The Israeli demand for
continued control over the Jordan Valley and the border crossings with
Jordan within the framework of a final-status agreement with the
Palestinians now stands at the center of the argument between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority.
For Israel, the Jordan
Valley is profoundly important from a military aspect due to past
efforts by the Palestinians, either in regard to terrorism or weapons
smuggling from Jordan (after the Six-Day War, the valley region was
nicknamed "The Land of the Chase," a reference to the army's anti-terror
campaign there), or to our ongoing experiences with them along the Gaza
Strip border. From a security perspective, it is undoubtedly preferable
for Israel to maintain control of the Jordan Valley rather than
redeploy along an alternate border line west of the valley.
Beyond the settlements,
it appears security is the core issue that needs to guide Israel in the
negotiations. In the reality of an Arab Spring in which hordes of
mujahedeen from across the globe are pouring into the conflict zones
around us, the importance of controlling our border with Jordan is even
more important. A strong and stable Jordan in control of its borders is
important for peace and quiet on Israel's eastern border. Therefore we
must take into account the inherent risk involved in relinquishing
responsibility for the border and its crossings to the Palestinians.
Such a step would expose Jordan, which has a population comprised mostly
of Palestinians, to the threat of a future Palestinian revolution.
The jihad tourists
Examining the threat
against us on our eastern front through the prism of our enemies'
deteriorating armies and their increased reliance on ballistic weapons
could lead one to conclude that territorial depth is inconsequential and
it is therefore possible to concede the valley. In actuality, these
"jihad tourists" flooding the conflict areas in our region are far more
hazardous and cast doubt on the aforementioned argument. The Arab
monarchies, including Jordan, are in danger. In this reality any step
that could weaken Jordan and flood it with fighters from al-Qaida, the
Nusra Front or Hamas would be unwise.
The jihad tourists
operating in disintegrating Arab countries are indifferent to the
suffering of the Islamic populations in the countries they have invaded.
They rape and murder the locals; deterring them is not easy. This is a
largely ground-based threat that highlights the importance of
controlling essential border crossings, tactical terrain and territorial
depth. Syria is a classic case of how losing control over border
crossings leads to throngs of mujahedeen invaders. During the Mubarak
era, Egypt allowed al-Qaida and global jihadist fighters to join forces
with the Muslim Brotherhood in the country and with Hamas in Gaza, and
establish an entire industry of weapons smuggling from Sinai into Gaza,
the foundation of terrorist attacks against Israel.
Jordan is managing for
the time being to stunt this process and has proven itself to be a
dependable partner along our eastern border. Even if it does not say it
out loud, Jordan is not thrilled about giving the border and the
crossings to the Palestinians. It has already coped, in the 1970s, with
an attempt at a hostile takeover by the Palestinians (Black September),
led by Yasser Arafat at the time. Furthermore, the Jordanian monarchy is
dealing with economic difficulties and with threats to the regime's
stability from home and abroad, while the Bedouin tribes that have
traditionally supported the crown have grown weaker.
In addition, Jordan is
currently flooded with a giant stream of refugees (many of them
Palestinians) from Syria and along its eastern border it is fighting to
block Islamist radicals trying to enter from Iraq. If the Jordan Valley
is handed over to the Palestinians, whenever that may be, the kingdom's
internal security will suffer the effects, because whether Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas turns a blind eye to terrorist
machinations or he collapses and Hamas assumes control of the West Bank,
the Jordan Valley will become an open security breach. The damage to
Israel in such a scenario is clear.
All signs indicate that
Israel and Jordan are unhappy at the prospect of changing their current
security situation on their shared border in favor of a dubious
arrangement like the one proposed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.
Therefore the debate over the border with Jordan necessitates an answer
to the question: Is it preferable to continue controlling the border
area and the crossings but to sustain the inevitable backlash from
failed negotiations with the Palestinians, or is a diplomatic
arrangement that we know is "a recipe for terrorism" preferable, one in
which the Palestinians will ultimately proceed according to the "balloon
effect" to take over the area that is breached first?
Were Jordan to indeed
ever become "Palestine," then in such a scenario Israel should never in
the first place have allowed the Palestinians to control the Jordan
River and the crossings, due to the potential threat to Israel posed by
an armed Palestinian-controlled Jordan.
The Jordanian concern
over the "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians concept getting
stronger inside Jordan led them to sever ties with the West Bank and to
support any solution to the Palestinian problem that does not involve
its own territory. There are those who believe the Jordanian kingdom
could kick-start its own initiative under its own auspices on the
Palestinian front that would preserve the Hashemite monarchy and its
relations with Israel. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian interest is to
uphold the status quo. The joint security interests of the two countries
began with those cross-border terrorist attacks on Israel through the
Jordan Valley region and the army's subsequent retaliatory raids into
Jordanian territory.
The security ties that
developed between Jordan and Israel curbed this phenomenon. The
relationship that emerged as a result of this cooperation involved
secret strategic cooperation, and it was able to withstand the pan-Arab
pressures to which it was exposed. The relationship was maintained by
the countries' leaders and ultimately led to the peace treaty signed in
1994. Jordan is now, essentially, a buffer between Israel and its many
enemies, and it cannot be weakened.
While Israel demands to
keep control of the Jordan River and valley region, the Palestinians
refuse to accept this and persist in their demand for sovereignty and
control over the area. In light of these conflicting positions there are
those among us who actually reason that we must placate the
Palestinians and concede to their demands, arguing that the threat of a
coalition of conventional armed forces poised against us on our eastern
front has been removed and that the likelihood of such a threat ever
returning is exceedingly small.
Those who share this
approach argue that Israel's deterrence capability is adequate enough to
render a presence in the Jordan Valley unnecessary and of secondary
importance. This dangerous approach is essentially founded in the notion
that Jordan, as it is presently constructed, is a constant variable. It
fails to account for the risk that Jordan could be weakened if control
of the border crossings is given to the Palestinians, and that it could
cease providing the service we expect from it -- or that it could fall
prey to a revolution that would be to our detriment.
In summary, Palestinian control
of the Jordan River and valley region along with the border crossings
with Jordan will harm the joint security interests of Israel and Jordan.
We must be mindful that dramatic developments could unfold in Jordan or
its Arab or Islamic neighbors (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon), ones which
are not in Israel's favor and which could pose a severe threat to us
from the east. That is why Israeli control of the Jordan Valley is
critical.
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