Israel
is well-versed in the mirage that has come to be known around here as
"foreign peacekeepers" • Israeli military experts weigh in on the
"terrible proposal" for the deployment of international forces as part
of a peace deal with the Palestinians.
A UNIFIL soldier in southern
Lebanon, 2010
|
Photo credit: AFP |
On the morning of March
14, 2006, an agreement hatched by the United States and a number of
European countries and which sprang from Israeli jails the killers of
former minister Rehavam Ze'evi and allowed them to be incarcerated under
the eye of the Palestinian Authority, evaporated like morning dew.
The Palestinians announced that Ahmed Saadat,
the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and Ze'evi's killers would be released. The American and
British security guards stationed in the prison and who were charged
with preventing such a scenario from coming to pass made a quick getaway
out of fear for their lives. Only a lightning-quick operation by the
IDF led to Saadat's reincarceration in Israel.
That same year, Israel suffered another
setback, this time on the Gaza front. In the wake of the Hamas victory
in the elections, dozens of European Union security personnel whose job
was to monitor the organization and flow of weapons to and from the
Strip fled their posts.
In the north, the IDF is even more well-versed
in the mirage that has come to be known around these parts as "foreign
peacekeepers." For years, officers in the IDF Northern Command have
looked on with clenched jaws as Hezbollah operatives lobbed rockets at
Israel from positions that were dug in near UNIFIL posts on Lebanese
soil.
IDF commanders have repeatedly complained that
the presence of international forces on the ground tie their hands and
limit their ability to respond, thus indirectly aiding the terrorists.
This week, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ilan Biran, who commanded a division in the
north in the 1980s, recalled how the political echelon denied him
permission to go after terrorist cells that used U.N. posts as cover.
Even the abduction of three IDF soldiers on Mount Dov in October 2000 took place right under the nose of UNIFIL.
'An inef'fective proposal'
The watershed moment that more than any other
shaped the way decision-makers in Israel viewed the involvement of
"foreign peacekeepers" in conflict (as was illustrated by Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu recently, when he rejected an American proposal to
incorporate NATO as part of an Israeli-Palestinian peace) took place on
the eve of the Six-Day War.
U Thant, the man who at the time served as
secretary-general of the United Nations, hastened to yield to Egyptian
demands to remove 4,000 U.N. troops that served as a buffer between the
militaries of Egypt and Israel. This got the snowball rolling downhill.
The Egyptians would go on to blockade the Straits of Tiran, cutting off
access to Israeli shipping, and they mobilized massive ground forces
into Sinai. A nerve-wracking "waiting period" ensued before war finally
broke out.
At the time, Yaakov Amidror was a conscript in
the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers that entered the Gaza Strip
near Khan Yunis. He remembers a group of Indian troops clad in Sikh
turbans -- an outfit which was part of the U.N. peacekeeping force that
withdrew from their positions on the eve of the war -- marching along
the rail lines in organized columns of four while the barrels of their
guns are pointed downwards.
Today, three months after concluding his stint
as head of the National Security Council, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amidror
believes that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' proposal to
John Kerry that NATO forces be stationed in Judea, Samaria, and the
Jordan Valley as part of an agreement with the Palestinians is
"bizarre." Kerry, as has been made public, is not ruling out the idea.
Amidror, the former head of the Military
Intelligence research division who also served as military secretary to
the defense minister, doesn't mince words when detailing his serious
objections to the plan.
"When you are the one defending yourself, you
are also the one who determined what is more important and what is less
important for your security," he said. "Can one seriously expect someone
in Brussels to determine what is or isn't important for our security?
Can they really determine if this force will be ready to sacrifice so
that Katyusha rockets aren't fired on Tel Aviv from Ramallah?"
"Let us assume that the lives of 20 soldiers
are what is needed in order to prevent rocket fire on Tel Aviv," Amidror
said. "On the other hand, a battalion of troops from Britain or Senegal
is only willing to sacrifice two soldiers. After the deaths of two
soldiers, they decide that the price is too steep, and it's too
dangerous. Can I then go to them and complain? This is really a terrible
proposal, and an ineffective one."
Three years ago, Amidror penned a paper for
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs titled "The Risks of Foreign
Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank." In an interview with Israel Hayom
this week, Amidror stuck to his guns.
"A U.N. force or an international force would
be an obstacle that would hinder Israel's ability to defend itself," he
said. "Whether that force would be deployed under the flag of the U.N.
or under NATO, as long as those troops are deployed in a situation of
conflict, they will face one fundamental problem that is faced by all
peacekeeping forces: the need to maintain good working relations with
violent militias and terrorist organizations."
"Generally, one can conclude that
'peacekeeping forces' tend to take a purely neutral position in a
dispute between one side which seeks to undermine peace and security,
and the other side which they are supposed to protect," he said. "First
and foremost, they will operate out of survivalist considerations."
'Bad international experiences'
Shlomo Avineri, a professor of political
science and the former director-general of the Foreign Ministry, is also
adamantly opposed to Abbas' idea.
"Israel has good reason to reject it," he
said. "A NATO force can, under certain circumstances, prevent an attack
by one country on another. But such a force cannot successfully deal
with terrorism. The most well-known example that proves this point is
Afghanistan."
"This is an attempt by the Palestinians to
bring in NATO so that it could defend them from Israeli pre-emptive
operations and retaliatory operations," he said. "This would give them
protection from Israel, but it won't protect Israel from terrorism. It's
a baseless idea. Our experience with foreign forces is a bad one, and
international precedents with peacekeepers have also not been
successful."
"In the former Yugoslavia, particularly in
Bosnia, it didn't prevent a massacre," Avineri said. "There were
horrible things that took place, when U.N. forces just stood aside and
watched as the Serbs slaughtered thousands of Muslims in Bosnia. So any
agreement needs to be between Israel and the Palestinians. The
responsibility must be borne by these two parties. Hiding behind NATO is
not the solution."
As commander of the Gaza division, Maj. Gen.
(res.) Gadi Shamni fought Palestinian terrorism in the early 2000s. He
then moved on to become the head of the operations division at the
General Staff. Shamni knows the terrain well, particularly from his
stint as GOC Central Command.
Like Amidror, Shamni also has a perspective
that is not of an exclusively military nature. He was former Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert's military secretary.
Shamni has a positive view of incorporating
international elements that can assist the Palestinians in building up
their security forces into an efficient outfit, "as was done with
General Keith Dayton, the U.S. security coordinator in the Palestinian
Authority." On the other hand, Shamni dismissed out of hand any
suggestion that international forces be tasked with security or defense
responsibilities.
"This is a recipe that is doomed to failure,"
he said. "The worst thing that can be done is to allow the Palestinians
to abdicate their responsibilities. This enables terrorism to be waged
under the auspices of a foreign power, or near a foreign power. We
remember how terrorists fired on us from Lebanon as they were stationed
in UNIFIL posts, and how when we responded we hit foreign troops on more
than one occasion."
Beware, observers ahead
Shamni notes that in Gaza, "UNRWA, the U.N.'s
refugee aid agency, has for the most part morphed into Hamas, which has
taken over many of the agency's properties: installations, vehicles,
symbols, with and without their knowledge, and this has put a great deal
of limitations on us."
"Even something that can seem like a success
-- like U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which mandates the
deployment of an armed force throughout south Lebanon -- led to results
that were not good," he said. "We see how these forces aren't really
succeeding in carrying out the duties that they were tasked to do, how
Hezbollah has massively re-armed itself and how active it is over
there."
"Picture a scenario where there's an
escalation in south Lebanon," he said. "Then you will understand the
kind of limitations and restrictions that the presence of such a force
places on the IDF and its freedom to act."
Shamni also recalls how "the presence of
foreign observers in Hebron only exacerbated the friction between the
IDF and the Palestinians."
"The IDF is very careful in trying to avoid
doing harm to observers, and this has greatly limited our ability to
act," he said. "The Palestinians exploited this. They began to get
closer to us, they grew bolder, and this necessitated a fiercer response
from us. We dealt with events in a less than ideal fashion."
Perhaps this could change with NATO forces on the ground?
"NATO also doesn't like to see its troops
being killed for someone else. We saw how NATO, even in places where it
supposedly had an indefinite commitment, like Afghanistan, removes its
soldiers the minute the number of its casualties begins to climb. Try to
look at the situation from the Palestinian perspective. Sooner or
later, a NATO force would be seen by them as a new occupier. They will
say, 'These are the new crusaders'."
"If things begin to go wrong -- and we have to
take into account the possibility that extremist elements like Hamas or
jihadist groups will rise -- then kidnappings and attacks against the
foreign forces will begin," he said. "This will automatically lead to
NATO holing up their forces within their encampments."
"At the end of the day, the responsibility
needs to be on the shoulders of the Palestinians," he said. "The only
question is when. From the moment an agreement is signed, how much time
will pass until the full responsibility of running their affairs goes to
them? In my opinion, it will be a while regardless of how the agreement
is formulated."
"It won't be three years, as Abbas is
demanding, and it won't be five years, as the U.S. is suggesting,"
Shamni said. "Those numbers are simply detached from reality. Eight
years sounds much more realistic to me, and I'm talking about it from a
practical standpoint, not a political one."
'I trust only myself'
Like Shamni, Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, the
former deputy chief of staff who also went on to head the National
Security Council, was a GOC Central Command. Two weeks ago, Dayan gave a
lecture before senior Military Intelligence officers. He asked them to
close their eyes and imagine how the Yom Kippur War would've turned out
if foreign forces had to defend Israel.
"You can't expect anything from such a force,
except for trouble," Dayan told Israel Hayom. "On a fundamental level, a
country doesn't send its sons to fight in other places in the name of
interests that aren't theirs. We don't do this either, not even in
places where genocide is taking place."
Dayan said he has yet to see an example where a foreign force effectively took on terrorism.
"Is the American force stationed in Sinai,
which has turned into a terrorist haven, fighting terrorism?" Dayan
asked. "Did the U.N. force do anything except for tuck tail and run once
the Syrian civil war reached the Golan Heights? On the Lebanese border,
I didn't see foreign troops thwart one attempt to carry out a
cross-border attack. The establishment of the Temporary International
Presence in Hebron observer force was also a blunder. I was sent to
Tunis to meet with Arafat. It was during that meeting that it was
decided to found TIPH. It was meant to assuage Arafat after the massacre
committed by Baruch Goldstein at the Cave of the Patriarchs.
Ultimately, TIPH became a hindrance in fighting terrorism, albeit
indirectly. Their presence was totally unnecessary."
Dayan is especially apprehensive over the possibility that foreign forces will be stationed in the Jordan Valley.
"Can such a force run routine security
operations?" he asked. "In order to establish security, you need to know
the terrain, the population, the sensitivities, and, most important,
you need to want it. Have the American observer forces in Sinai and the
U.N. forces on the Golan fired one shot during an operation? Why would
they do this in Judea and Samaria? They are supposed to provide
deterrence, be the trip wire, thwart attempts at infiltration, do
patrols and lookouts, be ready to intervene at a moment's notice, and
use their helicopters if need be. To do all this and more, you need an
army with soldiers and an engineering corps and tanks. I put my trust
only in myself, in the IDF, and in the state of Israel."
Despite these sentiments, there are veterans
of the defense and security establishments who take a positive view of
involving NATO forces in a final-status deal. Brig. Gen. (res.) Dani
Arditi, the former head of the national security headquarters and a
onetime commander of the military unit that liaised with foreign forces,
views NATO as "a trained European army whose job it is to fight when
the need arises and which can spare the IDF a number of headaches."
Arditi is not so quick to second the
fundamental assumption that the IDF can do the job better. In his view,
the IDF is limited militarily in operating inside any Palestinian
entity, while NATO can not only use its military force but also summon
its diplomatic leverage through the European Union in order to restore
quiet.
"The playing field is not just military in nature, and a solely military force will only put out fires," he said. "That's it."
Nonetheless, he also concedes that if the two sides have
no wish to preserve any agreement, "there's no point in any kind of
peacekeeping force."
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