A reader asks:
“I
agree that democracy and economic development are not panaceas for the
Middle East, just as they are not for any other location on the planet.
But aren't they a start? And since it is possible to chew gum and walk
at the same time, does it hurt to at least pay lip service to doing
things to bring the rest of the Middle East into the 21st century? And
what would those things be in your opinion?”
As
you noted, both
candidates in the presidential election spoke of economic development
as a top priority in their Middle East policy. This sounds good to
voters but is pretty meaningless.
"We...know
that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's why we plan to invest $1.5 billion
each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build
schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to
help those who've been displaced. That's why we are providing more
than $2.8 billion to help Afghans develop their economy and deliver
services that people depend on."
But
almost four years later none of this massive expenditure has either
changed the situation in those countries or even brought much benefit to
their people.
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A
Western viewer might accept Obama’s claim that people just want good
jobs, nice housing, and higher living standards for themselves and their
children. Yet the appeals of radical ideology overcome material
considerations. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dismissively referred to
this theory shortly after he took power in Iran by remarking that the
West seemed to think the Iranian Islamist revolution was about the price
of watermelons but that wasn't true of all.
It does make sense to the Western mind that material conditions will determine the political beliefs and loyalties of Arabs and Iranians. Yet over the span of the last century things have simply not turned out that way in practice. This was partly due to the fact that nobody delivered major increases in living standards except in the Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and in those places it was a highly traditional and religious way of life being reinforced.
Elsewhere governments mustered loyalty not by making the pie bigger but by controlling who got what. So if you had the option material well-being for the urban middle class and certain ethnic segments meant supporting the dictatorship and getting some reward. That will also apply if the dictatorship is an Islamist one, which can offer spiritual exaltation as well. And at least for some years many voters--where people have the opportunity to choose--will believe that Islamism is the best chance for a stable, just, and relatively prosperous society.
There are lots of people who would like their children to grow up to be suicide bombers or prefer piety to prosperity. Even though many don’t think that way, they might be persuaded that radicalism is the best route to better lives. And finally, when people and rulers see no real way to achieve prosperity, both the governments and the masses will turn to demagoguery, scapegoating, and foreign adventures.
It does make sense to the Western mind that material conditions will determine the political beliefs and loyalties of Arabs and Iranians. Yet over the span of the last century things have simply not turned out that way in practice. This was partly due to the fact that nobody delivered major increases in living standards except in the Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and in those places it was a highly traditional and religious way of life being reinforced.
Elsewhere governments mustered loyalty not by making the pie bigger but by controlling who got what. So if you had the option material well-being for the urban middle class and certain ethnic segments meant supporting the dictatorship and getting some reward. That will also apply if the dictatorship is an Islamist one, which can offer spiritual exaltation as well. And at least for some years many voters--where people have the opportunity to choose--will believe that Islamism is the best chance for a stable, just, and relatively prosperous society.
There are lots of people who would like their children to grow up to be suicide bombers or prefer piety to prosperity. Even though many don’t think that way, they might be persuaded that radicalism is the best route to better lives. And finally, when people and rulers see no real way to achieve prosperity, both the governments and the masses will turn to demagoguery, scapegoating, and foreign adventures.
Countries
are not prepared for progress due to ideology, worldview, institutions,
political culture, and many other factors. In particular, the presence
of such large and powerful radical forces—willing, even eager, to use
violence—is a huge problem. Demagoguery is potent. Such factors can
override the kind of materialistic
orientation and enlightened self-interest that Westerners expect and
that underpin the belief that democracy can provide stable polities and
ensure moderation.
It
should be stressed that every country is different. In general, though,
the problem with economic development is that it does not trump
politics. The countries of the region can be divided into those that
have oil wealth and those that don’t. The wealthy countries don’t need
American programs to engage in economic development. In some cases,
radicalism and instability keep getting in the way. In others—think of
Iran or Iraq under Saddam--economic development is managed within the
framework of an extremist regime and ideology.
It
is true that the wealth of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates have made them more cautious and—often in practice but not
in rhetoric or domestic policy—more pragmatic. But one must be cautious
here. Saudi Arabia’s wealth and the high living standards of many
citizens has not made the country a paragon of democratic values at home
and moderation abroad.
Saudi
money has been used to spread Islamism and back radical Islamists, most
notably in contemporary Syria and in Iraq a few years ago. Qatar has
aligned itself with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, engaging in
mischief as far afield as Libya. Iraq and Algeria need stability but the
problem is not economic development as such but merely pumping more oil
and doing something about bureaucracy and corruption.
Certainly, though, these countries do not need Western governments to promote economic development.
Radical
regimes, like Libya under Muammar al-Qadhafi, Iraq under Saddam
Hussein, or Islamist Iran use some of their wealth for development and
much of it for projects like building nuclear weapons and subverting
their neighbors.
So
regarding the wealthy countries there isn’t much for the West to do in
promoting economic development. What about the non-oil states? Let’s
look at the specific cases. Lebanon, famous for its merchants, had a
self-made multi-millionaire as prime minister who focused on economic
development. But he was forced out
and assassinated. Internal conflict, ideology, and engagement in
foreign adventures wrecked the chance for economic development.
The
same applies even more to the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip, which is
more interested in fighting Israel than in raising living standards. How
can the West help when the local impetus is lacking?
This
brings us to Egypt. The truth is that Egypt has a lot of people but few
resources and a terrible structural and cultural situation regarding
work. Here’s one
example. A leading British supermarket chain opened stores in Egypt.
Traditionalists, radicals, and competitors (the owners of small stores)
spread rumors that the supermarket company backed Israel and was
anti-Muslim. Despite the store’s efforts at denial and appeasement, the
pressure became so great that it had to close and leave the country.
In
a Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt, with Salafists engaging in anarchic
violence, is U.S.-backed economic development going to make any
differences. As for the Palestinian Authority, vast amounts of aid money
have flowed in and despite some apparent successes—a lot of luxury
apartments have been built
and people kept employed in the government bureaucracy—no lasting
progress has been made. A lot of the money has ended up in the political
leaders’ foreign bank accounts. At any time, Hamas could take over or
the Fatah-led regime turn back to a war against Israel.
Economic
development sounds good but in practice it is more a way to keep
Western citizens happy than to make a real difference in the Middle
East. For example, when discussing his economic development policy in
the foreign policy presidential debate, Obama cited his government’s
“organizing entrepreneurship conferences.” And in reality a lot of the
money is simply a pay-off
to local regimes or a way to shore them up. It has nothing to do with
real development.
The
story of the battle of factions and corrupt leaders in the Palestinian
Authority over awarding a mobile phone contract; how EU-financed public
housing turned into luxury apartments to reward regime supporters; or
the sabotage against building an improved sewer system in the Gaza
Strip—even though foreign aid was paying for the whole project—are
wonderful case studies in how economic development campaigns that look
good in the West amount to a joke on the ground.
There
are, however, three countries that could benefit from economic
development efforts if they were to be focused. Those are Tunisia,
Morocco, and Jordan. Tunisia, of course, is currently ruled by an
Islamist-dominated regime. Whether that government will remain cautious
or turn increasingly radical—pressed on by rampaging Salafists—is not
clear. Strengthening the moderate forces in Tunisia, which are more
proportionately substantial than in any other Arabic-speaking country,
is a worthwhile effort but it might not work.
Ironically,
Morocco and Jordan are led by moderate regimes threatened by a public
opinion that is often radicalized due to poverty. Even there, however,
this is not the sole factor. Jordan, for example, has a powerful
opposition Brotherhood and a potentially radicalized Palestinian
majority. The Palestinians who came there after being expelled from
Kuwait in 1991 (because of the PLO’s support for Saddam Hussein’s
invasion) brought in a lot of riches and business skills. Amman has
become a much wealthier city but Jordanians generally don’t seem to have
benefited much.
But
Jordan is relatively small, weak, and doesn’t cause trouble, while
Morocco is not a factor in the region’s international affairs. So the
places where a real economic development effort could really make a
difference get neglected. For a while, the Saudis talked about admitting
Jordan to the rich man’s club, the Gulf Cooperation Council and giving a
billion dollars in aid. But nothing came of it in the end.
Remember
that the United States gave tens of billions of dollars in aid to Egypt
without getting gratitude or popular moderation. Similarly, the United
States gave or helped organize an
effort for the Palestinians that constituted the most aid money given
per person in history. Yet this brought neither progress on the peace
process, a transformation in Palestinian thinking, or gratitude.
At
any rate, while “economic development” sounds like a great idea, a fine
way of making people happy, getting them to love America, and
undermining radicalism, in practice it isn’t so effective.
Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin
Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636933%22
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