Doc's Talk: Strategic Implications of Operation Protective Edge

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Strategic Implications of Operation Protective Edge

Prof. Shmuel Sandler,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The current Israel-Hamas war will have broad strategic implications that go far beyond the immediate results on the battlefield. The war might have an impact on the political future of the Palestinian Authority and the disposition of the West Bank, on the struggle against Iran, on the future of missile wars in the region, and on regional alliance politics.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon were very hesitant to be drawn into a third round of hostilities against Hamas within a decade and into a ground invasion of Gaza. Israel’s hesitation merits exploration. The current confrontation has a strategic context that goes beyond the Israeli logic of a “war of no choice’” that probably influenced the Israeli decision-makers. This paper looks at the strategic rationale that should accompany Operation Protective Edge from several viewpoints.

Hamas Control of the Gaza Strip

Hamas is undoubtedly one of the worst enemies Israel has faced. While classic enemies like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) grudgingly accepted Israel’s existence (although not as a Jewish state), Hamas and its counterparts (like Islamic Jihad) are not ready to grant Israel even that limited legitimacy. Hamas’ radical view on Israel is clearly expressed in its Charter, and is also repeated vocally at every public opportunity. Its goal is the physical destruction of the Jewish state.

Several strategic thinkers have urged a temporary Israeli takeover of Gaza to fully crush Hamas. These include Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Prof. Hillel Frisch, and David M. Weinberg – all of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; and former Homeland Defense Minister Avi Dichter.

Undoubtedly, Hamas should be weakened and neutered as much as possible. But a total uprooting of Hamas from Gaza would have messy strategic implications.

Firstly, such a result could only be accomplished by an all-encompassing military invasion. Such a conquest of the Gaza Strip would be highly costly for Israel in terms of manpower and military effort. More saliently, it would have negative effects on Israel’s international diplomatic standing.

The international media has largely ignored the eight years of Hamas’ periodic bombardment of southern Israel. Alas, we can predict that the media will continue to ignore the fact that Hamas terrorists hide behind civilians and instead portray only the Gaza civilian casualties, especially women and children. While the Arab world would quietly applaud the destruction of Hamas, it would still shed crocodile tears and scream about the casualties wrought by the hand of Israel. This will bring widespread international condemnation of Israel.

Secondly, the uprooting of Hamas and the handing over of Gaza to Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority is not in Israel’s interest. Israel has no interest in uniting the West Bank and Gaza under Abbas, before he has proven to be a reliable partner for peace. Abbas has vowed to never recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People – which is rightly Israel’s sin qua non for an end to the conflict. By refusing to take this most indispensable step, Abbas has indicated that his goal is not real peace.

The Israel-Iran Front

Furthermore, Israeli military conquest of Gaza would distract attention from the strategic campaign against a nuclear Iran. The foremost strategic threat to the existence of the Jewish state is Shiite Iran and its Lebanese offshoot, Hezbollah. It is true that the dethroning of Hamas would take Gaza off the board as a launching pad for rockets against Israel in the event of a strategic confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran; and thus the destruction of the missile infrastructure in Gaza is essential. However, conquest and military control of Gaza would be exhausting for Israel and may distract world attention from the Iranian existential threat to the Jewish state; indeed, the Iranian threat to global international stability.

Missile War against Israel

Ever since the Gulf War, Israel’s enemies have concluded that the answer to Israel’s technological superiority was missile warfare. The terror inflicted in 1991 on Israeli cities by Iraqi Scud missiles was not answered by an Israeli response. Israel’s restraint was misinterpreted and this eroded its deterrence. The Second Lebanon War seemed to confirm this belief in Israel’s vulnerability to missile attacks.

The current round of violence between Israel and the terror groups controlling the Gaza Strip will be studied by Tehran and its allies. Iran has repeatedly threatened that an Israeli preemptive attack to destroy Tehran’s nuclear enterprise would result in a far-reaching missile strike against Tel Aviv. But the minimal damage caused by Hamas missiles in this round of hostilities thanks to Israel’s very successful anti-missile system (the “Iron Dome”) has upset the Israel-is-vulnerable-to-missiles hypothesis.

Undoubtedly, a military confrontation with Iran would be several times more difficult than the conflict with Hamas, but Israel’s answer is the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system. The success of Iron Dome and the hopefully-similarly-successful Arrow system should give Iran pause for thought.

Alliance Politics in the Middle East

Despite the unique characteristics of the Middle East, and the raging Islamic civil wars underway across the region, this area of the world is still subject to the vicissitudes of power politics. We are witnessing the emergence of many interesting and new alliances. The current fighting, for example, has brought the common interest against radical Islam between Israel and Egypt into the open. Egypt has thus emerged as key mediator and diplomatic player. By contrast, Turkey’s openly anti-Semitic prime minister should not be given a role in mediation.

In its early days, Israel saw potential allies in many non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey. At this juncture, the alliances have shifted. Israel is cooperating with Egypt on the Gaza front, while Hamas is supported by Iran and Turkey. Another potential Israeli partner is Saudi Arabia, which sees Hamas as an ally of Iran. Unfortunately, it seems that the US has not yet understood the changing map of the region. Washington still seems to think that democracy promotion is a fine thing, even if it brings radical Islam to power.

My point is that the current Israel-Hamas war has broad strategic implications that go far beyond the outcome of local battle results. The impact of the war on the fortunes of the Palestinians, on the struggle against Iran, on the future of missile wars in the region, and on regional alliance politics must be factored into the management of the crisis.

Prof. Shmuel Sandler is a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and the Dean of the Regional College System at Bar-Ilan University.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family

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Posted by Ted Belman @ 5:01 pm | 2 Comments »

2 Comments to Strategic Implications of Operation Protective Edge

ArnoldHarris says:

July 22, 2014 at 8:47 pm

Israel no longer has any alternative than either national surrender or complete destruction of Hamas, which means more or less permanent re-assertion of the military occupation and policing of the Gaza strip.

The downing of a Malaysian airliner by a missile in eastern Ukraine, and the killing of all passengers and crew members, could in fact be accomplished by Hamas if and when they get control of missiles of the same range and destructive potency.

The Malaysian airline ought not to have routed that aircraft over what has become of war zone in one of the Russian-speaking oblasts of Ukraine. Foreign airlines and their respective governments are now banning flights into Ben Gurion airport, for exactly the same justification. And considering the circumstances, you would have to be considered a fool flying into any war-zone country under such circumstances.

Therefore, it no longer matters now how many young Jews are killed in the service of Zahal, destroying the Hamas menace. Because if you neglect to destroy them, for whatever reason, these particular Arabs will blockade the State of Israel from the air, with all the terrible outcomes that would imply.

Truly now, kill or be killed is exactly what the situation dictates.

Arnold Harris
Mount Horeb WI

bernard ross says:

July 22, 2014 at 10:35 pm

My point is that the current Israel-Hamas war has broad strategic implications that go far beyond the outcome of local battle results.

Perhaps it might be more accurate to state the reverse:

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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