Doc's Talk: WEATHERING MOROCCO'S SYRIA RETURNEES

Thursday, September 26, 2013

WEATHERING MOROCCO'S SYRIA RETURNEES

PolicyWatch 2148
September 25, 2013

By Vish Sakthivel

To read this article on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/1apdl8W

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The Moroccan government should be encouraged to adopt policies that preempt citizens from joining the Syrian jihad and deradicalize eventual returnees.

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Last week, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a video titled "Morocco: The Kingdom of Corruption and Tyranny." In addition to pushing young Moroccans to join the jihad, the video inveighs against King Muhammad VI -- one of several public communiques in what appears to be an escalating campaign against the ruler. The timing of the video could not be more unsettling. A week before its release, against the backdrop of an increasingly insecure Sahel region, the government arrested several jihadist operatives in the northern cities of Fes, Meknes, and Taounate and the southern coastal town of Tiznit. Meanwhile, Moroccan fighters are traveling to Syria in greater numbers and forming their own jihadist groups, raising concerns about what they might do once they return home.

VIDEO AND RESPONSE

The video released by al-Andalus, AQIM's media network, begins by outlining the king's alleged profiteering and corruption, citing WikiLeaks and the nonfiction book "Le Roi Predateur" by Catherine Graciet and Eric Laurent. It then moves to the king's close friends Mounir Majidi and Fouad Ali el-Himma, accusing them of perpetuating monopolies and patronage networks that impoverish the country while allowing the king to become one of world's richest monarchs. The producers drive this point home by juxtaposing images of Moroccan slums with details from a 2009 Forbes article describing his vast wealth.

The video then attacks the palace's relations with Israel over the last several decades under King Muhammad and his late father. It also condemns Morocco's participation in the U.S.-led war on terror, Rabat's imprisonment of transferred Guantanamo Bay detainees, and the closure of Salafist sheikh Mohamed al-Maghraoui's Quranic schools in Marrakesh, claiming that the palace represses Islamists. It ends with images and testimonies of Maghrebi harragas (individuals who attempt to emigrate to Europe illegally on makeshift boats, often dying in the process), juxtaposing them with AQIM training scenes and a call by Algerian AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droudkel to "migrate to God rather than to Europe."

Overall, the video is evidence of an alarming campaign against the monarch and should be handled at its root. Yet the government's response thus far has been untargeted and reactive. The video is no longer available in mainstream Moroccan online media, and a secular, leftist journalist charged with linking to it in an article has been arrested and accused of conspiring with extremists. The arrest has drawn more public attention than the video itself while doing nothing to address the underlying national security issues. The palace's reaction likely reflects its fears (and perhaps surprise) over the number of Moroccans joining the fight in Syria, since the kingdom was thought to be relatively insulated from the issue of foreign fighters and jihadist returnees.

GROWING POCKETS OF EXTREMISM

Foreigners comprise an increasing portion of the Syrian opposition, including the Salafist group Kataib Ahrar al-Sham, the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra, and the mainstream Free Syrian Army. Moroccan and Algerian fighters are on the rise, Tunisian fighters number in the several hundreds, and former Libyan rebels have long taken up the Syrian opposition's cause. Although exact figures are difficult to corroborate, between 50 and 100 Moroccan fighters are believed to be in Syria today.

In Algeria, Tunisia, and other Maghrebi states, extremism is on the rise, with many jihadists maintaining strongholds in parts of their home countries while others ship off to Syria. In Morocco, however, the jihadist presence has been comparatively minimal because of the government's zero tolerance policy against such movements, enforced via high arrest and imprisonment rates. This has spurred Moroccan extremists to seek haven elsewhere, such as Algeria and Syria.

Last month, Brahim Benchekroun (a.k.a. Abu Ahmed al-Muhajer) -- a former Moroccan Guantanamo detainee now based in Syria -- announced the creation of Harakat Sham al-Islam, a new, fully Moroccan jihadist organization. According to expert Abdullah al-Rami, the group's goal is not only to recruit fighters for the Syria war, but also to establish a jihadist organization within Morocco itself: "Although the [group's] name refers to Syria and its theater is Syria, the majority of group members are Moroccans. The group's creation was also announced in the Rif Latakia, where most Moroccan jihadists who go to Syria are based." Indeed, Benchekroun is exploiting his position in Syria -- both his presence on the battlefield and his links to major terrorist groups in the area -- to emerge as leader of the Moroccan Salafi jihadist movement. At some point, he will likely seek to apply the lessons he has learned and the networks he has generated in Syria back home in Morocco.

Several other Moroccan fighters have been killed or arrested in Syria in recent months. Former Guantanamo detainee Muhammad al-Alami (a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Maghrebi) was first recruited to the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group before joining Kataib Ahrar al-Sham and then Benchekroun's group; he was killed in action in August. Earlier this month, eleven FSA fighters from Morocco's al-Haouz province were killed in a clash with pro-regime forces. They had joined the FSA in May; one of them was the son of a former Moroccan official. In another incident, three Moroccan youths were arrested on the Syria-Turkey border and sent back home after attempting to join the jihad; they are currently being investigated by the National Brigade of Judicial Police.

The fallout in Syria will have further consequences for Maghrebi security when extremist fighters return home. Some of these returnees will likely attempt to generate new cells in Morocco, recruit within its urban slums, move on to projects in the Sahel, or recruit in Western Sahara or refugee camps in southwest Algeria. Many native Syrian rebels will no doubt encourage this exodus, since they tend to dislike the sharply conservative views espoused by foreign fighters and are concerned about their potentially powerful influence if the Assad regime falls.

U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

To help stem this growing problem, Washington should encourage Morocco to formulate policies for deradicalizing returning fighters. This means gathering data on Harakat Sham al-Islam and other nascent jihadist movements, as well as questioning arrestees on factors that pushed them to leave Morocco and pulled them into the Syria war. The palace could also offer incentives to convince the swelling but still-manageable number of returning jihadists to abandon their lifestyle, countering the push factors that led to their departure. Those who appear truly willing to return to normal life should be provided some degree of amnesty, even if they are kept under clandestine surveillance.

At the same time, the Moroccan government should avoid taking draconian action against returnees, such as indefinite detention, torture, or banishment to "black sites." Two observations provide justification for discouraging such measures. First, parts of the Salafia Jihadia movement -- once implicated in the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks -- have been brought into the political fold through an agreement between the monarchy and the Renaissance and Virtue Party (PRV), a moderate Islamist faction. Thus far, the arrangement has proven effective in deradicalizing them. Second, some of the current Moroccan jihadists were once Guantanamo detainees, so their grievances are at least partly shaped by that experience.

Washington should also nudge Morocco and Algeria toward cooperating on border security. In particular, they should exchange best practices and intelligence on their respective Syria returnees -- an issue that could be addressed without bringing up their longstanding dispute over another key security issue, the Polisario rebel movement in Western Sahara.

Finally, although last week's AQIM video is surely alarming to the king, Washington should advise the palace to focus its time, resources, thinly stretched budget, and limited political capital on the actual problem instead of arresting journalists. The number of Moroccan fighters in Syria is low compared to Algeria and Tunisia, so the government still has time to nip the problem in the bud and pursue preemptive and creative strategies for minimizing terrorism within its borders and among its citizens.

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Vish Sakthivel is a Next Generation Fellow at The Washington Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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