Doc's Talk: Winning the War of Ideas for Islamic Hearts and Minds

Friday, September 20, 2013

Winning the War of Ideas for Islamic Hearts and Minds

ANDREW E. HARROD September 20, 2013

The "war of ideas is the primary arena of conflict," stated Jamestown Foundation Senior Fellow Stephen Ulph at the U.S. Capitol Visitors Center on September 6, 2013. Ulph spoke as part of an all-star expert lineup discussing the international struggle against militant Islam during a daylong briefing by the Westminster Institute (WI) entitled "al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood: A New American Strategy." Presenting many insightful panels with experts such as Ulph already featured in WI's 2012 book Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism, copies of which were freely available at the briefing, the event was mandatory for anyone who wishes to engage effectively in this conflict.
Fellow event participant and book contributor Patrick Sookhdeo opened the proceedings with an address in which he argued that "in no way" are the United States and her allies "involved in any way in a war against Islam" as a faith per se.

Yet within this faith "we must address ideas" of aggressive and authoritarian agendas; otherwise, a "serious handicap" will result. "The strength of al-Qaeda is not in its leaders, but in its ideology," Sookhdeo observed. WI Executive Director and Fighting the Ideological War editor Katharine Gorka concurred that al-Qaeda's Islamic beliefs, not any given location with a street address, were the terrorists' "center of gravity." This is the "one thing that the enemy must have to continue operations."

One-time Egyptian Muslim extremist and Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Senior Fellow Tawfik Hamid accordingly criticized what he perceived as a "military confrontation with an ideology" in the years since September 11, 2001. Hamid argued in "Brainistan" that the confrontation with militant Islam must take place at the "mental level." Political warfare scholar J. Michael Waller, meanwhile, found it curious that American policymakers had failed to understand the "mobilization power of ideology," even though this was necessary for winning American elections.

Katharine's husband and fellow book contributor Sebastian Gorka agreed, quoting current al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri that over half of his group's struggle is in the "battlefield of the media." For the self-described "baby of the Cold War" Sebastian, whose parents fled Communist Hungary, the past struggle against Communism informed his current strategy against Islamism. A "fundamentally ideological victory" marked the end of a "fundamentally ideological war" without one shot fired during the Berlin Wall's fall on November 9, 1989, despite preceding years of arms races.

Yet Sebastian elaborated that Islamism's ideological threat came not so much from highly visible terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, but rather from broad social movements like the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood (MB). All Islamists, though, had the "same strategic goal," Sebastian observed, with arguments between them being merely "about timing and tactics." Thus, Sebastian rejected the view of some that the MB's "political" Islamists could somehow counter "violent" Islamists like al-Qaeda.

Sebastian analogized al-Qaeda and MB to the isolated Focoist attacks of Communist revolutionary Che Guevara and Mao Zedong's "people's war" in China, respectively. Despite Che's radical chic youth hero popularity today on t-shirts, his guerilla war theories were "rubbish," and Bolivian security forces killed this "loser" at the age of 39 in 1967. Mao, by contrast, died as China's ruler in bed at age 79 after his societally comprehensive "counterstate" took power. MB groups around the world had an "indirect ... soft approach" reflecting Mao's vision of long-term infiltration of society as a whole, something al-Qaeda and similar groups "are starting to understand."

Cold War public diplomacy veteran Robert Reilly, another Fighting the Ideological War contributor, drew as well from the past in order to confront Islamism. Reilly advised, "Don't get into a war of ideas unless you understand those ideas" and "unless you have an idea." Echoing Katharine's "center of gravity" comments, Reilly in particular noted that a failure to debate Islamic religious ideas gave al-Qaeda, in the words of one commentator, a "theological safe haven."

The ineffectiveness of various public diplomacy efforts experienced by Reilly at the Department of Defense after September 11, 2001, however, was sometimes "personally too painful to relate." The American government, for example, launched the Arabic-language Radio Sawa, yet Reilly dismissed its programming as largely "youth pop music" with "lyrics so offensive they had to be changed." The "war of ideas cannot be fought by the battle of the bands," Reilly criticized. In particular, Saudi Arabia's king has indicated that he does not listen to Radio Sawa, a damning indictment for any American attempt to influence Arab policymakers.

Reilly's experience with the American regime change in Iraq was also disappointing. In a Middle East dominated by state-owned media, satellite phone possession was a capital offense under Saddam Hussein. Amidst this intellectually arid environment, initial air attacks against Hussein's regime in 2003 destroyed the Iraqi Information Ministry, and "there went the broadcasting infrastructure" for any post-Hussein American initiatives, Reilly lamented. Into the media void came Arabic-language television from Iran. American forces also gave no thought to any "Iraqi Federalist Papers Project" discussing concepts of free government in an Iraqi context. Yet a wildly popular Iraqi television show called Light or Overcoming the Legacy of Evil exposing Hussein's crimes cost only $1.2 million to produce.
Reilly similarly noted that NATO forces in Afghanistan took no efforts to expose Taliban atrocities to the Afghan people. General David Petraeus considered this "nuts" upon taking command in Afghanistan, given his similar policies in Iraq. Another information warfare gap appeared in an Afghan poll ten years after September 11, 2001, showing that 93% of respondents had never heard of al-Qaeda's attacks that day. When shown pictures of these attacks, however, 59% of respondents deemed the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan justified.

The Islam scholar and former Mitt Romney presidential campaign adviser Walid Phares assessed that Americans through their government "are not waging the war of ideas" and "if we are, we are waging it on the side of those who are opposing us." American Middle East policy is "influenced by those we should bring down in the Middle East" such that Phares sees a "Hamas version" of events in official proclamations. "There is no kidding about it," Phares said in reference to a "Muslim Brotherhood operation in Washington."

Referencing her in parts controversial book American Betrayal: The Secret Assault on Our Nation's Character, with its thesis of a "de facto occupation" in America by Soviet espionage during the 1930s and 1940s, Diana West seconded Phares. Compared to this "flunked ... first experience with subversion," West saw America "doing worse today" with respect to the MB. Citing audience member Frank Gaffney, founder of the Center for Security Policy, Sebastian complained that if "the Egyptian people can reject the Brotherhood there, why can't we reject the Brotherhood here?"

Phares identified the "mothership" of this MB "crisis of penetration" in academia. There were a "series of impacts" from the "impact of the classroom" in a "compromised Middle Eastern studies world." "From the classroom," for example, "you go to the newsroom" such that news organizations like the New York Times referred to Osama bin Laden as a "Saudi dissident." Phares considered the "courtroom" and the "war room" of government as well, where jihadists and salafists appear as Islamic "revivalists" who "will be our partners."
Such language whitewashing any problems in Islam due to MB political pressure was a major concern. While the 9/11 Commission Report was an "uncommon document" of government veracity, Sebastian now had to submit all of his slides used at government facilities to a "nameless censorship board" for a non-appealable review. Sebastian noted a thought from one of his students' writings: "if your enemy can control what you can say about him, you have already lost the war." Sebastian compared present official terminology about various aspects of Islam to calling Lenin a "misguided democrat" instead of a Communist.

Mental honesty would be necessary for any Islamic reform movement, something that demanded "intellectual restructuring," in Ulph's words. Sookhdeo as well assessed that Muslims seeking to embrace a pluralistic society required a "massive reinterpretation" of Islam. Discussing efforts to reinterpret violent Koran verses such as the Sword Verse 9:5, Hamid confessed that "there is a problem in early Islam" with "a lot of violence." Thus Hamid would support only a "multi-stage democracy" in countries like Egypt, with elections being the final step in democratic development. Katherine likewise saw in America a "profound process of discernment" because ultimately, "we don't know whether Islam is compatible" in fact with a free society.

Discerning and defeating militant Islam, though, entailed that Western countries like America have their own faith. Discussing the "transcendental" nature of jihadist ideology, Sebastian warned that "if you don't believe in God, you will never understand the enemy." Sookhdeo, meanwhile, demanded that, having "lost its ideological base," America "rediscover an identity" in "Judeo-Christian" faith-based freedom and virtue. Only an America "sure of itself" could successfully demand allegiance to liberty's principles from Muslims.

Andrew E. Harrod is a freelance researcher and writer who holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a JD from George Washington University Law School. He is admitted to the Virginia State Bar. He has published over 110 articles concerning various political and religious topics at the American Thinker, Daily Caller, FrontPage Magazine, Faith Freedom International, Gatestone Institute, Institute on Religion and Democracy, Mercatornet, and World, among others. He can be followed on twitter at @AEHarrod.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk