Doc's Talk: Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress

Saturday, September 07, 2013

Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress

PolicyWatch 2133

Iran's new president will soon be tested on his ability and willingness to address international concerns about his country's nuclear program.

The latest International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran, which the organization's board of governors will discuss in Vienna next week, shows that Tehran has continued to build its nuclear capabilities, particularly its capacity to suddenly break out from its treaty commitments and build a nuclear weapon if it so desired. Although Iran denies having a nuclear weapons program, this growing potential to dash toward a bomb will likely complicate diplomatic discussions in the next few weeks, especially after President Hassan Rouhani's expected September 23 arrival in New York for a UN General Assembly meeting. Iranian officials are also scheduled to meet with the IAEA in Vienna on September 27.

MAIN REASONS FOR CONCERN

Interpreting the significance of the IAEA's August 28 report has proven difficult for non-experts: for example, compare the recent New York Times headline ("Iran Slows Its Gathering of Uranium, Report Says") with one from the Financial Times ("Iran Boosts Advanced Uranium Enrichment Capacity, UN Report Shows"). The core of the report -- which covers developments across the whole range of Iran's known, declared nuclear activities since the previous report in May -- is the series of sections assessing Tehran's progress on uranium enrichment, its construction of a reactor that could produce plutonium, and its degree of cooperation (or lack thereof) in explaining the program's "possible military dimensions."
Uranium enrichment. Iran continues to enrich uranium and increase the number of centrifuges installed, including around 18,000 of the IR-1 type centrifuge and 1,000 of the more efficient IR-2m type. Yet it will not need more than a small fraction of the enriched uranium it has already produced in the foreseeable future, let alone new uranium. Its sole nuclear power reactor uses low-enriched fuel supplied by Russia. Tehran persists in claiming that it needs some of the new enriched uranium it is producing to fuel a research reactor in the capital, despite refusing a past international offer to supply such fuel.
Worryingly, this research reactor requires 19.75 percent enriched uranium; Iran is currently producing 20 percent enriched fuel for it. In 20 percent fuel, the ratio of ordinary uranium-238 to its fissile isotope uranium-235 has already been processed from the 993:7 figure seen in natural uranium to 28:7, just short of the 1:7 needed for weapons-grade uranium. Iran continues to convert some of its 20 percent uranium into an oxide form, but most of this oxide (apart from a small amount that has been further processed into fuel plates) should be considered part of the enriched stockpile because it is comparatively easy to reconvert into centrifuge feedstock.

The increase in Iran's centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpile has opened the door for multiple breakout scenarios at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, especially if there are other undeclared plants available. For the past three years, discussions of Iran's breakout potential centered on its steadily growing stockpile of 20 percent uranium, but the number of centrifuges is now so great that the arithmetic has changed: the government's huge stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium is now a crucial part of the calculation. As a result, a previous diplomatic proposal -- asking Iran to cap enrichment at 20 percent and ship most of that material abroad -- is now much less relevant in terms of curbing the risk of breakout.

The Arak heavy-water reactor. This research reactor will use natural-uranium (i.e., non-enriched) fuel rods, and it will be "moderated" using heavy water. Yet such reactors also produce plutonium, which could serve as an alternative nuclear explosive if separated from the spent fuel. Although Iranian officials told the IAEA that construction delays had pushed the reactor's start-up date to after the "first quarter of 2014," they subsequently indicated that "start-up" means "commissioning using nuclear material," according to a footnote in the latest report. This ambiguous phrasing could complicate any attempt to take military action against the facility if it became necessary, though another footnote indicates that Iranian officials told the IAEA three days before the report was published that they would give the agency notice "at least six months prior to the first introduction of nuclear material into the facility."
As soon as nuclear fuel is brought to a reactor site, the whole facility becomes politically "unbombable" because of IAEA resolutions regarding attacks on safeguarded nuclear plants. And once the fuel is inserted and the reactor has gone critical, any military strikes could cause huge radiation emissions. (Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor and its reported 2007 raid on Syria's reactor both took place before nuclear material was inserted.)
Possible military dimensions. The IAEA remains frustrated at Iran's lack of cooperation regarding "undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." Tehran has dismissed these concerns, which focus on the Parchin facility on the outskirts of the capital. Unidentified "member states" have told the agency that Iran conducted "hydrodynamic experiments" at Parchin, an indication that it may be trying to perfect the type of implosion device needed to make an atomic bomb using highly enriched uranium or plutonium. The government continues to block IAEA requests to visit the site and has bulldozed and asphalted the areas of concern, preventing the agency from taking potentially revealing samples even if it were allowed there.

IMPACT OF SYRIA DEBATE

Since the IAEA released its Iran report, Washington and other capitals have been absorbed in the debate over allegations that Syrian used chemical weapons on its own people. President Obama decided to delay a U.S. response until Congress has had time to debate the evidence; intentionally or not, this approach may well affect the Iranian nuclear issue.
Washington's current policy toward Iran is based on the belief that U.S. intelligence will provide timely warning if Tehran decides to make a nuclear bomb. The assumption is that Iran cannot break out and produce sufficient nuclear explosive for a weapon without the international community having time to spot what is going on, debate it, and counter it. Yet President Obama's delay on Syria creates doubt that he would behave in a sufficiently timely fashion to counter Iran.

Meanwhile, Israel has long indicated that it will make its own assessment of Iran's nuclear progress. Last September, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presented his redline during a speech before the UN General Assembly: namely, Israel did not want Iran to acquire enough 20 percent enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb if the material was further processed. Yet when one factors in gaseous centrifuge feedstock and oxide that could be reconverted to feedstock, Iran is now past this line.

ROUHANI'S POSITION

Despite being inaugurated only weeks ago, President Rouhani should hit the ground running on the nuclear issue. He served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005 and was also involved in crafting nuclear policies as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. His election was widely attributed to his campaign promises of bringing relief from international nuclear sanctions.
Since winning office, Rouhani has been assessing his strengths within Iran's power structure, which is dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has also been crafting a new nuclear negotiating team. Although he has already publicly indicated that suspending the nuclear program is not an option, his administration's actual negotiating strategy has not yet crystallized. This strategy will be at least partly shaped by Tehran's assessment of President Obama's determination to act in Syria, a close ally of Iran. In other words, events in Damascus could be an important indicator of the direction and progress of nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Previously, they coauthored Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms, a joint publication of The Washington Institute and the Belfer Center.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk