The Hamas-Israel war is
a test of Israel's power-projection and posture of deterrence, which
directly impacts the national security of Jordan and other pro-U.S. Arab
countries. They rely on Israel's deterrence in their own battle against
rogue Islamic regimes.
In addition, the
Hamas-Israel war highlights the limited impact of the Palestinian issue
-- both the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas -- on Middle
East developments and intra-Arab relations. The war underlines the gap
between the Western perception and the Egyptian and general Arab
perception of the Palestinian issue.
Contrary to Western
conventional wisdom, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and all
other Arab leaders do not consider the Palestinian issue a top priority,
a strategic added value, a core cause of Middle East turbulence or the
crux of their conflict with Israel. In contrast to U.S. policy -- as
executed by President Barack Obama since his June 2009 speech in Cairo,
when he elevated the Muslim Brotherhood to unprecedented heights and
dumped Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak -- Sissi outlawed the Muslim
Brotherhood, the "parent company" of Hamas, branded it a terror
organization and sentenced its leaders to death.
During the current
Israeli offensive in Gaza, the Arab World has not flexed political,
financial or military muscles on behalf of the Palestinian Hamas, nor
did they during the recent intensive Israeli military crackdown on
Palestinian terrorism in areas controlled by Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas (in the aftermath of the murder of three Israeli
teens). This low Arab regard for the Palestinian issue was similarly
displayed in reaction to Israel's wars against Hamas terrorism in 2009
and 2012; Israel's 2000-2004 comprehensive war on Palestinian Authority
terrorism (the Second Intifada); Israel's 1987-1991 military suppression
of PLO terrorism (First Intifada); and Israel's 1982-1983 hot pursuit
of PLO terrorists in Lebanon, all the way to Yasser Arafat's and Abbas'
expulsion from Beirut.
Recently, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates have extended a $20 billion emergency
financial assistance to Egypt; in 2006-2007 the Saudis supported Lebanon
with a $2.5 billion package; during 1980-1988, Riyadh provided $1
billion annually to the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan, compared to $100
million annually to the PLO; but, the Saudi financial aid to the
Palestinian Authority has been limited to a total of $1 billion to $1.5
billion since 1994, reflecting the Saudi mistrust toward Abbas and
Arafat. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States do not forget and do not
forgive Abbas' participation in Saddam Hussein's plunder of Kuwait in
1990. They are aware of Abbas' track record of subversion and terrorism
since the 1950s in Egypt, 1966 in Syria, 1970 in Jordan, 1970-1982 in
Lebanon and 1990 in Kuwait.
Sissi's attitude toward
the Palestinian issue is consistent with his predecessors Anwar Sadat's
and Mubarak's distrust of the PLO/Palestinians. For example, during
1977-79, Sadat defied then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter's insistence upon
placing the Palestinian issue at the center of the Egypt-Israel peace
process. Sadat did not trust the PLO and was convinced that a
PLO-dominated state would undermine regional stability. In 1994, during
the signing of the Cairo Israel-PLO agreement, Mubarak expressed his
attitude toward the PLO, scolding Arafat in public: "Sign, you dog." In
recent months, the Egyptian military killed scores of Palestinian
terrorists in Sinai, as they did in the aftermath of Israel's 2005
"disengagement" from Gaza, killing scores of Palestinians in Rafah.
Moreover, Sissi's fundamental position on the Palestinian issue was
influenced by Abbas' and Arafat's key role in the Cairo cell of the
Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, when the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to
assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Abbas and Arafat fled
Egypt due to their involvement in subversion and terrorism.
The Arab League -- just
like all Arab countries -- has been preoccupied with the Arab tsunami
currently sweeping the Middle East independent of the Palestinian issue,
highlighting the marginal role played by the Palestinian issue in
shaping the Middle East. The Arab League persists in its historical
attitude toward the Palestinian issue: showering Palestinians with
rhetoric, but not with resources. Thus, in 1948, the Arab League formed
the "All Palestine Government" as an Egyptian-molded phantom, which was
reduced by 1952 to a department within the Arab League and officially
dissolved, in 1959, by Nasser. In 1948-1949, the Arab countries did not
fight Israel for the Palestinians, did not share the spoils of the war
with the Palestinians (Hama, Jerusalem, Samaria, Judea and Gaza) and
were not interested in establishing a Palestinian state.
While Hamas urges the
Arabs to rise in support of the Palestinians, the Egyptian media
features unprecedented criticism of Hamas, reminding Egyptians that
Hamas murdered 16 Egyptian soldiers in Sinai in August, 2012, supported
the Muslim Brotherhood in toppling Mubarak, broke into Egyptian prisons
and released Muslim Brotherhood terrorists, supported the Muslim
Brotherhood's attempts to oust the Sissi regime, and undermined the
stability of Arab countries.
Putting the Palestinian
issue in its proper intra-Arab perspective is a prerequisite for a
realistic Middle East policy (focusing on "smothering sandstorms," not
on "tumbleweeds"), for any progress in the "peace process," and for the
survival of Jordan and other pro-U.S. Arab regimes, which face clear and
present Islamic terrorist danger. They realize that the outcome of the
Hamas-Israel war may either embolden or deter their mortal enemies.
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