INSS
Insight No. 530
Oded
Eran, Yoel Guzansky . http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6776 SUMMARY: Notwithstanding the initial successes
scored by political Islam with the
uprising in the Middle East, the politically-oriented Sunni movements in the Arab world, be they
the veteran Muslim Brotherhood or newer
groups, have been put on the defensive. From Tunisia to the Persian
Gulf, Arab regimes and societies
are showing resilience and determination as they confront the attempt to impose a radical Islamic
interpretation on their way of
life. If there is any kind of common denominator among the anti-clerical protests it is represented by Saudi
Arabia, intent on preventing unrest,
neutralizing threats, stabilizing regimes, and, to the extent
possible, trying to influence
Islamists in the Gulf and elsewhere. Notwithstanding the initial successes scored by
political Islam with the uprising
in the Middle East, the politically-oriented Sunni movements in the Arab world, be they the veteran Muslim
Brotherhood or newer groups, have
been put on the defensive. From Tunisia to the Persian Gulf, Arab
regimes and societies are showing
resilience and determination as they confront the attempt to impose a radical Islamic interpretation on their
way of life. If there is any kind
of common denominator among the anti-clerical protests it is represented by Saudi Arabia, intent
on preventing unrest, neutralizing
threats, stabilizing regimes, and, to the extent possible, trying
to influence Islamists in the Gulf
and elsewhere.
The role and status of political
Islam, especially the Muslim Brotherhood
and affiliated movements, are a point of contention among the Gulf
states. Some of the monarchies have
demonstrated their growing concern for the survivability of their regimes in face of the threat of
political Islam. The UAE, for
example, is currently trying about one hundred members of al-Islah (“Reforms”), a movement associated with
the Muslim Brotherhood. On March 5,
2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain announced they were recalling
their ambassadors from Qatar
because of Qatar’s support for the Muslim
Brotherhood, which they view as subversive and a threat to their
stability. A few days later, both
Saudi Arabia and Egypt added the movement to their lists of terrorist organizations and arrested some of its
supporters. By contrast,
Qatar has not only provided asylum for Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Brotherhood’s supreme religious
authority, but also allows him to host a
weekly show on al-Jazeera where he is free to preach on a host of
subjects, including the attitude
to the Muslim Brotherhood in some of the Gulf states. Relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia became particularly
tense in 1995 when Hamad Bin
Khalifa seized control of the Qatari government, a move that impacted negatively on the Gulf
Cooperation Council (and in 2002-2007 Saudi Arabia did not have an ambassador in Doha). Now too, the
policy toward Islamist elements
has sparked tension among the Gulf States and punctured the veneer of unity created during the
Arab Spring (seen, for example, in
the common opposition to Qaddafi and Assad). The specific Saudi concern is that political Islam
offers an alternate model to existing
governing structures and provides a substitute political framework grounded in religious
legitimacy. Political Islam offers not only the possibility of another system – Western democracy does
the same – and not only competes
with existing systems combining state and religion, like the connection between the al-Saud
family and the Wahhabi religious
establishment, but represents a threat to the existing order. In
other words, because of its
religious element and because many movements promote democratic elections and participate in them, it offers a
concrete, attractive alternative
to the old order and has proven capable of toppling governments, both in Egypt and Tunisia. Moreover, in a
tribal society, such as in the
Gulf, political Islam is seen as a challenge to social norms and rules, the class structure, and the
tribe’s elite leadership.
Beyond the Gulf, groups identified with the Muslim Brotherhood or
its philosophy are also on the
defensive. In February 2014, the Ennahda
movement, the Tunisian political party that represents the moderate
Muslim movements and won the election immediately after the
ousting of Zine Abidine Bin Ali,
was forced to cede control of the country to a government of technocrats until an election to be
held later this year. The Ennahda-led
government failed in the socio-economic realm and likewise failed to
improve national security. It was
also accused of being soft toward extreme Muslim movements whose militias tried to impose an Islamist way of
life on Tunisia. Pressure exerted
by Europe and the United States along with internal constraints prompted Ennahda to abandon its objective of
establishing an Islamic state
ruled by sharia, Islamic religious law. In January 2014, the country adopted a generally liberal
constitution, though it does promote the
Islamic and Arab nature of the state. The Muslim Brotherhood control of Egypt, from late
June 2012 until early July 2013,
was short lived. In what seemed like capitalization on the popular protests against the hijacking
of the January 2011 revolution by
Egyptian Islamic movements, the Egyptian army regained control of
the country. The election this
coming July will determine if the next president will again emerge from the military, as was the case since
1952, with the exception of
Morsi’s one year in office. Saudi Arabia’s willingness, in defiance of Washington, to stand behind
the Egyptian army and funnel money
to the Egyptian government is an important element in the struggle
for control of a nation whose
economy has been badly damaged in the last three years. In
Jordan, a combination of tactical and strategic errors by the Jordanian faction of the Muslim Brotherhood,
starting with the boycott of the
parliamentary election in January 2013; the government’s smart handling
of the campaign to diffuse the
protests; and what is at least a temporary downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, has significantly
eroded the movement’s status.
Money from the Gulf states, especially Saudi money, made it possible for the Jordanian royal
family to provide a relative sense of
stability. The House of Saud, despite its historically ambivalent
attitude to the House of Hashem,
cannot ignore the enormous burden levied on Jordan by the Syrian civil war, where some of the opposition forces
are helped by massive Saudi
aid. Given its perception of
the Iranian threat, the Qatari audacity, and Washington’s drifting, Riyadh has decided to fight back. The
question of whether it can
successfully navigate internal problems (including a generational changing of the guard, a low but steady flame
of Shiite dissent in the eastern
province, changes on the global energy market, and the entrance of new players such as Russia
and China into the vacuum left by the
United States) as well as assume a leading role in the Arab world
remains wide open. The removal of the Muslim
Brotherhood from the Egyptian government also has immediate implications for the Gaza Strip where Hamas is in
government. Since the summer of
2013, the Egyptians have closed most of the tunnels and cut Hamas’s revenues that relied on
taxes levied on tunnel trade and
commerce. The budgetary crisis (resulting also from a halt in some Gulf
aid) means that the Hamas
government cannot pay the salaries of the civil servants and security forces, two vital mechanisms for
retaining public support. And
indeed, according to various polls, support for the Hamas government has plummeted, even if the
erosion in the support for Hamas does
not necessarily indicate a subsequent fall of the Gaza Strip
government. The current
conflict among the Gulf states, one of the most significant challenges to the Gulf Cooperation
Council since its establishment in 1981,
stresses the anger and frustration with Qatar’s policy in the Gulf
and beyond. Saudi Arabia believes
that Qatar’s policy and actions weaken the GCC and important Arab states, such as Egypt, which intends to hold
presidential and parliamentary
elections and conclude the political process that began with the ouster of President Morsi last
July. Moreover, the split among the
Gulf states on the role and status of political Islam is liable to be
rife with ramifications for the
role and status of Iran. The crisis allows Iran – interested in driving a wedge among the six in order to
prevent the formation of a united
front against it – to deepen the split among the Gulf states and isolate the Saudis from their smaller neighbors.
This has also affected the Saudi
attempt to unite the Arab Gulf states announced by King Abdullah (the Riyadh Declaration) in
December 2011. Furthermore, the crisis
will certainly not make it any easier for the United States to attain goals that require security cooperation among
the six Arab Gulf states, e.g., the
deployment of anti-missile defense systems meant to provide a
better response to the Iranian
threat. Israel, of course, has an interest in seeing the moderate regimes strengthened, especially those on its
borders – Egypt, Jordan, and the
Palestinian Authority. And while a resolution, even if partial, of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is no guarantee of the
stability of these regimes, calm on the Israeli-Palestinian front will
make it easier for them to cope
more successfully with their domestic problems. ________________________________________ IMRA - Independent
Media Review and Analysis
Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on
Arab-Israeli relations
Website: www.imra.org.il
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