Andrew J. Tabler
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By focusing on the Syrian regime's faltering commitment to eliminate its
chemical weapons, Washington can decisively push Damascus and Russia
toward real progress on larger issues -- and also set the table for
limited military strikes if they prove necessary.
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The Syria peace talks in Geneva ended in deadlock on February 16, with
the Assad regime seizing the personal assets of opposition negotiators
and UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi blaming Damascus for the
failure to schedule the next round. Brahimi accused the regime of
refusing to address the very basis of the talks: a negotiated political
transition. It is now patently clear that President Bashar al-Assad
feels no need to negotiate, be it a political solution to end the crisis
or humanitarian access and evacuation from areas besieged by the
regime. Similarly, his backers in Moscow refuse to pressure him into
fulfilling his political obligations under the Geneva Communique of
2012. According to U.S. ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, nearly
5,000 Syrians were killed during the latest rounds of talks in what she
described as "the most concentrated period of killing in the entire
duration of the conflict."
To make matters far worse, the regime is dragging its feet on disposing
of its chemical weapons (CW), with only 11 percent of only the first
shipment transferred out of the country so far. And on January 30, U.S.
authorities reported that the regime has "revised" its initial
declarations to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), refusing to destroy its twelve declared weapons sites.
Taken together, these developments show that Assad is not only playing a
ruthless game to hold on to power, but also escalating the crisis. By
starving out the opposition and obstructing a political solution, he is
ensuring that the country remains in a permanent state of partition,
with terrorist havens on both sides. And by not following through on his
commitments to the OPCW, he is threatening to supercharge the conflict
-- the longer such weapons remain in the country, the more likely they
are to be used by the regime again or fall into the hands of terrorist
groups. In short, the situation presents a clear threat to regional and
international security.
Accordingly, the United States should turn the tables on Assad, using
Syria's September decision to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention as
leverage to gain compliance on two other issues: a political transition
as outlined in the Geneva Communique, and humanitarian
access/evacuation. While the Security Council has shown little agreement
on the humanitarian issue, compliance with the OPCW and the Geneva
Communique are both enshrined in the same Security Council document:
Resolution 2118, which is enforceable by Chapter VII measures such as
sanctions and use of force following the passage of a subsequent Chapter
VII resolution. Pushing now on 2118 would create a useful dilemma,
forcing Moscow to reveal whether it is unable or simply unwilling to
goad the Assad regime into eliminating its CW program and negotiating a
political transition. This approach would also prepare the American
public for a possible military showdown with Assad this summer over his
refusal to dispose of chemical agents.
ONE RESOLUTION, TWO VITAL ISSUES
As Brahimi noted, the peace talks broke down because of the Assad
regime's refusal to discuss a "transitional governing body" as outlined
under the Geneva Communique, the internationally accepted "Action Plan
for Syria" agreed on by the United States and Russia and enshrined in
Resolution 2118. Instead, the regime has put forward a forced political
solution centered on Assad's "reelection" to a third seven-year term;
his current terms expires July 7, but he is virtually guaranteed to win
the rigged election slated for this spring. This is a nonstarter for the
opposition. And given the regime's inability to reconquer and hold all
the territory it has lost, this solution would make it impossible to
reunite Syria under central leadership, leading to permanent partition
along the lines of Somalia.
Meanwhile, the regime's efforts to remove "chemical agents and key
precursor chemicals" have -- as U.S. ambassador to the OPCW Robert
Mikulak put it on January 30 -- "seriously languished and stalled" in at
least two respects. First, only a small percentage of the first
scheduled shipment has been transported to the port of Latakia for
transfer outside Syria and destruction. The shipment is supposed to
include 500 tonnes of the most toxic chemicals, with another shipment of
700 tonnes due out thereafter. Mikulak's assessment was not surprising:
reports indicated that shipments had been remarkably small for some
time, leading Assad to blame the OPCW for the "slow" provision of
equipment in a January interview with Agence France Press. This was in
reference to Syrian requests for extra equipment due to "security
concerns" in the Qalamoun area along the M-5 highway north of Damascus,
through which CW shipments are transported. Mikulak branded such
concerns as "without merit" and said they displayed a "bargaining
mentality rather than a security mentality," since the regime and its
Hezbollah allies were already known to have consolidated much of their
position in that region.
Second, and much more worrisome, Damascus has sought to revise its
initial declaration to the OPCW in order to keep its twelve declared CW
weapons sites intact. The regime now wants to render these sites
"inactivated" by "welding doors shut and constructing interior
obstacles" -- measures that Washington has said are "readily reversible
within days" and therefore well short of Syria's original commitment to
"physically destroy" the sites "as provided for by the Convention and
the precedents for implementing that requirement." The proposal followed
Assad's statement in the AFP interview that Syria's only obligation was
"preparing and collecting data and providing access to inspectors."
"The rest," he said, "is up to other parties."
The site request indicated that Damascus was backtracking on its
commitments under Resolution 2118 and the Convention on the Destruction
of Chemical Weapons, which the regime acceded to last year under threat
of U.S. military force. In response, Mikulak stated that the United
States was willing to "explore an approach" where the roofs of seven
hardened aircraft hangars used as chemical sites could be collapsed. The
five remaining CW sites are underground; although Mikulak noted that
they present a "more challenging destruction problem," he recommended
collapsing the tunnel portals and compromising the "structural
integrity" of the tunnels at "key junctures."
USING 2118 TO BRING ASSAD BACK TO THE TABLE
The best way to prevent Assad from escalating the crisis and domineering
the transition is to pressure him into complying with the timetable for
disposing of CW and destroying chemical sites. Increased shipments out
of Syria would take away a strategic weapon that the regime has
repeatedly has used and keep it from falling into the wrong hands. But
there is another compelling reason to push Assad on 2118: the regime has
made itself vulnerable on other fronts by dragging its feet on the
OPCW. Focusing on the effort to rid Syria of CW would help Washington
determine exactly where it stands not only with the Assad regime, but
also with Moscow. The sequencing of this strategy could unfold as
follows:
1. Create diplomatic pressure around Resolution 2118 in terms of both CW
destruction and the transitional governing body outlined by the Geneva
Communique. The CW problem is the only Syrian issue on which there is
clear Security Council agreement regarding the steps Assad must take,
and the transition process outlined in the Geneva Communique has broad
international acceptance. Emphasizing these two issues by focusing on
compliance with Resolution 2118 would keep the regime on agenda and
steer it away from attempting to justify its onslaught against civilians
as a war on "terrorism." At the same time, the U.S. government should
continue pushing on the current UN draft resolutions regarding
humanitarian access and evacuation in response to the regime's recent
uptick in violence and continued besieging of approximately 200,000
Syrians. Given the urgency of the matter, any such resolutions should
have clear consequences in the event of noncompliance.
2. Build public pressure against the regime based on its delays in
implementing 2118. By increasingly highlighting the Assad regime's
recent barrage against the opposition, Washington can build pressure not
only on Damascus, but also on Moscow, determining once and for all
whether Russia will convince Assad to meet his commitments on CW and
political transition. In addition, such an approach would prod Moscow on
the humanitarian front.
A campaign of diplomatic and public pressure could also build opposition
support for the United States following its nadir last year, when the
Obama administration decided to delay punitive airstrikes after the
regime reportedly used CW against civilians. This goodwill could in turn
be used to obtain guarantees from rebel elements along the
Qalamoun-Latakia route not to attack or commandeer CW convoys. Such an
approach would cement the good impression made by Washington's strong
diplomatic stand at the latest peace talks, particularly in keeping Iran
away from the table unless it accepted the Geneva Communique.
REVISITING LIMITED DIRECT MILITARY FORCE
Thus far, the Assad regime has radically changed course only when
confronted with the credible threat of U.S. military force last autumn.
This is similar to Assad's shift in the face of Israeli military strikes
against convoys attempting to transfer strategic weapons to Hezbollah.
It is therefore important that Washington emphasize a point President
Obama has already made: U.S. strikes on Syria were only delayed last
year, not cancelled, while Washington explored the regime's willingness
to deliver on its commitments under Resolution 2118. Taking this tack
would not only instrumentalize the credible use of force and create
pressure to move, it would also prepare the American public for the
necessity of a limited strike in the increasingly likely event that
Damascus misses the final June 30 deadline to eliminate its CW program.
This is not just a matter of American credibility being on the line: by
escalating the violence, spurning real negotiations, and holding onto
its chemical arsenal, the Assad regime has ensured that the Syria crisis
will increasingly threaten the United States and its allies in Europe
and the Middle East. The domestic political timing adds increased
urgency: President Obama will likely face increased Republican criticism
over his handling of a crisis to which there will be no easy answers
any time soon, and such pressure is already emerging via tight
congressional races that could end Democratic control of the Senate and,
with it, the president's ability to govern assertively the next two
years. At the same time, the relative economic and political cost of
limited military intervention using offset assets (e.g., cruise
missiles) is decreasing as Washington's financial and military
commitments to curb humanitarian suffering in Syria grow. As the Syria
crisis enters its fourth year next month, dealing effectively with the
Assad regime's behavior now by pressing for implementation of Resolution
2118 -- and a potential new humanitarian resolution -- is the right
move, both politically and morally.
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Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.
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