August 17, 2012
In
1949, the Communist takeover of China rattled the US foreign policy
establishment to its core. China's fall to Communism was correctly
perceived as a massive strategic defeat for the US. The triumphant Mao
Zedong placed China firmly in the Soviet camp and implemented foreign
policies antithetical to US interests.
For the
American foreign policy establishment, China's fall forced a
reconsideration of basic axioms of US foreign policy. Until China went
Red, the view resonant among foreign policy specialists was that it was
possible for the US to peacefully coexist and even be strategic allies
with Communists.
With Mao's embrace of Stalin
this position was discredited. The US's subsequent recognition that it
was impossible for America to reach an accommodation with Communists
served as the intellectual architecture of many of the strategies the US
adopted for fighting the Cold War in the years that followed.
Today
the main aspect of America's response to China's Communist revolution
that is remembered is the vindictive political hunt for scapegoats.
Foreign Service officers and journalists who had advised the US
government to support Mao and the Communists against Chiang Kai Shek and
the Nationalists were attacked as traitors.
But
while the "Red Scare" is what is most remembered about that period, the
most significant consequence of the rise of Communist China was the
impact it had on the US's understanding of the nature of Communist
forces. Even Theodore White, perhaps the most prominent journalist who
championed Mao and the Communists, later acknowledged that he had been
duped by their propaganda machine into believing that Mao and his
comrades were interested in an alliance with the US.
As Joyce Hoffmann exposed in her book Theodore White and Journalism as Illusion,
White acknowledged that his wartime report from Mao's headquarters in
Yenan praising the Communists as willing allies of the US who sought
friendship, "not as a beggar seeks charity, but seeks aid in furthering a
joint cause," was completely false.
As he wrote, the report was "winged with hope and passion that were entirely unreal."
What
he had been shown in Yenan, Hoffmann quotes White as having written,
was "the showcase of democratic art pieces they (the Communists) staged
for us American correspondents [and] was literally, only showcase
stuff."
Contrast the US's acceptance of failure
in China in 1949, and its willingness to learn the lessons of its loss
of China, with the US's denial of its failure and loss of Egypt today.
On
Sunday, new President Mohamed Morsy completed Egypt's transformation
into an Islamist state. In the space of one week, Morsy sacked the
commanders of the Egyptian military and replaced them with Muslim
Brotherhood loyalists, and fired all the editors of the state-owned
media and replaced them with Muslim Brotherhood loyalists.
He
also implemented a policy of intimidation, censorship and closure of
independently owned media organizations that dare to publish criticism
of him.
Morsy revoked the military's
constitutional role in setting the foreign and military policies of
Egypt. But he maintained the junta's court-backed decision to disband
the parliament. In so doing, Morsy gave himself full control over the
writing of Egypt's new constitution.
As former ambassador to Egypt Zvi Mazel wrote Tuesday in The Jerusalem Post, Morsy's moves mean that he "now holds dictatorial powers surpassing by far those of erstwhile president Hosni Mubarak."
In other words, Morsy's actions have transformed Egypt from a military dictatorship into an Islamist dictatorship.
The impact on Egypt's foreign policy of Morsy's seizure of power is already becoming clear. On Monday, Al-Masri al-Youm
quoted Mohamed Gadallah, Morsy's legal adviser, saying that Morsy is
considering revising the peace accord with Israel. Gadallah explained
that Morsy intends to "ensure Egypt's full sovereignty and control over
every inch of Sinai."
In other words, Morsy
intends to remilitarize Sinai and so render the Egyptian military a
clear and present threat to Israel's security. Indeed, according to Haaretz, Egypt has already breached the peace accord and deployed forces and heavy weaponry to Sinai without Israeli permission.
The rapidity of Morsy's moves has surprised most observers. But more surprising than his moves is the US response to his moves.
Obama
administrations officials have behaved as though nothing has happened,
or even as though Morsy's moves are positive developments.
For instance, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal,
one administration official dismissed the significance of Morsy's purge
of the military brass, saying, "What I think this is, frankly, is Morsy
looking for a generational change in military leadership."
The Journal
reported that Egypt's new defense minister, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sissi,
is known as a Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer. But the Obama
administration quickly dismissed the reports as mere rumors with no
significance. Sissi, administration sources told the Journal, ate
dinner with US President Barack Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser
John Brennan during Brennan's visit to Cairo last October. Aside from
that, they say, people are always claiming that Morsy's appointments
have ties to Morsy's Muslim Brotherhood.
A slightly less rose-colored assessment came from Steven Cook in Foreign Affairs.
According to Cook, at worst, Morsy's move was probably nothing more
than a present-day reenactment of Gamal Abel Nasser's decision to move
Egypt away from the West and into the Soviet camp in 1954.
Most
likely, Cook argued, Morsy was simply doing what Sadat did when in 1971
he fired other generals with whom he had been forced to share power
when he first succeeded Nasser in 1969.
Certainly
the Nasser and Sadat analogies are pertinent. But while properly citing
them, Cook failed to explain what those analogies tell us about the
significance of Morsy's actions. He drew the dots but failed to see the
shape they make.
Morsy's Islamism, like Mao's
Communism, is inherently hostile to the US and its allies and interests
in the Middle East. Consequently, Morsy's strategic repositioning of
Egypt as an Islamist country means that Egypt - which has served as the
anchor of the US alliance system in the Arab world for 30 years - is
setting aside its alliance with the US and looking toward reassuming the
role of regional bully.
Egypt is on the fast
track to reinstating its war against Israel and threatening
international shipping in the Suez Canal. And as an Islamist state,
Egypt will certainly seek to export its Islamic revolution to other
countries. No doubt fear of this prospect is what prompted Saudi Arabia
to begin showering Egypt with billions of dollars in aid.
It
should be recalled that the Saudis so feared the rise of a Muslim
Brotherhood-ruled Egypt that in February 2011, when US President Barack
Obama was publicly ordering then-president Hosni Mubarak to abdicate
power immediately, Saudi leaders were beseeching him to defy Obama. They
promised Mubarak unlimited financial support for Egypt if he agreed to
cling to power.
The US's astounding sanguinity
in the face of Morsy's completion of the Islamization of Egypt is an
illustration of everything that is wrong and dangerous about US Middle
East policy today.
Take US policy toward Syria.
Syria
is in possession of one of the largest arsenals of chemical and
biological weapons in the world. The barbarism with which the regime is
murdering its opponents is a daily reminder - indeed a flashing neon
warning sign - that Syria's nonconventional arsenal constitutes a clear
and present danger to international security. And yet, the Obama
administration insists on viewing Syrian President Bashar Assad's
murderous behavior as if it were a garden variety human rights crisis.
During
her visit with Turkey's Islamist Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu last
Saturday, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton didn't even mention the
issue of Syria's chemical and biological weapons. Instead she continued
to back Turkey's sponsorship of the Islamist-dominated opposition and
said that the US would be working with Turkey to put together new ways
to help the Islamist opposition overthrow Assad's regime.
Among other things, she did not rule out the imposition of a no-fly zone over Syria.
The
party most likely to be harmed from such a move would be Israel, which
would lose its ability to bomb Syrian weapons of mass destruction sites
from the air.
Then of course, there is Iran and its openly genocidal nuclear weapons program. This week The New York Times
reported a new twist in the Obama administration's strategy for
managing this threat. It is trying to convince the Persian Gulf states
to accept advanced missile defense systems from the US.
This
new policy makes clear that the Obama administration has no intention
of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Its actions on the
ground are aimed instead at accomplishing two goals: convincing Iran's
Arab neighbors to accept Iran as a nuclear power and preventing Israel
from acting militarily to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
The missile shields are aspects of a policy of containment, not
prevention. And the US's attempts to sabotage Israel's ability to strike
Iran's nuclear sites through leaks, political pressure and efforts to
weaken the Netanyahu government make clear that as far as the US is
concerned, Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is not the problem.
The prospect of Israel preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is the problem.
Several
American commentators argue that the Obama administration's policies
are the rational consequence of the divergence of US and Israeli
assessments of the threats posed by regional developments. For instance,
writing in the Tablet online magazine this week, Lee Smith
argued that the US does not view the developments in Egypt, Iran and
Syria as threatening US interests. From Washington's perspective, the
prospect of an Israeli strike on Iran is more threatening than a
nuclear-armed Iran, because an Israeli strike would immediately
destabilize the region.
The problem with this
assessment is that it is nonsense. It is true that Israel is first on
Iran's target list, and that Egypt is placing Israel, not the US in its
crosshairs. So, too, Syria and its rogue allies will use their chemical
weapons against Israel first.
But that doesn't
mean the US will be safe. The likely beneficiaries of Syrian chemical
weapons - Sunni and Shi'ite terrorist organizations - have attacked the
US in the past. Iran has a history of attacking US shipping without a
nuclear umbrella. Surely it would be more aggressive in the Persian Gulf
and the Strait of Hormuz after defying Washington in illegally
developing a nuclear arsenal. The US is far more vulnerable to
interruptions in the shipping lanes in the Suez Canal than Israel is.
The reason Israel and the US are allies is that Israel is the US's first line of defense in the region.
If
regional events weren't moving so quickly, the question of who lost
Egypt would probably have had its moment in the spotlight in Washington.
But
as is clear from the US's denial of the significance of Morsy's rapid
completion of Egypt's Islamic transformation; its blindness to the
dangers of Syrian chemical and biological weapons; and its complacency
toward Iran's nuclear weapons program, by the time the US foreign policy
establishment realizes it lost Egypt, the question it will be asking is
not who lost Egypt. It will be asking who lost the Middle East.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post.
No comments:
Post a Comment