Doc's Talk: FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON SYRIA: THE LEAST-BAD RESULT

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON SYRIA: THE LEAST-BAD RESULT

James F. Jeffrey

To read this article on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/1aOkxQn

******************************

The Obama administration should take steps to ameliorate the negative effects of the chemical disarmament agreement, restore Washington's credibility, and preserve its ability to use force if necessary.

******************************

The good news about the new U.S.-Russian framework agreement on Syria is that it could remove the Assad regime's chemical weapons (CW) stocks, eliminating a major tool against the insurgents. This result would have been unimaginable if Washington had not threatened military action. The bad news begins with the major obstacles the agreement places in the path of any credible U.S. threat of unilateral force, among other troublesome issues. Given President Obama's position that military force -- even a justified, low-risk operation -- requires support from a recalcitrant Congress, the agreement might be the "least bad" outcome. But Washington now faces the urgent task of minimizing the damage to its Syria policy and broader regional strategy.

USE OF FORCE OFF THE TABLE?

The terms that Secretary of State John Kerry worked out with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov may hinder unilateral military action if Bashar al-Assad violates the agreement or uses CW again. The fourth paragraph of the document (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm) states that in the event of such violation or use, the two sides commit to take the issue to the UN Security Council, which "should" issue a Chapter VII resolution (i.e. authorizing the use of force). But any such resolution would require the acquiescence of Russia, which still disputes that the Assad regime was responsible for the August 21 CW attack. What guarantee does Washington have that Moscow would not take the same "fly in the face of the facts" stance on a Chapter VII resolution?

Secretary Kerry stated repeatedly over the weekend that the use of force, including unilaterally by the United States, is still in play. But taking such action without a Security Council deliberation would violate at least the spirit of the agreement. As Lavrov said on Saturday, "there is nothing said about the use of force" in the document.

AGREEMENT TILTED TOWARD ASSAD

Despite the prospect of potentially eliminating Syria's CW, the framework agreement could wind up helping Assad and hurting the opposition. Even its most helpful provision -- checking the regime's ability to use CW, whose tactical utility in clearing urban areas was shown on August 21 -- comes with problematic limitations. For example, assuming Assad complies, he would still be able to implicitly threaten the use of CW until mid-2014, the agreement's proposed deadline for destroying the weapons. Such threats could limit the opposition's tactical options.

The rebels stand to lose even more in the political realm. Assad has gone from an almost-friendless pariah to a partner of the United States and Russia in resolving a problem created by his criminal behavior, only months after his government was condemned by over 100 states in the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, as the focus turns to carrying out the agreement, his ability to blackmail the international community will soar. In particular, the need for his cooperation and control over CW sites and routes thereto in the face of rebel resistance may well tilt international sympathy toward him, probably including endorsement of a "temporary" ceasefire.

But ceasefires are almost impossible in insurgent conflicts. There are no fixed lines, and governments tend to assert their sovereign right to maintain their monopoly of force. In Syria, the regime would no doubt view attacks on rebels outside areas under their control as legitimate, particularly if "justified" for the sake of implementing the CW agreement. Under such circumstances, the insurgency would eventually shift from a legitimate uprising supported by most of the international community to an obstacle impeding the agreement.

REGIONAL BALANCE TILTED TOWARD RUSSIA?

Russia has been playing a smart Syria game with limited cards, using its arms deliveries, UN vetoes, and naval maneuvers to safeguard its interests, support its ally Assad, and stymie the United States. Moreover, by making Putin its partner, Washington has formally elevated him to the U.S. level despite Russia's lack of regional hard power and its backing of a murderous regime. One proof of this elevation is Putin's September 11 New York Times op-ed, which was filled with outrageous assertions on America's role in the world and the insurgents' responsibility for the August 21 attack. The lack of foreign outcry against his rant has been telling.

REVERSING THE SHIFT

To counter the CW agreement's downsides, the most important step is to portray it as a "least bad" move with potential positive aspects, rather than a historical success analogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis resolution. The deal does nothing to solve the larger Syrian crisis and will likely encourage Assad to fight on without compromise. But the United States can help change perceptions that it is "chained" by accelerating its efforts to arm the rebels, coordinating better with nonextremist factions, and developing a common approach with regional governments.

Washington should also make clear that it will strike if Assad violates the agreement or uses CW again. For now, the administration can be vague about whether such a strike would come after obtaining a UN Chapter VII resolution, after failing to reach one, or immediately and without UN recourse. To this end, the United States should keep sufficient forces in the Mediterranean to carry out the threat if necessary.

Beyond the agreement, the past two weeks have raised questions about America's willingness to use military force, whether in Syria, Iran, or elsewhere. The president himself will have to take steps to restore U.S. credibility by recognizing that this is now a serious international problem, to which his language and decisions have contributed. One helpful move would be to eschew the "I am ending American wars" theme. For Americans, "wars" have become conflated with any use of force, however limited or necessary. The administration could also bolster its standing by ensuring that U.S. military trainers remain in Afghanistan and stating that this outcome is important to the president.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, the president will have to deal with the dilemmas arising from both the Syrian CW developments and the use of "redlines" in general. His September 15 comments on Iran were a welcome step, but he should still spell out his views on military force and what he will do if Iran crosses his redline, using themes from his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize speech. Although avoiding specificity on redlines is usually a good idea, being more specific could heighten U.S. credibility under the current circumstances.

******************************

James F. Jeffrey is the Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute.

******************************

Tweet this item:
http://twitter.com/home?status=http://washin.st/1aOkxQn

Share this item on Facebook:
http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=http://washin.st/1aOkxQn

Follow us on Twitter: @washinstitute

******************************

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk