INSS Insight No. 520, February 24, 2014
A recent article in Newsweek
reported that “according to a well-placed intelligence source,” in 2007
Saudi Arabia began to purchase CSS-5 (DF-21) ground-to-ground missiles
from China. While similar reports appeared in the past, the recently
published information is distinguished by its confirmation by an
official – albeit anonymous – source, and by the revelation that the
Americans knew about the Saudi-Chinese deal and were involved in it. The
report raises many questions about the Saudis’ motivations, the
implications of the deal, and the timing of the exposure.
A
recent article in Newsweek reported that “according to a well-placed
intelligence source,” in 2007 Saudi Arabia began to purchase CSS-5
(DF-21) ground-to-ground missiles from China. While similar reports
appeared in the past, the recently published information is
distinguished by its confirmation by an official – albeit anonymous –
source, and by the revelation that the Americans knew about the
Saudi-Chinese deal and were involved in it. The report raises many
questions about the Saudis’ motivations, the implications of the deal,
and the timing of the exposure.
CSS-5 (DF-21), Wikimedia/ Creative Commons
The DF-3A missiles were already
outdated when the Saudis purchased them, and it was only a matter of
time until they would seek to replace them or add more modern missiles
to their arsenal. Moreover, these missiles use liquid fuel, are
cumbersome to prepare for launching, and have low accuracy. And indeed,
for several years there have been reports on Saudi expansion of its
missile arsenal. In 2009, the existence of additional sites suspected of
belonging to the Saudi missile arsenal was reported. A book by a former
CIA employee published in 2010 even claimed that in 2003, the Saudis,
with the knowledge of the United States, purchased advanced
ground-to-ground missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Also in
2010, there were reports that the strategic missile arsenal was being
upgraded and that a new headquarters was dedicated outside of Riyadh for
the kingdom’s Strategic Missile Force. Already then, doubts surfaced as
to whether the Saudis needed the facility if they still had the old
missiles.
The latest report confirms the
previous ones: the Saudis did in fact purchase missiles from China, with
the knowledge of the United States. According to the report, CIA
personnel examined the missiles in Saudi Arabia in order to confirm that
they did not carry nuclear warheads. It may be that the deal was not
revealed until now because the Americans examined the missiles and were
not concerned by what they found or because of a desire to avoid
embarrassment on both sides. The Americans may also have understood that
if they were not involved in the process, Saudi Arabia could do without
them, as it did in the past, and they preferred to retain control of
the process.
The Dong Feng 21 missile (East Wind
21) is a two-stage ballistic missile that uses solid fuel, which
shortens the launch preparation time and makes maintenance easier. It
has a range of some 1,700 kilometers and can carry a load of about 600
kilograms. It is much more accurate than the old DF-3A, and its CEP
(Circular Error Probable, a measure of accuracy) is estimated at about
300-400 meters. Its later models are also equipped with terminal
guidance, which enables it to hit pinpoint targets (though it is
unlikely that these later models were exported).
It is possible that the Saudis have
purchased other missiles in addition to the DF-21, including other
models produced in China (such as the DF-11 or the DF-15) or
Pakistani-made missiles, such as one of the Shaheen series. Moreover,
the Saudi efforts to acquire long range weapons have extended to cruise
missiles, and the British reportedly sold the kingdom Storm Shadow
cruise missiles as part of the Saudi program to upgrade its Tornado
jets. The missile has a range of some 500 kilometers (and therefore, its
export is restricted under the Missile Technology Control Regime
agreements). An unofficial confirmation of the sale of the missile
appeared in WikiLeaks documents in 2009, and in 2013 it was reported
that in contrast to previous refusals, the United States had agreed to
sell the Saudis SLAM-ER cruise missiles.
While the new missiles have a shorter
range than their predecessors, they have better accuracy. This gives
them a greater deterrent value in Saudi eyes, even if they have
conventional warheads, because of their ability to hit government
buildings, strategic facilities, and military bases in Iran. Does the
presence of these missiles significantly change the military balance in
the region? Not as long as the missiles are armed with conventional
warheads.
The recent Newsweek report raises new
questions as to the kingdom’s intentions in the nuclear realm. Officials
in Saudi Arabia, which is in the midst of a significant conventional
military buildup, have often stated that the kingdom is focusing on a
nuclear program to meet the country’s energy needs and reduce its
dependence on oil. However, Saudi Arabia has previously examined the
military nuclear path, and to this end, has increased its cooperation
with a number of countries, in particular Pakistan. It has had military
cooperation with Pakistan for some years, and funded part of its nuclear
program. In addition, several unusual comments from Riyadh since 2011
have indicated Saudi Arabia’s willingness to examine the nuclear path if
the international community is unable to prevent Iran from attaining
military nuclear capability. Because Saudi Arabia lacks an independent
knowledge infrastructure, if it makes a decision to pursue a nuclear
option, it will presumably prefer to purchase an off-the-shelf nuclear
deterrent.
The Saudis’ motivation in purchasing
the missiles is Iran’s progress in its missile program and the growth
and improvement in its ground-to-ground missile arsenal. It is possible
that the progress in the Iranian nuclear program will lead to increased
Saudi pressure on Pakistan to provide the kingdom with some type of
nuclear guarantees, whether through extended deterrence, the stationing
of nuclear forces in Saudi Arabia, or transfer of nuclear warheads to
the Saudis for installation on the new missiles (in a regulated move or
by turning a blind eye).
Not only have Saudi Arabia’s concerns
not been mitigated by the interim agreement signed with the Islamic
Republic; they have actually intensified, if only because of the
agreement’s significance for Iran’s international and regional status.
The Saudis are anxious about the Iranian buildup, and it may be that the
“revelations” on its missile arsenal are part of an attempt by Saudi
Arabia to make its fears public. Furthermore, the report on the American
involvement comes in advance of an expected visit by President Obama to
the kingdom, which inter alia is designed to assuage Saudi fears that
current American policy endangers Saudi security interests.
In recent years, the discussion on
strategic issues inside and outside the kingdom has become more public,
and therefore, it is likely that further “revelations” can be expected.
This is due to the negotiations with Iran and the significance Riyadh
attributes to deterrent signals of this kind. The deal itself is also
significant, indicating China’s growing interest in selling advanced
weaponry to the region (and to Saudi Arabia, China’s largest oil
supplier), but perhaps also the weakness of America’s standing in the
region.
To date there is no solid evidence
that Saudi Arabia intends to pursue the nuclear route, even though
nuclear weapons in Iranian hands would be a grave threat to the kingdom.
However, in light of its great wealth and relative military weakness,
Saudi Arabia will likely seek to construct security arrangements that
will lend it more independence in decision making and better chances of
maintaining a stable balance of deterrence in the Gulf over time. This
is because of the tension in relations with the United States and the
fear that it will reduce its involvement in the region after improving
its relations with Iran, which would once again turn Iran into the
dominant power in the Gulf.
It is not clear whether Israel has
received any guarantees from the United States (perhaps even from Saudi
Arabia) about the deals in question. Israel, as a rule, does not favor
equipping an Arab state with advanced weapons that are capable of
threatening it too. In the past, Israel actively opposed any such
buildup. However, in recent years, given the joint Iranian threat,
Israel has preferred to turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia’s military
buildup (and that of the other Gulf states), which has even been
perceived in Jerusalem as an advantage. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s
arming itself with modern ballistic missiles should worry Israel. In
addition to the fact that these weapons are in the hands of a state
hostile to Israel, the buildup, particularly the silence surrounding it,
and the nature of US involvement, bode ill for the stability of the
region and the struggle against missile proliferation.
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