Doc's Talk: ISRAEL AND LEBANON AT ODDS OVER OFFSHORE BORDER

Thursday, July 14, 2011

ISRAEL AND LEBANON AT ODDS OVER OFFSHORE BORDER

Simon Henderson

Tensions are rising between Israel and Lebanon due to potentially huge offshore gas and oil reserves in yet-to-be-agreed "exclusive economic zones" in the eastern Mediterranean.

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On July 10, Israel announced that it will soon submit a claim to the United Nations demarcating its maritime boundary with Lebanon. The announcement came a day after a Lebanese newspaper published a front-page story suggesting that Israel was claiming offshore exploration rights in Lebanese waters. Israel has already discovered substantial reserves of offshore natural gas, setting the scene for fractious disputes over land and sea borders. Such disputes could even put Israeli offshore installations at risk of attack by Hizballah, a group that has access to Iranian missiles and is now part of the Lebanese government. TERRITORIAL WATERS AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES

The latest row between Israel and Lebanon stems from differing notions of the criteria by which their maritime border should be drawn, which until the hydrocarbon discoveries had not been a particular issue. Lebanon has not yet begun looking for natural gas offshore, but it has agreed on, though not ratified, a maritime line with the island of Cyprus. Beirut has also reportedly sent the UN a map illustrating its view of where the Israel-Lebanon maritime border lies. Israel is now doing the same.

Over the years, various international arguments over fishing rights and offshore oil led to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea permitting exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Specifically, countries could claim maritime borders extending 200 nautical miles from the low-water mark on their coasts. For countries with less than 400 nautical miles separating them, the convention offers additional principles for drawing agreed-on maritime boundaries. Israel and Cyprus reached such an agreement last year, encouraging further exploration of recent and substantial gas findings in Israel's EEZ. Cyprus likely has large gas deposits in its EEZ as well.

LAW OF THE SEA

The main Law of the Sea principle by which maritime borders are drawn between two adjacent coastal states is the notion of "baselines," or straight lines that run along the coast. Once this principle is applied, the border is drawn equidistantly from points along the coasts. In the case of Israel and Lebanon, this approach produces a border extending from the coast at approximately 300 degrees, or slightly below northwest. Although Lebanon has not revealed its official view, an Israeli newspaper has produced a map claiming the Lebanese line runs at 292 degrees. Arab media reports seem to suggest the line's bearing should be 270 degrees -- that is, directly west, continuing the rough line of the assumed land border between the two countries.

An Israeli official view of the maritime line is suggested on a map depicting recent government petroleum leases and licenses, as posted on the Ministry of National Infrastructures website (http://www.mni.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/D416D03A-BCA1-49D0-8FF3-8A8A3FC71EC1/0/PetroleumRights01_06_11Geogr.jpg). The Lebanese paper al-Safir featured a map very similar to this on its July 9 front page, alongside a story claiming that Lebanon would defend its borders.

In addition to the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries, negotiating a maritime border could be complicated by disagreements on where their land border lies. Yet such differences might not amount to much, given that any land disputes at the border point nearest the coast -- known as Ras Naqoura in Arabic and Rosh Hanikra in Hebrew -- can probably be measured in yards, if not feet.

In Israel's potential favor, a line of small reefs and rocky islands (viewable on Google Earth) lies several hundred yards offshore between the northern Israeli city of Nahariya and Ras Naqoura/Rosh Hanikra. According to Law of the Sea conventions, such islands could be considered the baseline for calculating the maritime border. If so, this would shift Israel's EEZ even further northwest into what Lebanon currently regards as its own waters.

Of course, the legal situation may be further complicated by the fact that Israel has not yet signed the Law of the Sea treaty. Other potentially relevant nonsignatories include Syria and Turkey; the United States has signed but not ratified it.

CYPRUS IN AN UNENVIABLE POSITION

The Cypriot government, having negotiated maritime boundaries with both Israel and Lebanon, now finds itself a potential party in a nasty diplomatic squabble. Israeli officials argue that the northern point of the Israel-Cyprus maritime border is exactly the same as the southern point of the Lebanon-Cyprus agreement, suggesting that Lebanese negotiators implicitly recognized Israel's view of the line between the Lebanese and Israeli EEZs. That would fit a pattern seen in certain other international disputes regarding offshore oil and gas development, in which the parties refuse to abandon their claims but work out a way for each side to develop resources.

This implied recognition of Israel's EEZ could hamper or even scuttle Lebanese parliamentary ratification of the agreement with Cyprus. Yet the main reason for the legislative delay appears to be Lebanon's reluctance to annoy Turkey, which believes it has a crucial interest in the island's decisions. This belief dates from 1974, when Ankara ordered the invasion of Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish-speaking minority. Several thousand Turkish soldiers still occupy positions in the northern part of the island. Indeed, Ankara has already condemned the Cyprus-Israel agreement, although both Nicosia and Israel have apparently ignored these comments.

ISRAEL'S GROWING GAS RICHES

The strong and even bellicose statements coming out of Lebanon are unlikely to halt Israel's development of recently discovered natural gas deposits. Its giant Leviathan field -- the largest offshore gas discovery in the world last year, slated for export purposes -- lies in Blocks 349 and 350, south of Lebanon's reportedly claimed line. The Tamar field, intended for domestic consumption, lies similarly well south. Currently estimated at around 750 billion cubic meters, Israel's total natural gas reserves could prove double that figure, not to mention potential oil findings. The country's current consumption is around 4 bcm per year, so the newfound reserves should expand its domestic use while still giving it a considerable surplus for export.

A short-term hiccup in Israel's plans is the increasing vulnerability of gas imports from Egypt due to recurring sabotage of the Sinai pipeline. Its current domestic supplies -- obtained from the Mari-B field off Ashkelon -- will be depleted before the Tamar field starts production, so long-term interruption of Egyptian supplies could prove problematic. In the meantime, Israel has plans in place for using the small Noagas field and mooring a floating regasification plant off the coast so that it can import liquefied natural gas.

U.S. ROLE

Despite the recent rhetoric from Israel and Lebanon, open hostilities over offshore gas seem unlikely. Israel would no doubt react strongly to any attack on an offshore platform, and the gas supplies themselves are probably invulnerable. Once in production, the gas will flow through pipelines on the seabed running to shore -- there is no visible surface indication of the fields' location, and the depth of the sea (more than a thousand feet) would inhibit any sabotage attempts.

Nevertheless, Washington has an important role to play in ensuring that the prospective economic bonanza in the eastern Mediterranean does not become a fresh reason for war. Washington should reemphasize to Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Turkey that developing offshore discoveries could be a win-win proposition for all the countries of the region, since geological evidence suggests that gas and oil reserves are widespread. The United States should also use its good offices to work out quiet understandings that allow exploration to proceed despite continuing border disputes.

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Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute.

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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
PHONE 202-452-0650
FAX 202-223-5364
www.washingtoninstitute.org
Copyright 2011. All rights reserved.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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