"The Philadelphi Corridor"

The Philadelphi Corridor is a narrow stretch of land, mostly sand, ten kilometers long and some hundreds of meters wide, that separates Egypt (the Sinai) from the Gaza Strip; it runs from the Mediterranean Sea to the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel and Gaza.

The town of Rafah straddles this corridor and is the crossing point between Egypt and Gaza.

Credit: Israelmatzav

The 1979 peace accords with Egypt allocated to Israel control of and the right to patrol the Corridor, even as Israel pulled back from the Sinai. That situation pertained until Israel's unilateral "disengagement" from Gaza in 2005, which -- if Israel were truly to "leave" Gaza -- required a self-imposed (and very unfortunate) withdrawal from the Corridor. 

 

Jurisdiction for patrolling on the Gaza side of the Corridor was turned over to the PA. But any agreement with the PA in this regard no longer exists, as the PA was driven out of Gaza in 2007 by Hamas, which is in control there now.

 

As to the Sinai side, at that time, Egypt -- worried that radical Islamists might slip into the Sinai from Gaza because the PA would not patrol effectively (this is when Hamas was not in favor with Mubarak) -- secured permission from Israel, via a formal agreement, to station patrols along the line. The number of guards permitted was 750, across the Corridor on the Sinai side. It was understood that they were to combat terrorism, and were not for military purposes; the agreement did not modify the original peace treaty. It is this deployment force whose numbers Egypt has sought to augment recently with growing unlawfulness in the Sinai.

 

One of the original purposes of the Corridor was to prevent smuggling from Egypt to Gaza. The assumption was that this band of sand, patrolled by Israeli soldiers, would make it very difficult for smugglers to cross over without being seen.

 

But that was before the tunnels, which were dug under the Philadelphi Corridor, mainly in the area around Rafah. There are many dozens if not hundreds of such tunnels today. Some of them are quite large and sophisticated. There are so many, and new ones are dug so rapidly, that no matter how many are taken out in intermittent Israeli Air Force strikes, there are always many more. 

 

They have been used for bringing in commercial goods and building materials -- a whole underground economy, literally and figuratively. Even livestock, including cows, have been brought through. Although this economy has dwindled somewhat as Israel (which always allowed humanitarian materials in) has permitted more goods to come through the crossings into Gaza.

Credit: wsj

But the tunnels are also used for bringing weapons to Hamas, and over time those weapons have become more numerous and more sophisticated.

 

Some -- for example, Grad Katyusha rockets -- are utilized for intermittent Islamist terror attacks on Israel's south. But there is also military equipment -- such as shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles -- that can be stockpiled against the time when Israel goes to war against Hamas. This is a deeply worrisome situation, as Hamas has morphed from a rag-tag terrorist group to something resembling a decently equipped army.

 

There have been rumors time and again about Israel re-taking the Corridor. When we fought the last war in Gaza in the end of 2008 and early 2009, there were sources predicting that when Israel pulled out, a force would remain at the Corridor. It didn't happen.

Now the subject is being raised again, and with very good reason: The growing lawlessness in the Sinai, with the Egyptians not firmly in control there and Sinai Bedouin increasingly engaged in the smuggling of arms, has brought about a very troubling situation.

Even more so is this the case because in post-war Libya there are huge unsecured arms depots; reliable reports trace arms from this source to the Sinai, where they are held for smuggling into Gaza. 

 

I wrote recently, in the course of a post on Morsi, that Egyptian forces -- even as ineffectively as they may be monitoring the Sinai -- had captured the largest cache of serious weapons intended for smuggling yet; they believe that cache came from Libya.

Ariel Harkham, in an article on this issue cited the head of Shin Bet as saying that the newly available Libyan depots are "the new gate to hell": http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=276839&R=R1

 

And so, the case for re-taking the Corridor can be made. It becomes a question of political will.

 

Some say with a new Egyptian regime that has Muslim Brotherhood elements predisposed to Hamas, the chance has already been lost. Others believe that now is precisely the time, while Egypt is still in the throes of a political struggle, and the Brotherhood less dominant than it may yet become.

And there is yet one other factor that might come into play. Earlier this month, it was reported -- http://imra.org.il/story.php3?id=57332 -- that:

"The Israel Defense Forces plans to install a new underground system along the Gaza border to detect tunneling activity in its early stages, Army Radio reported Monday. According to the report, over the past several months the army has carried out a series of tests near the Kerem Shalom border crossing and declared the new technology, called 'Strong Number,' a success. The system will eventually be deployed along the entire border aiming to avert all cross-border raids...

"An IDF spokesperson told Army Radio on Monday that the system is considered reliable. It is not prone to false positive detections, and may even prove to be the ultimate weapon in combating tunnel-related terror activity.

"...'The IDF believes that a solution has been found to the tunneling problem; we will soon be able to overcome this complex challenge,' the officer said. 'What we have is a reliable system that seldom fails.'"

This report indicated that this new underground system was eventually to be installed along the entire border between Gaza and Israel, thereby preventing terrorists from entering Israel via tunnels in order to attack, or doing cross border raids that result in kidnappings, as Shalit was kidnapped. 

But Aaron Lerner, director of IMRA, which ran this article, has another thought: Does this justify re-taking the Corridor? he asks. Until now, the fact that tunnels would be utilized to smuggle weapons even if Israeli soldiers were again stationed at the Corridor was used as an argument against re-taking the Corridor: 

"After all, what's the point of endangering soldiers and taking a lot of diplomatic heat if the smuggling tunnels continue to operate despite the Israeli presence. But if the IDF has come up with a way to detect the tunnels this means a dramatic shift in the equation." (Emphasis added)-Arlene Kushner
---
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=276839&R=R1
The Philadelphi Corridor

By ARIEL HARKHAM

07/09/2012

While the Muslim Brotherhood is still settling in in Egypt, Israel must imprint a stable precedent for action and establish a more durable framework for dialogue.

.

Photo: Ronen Zvulun / Reuters

Today Israel’s politicians need to reorient themselves to a re-engagement policy in Gaza. Overcoming the trauma of disengagement and the world’s condemnation in the wake of Operation Cast Lead, Middle Israel must come to the realization that disengaging from Gaza didn’t mean Gaza disengaged from Israel.

Israel will have to come to grips with the basic fact that Hamasis implacable, that no hudna, no summit and no piece of paper will stop the growing violence we are witnessing in the south. Retaking the narrative, defeating Hamas and regaining the initiative requires prudent policy which begins at the source of Israel’s immediate instability.

The Philadelphi bridge of terror, now bustling, quickly becomes Israel’s first order of business. This bridge must be destroyed, sending the clearest signal to Egypt that Israel will always act vigorously in its own defense.

Re-engaging Gaza begins in Philadelphi and ends in Cairo. Severing Hamas’ weapons supply route will fundamentally alter its strategic orientation. By asserting control over its entire border, Israel will be able to set the tone for what is sure to be a very tenuous relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood now in power. Dividing Egypt from Gaza today will be the fullest expression Israel can send to this revolutionary government in Egypt that Israel is interested in stability that is reinforced by prudent security policies.

A TWO-hour drive south of Tel-Aviv lies a 14 km.strip of land that sits between Gaza and Egypt, known as the Philadelphi Corridor. Since 2008, this border zone has been controlled by Hamas, and a limited Egyptian presence. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, which founded Hamas, sharing these 14 km. inherently spells disaster for Israel’s long-term stability.

This tiny corridor holds the strategic keys for Israel to either diminish Hamas’s ability to commit acts of aggression or allow Hamas’s aggression to continue to continue to determine the facts on the ground.

Looking further down the road, ignoring the strategic significance of Philadelphi will give Mohamed Mursi a lever of soft power, very similar to how Iran uses Hezbollah as a proxy, to disrupt, deflect and destabilize Israel with.

In 2005, Ariel Sharon undertook a sweeping policy to completely disengage from Gaza. This meant many things; an ethnic transfer of a multi-generational Jewish population (many still dispossessed), destruction of costly infrastructure and finally, the removal of its border guard on the Philadelphia Corridor.

Today in Israel, the disengagement is understood by the majority to have been a failure. However we consider both the security and diplomatic implications involved, Israelis now understand that the Gaza retreat made it far more difficult to control the events in and out of Gaza. The ethical questions surrounding population transfer remain, debate over the fallout of the Mavi Marmara incident continues, but there is a general consensus regarding the failure of pulling out from the Philadelphi corridor, the results of which Israel’s entire south today suffer.

Public opinion in Israel today would back a reengagement of Gaza along the lines of retaking the strategic Philadelphi Corridor.

ISRAEL HAS every right to secure the Philadelphi Corridor.

The accords it signed with Egypt following its withdrawal were not an amendment to the Sinai peace agreement. The 1979 peace deal made clear that Israel maintains control of this particular strip of land.

As for the understanding with the Palestinian Authority, which was given custodianship, they are no longer there, are no longer the custodians, which de-facto nullifies any agreement on the matter between Israel and the PA. In diplomatic speech, Israel has freedom of action.

Militarily it is familiar with this terrain, it’s now a question of political will. Retaking the corridor thus revolves around Israeli leaders’ ability to accept a new reality and swing into the right frame to engage it.

As for Hamas providing the moral case for Israel’s return to the Philadelphi, the sheer amount of weapons which flow through this border crossing, ultimately ending up landing in townships across southern Israel, is justification enough.

The lawlessness in the Sinai peninsula allows for increased weapons smuggling into Gaza. Some items worth mentioning are taken from huge, unsecured arms depots in postwar Libya, including advanced SA-24 shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles.

Yoram Cohen, the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), described the Libyan depots as “the new gate to hell.”

Given the magnitude of instability in Sinai and Gaza, Israel has little choice but to sever this conduit of terror and retain ultimate control of Gaza’s borders until such time as a peaceful government can reign responsibly inside Gaza.

Considering the powerful backlash Israel received when it left Gaza, when it was accused of causing a humanitarian crisis, Israel’s border guards must be prepared to administer a border where transit of goods and services need to be maintained in the face of danger. Outsourcing much of the administration of the crossing to bonafide international organizations and legitimate NGOs will significantly reduce friction and deter Hamas freedom of action.

A RE-ENGAGEMENT policy toward Gaza means taking the battle into Gaza, thereby forcing Hamas to dedicate its energies to Israel’s military presence there rather than to Israel’s home front as it does now. It is a far better scenario for Israel to employ the Iron Dome defending the Philadelphia Corridor than to defend playgrounds, schools and hospitals.

Finally, defeating Hamas, at least as an effective paramilitary agent, can only be effective if Israel actually controls all Gaza’s access points. Egypt has proven to be utterly ineffectual, and Israel cannot really believe this situation will improve under an Islamic Brotherhood-run Egypt. After Mursi consolidates his power, the opposite will be the case.

For those who truly desire peace, Israel is the only responsible agent to ensure Gaza becomes a functioning society as well as a stable, demilitarized territory down the road.

Before undertaking the aforementioned policy, Israel’s leadership needs to reorient itself to a new southern Muslim Brotherhood reality. As the Islamic Brotherhood enters a phase of power consolidation, Israel has a small window to institute a mode of conduct that the Muslim Brotherhood will have to adjust to in order to deal effectively with Israel.

While the Muslim Brotherhood is still settling in in Egypt, Israel must imprint a stable precedent for action and establish a more durable framework for dialogue. This small window can best be exploited by re-engaging Gaza, retaking the Philadelphi Corridor and regaining control of its borders. All of which are essential ingredients to a new national security posture in a region growing more and more hostile to Jewish sovereignty.

The writer is the co-founder of the Jewish National Initiative.