Navy
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greets the
various commanding generals of U.S. Forces, Iraq in Baghdad on July 27,
2010. Mullen’s final stop in Iraq wraps up the ten-day, around the world
trip to meet with counterparts and troops engaged in the war on
terrorism. DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J.
McNeeley
In 1999, I wrote an article entitled “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” which has appeared a number of times in other periodicals and has had a rather long shelf life on the internet. Some considered it as stereotypical, but it was derived from my many years of being with or observing Arab armies, including the civil war between the Jordanian Arab Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[1] Other than the Jordanian experience, my store of knowledge comes from more than two years of daily interface with the Egyptian ground forces as an Army Attaché and a number of temporary duty assignments with Gulf military establishments, including an assignment to the British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts before the emergence of the United Arab Republic. I have combined these on-the-ground observations and experiences with over 40 years of collecting as much information as possible on the military culture and way of life of Arab militaries.
As the Middle East Seminar Director for over 18 years at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, I have interviewed literally hundreds of my former U.S. Army Special Operations personnel, reviewing their experiences with various Arab military establishments. Since retiring from government service, I continued as a consultant working with military personnel deploying to the Middle East. The most salient observation I have drawn from my observations and study of Arab military establishments has been to convince me that little of significance has happened to change the deeply embedded character of the Arab military mindset.[2]
From these many conversations and discussions, I found little has evolved in the Arab military culture in the years since I wrote the article that would cause me to change the conclusions I reached. Moreover, they sharpened my belief that there is indeed a distinct Arab military tradition and that our attempts to recreate it in our image are not only fruitless, but often counter-productive. When we write articles on how to improve Arab military effectiveness, to me it smacks of condescension and leftover colonialist thinking, however well intended the suggestions may be.[3]
The article I wrote focused on conventional war and the Arab impediments to conducting it successfully against Western type forces.
Yet as the Iraqi insurgent war against the coalition forces dragged on with continuing violence, an obvious degree of effectiveness was visible on the part of the Iraqi insurgents,[4] and it was becoming apparent that the demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies in conventional warfare did not apply to the parameters of unconventional warfare. The insurgents displayed initiative and imagination[5] in their tactics that were rarely displayed in their conventional war making. Reviewing the historical record, Arab unconventional war effectiveness in the modern era has presented a much more positive picture. Through the Arab resistance against the Italians, French, and Spanish in North Africa as well as the guerrilla warfare against the British in Aden, Iraq, and Palestine, the Arabs demonstrated a proficiency lacking in their conventional warfare operations.[6]
THE ARAB AS UNCONVENTIONAL FIGHTER
As I examined what in fact made the difference between the Arab insurgent or guerilla fighter and the conventional soldier, I surfaced a number of factors. Among them was that the Arab guerilla usually had leadership sharpened by battle as well as experience and exuded the confidence that motivated others to follow him–as opposed to a conventional unit commander most likely picked by the regime for political reasons.[7] Moreover, the Arab guerilla was apt to be with those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe–once again as opposed to a conventional unit of diverse, urban/rural, tribal, or sectarian differences. The officers almost always came from the dominant ethnic group, such as the east bank Jordanians versus the Palestinians in Jordan, the Sunnis in Iraq versus the Shi’i soldiery, or the Christian Maronite officers in Lebanon.
The unconventional Arab soldier is fighting within his element with people he trusts. In admittedly simplistic terms, it boils down to the concept of fire and maneuver–the idea that an attacking soldier exposing himself to enemy fire can count on those who support him to provide covering fire, and that his life has meaning to his superiors. If there is a lack of trust in officers and one’s fellow soldiers, the willingness to expose oneself to attack is missing.[8] My observation was that they trusted soldiers in their own unit but not those in neighboring units.
The stark differences between the Arabs’ capabilities in conventional and unconventional war led me to the next step. Thinking about the long history of Western presence and involvement with the militaries of the Arab world, and the fact that for the most part the Western powers tried to create an Arab military in their own image, what has been the result? More importantly, perhaps, has the Western military influence been adverse to Arab effectiveness in war in general?
CONTINUITY IN THE ARAB MILITARY CULTURE
Reading the passages from the River War by Winston Churchill on the remaking of the Egyptian Army with the infusion of British training and officers reminded me of our effort, now dwindling, to remake Saddam’s army. As Churchill wrote, under the new army, “The recruits were treated with justice. Their rations were not stolen by officers. The men were given leave to visit their villages from time to time. When they were sick they were sent hospital instead of being flogged. In short, the European system was substituted for the Oriental.”[9]
Exactly 100 years later, I was observing the Egyptian army, and I realized, in reality, how little things had changed. The officers did not steal from their men, but they used them as indentured servants working on their farms and cared very little for their rations, which usually consisted of bread, some onions, a little dried fish, beans, tea, and sugar. Watching a truck roll into the unit area with the cargo bed piled high with bread being held down by soldiers standing or sitting on it, gives some idea on the care that went with their rationing. Moreover soldiers could buy supplemental food items from a sort of unit-level Post Exchange in which very often the unit officers would retain the profits.[10] I did not see soldiers flogged, but I did witness soldiers being slapped and pushed around.
The Egyptian officers were not barbarians or uncaring brutes. It was and is a way of life inculcated by centuries of living in a specific environment. The Egyptian soldier expected nothing more. I once asked an Egyptian officer why the officers got into their autos and drove off to Cairo on Thursday afternoons, leaving their soldiers stranded in the desert and having to hope they could hitch a ride to Cairo on a passing truck. His answer was that to give them a ride or in any way assist their way into Cairo would only perplex and confound them. The same concept that officers have privileges and are fools not to take advantage of them is pervasive throughout the Arab world. For example, in the U.S. Army and British Army, traditionally the officers eat after the last soldier has gone through the mess line. Not so in the Iraqi army[11] nor among the Bedouin troops of the Israeli Defense Forces,[12] and certainly not in the Egyptian army I served with. Yet again, as indicated by the IDF officer training with the Arab troops, the soldier does not expect anything more from the officer. The thought occurs then that if officer and soldier are content with the practice, why attempt to change it?
As Churchill wrote those many years ago, “Under pressure of local circumstances there has been developed a creature who can work with little food, with little incentive, very long hours under a merciless sun.”[13] The truth of this was brought home to me by watching soldiers with bricks on their backs toiling in summer heat during Ramadan, with only a wet rag to moisten their lips. In stark contrast, the scene reminded me of our helicopters bringing in ice and beer during my Vietnam tour or the extensive establishment of post exchanges and other amenities in the many “green zones” throughout Iraq.
THE RAPID EVAPORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE
The rapidity with which Western influence evaporates is further shown in the Egyptian case by the rapidity with which the earlier French influence had disappeared. Churchill was not the first to overestimate the influence of his nation on the Egyptian military culture. He made much of the positive effects of the French influence on Egyptian society. In commenting on al-Jabarti’s observations, Shmuel Moreh cited the profound French influence on the Egyptian military in terms of modern weaponry and tactics.[14] However, it may have seemed then, by the time of the British attempts to develop a new Egyptian army, little if any French influence remained. Today French influence in Egypt is negligible.
As P.J. Vatikiotis noted in his seminal study of the Egyptian army,[15] for centuries the people of Egypt were generally excluded from military service. It was not until the reign of Khedive Muhammad Sa’id that some Egyptians obtained officer rank, and not until 1936 that larger numbers of officers came from the general Egyptian society. As Vatikiotis observed, the officer corps of Egypt was drawn mostly from the lower middle class, who had no other hope of achieving a better station in life. As the social origins of the officer class broadened, their attitude toward political issues closely coincided with Egyptian society in general, including the propensity to blame others for their failures. George Kirk wrote that the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian army in 1948 was blamed on all sorts of reasons, few having to do with reality, most being of the “stabbed in the back” rationale. The chief villain, according to Nasser and his colleagues, was Britain.[16] Most of the reasons lie in the fact that it had been 66 years since the Egyptians had gone into battle under their own commanders. Their inexperience and “…congenital unwillingness to accept responsibility was among the primary reasons for their defeat.”[17]
The turn to the Soviets in 1955 came with promises of huge deliveries of military equipment and later, after the defeat of 1967, the advisors to train the Egyptians on how to use it. The Russians carried out most of their promises, mostly to salvage their pride and credibility in the region.[18] It seemed a new spirit had been infused into the Egyptian military. Sadat wrote of his confidence in the Egyptian preparations for the 1967 war, but with the outbreak of the war he gradually learned the dismal truth. He was embarrassed when he saw huge crowds celebrating a “victory” as portrayed by the Nasser propaganda machine. This turned into dismay as the Egyptian Field Forces commander, General Hakim Amer, tried to blame it on American armed intervention.[19] Egyptian officers told me that following that war, there was so much public resentment against the army–and particularly its officers–that they tried to avoid wearing their uniforms whenever possible.
With renewed massive Soviet equipment assistance, and a determination to redress the previous humiliations, the Egyptians rebuilt their army, absorbing Soviet instruction on weapons and tactical employment, but also taking Soviet doctrine and weaponry designed primarily for a European war and adapting them to Egyptian methods and military culture.[20] In the final analysis, the Egyptians carefully used Soviet assistance but ensured that it was compatible with the Egyptian level of military proficiency and military culture. They thus “Egyptianized” the Soviet doctrine and training.[21]
The Russians confined their instruction to improving operational and tactical military proficiency, avoiding subjects pertaining to military ethos and values.[22] The Egyptians, for the most part, tended to eschew close relations with the Soviets, apparently an arrangement that suited the Soviets as well. With two very competent generals, Sa’d al-Shazli, the chief of staff, and Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamasy, the chief of operations, the Egyptians did very well without the Russians.[23]
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN ARMY
My personal observations of the Egyptian feat of crossing the canal were the result of a visit made to Egypt in 1977 with the U.S. Army assistant chief of staff of Intelligence. As the Egyptians had made a decision to turn to the West, the Egyptians were opening up to us (to a degree, of course). To a U.S. contingent of officers, including myself, they showed many of the intelligence documents used in the preparation of the crossing of the Suez. I was amazed at the detail of the schematics. They were drawings made in pen, longhand, with every detail of the Israeli defenses shown, including the taps on the fuel lines designed to turn the Suez into a fiery inferno. All the main strongpoints of the Bar-Lev line of Israeli defenses along the Suez had been carefully pinpointed. A combination of strong commanders, troops carefully prepared, a will to win infused in the military, an excellent strategic deception plan,[24] and more than a little Israeli hubris, resulted in what the Egyptian public and army considers a victory. The humiliations of 1948, 1956, and 1967 were erased.
Following the 1973 war, my observations were that the Egyptian army returned to a business as usual and standards declined. The Egyptian army and its commanders became enmeshed in the economy of Egypt, with defense industries making washing machines and other consumer goods.[25] The army increasingly set itself apart from the people. The regime went to great lengths to ensure the loyalty of the junior officer corps, providing subsidized housing and automobiles. The old plagues of nepotism and wasta[26] returned. Weapons and equipment the Egyptians were–and still are not ready–to assimilate logistically were being bought from diverse sources based on factors other than need or logistic sustainability.[27]
Having gone through French, British, Soviet, and now American involvement with their military, it is evident that the pervasive and powerful Arab/Egyptian culture seeps back in as soon as the advisors leave. So today, the Egyptian army retains some vestiges of the British influence, more of the Soviet, and about the same amount from the United States. None of it is pervasive or permanent. In the midst of the “Arab Spring,” the Egyptian army is still operating primarily as a regime preservation institution–albeit under new management–with all the detriment to soldering that this factor produces.[28]
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