Khalil al-Anani
Translated by the Arabist
According to the Islamists’ opponents, the Islamists’ arrival to power
was neither pure chance nor a stroke of luck offered by the Arab Spring
but rather a result of long decades of opposition to existing regimes,
which provided them with legitimacy and organization that others lacked.
The Islamists cannot be blamed for this as much as their opponents, who
busied themselves – and continue to do so – with attacking the
Islamists and attempting foil their project more than they busied
themselves with building the organizational and social structures
necessary to compete with the Islamists on the political and the popular
level. However, contrary to what some think, the danger the Islamists –
or more specifically the Islamist project – face does not come from the
outside but rather from within the Islamists’ political and ideological
project itself.
In other words, the dilemma faced by the Islamist project – regardless
of its meaning and connotation – is not found in the attacks that its
liberal and secular opponents have launched against it, despite its
leaders’ repeated assertions to that effect. Rather, the dilemma springs
from the intellectual and ideological environment of the Islamic
project itself. This means that the crisis that the Islamist project
currently faces, which will become worse over the next few months and
years, is an internal crisis whose source lies in the nature of power
itself and not in the opposition. This is a strange irony, as some may
regard the Islamists’ rise to power as a victory for the Islamist
project, even though in reality it may be the beginning of the end for
the project and its principle slogans.
To clarify, it is possible to say that the Islamist project (by which we
mean the dominant sayings and principle narratives upon which the
Islamists’ intellectual and ideological discourse rests) grew up in the
lap of opposition. This means that it is fundamentally a project of
opposition and not a project of power. Therefore, by definition, the
crisis faced by this project is the same crisis that all ideological
projects face when they move suddenly from the opposition to power
without prior warning. This is what happened to Nasserism, nationalism,
and Baathism, which all lost their existential and moral legitimacy over
time as they changed from being agents of the people and
representatives of the opposition to ruling elites wielding dictatorial
powers. These projects were not able to find the political and
psychological balance between being representatives of popular
conscience and being ruling authorities that seek to embody this
conscience in policies to implement the promises they made before
obtaining power.
Take for instance the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power in a
manner that some found surprising – even though that was not the case,
for reasons too long to explain here. Overnight the Muslim Brotherhood
moved from representing the most important opposition power to being the
principal ruling power. However, in the midst of this radical
transition, the Muslim Brotherhood neither changed its opposition
discourse into a new discourse of power nor struck a psychological
balance between the two. Therefore, one feels at times as if the Muslim
Brotherhood has placed one foot in the ruling camp and the other –
albeit nominally – in the opposition camp. When reviewing the Muslim
Brotherhood’s confusing intellectual and ideological discourse, one
recognizes that there is no longer anything that distinguishes this
discourse from any other discourse of power.
On one hand, most of the classical sayings that formed the basis of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse have disappeared, especially those
relating to the Islamic state, the enforcement of Islamic law and the
preservation of identity, in favor of a discourse focused on daily life
and free from any theology or religious content. Some see this as a
positive development, even though to the naked eye it represents the
Muslim Brotherhood ridding itself of the original content of its
opposition discourse and gradually replacing it with a discourse of
power. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood has found it difficult to find
the internal balance between its rise to power, its mobilization
process, and what was fundamentally suitable within an opposition
movement, but is no longer suitable within a ruling party. From here,
the Muslim Brotherhood has faced great difficulties in preserving the
virtues of both opposition and power at the same time, as demonstrated
by the confrontation that occurred between the Muslim Brotherhood and
those demonstrating against President Morsi’s policies.
The issue is not so different within the Salafi bloc. The Salafi
current, although not completely opposed to Mubarak’s regime,
nonetheless paid a high price for the prevalent, official mania against
Islamists. Overnight, this current moved from the political shadows into
media and power spotlights without any intellectual or jurisprudential
review of its governing sayings and it thus came to resemble a deformed
political being. It neither reflects an original opposition movement nor
is it able to rival the revolutionary movement in the expression of its
demands and admissions. Moreover, the Salafi struggle for power
revealed the Iran-style discourse and religious commitment that
represent the mainstay of Salafi tactical discourse.
While Islamic law remains the cornerstone of this discourse, over time
this demand will change under the pressures of reality and societal
repulsion to become a part of the past. It appears that the issue of
symbolic representation will become one of the challenges faced by the
Islamic project. This issue has sparked many questions that still await
decisive answers from the Islamists. For instance, from now on many will
ask: Who represents the Islamists? Who has a right to speak in the name
of the Islamist project? Is there one Islamic project or are there
multiple Islamic projects? What are points of difference and overlap
between these projects? Can these projects coexist or will they rival
each other and come into conflict? The principal question also remains:
What is the nature and goals of this project and what parts of them will
remain after the Islamists reach power?
In general it could be said that the Islamist project in of itself may
change into a mere mobilizational, political slogan rather than an
expression of an intellectual and ideological vision reflecting an
awareness held by those speaking in its name. This project existed for a
long time – especially when the Islamists were in the opposition – as a
romantic dream that flirted with the imaginations of its leadership and
youth. However, reaching power has ended this dream and revealed many
of the flaws inside of this project. (Just as the Renaissance Project
proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood now appears to merely be a
mobilizational plan devoid of any content or meaning.) The more power
the Islamists acquired, the more the Islamist project lost its luster,
the more its mobilizational capacity eroded and the more its symbolic
capital regressed. Contrary to what many may think, arriving to power
may be the final chapter of the project whose end may come at the hands
of its own supporters. For, this is the nature of power, which is
seductive but not merciful.
Perhaps it is too early to judge whether the Islamists’ project has
succeeded or failed. But, in my opinion the challenge before them now is
to create a new discourse of power free from authoritarianism and
oppression in order to guarantee that their project endures, less it
fail just as the other ideological projects that transitioned from
opposition to power have failed.
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