Pushed on the Bandwagon
Obama's Syria plan forced AIPAC's hand
Obama's Syria plan forced AIPAC's hand
by Steven J. Rosen
Foreign Policy
September 4, 2013
Foreign Policy
September 4, 2013
President
Barack Obama's decision to make Congress decide on the course of the
Syrian intervention has put the pro-Israel camp just where
it did not want to be: openly advocating American military involvement
in the volatile Middle East. It's a calculation based on the lesser of
two evils, the greater being risking Washington's withdrawal from
leadership on global security just as Iran crosses
the nuclear threshold. No one has a greater stake in a strong United
States -- and the credibility of America's deterrent capability -- than
Israel and the Jewish people. Indeed, many of the arguments that
motivate the president's opponents on Syria could also
apply in the event that a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities
becomes necessary.
Yet
this is a debate about the American national interest, and most
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) supporters do not
want it to degenerate into a debate about Israel. Most agree with former
Israeli Ambassador Itamar Rabinovitch that, "It's bad
for Israel [if] the average American gets it into his or her mind that boys are again sent to war for Israel."
Paralyzed by these fears, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and AIPAC supporters in Washington remained nearly silent
for weeks, even after evidence of Bashar al-Assad's murderous
chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians outside Damascus. And they
remained quiet even after Obama indicated that he was preparing a
military strike. They did not want to be drawn into a
political melee in a deeply divided Congress, risking strains in the
bipartisan support for Israel that forms the bedrock of the U.S.-Israel
relationship.
All
that has now changed. Responding to a full-court press by the Obama
administration -- a call to Netanyahu, a direct message to AIPAC,
and messages via congressional leaders -- AIPAC has weighed in fully in support of the president's call for intervention.
This
is a major change in precedent. Ten years ago, AIPAC struggled to stay
out of the Iraq War vote when that issue was before Congress,
and did not openly endorse that authorization. Neither the Israeli
government nor AIPAC supporters in the United States considered Saddam
Hussein nearly the threat that Iran was. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon thenwarned President
George
W. Bush privately that he thought an attack on Iraq would be a mistake.
After the Iraq vote, to prove its innocence, AIPAC organized a letter
from 16 Jewish members of Congress stating that
"AIPAC as
an organization never took a position on the war and none of us were
ever lobbied by the organization on the war in Iraq." It did not work.
Israel's detractors never cease asserting that the Iraq War was fought
on Israel's behalf, and that belief
has eroded support for Israel on the left wing of the Democratic Party.
But
now, President Obama is making everyone stand up and be counted, and he
is putting maximum pressure on all prospective allies to come
out from behind the curtain and speak up. As a White House official told
the New York Times,AIPAC is "the 800-pound
gorilla in the room" because it has close relations with and access
to a vast array of members on both sides of the aisle and on all sides
of the debate. Simply put, the president has staked a lot of political
capital on the gambit to sway Congress on his
Syria plan -- and he needs AIPAC's support.
The
administration is certainly aware that many of the wavering members in
the House and Senate could be influenced if Israel's outgoing
but powerful ambassador, Michael Oren, and the pro-Israel lobby joined
the fray. Public statements of support are helpful, but the main thing
is the mobilization of AIPAC's vast network of trusted "key contacts" to
speak privately with members they know well.
AIPAC's
leaders, like other Americans, don't see much to support on any side of
the civil war in Syria, and in their hearts they would
probably like to see both sides lose. But an American military strike
that destroys Syria's aircraft and helicopters, degrades its air
defenses, and disables its runways, would be a benefit to Israel and the
region -- no matter who emerges victorious there.
And
if, conversely, the red lines that have been declared by President
Obama were to be wiped out by an isolationist Congress (much as
British Prime Minister David Cameron was repudiated by Parliament), it
could begin a wider U.S. retreat in the Middle East. It would certainly
undermine the campaign to prevent Iran from completing its nuclear
weapons program. Already, the Syrian regime and
Hezbollah are boasting about a "historic American retreat,"
and extremist elements from al Qaeda to North Korea must
be rubbing their hands in glee. Without a strong United States, the
world of our children will descend into a very dark void, because after
America there is no one else waiting in line to assume leadership except
these forces of evil and chaos.
If AIPAC sits
on its hands, Obama might well lose this historic vote on Capitol Hill.
If so, the Rand Paul/isolationist right and the
antiwar left may celebrate, and conservative critics can blame it on
Obama's feckless leadership. But it will be a disaster for the Middle
East and the world, and it may be impossible to contain the damage.
Some
can close their eyes to these realities, but Israel and its friends in
Washington don't have that luxury. Americans and Brits are
far away, but Israel's permanent reality is that it lives in that very
bad neighborhood, faced with an existential crisis and a Syrian civil
war in danger of spiraling out of control. That is why, while Americans
are divided on the issue, an overwhelming majority
of Israelis are hoping President Obama will prevail. And why, in the end, the pro-Israel camp knows it needs to support Obama.
Steven J. Rosen served for 23 years as a senior
official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. He is now the
director of the Washington Project of the Middle East Forum.
Guest Comment: Think about it this way.
J-Street won't support Obama. That means that they counted the votes and know he won't get his resolution. This way they can claim victory. (Noah and/or Omri have noted that this is the MO. Support something that's going to pass and claim credit for the victory. Like a rooster claiming that his crowing brought out the sun. J-Street's records when supporting not sure things - Sestak comes to mind - isn't so impressive.)
I don't believe that he wanted the resolution to pass. He went to Congress because he was looking to scapegoat Republicans. But with Boehner and Cantor getting on board, the main storyline will be that the President couldn't get his own party to support him. AIPAC's support/non-support as Barry pointed out turns into a non-issue.
If Obama had really wanted to attack Syria he would have gone to Congress right away. Going to Congress as an afterthought (after a discussion with his chief political adviser and undermining both Kerry and Hagel) betrays his intent as purely political.
The bigger problem is what comes next. Barry suggested something that we ought to be looking out for:
The administration is looking for some sort of deal with Iran that it can pass off as a diplomatic "victory." The NYTimes has been pushing the Rouhani/Zarif moderate fairy tale especially hard for the past two or three weeks. (Or Twitter speaks louder than actions.)
David
J-Street won't support Obama. That means that they counted the votes and know he won't get his resolution. This way they can claim victory. (Noah and/or Omri have noted that this is the MO. Support something that's going to pass and claim credit for the victory. Like a rooster claiming that his crowing brought out the sun. J-Street's records when supporting not sure things - Sestak comes to mind - isn't so impressive.)
I don't believe that he wanted the resolution to pass. He went to Congress because he was looking to scapegoat Republicans. But with Boehner and Cantor getting on board, the main storyline will be that the President couldn't get his own party to support him. AIPAC's support/non-support as Barry pointed out turns into a non-issue.
If Obama had really wanted to attack Syria he would have gone to Congress right away. Going to Congress as an afterthought (after a discussion with his chief political adviser and undermining both Kerry and Hagel) betrays his intent as purely political.
The bigger problem is what comes next. Barry suggested something that we ought to be looking out for:
It is not inconceivable that the White House would
consider easing sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program to have a
chance in Syria. What is likely then is stalling, with the probability
that the civil war will settle into stagnation
for several years and thus a de facto partition of Syria.
The administration is looking for some sort of deal with Iran that it can pass off as a diplomatic "victory." The NYTimes has been pushing the Rouhani/Zarif moderate fairy tale especially hard for the past two or three weeks. (Or Twitter speaks louder than actions.)
David
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