The description of
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in The New York Times as "a
leader willing to risk political isolation" should include a full
disclosure: The important American newspaper and Netanyahu have a long
history. Netanyahu ridiculed The New York Times from the podium at the
United Nations General Assembly, when he quoted an article published by
the paper that dripped with praise for the American diplomacy that once
convinced North Korea not to produce nuclear weapons. Time passed and
the poor, isolated, disadvantaged regime in Pyongyang allowed itself to
disregard its obligations and tested a nuclear device.
Why would a weak
country allow itself to act in such a way that even Soviet Russia would
have never dared to act? In 1948, the USSR attacked Berlin, but the
Americans defended the city by providing it with goods via airlift. For
11 months, the Soviets didn't dare take down even one plane. The
difference between these two events does not have to do with technology
or weapons, but with trustworthiness. The Russians feared U.S. President
Harry Truman. The North Koreans see the American presidents of the 21st
century as paper tigers.
The year 2013 is not
1948. Many in the U.S. and in Europe are prepared to surrender, to give
up. To celebrate a diplomatic agreement and to rush to roll back the
sanctions on Tehran, and at the end of the day, to accept the creation
of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Of course, U.S. President Barack Obama
delivers a forceful speech from time to time, saying he will not let the
ayatollahs arm themselves with nuclear weapons, as does his French
counterpart -- but the overall trend is clear: reducing the sanctions
using "salami tactics," slice by slice.
In the last round,
Israel had the opportunity to threaten a military response in a covert
but concrete way, and the world slapped Iran with painful sanctions. Not
willingly, but in what seemed to the leaders of the world to be a
reasonable alternative to an Israeli attack. I do not know if Netanyahu
and former Defense Minister Ehud Barak were serious about their
intentions. I also have not formulated an opinion on what is the right
thing to do, unlike MK Tzachi Hanegbi (Likud) who supported an attack
and still holds that opinion. Yet there is no doubt that in their
hinting of the military option, Barak and Netanyahu arrived at
significant political achievements that weighed heavily on Tehran.
The empty words of
former Mossad head Meir Dagan, former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin, and to
a lesser extent former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi
Ashkenazi, weakened not Netanyahu and Barak's very intention to attack
-- which it is possible did not exist -- but Israel's capacity to
threaten. The believability of Israel's military option diminished
following their chatter. Yet the sanctions slowly did their job, causing
the Iranians to exchange former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
rude manner with current President Hasan Rouhani's sweet talk.
Now, the West is
prepared to begin negotiations with Iran, and the media is flooded with
trial balloons, and also in my opinion, Netanyahu will not achieve his
full objective, but -- in the best-case scenario -- will see the world
hold Iran back from nuclear weapons capability for two to three years,
as was published here following his speech at the U.N. And even for this
compromise, he must draw a tough and demanding line at this stage.
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