As this is being composed, American ships are rushing to the Levant,
presumably preparing to launch a bombing-campaign in reaction to the
mass-gassing that Assad again directed at his citizenry. Although
pundits could analyze the reasons for—and consequences of—the delay of
this effort, it is only necessary to “get into the weeds” far enough to
identify how a “coalition of the willing” can quickly be assembled to
stop the slaughter…and to build a stable, peaceful Syrian society. The
Kurds have been issuing humanitarian
appeals to the international community to save the Syrian Kurds, but it
finally seems their plight is finally being “heard”…or maybe not! In
any case, the way breaking-events may be placed within a larger context
is explored at the end of this op-ed.
Minority ethnic and religious groups hope to create a secular democratic federal republic led by secular Sunni Kurds, Arabs, Alawi moderates, Christians, Druze, and Turkmen. Kurds
played a substantial role as Syria gained independence from France;
inasmuch as they are the country’s second largest ethnic group, the
Kurds can play a very positive, democratic role in forging its future. That is the goal of the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria (KURDNAS), assisted by US Syrian Sunni reformer Dr. M. Zhudi Jasser, a cause that is being advanced via the Syrian Democratic Coalition. This
would both recognize that Arabs constitute ~57% of the country’s
population of 22 million, and the desire of the rest of the population
to exercise equal-rights.
This essay summarizes the forces-at-play, the pressures being exerted upon the Syrian Kurds, and the urgency that the Kurds feel threatens their survival. Because Kurds have been consistently friendly to America and Europe, they feel it is in the best interests of the United States and the international community to lend them support—both humanitarian and military—as they attempt to survive the surrounding bloodbath.
The Players
Bashar Assad’s Alawites are Shia or related to it and, thus, feel naturally allied with their Iranian patrons. That this sect numbers only 5-6
million worldwide—2.2 million of whom dominate the Syrian
government—illustrates the success Bashar’s father, Hafez, enjoyed since
1971, ensuring the rest of the 22.5 million population (excluding
Palestinian Arabs encamped therein) remained under his iron-clad grip.
Indeed, until recently, he aggressively attempted to extend his hegemony
into dominating contiguous Lebanon.
After
the “Arab Spring” triggered a civil war that has claimed 100,000+ lives
during the past 2 ½ years, Sunni radicals have allegedly grown to
dominate the “rebels,” even as factions thereof have conflicted.
Specifically, al-Qaeda elements have emerged, thereby quelling
enthusiasm among Westerners (USA/EU) to provide unbridled support. The
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), affiliated with al-Qaeda,
sponsors the most active militant group of Arab Nationalists/Islamists
in Syria, al Nusra. Most of its support is derived from Gulf Arab States and Turkey.
Upwards
of 38-50 million Kurds (encompassing those tracing their genealogy to
the Middle East) reside throughout Southwest Asia; this population is
in-flux, as war-induced emigration has prompted many to flock
temporarily into Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. Although predominantly
residing in NE-Syria (a region rich in agriculture and natural
resources), they live throughout Syria, as illustrated by the existence of the aptly-named Kurdish Mountain on Syrian coast in NW-Syria to Aleppo in the North. (This is a continuous area along the Turkish border.)
The
Kurds constitute the largest non-Arab ethnic group; their language is
based on Farsi, the Persian language (recalling that Cyrus the Great was
a Kurd). They have, therefore, dominated convocations of
disenfranchised populations seeking to piece-together provisional
governments; these meetings have been held primarily in Washington, D.C.
during the past half-decade, and they have counterpointed events
sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood that have harbored a comparable
goal. In addition, although the “official” tabulation is that the Kurds
constitute 15% of Syria (~3.3 million), another 16% have been “Arabized.” [see Will There Be Room for Kurds and Other Minorities in a Post-Assad Syria?]
The Kurds
Syrian
Kurds seek support from the international community, lest they be
forced to continue to divide loyalties among four regional
countries…each with competing interests. Having remained staunchly
pro-American, such loyalty merits the urgent provision of robust
assistance, if for no other reason than to assist the United States in
pursuit of the weapons-of-mass-destruction (primarily chemical) that
serve as Assad’s ultimate military “stick.” There is general agreement
that they must be secured before Islamic Terrorists are able to acquire
them, and the Kurds serve as natural allies in this effort.
One could argue that, at the end of the day, a region in North-NE-Syria
could serve as a semi-autonomous region but—until matters have been
settled throughout the country—any territory currently occupied by the
Kurds is vulnerable to attack from all sides. Thus, factions have become
aligned with contiguous nations, even as the neighboring countries
themselves enjoy quasi-alliances with more distant entities; for
example, the Saudis have supplied the rebels via Turkey, as America
seems to be doing through Jordan. This discussion excludes review of how
Assad is vigorously propped-up by Iran and Russia.
Assad’s Strangulation Strategy
Tragic
conditions have arisen in The Kurdish Region of Syria (primarily in the
north and northeast), which had been a safe haven for more than 4
million people during the past 2 years, including ½ million
recently-displaced Syrians. Kurds
have called upon the conscience of the international community to act
forcefully to prevent (or, at least) to reduce the deaths, destruction,
and starvation that is occurring due to the lack of food, electricity,
medicine and cooking and heating fuels. If humanitarian aid is not
received very soon, thousands of people will die due to starvation,
illness, and dropping temperature. All the UN aid goes to non-Kurdish Areas that are controlled by MB-led radicals
This has occurred as a result of what several parties have done, for several reasons:
During
the past four decades, Assad’s totalitarian regime has changed the
ethnic demography of the region by implanting Arab settlers in the
region and making the region economically dependent
on the rest of Syria. Economic development was disallowed,
infrastructure was ignored, the region’s resources (like gas and oil)
were extracted, and reinvestment in the region was impermissible. Thus,
despite the fact that the region is a breadbasket and constitutes
Syria’s only source of gas and oil, it became necessary to import
key-supplies (medicine, food, fuel, etc.) from the rest of Syria.
During
the Syrian revolution, the regime transferred all food resources
(wheat, grains, etc.) from the region to their own areas (emptying the
region of food resources) and no assistance, processed food, fuels, etc.
were sent back throughout this past year. This was designed to force the Kurds to take the regime’s side by only providing minimal assistance for loyalists.
Recently,
however, the regime lost control of the main routes to the region to
radical Islamist rebels armed by groups aligned with myriad al-Qaeda
movements (Jabhat al Nassra, Arab radical tribes lead by Nawaf
al-Bashar, Arab tribes belonging to the regime, and Jihadists). After
they cut-off the supply routes (for all goods, including medicine, food,
fuel, etc.), they confiscated or destroyed them, so as to force Kurds
to take their side of the conflict.
Assad, assisted by Arab settlers in the Kurdish Region and groups like the PYD [vide infra],
closed border crossings (like Qamishli and Derek); similarly, radical
Islamic movements or Salafist groups assumed control of other border
crossings that are now being used to advantage the interests of Turkey. On the Eastern border, Assad’s supply lines from Iran/Iraq to Syria—routed via the Kurdish Region of Syria—were disrupted by al-Qaeda groups. As
a result, the isolated Kurdish region faces famine; the lack of
electricity, seeds, and fuel for heating or transportation has led to
the failure of land cultivation, for at least half of this year’s crop
was not even planted.
The
Kurdish region has been besieged economically because of its peaceful
democratic revolution. Because they hope to resolve the civil war
democratically (and have, thereby, stayed away from Islamic radicalism
and political dictatorships), they are targeted by extremists on both
ends of the political spectrum. Because commerce has virtually ceased,
no salaries are being paid and prices have increased more than 10-fold
during the past year. Also,
non-Kurds receive international support from the UN, Qatar, and many
Arab Counties, whereas Syrian Kurds have been given only empty promises
from the KRG government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Indeed,
local doctors report they are receiving dozens of children daily who
are on the brink of death due to diseases, starvation and
weather-related illness. Because
the Kurdish Region lives in darkness and extreme cold temperatures,
people have been forced to heat themselves by cutting-down trees and
burning wooden furniture; most schools are closed because their wooden
seats have been burned.
The Kurdish Factions
Thus,
some familiarity with how this has transpired serves to enlighten those
who attempt to conjure how matters will play-out. As noted, three factions have emerged (KDP, PUK, and PKK), although only ~30% of Kurds are politically aligned with any of them; the
others have understandably attempted merely to survive the conflict,
but all seek a post-Assad government that will not be oppressive and
that, instead, will allow them to become stakeholders in Syria’s future
and promote a decentralized, democratic federalized Syria in which the
Syrian Kurdish Region will enjoy self-rule. This general summary
of the prevailing situation in the Kurdistan Region of Syria mainstreams
both expectations for the moment and visions for the foreseeable
future. Essentially, inasmuch as the Kurds irritate both Assad and
al-Qaeda, the natural alliance of the Kurds with America should be exploited
to optimize promotion of human rights, representative democracy, and
regional stability…thereby preventing radicalization of the Middle East.
The
factions are aligned (by myriad pathways) with the four regional
countries (Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria), each of which is to be
represented at a (Russia-inspired) proposed Kurdistan National
Conference in Erbil. The government of Iraqi Kurdistan—the KRG
(Kurdistan Regional Government)—is based in Erbil and plans to have
“independent” representation thereat, but it is anticipated to be
aligned with Baghdad which, in turn, will probably accommodate the
interests of fellow-Shiites leading Syria (Assad); and it appears that,
as America withdraws therefrom, Iraq will increasingly abide by the
interests of Iran.
The KRG’s coalition government consists of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) aligned with Syria and Turkey and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) aligned with Syria and Iran; because neither is supported by America, they
are attempting to retain whatever power is available via these
relationships, thereby sacrificing the interests of the Syrian Kurds. In
fact, this state of affairs has been noted by most Syrian Kurds from
KNC, by Kurdnas, and by independent observers; this is why Syrian Kurds
seek outside help for the region.
Another
faction is the PKK, which had dominated the conflict in eastern Turkey
with Ankara; that effort appears to have died-down, as attention of both
entities has turned southward. The PKK has also been bifurcated into
unofficial political entities. One
is currently working with Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue therein;
it is anticipated that it will yield minimal cultural rights (and will prop-up Erdogan), for discussion is being led by the political leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been imprisoned. The other has morphed into the military wing of PKK led by Cemil Bayik, and it is currently working with Assad and Iran to support PYD (Democratic Union Party). PYD is linked to PKK’s military wing, but neither its name nor its Charter/Constitution mentions Kurds; rather, Bayik promotes a radical socialist Stalinist ideology in support of Assad.
The
PYD is ostensibly more militant, but it supports Assad (and Iran) and
thus does not enjoy widespread support among Kurds; it has watched Assad
deny fundamental life-support (food, water, electricity) to the Kurds,
causing prices to have become inflated to levels 5-10 times the levels
throughout the rest of Syria. This oppression (and staged fighting)
promulgated by the Assad-PYD alliance explains why, during the past
eight months—unlike Christians and Arabs (even those who have arrived as
refugees from other war-torn
villages)—more than 300,000 Kurds have emigrated and/or fled to Iraqi
Kurdistan and Turkey. While experiencing this turmoil, they are trying
to escape from tyranny imposed by PYD, al-Qaeda groups and Assad’s
forces.
All three non-Syrian Kurd groups harm Syrian Kurds by trying to control them and, then, to reduce their rights through their support of Iran (PUK), Turkey (KDP) and Syria (PYD/PUK/KDP).
Specifically, the KDP is trying to link them along the Sunni Crescent
that runs through Turkey, abiding by the Syrian National Coalition
(dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood) which controls the Free Syrian
Army (FSA); meanwhile, the PYD and the PUK from Iraq are trying to link
them along the Shia Crescent that runs through Syria, abiding by the
wishes of Syria (and Iran).
Assad’s Military Strategy
Assad and his allies (Iran, KRG, PYD=PKK) are
fighting Radical Islamists and their allies (ISIS and al-Nusra),
although infighting among rebel elements occasionally arises. Assad is
trying to convince the Kurds to support PYD as the Representative of the
Kurds while Islamists are recruiting Kurds to support
regime-infiltrated groups such al-Nusra. Assad has wanted to show the
international community that only he can keep the country unified, stop
ethnic/sectarian wars, ensure al-Qaeda does not obtain WMD (chemical and
biological), and fight infidels (Zionists, Americans and Kurds). It does appear unlikely, now, that he will be able to maintain this façade after having engaged in chemical warfare.
Cemil Bayik, who orchestrates what is happening in Syrian Kurdistan, is the real military leader/commander of PKK (and thus, controls PYD). Presumably,
his recent relocation from Qandil Mountain via Mousal to Kurdistan of
Syria (Qamishly) was facilitated by the KRG and Iran/Iraq. He is working
with Assad (and Iraq and Iran) to exert control over the Kurdish Region
of Syria by clearing the Syrian-Iraqi Border from unfriendly groups, thereby opening a supply line from Iraq/Iran to the Syrian eastern border, abutting Iraq; in the process, he would
prevent Kurds from leaving. He is also echoing Assad’s argument
[amplified by Russia and China] that America is unjustifiably trying to
split Syria and thus to create ethnic division between Arabs and Kurds.
Other groups linked to al-Qaeda that worked with Assad during the Iraq
War convey the same message to Arabs (coordinated by Assad/Iraq/Iran).
In
short, Assad is trying to change the narrative from focusing on a
Syrian revolution against him to the need for Arabs to oppose Kurds vis-à-vis Hezbollah and PYD. Now
that Hezbollah had helped Assad in efforts to re-take Homs), Hezbollah
would be free to wreak worldwide havoc, while the PYD would be
dispatched to fight on the Iraq/Syrian border
to create national movements against the Kurds, reduce pressure on the
regime, and rally Kurdish support against Syrian oppositions.
Meanwhile,
opposition-rebels are trying to accuse the Kurds of being separatists,
supporters of the PYD, and even Assad supporters; as evidence, they
claim the PYD tried to split the Kurdish Region from Syria (in
coordination with Assad!) to create a quasi-independent entity; this
imaginative plot necessitates that all parties—including the Kurdistan
region in federal Iraq—are working against Syrian Kurds to keep Assad in
power, per Iran’s request.
And,
pursuant to this scenario, the Kurdish political movement and the
Kurdish “street” would have to be sold on the notion that massive
regional migration (even from liberated Kurdish areas) would have
occurred due to the liberation. To puncture this argument, Kurds would
merely have to note that emigration had suddenly exploded; whereas, more
than a half-century of Pan-Arab Baathist Arabization policy against the
Kurds had prompted fewer than 250,000 Kurds to move from Syrian
Kurdistan, more than 300,000 Kurds had become refuges (in Iraqi
Kurdistan and Turkey) after less than one year of PYD-control over
Syrian Kurds. Indeed, why would having been liberated trigger massive
migration?
Action-Items
That is why most Syrian Kurds, the Kurdnas, and the KNC seek help from the international community; neither the KRG nor
nearby countries can be believed or trusted. Kurds hope other countries
would enthusiastically support the Syrian revolution and robustly
appreciate why it would be preferable for Kurds to assume leadership
thereof; Kurds could effectively stabilize the Syrian conflict (stopping
the violence) and gently promote a representative democracy (protecting
WMD). It is now intuitive that Assad can no longer control Syria’s
(secretly maintained) chemical weapons, and it is now clear Assad has
been promoting ethnic/sectarian civil wars to distract his citizenry
from addressing his thuggery. Because Syrian opposition-rebels cannot be assumed to promise a meaningful improvement over the status-quo regarding democracy and Kurdish Rights, this type of paradigm-shift is long overdue.
The
risk of generating policy based on upon word-of-mouth is ever-present,
but it is possible that Putin has deviated privately from his public
stance—reiterated on August 25, 2013 @ 6:05 p.m.—namely, that “Russia
issued a stark warning today against renewed calls for foreign military
intervention in Syria after an alleged chemical weapons attack near
Damascus last week.” Thus, to whatever degree he may be attempting to
goad America into launching some type of limited air-campaign (rather
than, for example, imposing a no-fly-zone) may harbor a “public
relations” component, for he does not appear to have agreed to any
serious move to oust Assad. Perhaps
any degree of concurrence with the United States, therefore, may
placate others who would want him—somehow—to accept the potential for
“consequences” to ensue after Assad has unabashedly crossed a neon-lit
“red line.”
A
second “breaking report” that has emerged suggests that Syrian Kurds
aligned with the KNC may have been forced to join the SNC, symbolized by
the fact that “The Democratic Union Party (PYD) flag was replaced by
the Kurdish National Council flag in the northern Syrian town of Ras
al-Ayn early on July 26.” Perhaps Syrian Kurds are being forced to
accept joining the SNC because Iraqi Kurds failed to help them while PYD
and Assad were undermining their interests and the FSA and Islamists
were attacking them. Indeed, the “price” ethnic Kurds may be forced to
pay for American intervention—of whatever ilk—may be agreement to a
shotgun-marriage with other political entities functioning under the
auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood.
These ideas have been explored further in a recent essay by a Middle East Expert, Joseph Puder:
In summary, assistance had been requested that could be delivered in a number of ways:
· Provide political and economic support to the Syrian Kurdistan Federal Region.
· Ensure
humanitarian aid can be delivered to the Kurds by pressuring Turkey and
Iraq to open border crossings under their control and under the control
of Turkey’s aligned Salafist groups.
· Ensure humanitarian aid can be delivered to the Kurds through Qamishli International Airport.
· Declare
the Kurdish Region as a military exclusion and no-fly zone (both for
the current regime and for radicals) for humanitarian purposes.
· Distribute
any/all assistance delivered to Iraqi Kurdistan via the UN (rather than
through the KRG, which is riddled with corruption).
· Declare
PYD as a non-Kurdish entity, for it does not represent Kurds (and
instead, is linked to PKK, which America has declared a terrorist
organization).
· Declare
as “terrorist” any entity in the Syrian opposition from SNC to FSA that
supports attacks on Kurds (for such assaults on unarmed civilians
constitute ethnic cleansing).
Those
who claim that there is only one choice in this matter (arming Assad or
the “Rebels”) must be helped to view the conflict within a larger
context; opposition is not homogeneous. Although facets of the
below-depiction of the dynamics affecting the region may be disputed,
its clear message (in addition to suggesting America often “has no
clue”) is that this is a multidimensional conundrum that must be viewed
from the perspective of satisfying fundamental American interests. In
this case, acting upon humanitarian concerns urgently would dovetail
with the need to help long-term friends of the United States who can be
depended upon to help others build a modern Syria that is at-peace with
its neighbors.
{*-Dr. Sherkoh Abbas is president of the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria He may be contacted at sherkoh@gmail.com. Dr. Sklaroff is a hematologist, oncologist and internist. He may be contacted at rsklaroff@gmail.com. Their prior analysis of this issue (“The Road To Iran Runs Through Kurdistan – And Starts In Syria”) was initially published on 4/15/2008 (http://www.doctor-bob.biz/AA-Political%20Essays/Foreign%20Affairs/kurdistan.htm) and was reprinted on 3/6/2013 (http://www.israpundit.com/archives/53330). An extended-interview of Dr. Abbas (which includes elaborative demographic information) was published in June, 2012 (http://www.newenglishreview.org/print.cfm?pg=custpage&frm=7937&sec_id=115831).}
Thanks Ted Belman
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