Doc's Talk: Financial Setbacks for Hamas

Friday, December 05, 2008

Financial Setbacks for Hamas

Matthew Levitt
December 3, 2008

Over the past few weeks, Hamas's international financial support network suffered a series of setbacks, most notably the U.S. federal court conviction of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five of its leaders on charges of providing material support to Hamas. Despite these convictions and the broad sanctions in place against Hamas, however, the group remains capable of raising substantial funds, through both traditional and innovative means. Holy Land Foundation Conviction
On November 24, a Dallas jury convicted the HLF of all counts in a major terrorist finance case. According to the Justice Department, "HLF intentionally hid its financial support for Hamas behind the guise of charitable donations" amounting to approximately $12.4 million "provided in support to Hamas and its goal of creating an Islamic Palestinian state by eliminating the State of Israel through violent jihad."

Evidence presented at the trial revealed that the foundation's leadership was well aware it was funding Hamas charities. For example, a 1991 report sent by an unindicted coconspirator of HLF's chief executive officer, Shukri Abu Baker, specifically listed charity committees controlled by Hamas; some committees were noted "all of it is ours" while others were described as "guaranteed." Later, at a 1993 meeting featuring HLF officials, Muin Shabib, a member of Hamas's terrorist Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, categorized the institutions tied to Hamas as educational, social, charitable, cultural, medical, and religious. He then proceeded to describe specific charities and organizations in the West Bank and Gaza -- some of which were affiliated with HLF -- as "our [Hamas] institutions." Coming on the heels of a hung jury in the first HLF prosecution last year, the "guilty on all counts" verdict is a major blow to Hamas fundraising in the United States under the guise of charity.

Union of Good
Just two weeks before the HLF verdict on November 12, the Treasury Department designated the Union of Good (Etelaf al-Khair, also known as the Charity Coalition), a Saudi-based umbrella organization that began as a fundraising drive and developed into an institution working with more than fifty Islamic foundations worldwide, as a "specially designated global terrorist entity" (SDGT). According to the Palestinian Preventive Security in the Gaza Strip, "The Union [of Good] is considered -- with regard to material support -- one of the biggest Hamas supporters." Noting its ties to Hamas, Israel outlawed the organization in February 2002. According to Treasury, Hamas leaders created the Union of Good in 2002, stating that it "facilitates the transfer of tens of millions of dollars a year to Hamas-managed associations." The Union "acts as a broker for Hamas by facilitating financial transfers between a web of charitable organizations . . . and Hamas-controlled organizations in the West Bank and Gaza."

The SDGT designation appears to already have had an impact on Hamas financing. A few days after Treasury's decision, the British bank Lloyds TSB instructed the Birmingham-based Islamic Bank of Britain to cease dealings with Interpal, a UK-based charity previously designated as a Hamas-financing entity by the U.S. government and highlighted as a central player in the Union of Good's web of Hamas-associated charities.

New Funding Streams in Gaza
Despite the recent successes in efforts to disrupt Hamas's financing, the group is still able to raise substantial funds. As the governing party in Gaza, Hamas has access to new sources of funding, including taxes and customs fees. The European Union, for example, halted fuel shipments to Gaza in August 2007 over concern that Hamas would tax Gazans to fund its government and military arm. Hamas also began to impose large taxes on companies operating in Gaza, in addition to taxing specific commodities, many of which have been smuggled into the area.

Hamas also initiated fees for the registration of vehicles, licenses, and birth certificates. The group imposed heavy fines for the failure to license or register cars in Gaza, and opened customs offices near several border crossings to collect customs duties on incoming goods. These duties also apply to smuggled goods. Hamas reportedly patrols the network of underground tunnels in Gaza and shuts down those whose operators fail to pay these charges.

Due to Hamas's position, the group also gained full control over Gaza's zakat (charity) committees. While some zakat committees have long been associated with Hamas, they all require government registration and some operate independently of the group. Under the Hamas government, zakat funds have been channeled into the government budget -- to fund whatever Hamas deems necessary.

Tried and True Fundraising
With its new governmental responsibilities in Gaza, Hamas's financial needs have increased dramatically. In addition to new fundraising techniques, Hamas still supports itself financially employing many of the same tactics it used prior to winning the January 2006 election and seizing control of Gaza in 2007. Smuggling goods and weapons into Gaza by using the extensive network of tunnels underneath Gaza that lead to both Israel and Egypt has remained an important source of funds. In fact, the number of tunnels has reportedly risen from fifteen in 2007 to nearly 120 in March 2008. Hamas has controlled these tunnels since shortly after the 2006 election and utilizes the network to smuggle militants, cash, weapons, and commercial goods in and out of the Strip. The most "lucrative" commercial activity has been the smuggling, and subsequent selling, of cigarettes, which has aided Hamas in its plight to financially support itself and the Gaza government.

Hamas has also continued to raise funds for its West Bank and Gaza activities through its network of social welfare and charitable organizations. These, however, have come under increased scrutiny in the West Bank over the past year. In July 2008, Israel outlawed thirty-six nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the West Bank, charging them with fundraising for Hamas. Palestinian officials say they have shut sixty-eight Hamas centers and confiscated some 8.5 million Israeli shekels. They have also begun to replace Hamas leaders on zakat committee boards and audit the many NGOs that Hamas quickly -- and often improperly -- approved while heading the National Unity Government from March to June 2007. According to Israeli government data, nearly $120 million was transferred to the West Bank and Gaza in 2007 "to finance the activities of terrorist organizations in these areas." It is estimated that foreign donations account for most of Hamas's revenue, funding not only the Gazan government but also the military and organizational aspects of the movement.

A large portion of Hamas funding from foreign governments has historically come from Iran -- a trend that has continued since Hamas governed the Gaza Strip. In March 2007, Khaled Mashal, the political leader of Hamas, visited Iran and stated that the Islamic Republic had been providing financial support for his group since it took office in 2006. Although Mashal detailed that funding from Iran would continue, he did not provide a specific amount. Qatar has cited the humanitarian crisis caused by the international financial isolation of Hamas in Gaza to justify its support for the group. In early 2008, however, a senior aide to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas stated that Qatar gives Hamas "millions of dollars a month," some of which may be used to purchase weapons. Iran and Qatar's financial support of Hamas is illustrative of the movement's continued reliance to tried and true methods.

Conclusion
This September, the editor-in-chief of the Arabic daily al-Sharq al-Awsat wrote, "It is clear that Hamas's priority is to look after its militants, at the expense of Gaza's people and their suffering!" Even under siege, the militant Hamas movement in Gaza continues to have access to funds while the Strip's residents do not. To disrupt Hamas financing further, the United States and the international community together must continue to crack down on the group's fraudulent fundraising and press Egypt to do more to shut the smuggling tunnels that funnel funds and goods to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Matthew Levitt is director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and at The Washington Institute. He is the author, with Michael Jacobson, of The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances (2008).

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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