Doc's Talk: Israel's Future in the 'New Middle East'

Sunday, March 13, 2011

Israel's Future in the 'New Middle East'

Louis René Beres

For Israel, the basic Jewish philosophic choice between life and death, between the "blessing" and the "curse," has always been clear. What remains problematic, of course, is precisely how to best ensure the former. And in these especially uncertain times of a "New Middle East," the strategic search for Jewish national survival has become even more complex and perilous.

From their very ingathered beginnings, and even before the United Nations conferral of sovereign statehood in 1948, Jews in Israel have faced war, terror and extinction. Now, Israel confronts existential destruction from two increasingly plausible sources: (1) the already-constituted and nuclearizing state of Iran; and (2) the still-aspiring state of "Palestine." Together, largely in various unrecognized and even unimagined synergies, the interactive effects of these two mega-threats portend strong reason for very deep concern. he fragile existential situation in an incrementally chaotic region is made more worrisome by U.S. President Barack Obama's misguided support for a "Two-State Solution," and, correspondingly, by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's formal acceptance of a Palestinian state that has been "demilitarized." The Palestinian side (Hamas, Fatah, it makes little difference) still seeks only a One-State solution (on all their maps, Israel is already drawn as a part of "Palestine"). As for a demilitarized Palestine, it could never actually happen.

This is true, in part, because any post-independence abrogation of earlier pre-state agreements to demilitarize by a now-sovereign Palestinian state could be entirely permissible under international law.

Iran is an established state with an expanding near-term potential to inflict nuclear harms upon Israel. The so-called "international community" has effectively done absolutely nothing to stop Iranian nuclearization. Metaphorically, the "sanctions" have represented little more than a mildly-pestering fly on the lumbering elephant's back.

The Palestinian Authority, with its Fatah "security forces" now expertly trained by the U.S. military in unstable Jordan (under American Lt. General Keith Dayton), maintains exterminatory plans for Israel. These unhidden plans are shared by the Hamas-led configuration of assorted terror groups that collaborates regularly and systematically with Iran, and that now draws renewed sustenance from its quickly-growing Muslim Brotherhood "parent" organization in Egypt. Still rapidly-developing Iranian-Syrian war plans against Israel from Lebanon that would involve Hezb'allah proxies could add yet another decisive synergistic threat to the explosive genocidal mix.

What shall Israel do in this more and more confusing regional maelstrom? If President Obama's openly expressed wish for "a world free of nuclear weapons" were ever realized, the survival issue would become moot. Fortunately, this presidential hope is not only foolish, but wholly unrealistic, and Israel will likely retain the critical deterrence benefit of its "bomb in the basement."

The extent of this particular benefit, however, may vary, inter alia, according to a number of important factors. These include Jerusalem's observable willingness to make limited disclosures of the country's usable and penetration-capable nuclear forces, and also the extent to which the Israeli government and military selectively reveal certain elements of Israel's nuclear targeting doctrine.

From the standpoint of successful deterrence, it will make a major difference if Israel's nuclear forces are recognizably counter value (targeted on enemy cities), or counterforce (targeted on enemy weapons, and related infrastructures). In turn, Israel's decisions on targeting policy may be affected, more or less, by current and ongoing regime transformations across the Middle East and North Africa.

"For what can be done against force, without force?" inquired the Roman statesman Cicero. The use of force in world politics is not inherently evil. On the contrary, in preventing nuclear and terrorist aggressions, force, though certainly not a panacea, is almost always indispensable.

All states have a fundamental ("peremptory," in the language of formal jurisprudence) right of self-defense. This right is explicit and unambiguous in both codified and customary international law. It can be found, in part, at Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and also in multiple authoritative clarifications of anticipatory self-defense.

Israel has every legal right to forcibly confront the expected (and possibly mutually reinforcing) harms of both Iranian nuclear missile strikes, and Palestinian terror.

Albert Camus, recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957, would have us all be "neither victims nor executioners," living not in a world in which killing has disappeared ("we are not so crazy as that"), but one wherein killing has become illegitimate. This is a fine expectation, to be sure, but the celebrated French philosopher did not anticipate another evil force for whom utter extermination of "The Jews" was its declared object.

Credo quia absurdum. "I believe because it is absurd." Not even in a still-crazy world living under the shadow of Holocaust did Camus agree to consider such an utterly preposterous prospect.

Israel lacks the quaint luxury of French philosophy. Were the Jewish State to follow Camus' genteel reasoning, the result could be another boundless enlargement of Jewish suffering. Before and during the Holocaust, at least for those who still had an opportunity to flee, Jews were ordered: "Get out of Europe; go to Palestine." When they complied (those who could), the next order was: "Get out of Palestine."

My own Austrian-Jewish grandparents received "special handling" on the SS-killing grounds at Riga, Latvia. Had they somehow made it to Mandatory Palestine, their sons and grandsons, now Israelis, would likely have died in subsequent genocidal wars begun by Arab forces to get the Jews "out of Palestine."

Cicero understood. Failure to use force against a murderous evil imprints an indelible stain upon all that is good. A similar point can be found in the Talmud, which clarifies that by being merciful to the cruel, one becomes cruel to the merciful.

By declining the right to act as a lawful executioner in its struggle with annihilatory war and terror, Israel would be forced by Camus' stylized reasoning, and by neglect of its own authoritative scriptures, to embrace disappearance.

Why was Camus, who was thinking only in the broadest generic terms, so badly mistaken? The answer lies in the philosopher's unsupportable presumption of a natural reciprocity among both individual human beings and states in the primal matter of killing. We are asked to believe, by Camus, that as greater numbers of people agree not to become executioners, still greater numbers will follow upon the same brotherly course. In time, the neatly mathematical argument proceeds, the number of those who refuse to accept killing will become so great that there will be fewer and fewer victims.

Sounds nice. But Camus' presumed reciprocity simply does not exist. It can never exist, especially in the still-Jihad centered "New Middle East." Here, the unhidden Islamist desire to kill Jews (always "Jews," not Israelis) remains unimpressed by good intentions, or by Israel's disproportionate contributions to science, industry, medicine and learning. Here, in the basically unchanged "New Middle East," there are no identifiable Iranian or Palestinian plans for rational coexistence. Their only decipherable "remedies" are for an all-too- familiar Final Solution.

Exeunt omnes.

Martin Buber identifies the essence of every living community as "meeting." True community, says Buber, is an authentic "binding," not merely a "bundling together." In true community, each one commits his whole being in "God's dialogue with the world," and each stands firm and resolute throughout this dialogue.

But how should the dialogue be sustained with others who refuse to "bind" in the absence of murder? How can there ever be any conceivable solution to the genocidal enmity of Iran and "Palestine" to Israel so long as this enmity is presumably indispensable to their very lifeblood meanings in the world?

These are not easy questions to answer; moreover, they will never be answered by political leaders in Washington, Jerusalem or anywhere else.

The time for clichéd "wisdom" is over. In national self-defense and counter-terrorism, Jewish executioners require an honored place in the government and army of Israel. Without them, evil would triumph again and again.

For Iran and for an emergent "Palestine," murdered Jews are not so much a means to an end, as a prayed-for end in themselves. In this unheroic Islamist world, even while so much of the region is now seemingly struggling for "democracy," sacrificial killing of Jews by war and terror is still widely-presumed to be a religious mandate, and also a distinctly coveted path to personal immortality. It follows that any Israeli unwillingness to use all necessary defensive force could invite both individual and collective Jewish death.

Cicero understood. Legally and morally, killing is sometimes a sacred duty. Faced with undisguised sources of genuine evil, all civilized states sometimes have to rely upon the executioner. To deny the Israeli executioner his proper place at this eleventh-hour of danger would make a mockery of "Never Again." Just as importantly, it would open the floodgates of several new man-made human catastrophes.

In the best of all possible worlds, Buber's "binding" would supplant all "bundling." But we don't yet live in the best of all possible worlds, and there is absolutely nothing in the "New Middle East" to suggest any real chances for meaningful improvement. In their present condition, Jews in Israel must still remain utterly prepared to fight strenuously for Jewish survival.

Life is always better than death. Better the blessing than the curse.

Louis René Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) lectures and publishes widely on issues concerning international relations and international law, especially war and terrorism. He is the author of some of the earliest major books on nuclear war and nuclear terror.

Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/03/israels_future_in_the_new_midd.html at March 13, 2011 - 10:15:23 AM CDT

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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