PolicyWatch 2216
February 28, 2014
By Adel El-Adawy
To read this article on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/1mKFh11
******************************
The military chief has some strong assets and likely staying power, but
he will still face great pressure if he is elected as anticipated, since
the benchmark for success will be his ability to satisfy an Egyptian
polity filled with unrealistically high socioeconomic expectations.
******************************
The February 24 resignation of Egypt's cabinet has fed expectations that
Field Marshal Abdul Fatah al-Sisi will soon announce his bid to run in
this year's presidential election. For now, he remains defense minister
in the reshuffled cabinet formed by new prime minister Ibrahim Mahlab,
but army chief of staff Gen. Sedki Sobhi is expected to replace Sisi
once he resigns to seek the presidency.
Egypt's serious socioeconomic problems and security threats will make
the next president's job exceedingly difficult. The new leader's ability
to sustain the current institutional power configuration will be
crucial in a tough domestic and international political environment. In
this regard, Sisi's professional background -- as a strongman with close
ties to Egypt's military leadership and various Persian Gulf
governments -- gives him an advantage over other potential candidates.
But he has yet to clearly articulate his views on governance, the
economy, and international political issues. His success will therefore
require the assembly of a technocratic presidential team ready to make
bold decisions and deliver to a people hungry for a better life.
BACKGROUND
In 2011 and 2013, the military and other powerful institutions had
reasonable incentives to move against the government. In 2011, Egypt's
power centers were divided -- few approved of Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal
running for president, and many were frustrated with the ruling family's
increasingly overbearing role in the decisionmaking process. In 2013,
the Muslim Brotherhood's incompetent and destructive leadership
galvanized the state apparatus to support the protestors. In short, the
institutional configurations in both situations did not favor those in
power at the time.
The reality on the ground is different today, however, as revealed by
numerous interviews conducted over the past few months with officials
from various Egyptian security agencies. There is clear alignment and
consensus among state institutions, especially the security apparatus
behind Sisi, who enjoys considerable support from many power centers.
At the same time, the past three years show how quickly public opinion
can shift, especially if a government is believed to be ineffective at
addressing the country's socioeconomic, security, and political
problems. Sisi himself has acknowledged these challenges, and if he
becomes president, he will need to deal with a complex bureaucracy in
order to resolve the most pressing problems.
The country's crushing socioeconomic burden is the foremost concern, but
another factor that could trigger popular discontent with a Sisi-led
government is anger at repressive measures against political opponents,
especially against nonviolent, non-Islamist critics. At the moment, most
Egyptians appear willing to give the government wide berth on this
issue, content to accept the collateral damage endured by democracy and
civil-society advocates in the fight against the Brotherhood and its
fellow travelers. Yet there is an undefined threshold that, if crossed,
may tip the balance against popular deference on this issue. Given
Sisi's efforts thus far to align the operations of the Interior Ministry
and the army, he would likely bear the brunt of such criticism.
THE MILITARY'S GENERATIONAL TRANSITION
In August 2012, Egypt witnessed a major generational transition among
its highest military ranks when Sisi and Sobhi rose to the top
leadership positions. Many analysts prematurely concluded that the
removal of Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Anan
was not a significant change, arguing that Sisi represented a
continuation of the Tantawi era. Yet while Sisi did enjoy a close
relationship with his predecessor, some of his methods for leading the
Defense Ministry are profoundly different. In fact, Sisi and Sobhi's
ascendance has marked a new era within the military establishment.
Part of this shift is due to the manner in which both men benefited
directly from close U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. Sisi and Sobhi
each had the opportunity to study at the U.S. Army War College,
familiarizing them with modern American military doctrine and leadership
style while fostering strong friendships with U.S. military officers.
Yet Tantawi and Anan were mainly exposed to Soviet military doctrine in
their formative years, as reflected in their leadership styles.
In addition, military education and training during the Tantawi era were
based on traditional warfare, which made the top brass less adaptive to
modern transnational threats and rapid technological developments. The
rise of nonstate actors, advances in intelligence gathering, and broader
transformations in global security dynamics were difficult for the
older generation of officers to fully embrace. Today, a younger
generation of leaders is taking a much more proactive approach to
unconventional security challenges.
In particular, Sisi and Sobhi both understand that the Sinai security
threat requires an active military response. The military has undertaken
a major, unprecedented, and increasingly effective campaign against
terrorist cells in the peninsula and the Gaza smuggling tunnels on which
they rely. Over 1,000 tunnels have been destroyed in the past few
months, and a buffer zone has been established to limit the activities
of jihadists and smugglers at the border. Ahmed Wasfi, the army general
in charge of the campaign, is another member of a rising young military
leadership that is eager to take on the important Sinai portfolio and
much more receptive to focusing on border security and counterterrorism.
Sisi has also established himself as the main interlocutor with regard
to U.S.-Egyptian security cooperation. This is different from the
Tantawi era, when an older generation of army officers was reluctant to
embrace the broader and more flexible security cooperation paradigm
Washington sought following the September 11 attacks. Their reluctance
tilted the pillar of U.S. cooperation with Cairo toward former
intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, who established himself as the main
link in the relationship.
SISI'S LEADERSHIP STYLE
As defense minister, Sisi has shown a much more outgoing leadership
style than his predecessors. For example, one of his first decisions was
to appoint a young spokesman, Ahmed Ali, to represent the armed forces.
At the time, the military was badly shaken by its difficult
eighteen-month rule post-Mubarak. Appointing a young officer as the
military's public face would have been difficult to imagine during the
Tantawi era, but Sisi saw a need to improve relations with the street.
According to several senior officers, Sisi also became much more
involved than his predecessors in going to the field and surrounding
himself with younger officers to boost institutional morale.
In addition, he has moved away from the strictly hierarchical leadership
style that gradually disconnected Tantawi from his peers and fostered
discontent within the military. Sisi showed more of a team-player
approach from the outset, especially given his younger age and his need
to gain the respect of more senior peers. For example, his deputy Sobhi
is even younger but technically outranks him. Sisi also made drastic
changes to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, assembling a trusted
team of handpicked officers.
Sisi's approach quickly earned him popularity and helped him maintain
cohesiveness. This was put to the test in the lead-up to last June's
mass uprising, when the Brotherhood government attempted to replace him
with General Wasfi, his close colleague. That gambit failed, and during a
July 4 phone interview broadcast on MBC Masr, Wasfi declared that the
military's cohesiveness was unbreakable.
Sisi also appears to have been effective at building coalitions among
previously competing institutions. During the Mubarak era, the Interior
Ministry and police were used as a counterbalance to the military
establishment. As a result, the police grew exponentially, and their
relations with the military worsened, hitting an all-time low in 2011.
Since Sisi took over as defense minister, however, the relationship has
gradually improved. In the past few weeks, police and military officials
have exchanged high-profile visits and offered positive remarks about
each other. On January 21, Sisi and a senior military delegation met
with senior Interior Ministry officials to mark the upcoming police
holiday. At the gathering, he emphasized the importance of their
relationship: "The police and military are the real guarantors of
Egypt's security and stability...The existing challenges are no doubt
immense...and we [military] are right next to you [police] to protect
our country...Together, we are capable of delivering even though there
are many threats."
Sisi has also demonstrated awareness of the need to show broad political
support for major decisions. For example, during the July 3 televised
announcement of Morsi's removal, a wide spectrum of public figures and
politicians were visible in the background. Sisi even asked for a
popular mandate on July 24 to aggressively fight terrorism, making sure
that the people would accept the intense crackdown against the
Brotherhood leadership.
What is less clear is how vigorously Sisi will tackle Egypt's deep
structural socioeconomic problems as president. He has not worked on
these issues in the past, nor has he articulated his vision for
addressing them in the future. Rather, he has kept a low profile on
structural-reform subjects such as subsidies, which are critical for
economic progress but very delicate politically. If he tackles these
problems head on -- or if he does little and the economy stumbles along
-- his popularity may well drop.
CONCLUSION
Field Marshal Sisi is part of a new generation of U.S.-educated Egyptian
military leaders who tend to be more adaptive to the fast-changing
security threats across the region. His close relationship with various
power centers -- especially his same-generation military colleagues --
enhances his prospects of enduring if he becomes president. Given his
extremely good chances of winning the election, it would be shortsighted
for Washington to jeopardize its three-decade investment in close
relations with Egypt's armed forces by prolonging its military aid
suspension. Moreover, Sisi's greater focus on counterterrorism compared
to his military predecessors creates an opportunity to better advance
mutual strategic security interests.
******************************
Adel El-Adawy is a Next Generation Fellow at The Washington Institute.
******************************
Tweet this item:
http://twitter.com/home?status=http://washin.st/1mKFh11
Follow us on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/washinstitute
Follow us on Facebook:
http://www.facebook.com/WashingtonInstitute
******************************
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
No comments:
Post a Comment