The US knows the truth

The U.S. and many other Western countries have suffered blows at the hands of Iranian terrorism. One would expect that an Israeli demand to curb Iranian terrorism would fall on receptive ears and put the Iranians to yet another test.

Iran's terrorist network spreads far | Photo credit: Bulfoto, KOKO, AP, AFP

If Jerusalem really wanted to further embarrass Washington over the about-face that it performed in response to Iranian President Hasan Rouhani's charm offensive, it wouldn't make do with revealing the arrest of Ali Mansouri, the Belgian-Iranian national who was detained in Israel on charges of spying for Iran earlier this week. 

Mansouri, who is alleged to have plotted terrorist attacks against American targets in Israel, was pulled out as an "ace" at a time that was hardly coincidental. While news of his activities certainly stung the Americans, the "ironclad" material that implicates Iran in international terrorist activities -- the "smoking gun" -- can be found on the pages of the reports on international terrorism released by none other than the U.S. State Department just four months ago. 

According to the report, Iran's terrorist activities worldwide reached levels that have not been witnessed since the 1990s. It executes these plans mainly by way of the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, a division of the Revolutionary Guards headed by Qassem Suleimani. Suleimani's Quds Force is also the outfit that reportedly activated Mansouri.

According to the Americans, the Quds Force's tentacles reach around the globe. Its commander, which the U.S. views as an influential member of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's inner circle, is on the list of some of the most wanted terrorists in the world, a list that the U.S. itself drew up. Suleimani was given this "distinction" after it was determined that his organization played a role in the attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington two years ago. 

In the Israeli context, which is naturally of more interest to us, there is nothing for us to reveal to the Americans. The U.S. already knows almost everything. Some of the information was combined with the State Department's report. Other declassified elements could be found in reports issued by intelligence bodies and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Here is what we know about Iran's ties to Hamas. To this day, hundreds of Hamas operatives have trained in Iran. They reached Iran by exiting Gaza via Egypt. From there, they flew to Syria and continued on to Tehran. Upon leaving Iran, they were exempted from having their passports stamped so as not to incriminate them in the future.

Hamas operatives who reached Iran received months-long training at a closed military base. They were given instruction on combat tactics and advanced technology, rocket fire, activating explosives, sniper fire, and other guerilla-like exercises that are reminiscent of Hezbollah's modus operandi. The British Sunday Times reported years ago that Iran has already trained seven courses-worth of Hamas members. It is safe to assume that more have come through their system since.

Iran has funneled cash to subsidize Hamas -- and, even more so, Islamic Jihad -- activities in the Palestinian Authority. Its Quds Force built a vast, complex smuggling network that stretched across numerous borders and included both maritime and terrestrial routes. The key country in this equation is Sudan.

Sudan has been a way-station for arms destined to reach Gaza through Egypt. From there, the arms were to be smuggled into the Strip through an infrastructure of tunnels closely watched and monitored by Hamas. There were, of course, numerous attempts to smuggle arms by sea.

The Iranians also provided Gaza-based terrorist organizations with medium-range Fajr-5 missiles (which possess a range of 75 kilometers), a few of which were launched during Operation Pillar of Defense. They also exported 122-milimeter Grad rockets with ranges of 20 to 40 kilometers.

Iran has also made little effort to conceal the nature of their relationship with Hamas. For its part, Hamas has reciprocated with overt gestures of gratitude and praise toward Tehran. The history of this romance is well-documented. The Iranians will have a hard time erasing it from memory.

The two central figures in the Quds Force who have been most prominent in the organization's dealings with Palestinian terrorist organizations are Suleimani and his deputy, Esmail Ghaani.

Crossing all lines

Iran does not only act against Israel through its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. A number of terrorist attacks and attempted terror attacks in various spots around the globe in recent years vividly highlight the grim fact that Israel remains subject to a worldwide Iranian terrorist onslaught.

As the State Department concluded: "The terrorist activities advanced by Iran are not limited just to the Middle East but are also executed in many countries around the world. The methods employed by Iranian terrorism change from time to time, ranging from indiscriminate suicide bombings to 'pinpoint' assassinations (including against diplomats).

"The targets of Iranian terrorism are Israel, Jews, the U.S., and Western allies; Arab countries opposed to Iran (with a special emphasis on Saudi Arabia and Bahrain); and oppositionists to the regime. The fact that these terrorist actions are orchestrated by a country that possesses considerable resources renders Iranian terrorism much more dangerous and operationally sophisticated than that practiced by local terrorist groups that do not enjoy backing from a state."

Among the instances of Iranian terrorism listed in the State Department report are weapons shipments which Iran organized for the Taliban in 2006, and which was to be delivered by way of Kandahar in Afghanistan; instruction and training to militant Iraq Shiite groups both inside and outside of the country; massive support to the Syrian regime, including military aid; backing of the rebels in Yemen; and logistical support to al-Qaida, which is allowed to operate on Iranian soil.

Last year, Hezbollah operatives acting at the behest of Quds Force commanders sought to attack tourist sites frequented by Israelis in Bangkok. One of the terrorists who was apprehended led the local authorities to a hideout where the organization stored large quantities of chemical substances used to manufacture explosives.

Early last year, an explosive device was magnetically attached to the car of an Israeli diplomat in Bangkok. Thai police arrested two Iranians who activated the device, though two other Iranians managed to flee.

The most successful Iranian-sponsored terrorist gambit was perpetrated by Hezbollah. In 2012, the organization managed to detonate a large explosive device that was planted at the back of a bus filled with tourists (mostly Israelis) in the Bulgarian resort town of Burgas. Five Israelis, the Bulgarian bus driver, and the terrorist who perpetrated the act were killed in the incident. Thirty-six other Israelis were wounded, three of them seriously.

A similar tragedy was averted around the same time in the Cypriot town of Limassol, where local law enforcement arrested Hossam Taleb Yaqub, a Hezbollah agent of Lebanese origin who was gathering information on Israeli tourists arriving to the island.

The Azeri precedent

The annual terrorism report compiled by the U.S. State Department sheds light on a series of attempts to target Israeli, American, and Western interests worldwide. It is in Azerbaijan, however, where the Iranian connection is particularly evident.

Although Azerbaijan is a Shiite Muslim country (70 percent of the population is Shia), it has a decidedly pro-Western orientation. The authorities there have instituted a clear separation of religion and state, and the government maintains warm ties with Western countries, including Israel, much to the chagrin of Tehran, where the regime is run by religious clerics.

The Iranian link to terrorism, which in many instances is not apparent, is in this case quite exposed. Early last year, three Azeri terrorists were caught working at the behest of "the Iranian Special Services." They planned to stage terrorist attacks against Jewish targets. According to the Azeri authorities, each of the planning stages was subject to the close supervision of Iranian intelligence handlers.

One of the targets was the Or Avner Jewish school in Baku. The terrorists planned to kill two Chabad emissaries, one of them a rabbi and the other one the headmaster of the Jewish school that serves the local community. The three terrorists were arrested outside the school. One of them used to live in Iran, and another was promised a payment of $150,000. The third was tasked with providing sniper fire.

According to the State Department, the three men received arms, explosives, and ammunition, all of which was smuggled from Iran in the latter stages of 2011. Their arsenal included a Dragunov sniper rifle outfitted with a silencer, two magazine cartridges, an optic scope, three hand guns, bullets for the rifle and guns, and 16 demolition blocks.

In March 2012, 22 Azeri nationals were arrested on charges of maintaining contacts with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The network that was uncovered had planned to strike a number of Western embassies and other entities that had ties to Western governments. In April, local security forces nabbed 17 other operatives who were also found to have possessed large quantities of armaments.

In May, Azeri authorities apprehended another 40 terror suspects. A subsequent investigation revealed that they had planned to carry out an attack during the Eurovision song contest which was being held in Baku. The attacks were supposed to take place in the hotels that were hosting the delegations to the competition, including the Israeli team. This could have been a horrific rerun of the attack that took place at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Luckily, the plot was snuffed out before it could be executed.

Last October, a Baku court convicted 22 members of a terrorist network that was operating at the behest of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The terrorists were found to have plotted to attack Americans, Israelis, and other Westerners.

Monitoring with apprehension

Numerous intelligence agencies around the globe attribute the February 2012 attack in New Delhi against an Israeli diplomat's car to the Quds Force. The car was driven by Tal Yehoshua-Koren, the wife of an Israeli diplomat, who suffered serious injuries. All leads point to Iran, even in cases of attempted attacks against Israeli diplomats stationed in missions in Tbilisi, Georgia and Nairobi, Kenya.

In June 2012, two Iranians, Ahmed Abdul Fathi and Mohammed Wasayid Mansour Moussawi, were arrested in Kenya. They led investigators to a safe house in Mombasa, where 15 kilograms of explosives were discovered. The terrorists' target was apparently Israeli-owned hotels situated along the Mombasa beachfront. They were also said to have kept track of Israeli diplomats and businessmen who frequented the area. American experts believe that the quantities and quality of explosives were sufficient to completely destroy the medium-sized hotel.

Lt. Col. (res.) Michael Segel, who served in the Iranian department of the Military Intelligence's Research and Intelligence Division, authored a memorandum for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. In it, he notes that the U.S. State Department reports give considerable attention to the Quds Force in the section devoted to state sponsors of terrorism.

"Iran continues to be the most active state sponsor as it relates to terrorism," one of the State Department's most recent reports reads. "Iran's Quds Force trained the Taliban in Afghanistan and even arranged for weapons shipments to Taliban members."

"The Revolutionary Guards are comprised of ground forces, air forces, naval forces, missiles, volunteer militias, and the Quds Force," Segel said. "All of the military forces (the army and the Revolutionary Guards) are subservient to the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, which operates outside of Iran's borders, is tasked with strengthening ties with Islamic organizations and non-state actors. This entails arranging for weapons supplies for them, training, funding, ideological indoctrination in camps in Iran, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq.

"The Quds Force is the most effective, important means available to the Iranian leadership," Segel said. "It determines its policy for exporting the revolution by means of sabotage activities against moderate Arab regimes, and it is also responsible for high-profile terror attacks. This duality enables it to deny and obfuscate the Quds Force involvement in terrorism."

"The Quds Force uses its proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah of the Hijaz, Hezbollah of Bahrain, and secular (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command) as well as Islamist (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) Palestinian groups to carry out missions," he said.

The revelations regarding Iranian involvement in the attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador to Washington in October 2011 has already prompted the U.S. to impose sanctions on the five individuals involved in the plot, among them the commander of the Quds Force, Suleimani.

The emerging dialogue between the Obama administration and the ayatollah regime in Iran, which continues to openly declare its desire for Israel's eradication, is currently focused on the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, Israeli officials intend on pressing the Americans to address the matter of Iran's global terrorist activities. Israel obviously has a direct interest in this issue, for it devotes considerable resources to thwart these operations. Here, too, Israel is not alone.

The U.S. and many other Western countries have suffered blows at the hands of Iranian terrorism. One would expect that an Israeli demand to curb Iranian terrorism would fall on receptive ears and put the Iranians to yet another test. The Iranians, for their part, are showing no signs as of yet that they intend to fold up their terrorist operations overseas, with the Quds Force as the main entity responsible for its perpetration.

Nadav Shragai is a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.