugees, and a new generation of Palestinians, especially refugees, must be raised with the capacity and skills required to defend these rights. The Global Right of Return Coalition, which is one of the most important outcomes of the popular conferences, has adopted these same recommendations in its statements and annual action plans. Palestinian parents and students confirm that Badil has succeeded to translate the popular message into a professional agenda of research, legal advocacy and teaching. Abdel Qader Nasser, a Palestinian activist and parent of one of the students enrolled in the Badil law course, said: "the first time I read from Badil that the right of return is an individual and collective right that is legal and possible I felt that this is different from what we heard from officials of the Palestinian Authority. Then I discovered that its meaning is the most accurate expression of my feelings as a refugee.”The Badil syllabus and course materialsBadil signed the partnership agreement with Al-Quds University less than two months before the start of the Fall semester of 2007, giving us only a few weeks of preparation time. However, the collection of research papers and legal studies already gathered and prepared by Badil on various aspects of the Palestinian refugee issue made it easier to put together the course materials and syllabus. Members of Badil’s Legal Support Network, many of whom teach similar courses at universities abroad, provided valuable input into the design of the the course and contributed to the timely completion of preparations.The course has been divided into two main parts: the first part explores the concepts and rights related to refugee status, state obligations, and the role of international agencies and mechanisms. Students study the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, documents and recommendations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, human rights treaty committees and relevant UN guidelines and declarations. Students learn about international standards for the treatment of refugees, and about examples of good and bad state practice. Students also learn how to assess states’ practices in light of the relevant instruments.The second part of the course examines the genesis of the Palestinian refugee issue, the rights and specific status of Palestinian refugees, and protection gaps resulting from Israel's violation of its legal obligations and the failure of the international community to ensure Israel's respect of international law. In this section students also learn about other cases of displacement and dispossession through specific examples, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Apartheid in South Africa.3 They also examine the implementation of relevant provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Such comparative studies enable students to see the protection gap that affects Palestinian refugees, develop their knowledge of other cases and enhance their understanding of the potential of a rights-based approach for solving the Palestinian case, thereby improving their ability to play an active role in defending Palestinian refugee rights.From a legal perspective, the course is unique in that it combines various bodies of international law, specifically the Law of Nationality in state succession, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. It goes beyond highlighting the rights and obligations enshrined in international treaties by encouraging students to discover the links between the various bodies of international law and their connections with the realities on ground. The course emphasizes the importance of applying a broad body of international law rules to conflict analysis, treatment of its consequences and formulating the solution.

“I studied International public law, international humanitarian law, the law of international organizations, and international human rights law, but I had not realized the importance of international law for ending the Israeli occupation before I took the course on Palestinian refugees under international law.” (Kifah Froukh, course of fall 2007)

In political terms, the course deals with the root causes of the conflict, its evolution, and proposed solutions. Although these topics are fundamental for any student of the region, they have been largely absent from the Palestinian curriculum at all levels. As such, Palestinian students have for the most part encountered materials dealing with their own history and struggle in a way that has not sufficiently engaged them to form a nuanced perspective of the various historical, political and legal dimensions of the struggle. By examining these dimensions, the course provides what can be considered a new way of looking at the conflict and an attempt to analyze and overcome the deficit in both, the educational curriculum and the common approach to “solutions” debated in the public sphere which look only at the political dimension while ignoring history and law.

“I have never believed that international law and mechanisms might be of any benefit for the rights of the Palestinian people. Even after I had taken three courses in international law, I could not see in international law any more than a tool in the hands of colonial powers. The course on Palestinian refugees under international law opened my eyes to see the possibility of using the same tool for defending our rights.” (Bader al-Tamimi, course of Spring 2009)

In practice, the course has contributed to mobilizing and advocating for a rights-based approach. Suhair Al Weradat, student of the Spring 2009 semester said, “the course opened my eyes to the importance of advocating for our rights, not only because we need to widen the support at the international level, but also because we need to always strengthen our home front.” In early 2009, students of the Fall 2008 semester decided to organize a photographic exhibition explaining the ongoing Nakba in cooperation with the university's students union. Their initiative was supported by Badil and welcomed by the Law School faculty. It was developed to include a book fair and two seminars, one on refugee rights and the other on the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Campaign. Ahmad Nouba, a student of the Fall 2008 semester, noted that, “the title of the photographic exhibition - ‘Haq Al-Awda Mish Lalbay' (the right of return is not for sale) - which took place in mid March 2009, had a significant impact on the student community at the university. After the exhibition, this title became a slogan that can still be heard in everyday discussions.”

Endnotes
1 For more information about the campaign see: http://www.badil.org/en/right-of-return-movement-initiatives.
2 For more on the evolution of the post-Oslo right of return movement, see Muhammad Jaradat, “Reflections on the Palestine return Movement”, al-Majdal #36-37 (Winter 07-Spring 08).
3 Texts used for these examples are Badil's working papers: “The Right to Housing and Property Restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A case Study”, and “Land Restitution in South Africa: Overview of Learned Lessons” accessible at http://www.badil.org/en/documents/category/2-working-papers

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk