Doc's Talk: Top 6 reasons Israeli PR sucks, and what you can do

Monday, August 06, 2012

Top 6 reasons Israeli PR sucks, and what you can do

Neil Lazarus

The Israeli concept of public relations, or hasbara, has failed to meet many of the needs required to explain the position and policies of the State of Israel. It is clear that classic hasbara doesn’t work; what is less apparent is that hasbara cannot work, as it is inherently reactive.

To win the war of public opinion Israel needs to be proactive in its messaging, marketing Israel as a product and not an apology. Classic hasbara needs to be replaced with a radically new model of PR. To win the media war, a dramatic paradigmatic shift must take place.

Why does classic hasbara not work?

6. Hasbara = explanation = failure

Israelis continually putting out the PR fire, seeking to justify a military reaction whilst a new crisis is already breaking out. It is the dog so busily chasing its tail that it has not noticed that there is a fire in the lounge. How can you explain yourself in a proactive manner?

If you translate the word “hasbara” into English it is very apologetic, translating as information or explanation. We have a strong case, we have a just case and we have to be proactive.

5. Hasbara and the culture of the Sabra

Zionism is the rejection of Diaspora and the rejection of an image of a perceived weak Diaspora Jew. Many of the early socialist Zionists came to Israel to build and be rebuilt.

Many Sabras, Israelis born in Israel, refuse to play the game of pandering to public opinion. A distrust of the non-Jewish world is deeply rooted in the psyche of many Israelis, and originates from a post-Holocaust mentality.

This suspicion is deeply entrenched in the Sabra psyche, especially within the political right. Ben Gurion is rumored to have said: “It’s not what the Goyim (non-Jews) think, it is what the Jews do.”

A modern version of this misled belief is that the world is just anti-Semitic — so why bother explaining Israeli policy –- the world will hate Jews and the Jewish State regardless.

For those who hold this view, the possibility of Israel becoming a pariah state is of little concern, as it would reconfirm Israel’s chosenness and reassert the biblical Balaam of “a nation that shall dwell alone.”

In more recent times this attitude has been challenged, particularly with the growth of support for Israel from American evangelical Christians.

Ingrained within the identity of the Israeli is a rejection of being a fryer, a sucker in English.

For many Sabras it is difficult to consider themselves as victims of terrorism or to graphically use personal experiences of terror. To do so would undermine a Zionist self-image of a strong reborn Jew inbred from an early age.

Palestinian spokespeople have no problem with their self-image as victim, speaking freely in terms of victimhood. Consequently the only victims of terror in the conflict seem to be Palestinians.

4. Two Jews – three opinions

There is an old joke that says that wherever there are two Jews there are three opinions.

In Israel, wherever there are two Israelis there are four opinions, two political parties and a government crisis! The issue of hasbara is dealt with by a plethora of departments with conflicting interests.The problem is not just a lack of funding but also a lack of coordination.

Synchronization of information is crucial for an effective PR campaign and remarkably problematic, especially between the army, the Foreign Ministry and the so-called Ministry of Public Diplomacy.

3. The medium is the message

Classic hasbara fails in its task to advocate the case for Israel because it fails to understand the impact of television and internet on the way people receive their news.

If researchers are correct, the average American 16-year-old student has a concentration span of seven minutes, the same time that television programs run before breaking for advertisements. Television has influenced and changed the cognitive ability of the viewer and America is moving from a fast food to an attention deficit nation. Immediacy has become the ultimate value in the “ready to go” society. Whether it is a modem or a diet, speed is of the essence.

For the Israeli advocate explaining the case for Israel in an emotive language is a fundamental challenge. For the Sabra it is more of a challenge as it requires a contradiction of many inherent cultural norms. Historic facts alone are not enough to convince the flick-click generation, but without them Israel’s case is worthless. The flick-click generation is rational and irrational and the advocate for Israel must appeal to both elements.

The flick-click generation bases its opinion on a combination of visual and emotive memory and not facts or knowledge. It remembers how it felt about an event not the information concerning the incident. If entertainment is the outlet of emotion, then for the flick-click generation entertainment and information has been combined to form entertaininfo. Information is provided as entertainment.

Ironically it was the Jewish people that received the first recorded sound bites, namely the 10 Commandments.

The Commandments were short and easy to remember and written only on two tablets of stone. Imagine the lack of impact the 10 Commandments would have had if they were the 100 Commandments or had been handed down in a 400-page hardcover book. Nobody would have read them.

For Israel to be more effective in its messaging it will have to stop explaining its policy and start creating messages which are short, simple, emotive and easy to remember.

2. Good policy makes good hasbara

Israel fails to be effective in advocating its position because many people believe that hasbara is just propaganda, not educational, and is what the other side does. Using these techniques of persuasion would, it is argued, be lowering Israel to the standards of the Palestinians and is therefore not appropriate. Ironically these people are usually the first to complain about the effectiveness of Israel’s PR campaign.

There are many differences between Israeli PR and that of the Palestinians, the most obvious being that the Palestinian campaign is more effective. Israel has a number of clear red lines that it will not cross.

Israel does not lie for hasbara, whereas Palestinians have no problem creating a massacre in Jenin that never took place. Israel is more sensitive regarding the use of photographs of dead bodies whether out of respect for the dead or a rejection of being perceived as victim. Palestinians are more open to the use of such photographs as it reinforces a sense of victimhood.

This argument is fundamentally flawed. Messages need to be consistent and repeated to be remembered. Despite their success, McDonalds and Coke spend millions in advertising their products.

The Israel advocate is opening the minds of the audience to the complexity of the issues of the Middle East.

1. Political correctness

One of the greatest challenges to effectively explaining the case for Israel, especially for young Americans, is political correctness (PC). PC is the alteration of language to redress unjust discrimination or to avoid offense. In the world of PC the English language has been stripped of its masculinity and the use of the word man has nearly disappeared. Firemen are now firefighters, policemen are Law Enforcement Officers and postmen are postal workers. Obese people are no longer fat but are gravitationally challenged and the disabled have special needs — even mankind has been replaced by earth’s children.

Deeply rooted in the mindset of the politically correct is a wish not to upset. In such an environment it is hard to seriously advocate for Israel. Having an opinion is seen as bias and even intolerance. Democracy allows people the freedom to say what they think; it does not mean that every opinion is as valid as the other.

The politically correct pity the victim and naturally ally themselves with the Palestinian cause. They are also particularly susceptible to arguments of moral equivalency, where Palestinians and Israelis are concerned. In their world there is a cycle of violence in the Middle East that is perpetuated by Israel and if only Israel would stop building settlements everything would be just fine.

The case for havashook

Don’t try to find havashook in an English Hebrew dictionary, it doesn’t exist. Nor is it the name of a quaint English town inSurrey, England. Havashook is a new concept combining two Hebrew words: havana (understanding) and shivook (marketing). If Israel is to be successful at PR it does not need to explain every policy, but it does need to proactively create an understanding of Israel’s security situation. How can Israel explain the need for a security fence if there is not an understanding of Israel’s security needs, or what it is like to travel by bus in Israel on the day a bus has been targeted by suicide bombers? The second part of the word havashook comes for the Hebrew word shivook: or marketing. Israel needs to market itself as a product and use many of the concepts associated with selling any product.

The concept of havashook has been implemented by many diplomats, Jewish and Christian religious leaders, students and friends of Israel worldwide in an attempt to replace many of the disproved attempts at media spinning and public relations. The Five Rules of Effective Israel Advocacy will enable the reader to practice Havashook.

The Five Rules of Effective Israel Advocacy are:

Use emotion and personalize
Refute and redefine
Speak their language
The logic of yes
Get to yes

Logos, ethos and pathos

The five rules of effective Israel advocacy have been proven to work and are an important tool for Israel and its friends worldwide. Yet in reality the rules are rooted in the wisdom of the classic Greeks. If Aristotle was asked by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to advise on hasbara he would have advised three major pillars of advocacy — Logos, Ethos and Pathos.

Logos is the appeal to reason. Aristotle believed that by appealing to simple reason, a speaker could convince his audience of the cause. Ethos is an appeal to character and a judgment of what is fair. By appealing to an opponent’s sense of justice, a speaker would prevail. Pathos is the appeal to emotion, a force that was as powerful as ration. When ration did not work then a careful and considered use of emotion was prescribed.

It would be interesting to ask Aristotle what he thought of hasbara and Israel’s attempts to explain its cause.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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