Sam Tadros
A friend of mine in academia forwarded this e-mail to me from an Egyptian student whose good sense he vouches for. The student tells a story very different from what most of you are seeing on television or reading in your papers.
Unless the author gives me permission to reveal his identity, I am not at liberty to disclose it. [Update: The author, Sam Tadros, has given his permission to publish his name.]
- Clarice Feldman
****
My apologies for the length of this article, but I see it as extremely important to tell the whole story as it happened.
The Story of the Egyptian Revolution
One week ago, Egypt was a stable authoritarian regime, prospects of change were minimal and every expert in Washington would have betted on the endurance of its regime. Today, Egypt is in a state of chaos. The regime, even after using its mightiest sword is not able to control the country and the streets of Egypt are in a state of utter lawlessness. As the world stands in awe, confusion, and worry at the unfolding events, perhaps it is important to write the evolving story that is happening in Egypt before any reflections can be made on them. Contrary to pundits, it turns out that the Egyptian regime was neither stable nor secure. The lack of its stability is not a reflection of its weakness or lack of a resolve to oppress. It is a reflection of its inherent contradiction to the natural desire of men to enjoy their basic freedoms. Egyptians might not know what democracy actually means, but that does not make the concept any less desirable. Perhaps it is precisely its vagueness and abstraction that makes the concept all the more desirable.
For two weeks calls were made using new social media tools for a mass demonstration on the 25th of January. Observers dismissed those calls as another virtual activism that would not result in anything. Other calls in the past had resulted in very small public support and the demonstrations were limited to the familiar faces of political activists numbering in the hundreds. As the day progressed, the observers seemed to be correct in their skepticism. While the demonstrations were certainly larger than previous ones, numbering perhaps 15,000 in Cairo, they were nothing worrisome for the regime. They were certainly much smaller than the ones in 2003 against the Iraq War. The police force was largely tolerating and when they decided to empty Tahrir Square, where the demonstrators had camped for the night, it took them less than 5 minutes to do so.
But beneath that, things were very different. The social media tools had given people something that they had lacked previously, an independent means of communication and propaganda. Hundreds of thousands of young Egyptians in a matter of minutes were seeing the demonstration videos being uploaded on youtube. For an apolitical generation that had never shown interest in such events the demonstration was unprecedented. More remarkable they were tremendously exaggerated. At a moment when no more than 500 demonstrators had started gathering in that early morning, an Egyptian opposition leader could confidently tweet that he was leading 100,000 in Tahrir Square. And it stuck.
It should come as no surprise to anyone that after 58 years of organized state propaganda, people would not believe for a second the government's media machine and its coverage of the events. Why they chose to believe the alternative propaganda needs more explaining. People believed the twitter messages and the facebook postings because they wanted to believe them. Tunisia had broken the barrier for many people. It mattered not that the situation and ruling formula in Tunisia is very different than the one in Egypt. Perceptions were more important than reality. If the Tunisians could do it, then so could we. With 15,000 demonstrating in Cairo, Egyptians were already texting each other with stories of the President's son escape. The only debate being whether Hosni Mubarak would escape to London or Saudi Arabia.
The next day the demonstrations continued with a promise of a return on Friday the 28th after Friday Prayers in Mosques. The regime started panicking at this moment. This was simply something they did not understand. Imagine for a second Mubarak's advisors trying to explain to the 83 year old dictator what twitter is in the first place. What was more worrying for them was that the only real force in Egyptian politics, the Muslim Brotherhood, announced its intention of joining the demonstrations. Suddenly they were faced with the prospect of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators from every Mosque in the country. They acted as every panicking authoritarian regime would act. They acted stupidly.
The internet was cut off in Egypt. Mobile phone companies were ordered to suspend services. With tools of communication disrupted the regime was hopeful that they had things under control. Simultaneously they started standard arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Things seemed for them under control. But they weren't. With every stupid panicking move by the regime, the narrative of its weakness was only reinforced for the people. People saw a regime that was scarred of the internet and they rightfully calculated that this was their golden opportunity.
Friday was an unprecedented event in Egypt. While it is impossible to guess the number of protestors on the streets that day, it is safe to say that they exceeded one million. Every Mosque was a launching site for a demonstration. The Islamists were out in full force. The slogans that day were quite different than the previous ones. Islamic slogans and activists were clearly visible. The security forces were faced with wave after wave of protestors that came from every street. In 4 hours, the security forces were collapsing.
Whether Mubarak was fully previously told about the deteriorating situation for the previous days or whether it was at this moment that he suddenly realized the gravity of the situation remains unknown. One thing is sure; the regime was not prepared for this. It is at this moment that the decision was taken to call in the army, announce a curfew, and withdraw the security forces. In reality the army did not deploy immediately. The troops and tanks that appeared in the streets were the Presidential Guard units deployed in Cairo.
The army was actually still far away from deploying in Cairo. Because no one had imagined that the situation would totally be out of control, the level of alert of the army was never raised. Officers were not called from their vacations and the whole top command of the Egyptian army was actually thousands of miles away in Washington for strategic prearranged discussions at the Pentagon. Moreover, the plan of deployment of the army never imagined a scenario where people would defy it. No one imagined that the army would be required to put a tank in every street. They thought that the mere mention of the army being called in, the sight of a few tanks, and the announcement of the curfew, would make people immediately go home scared. People did not.
The Egyptian army is hugely popular. This is due to the established mythology of Egyptian politics. The army, which is in all aspects the regime, is seen as separate by the people. The army is viewed as clean (not like the corrupt government), efficient (they do build bridges fast), and more importantly the heroes that defeated Israel in 1973 (it is no use to debate that point with an Egyptian). With the troops and tanks appearing in the streets, people actually thought the army was on their side, whatever that might mean. With an announced Presidential addressed that kept being delayed; Egyptians prepared themselves for an announcement of Mubarak's resignation.
Mubarak was at a loss. The troops could not possibly shoot people. That would not only destroy the army's reputation, but more importantly the troops practically could not do it. These guys after all were not trained for this. They do not have rubber bullets or tear gas. They only have live ammunition and tanks and the thought of actually using them in this situation was never an option. To the surprise of the regime, people just celebrated the army's arrival and started dancing in the streets defying the curfew. More importantly something else was happening as well. The looting was starting.
The decision to withdraw the security forces was a natural decision. First they were utterly exhausted and needed the rest to regroup. Secondly, as the security forces had become the symbol of the regime's oppression their withdrawal was seen as necessary to calm things. Thirdly and most importantly, in the protocol of operations there could not possibly be two forces with arms in the same street receiving orders from two different structures of command. Even with the best of coordination, a disaster is bound to happen.
What was not calculated however is the fact that suddenly a vacuum was created. The security forces were withdrawn and the army was not deployed yet. In this gap an opportunity presented itself for everyone. The scenes were unbelievable. First there was massive anger vented at symbols of state oppression such as the ruling party's headquarters. More drastically, in what can only be described as systematic targeting, police stations everywhere were attacked. Every police station in Cairo was looted, the weapons in them stolen and then burned. At the same time, massive looting was taking place. Even the Egyptian Museum, which hosts some of the world's greatest heritage, was not spared.
Saturday was indescribable. Nothing that I write can describe the utter state of lawlessness that prevailed. Every Egyptian prison was attacked by organized groups trying to free the prisoners inside. In the case of the prisons holding regular criminals this was done by their families and friends. In the case of the prisons with the political prisoners this was done by the Islamists. Bulldozers were used in those attacks and the weapons available from the looting of police stations were available. Nearly all the prisons fell. The prison forces simply could not deal with such an onslaught and no reinforcements were available. Nearly every terrorist held in the Egyptian prisons from those that bombed the Alexandria Church less than a month ago to the Murderer of Anwar El Sadat was freed, the later reportedly being arrested again tonight.
On the streets of Cairo it was the scene of a jungle. With no law enforcement in town and the army at a loss at how to deal with it, it was the golden opportunity for everyone. In a city that is surrounded with slums, thousands of thieves fell on their neighboring richer districts. People were robbed in broad daylight, houses were invaded, and stores looted and burned. Egypt had suddenly fallen back to the State of Nature. Panicking, people started grabbing whatever weapon they could find and forming groups to protect their houses. As the day progressed the street defense committees became more organized. Every building had its men standing in front of it with everything they could find from personal guns, knives to sticks. Women started preparing Molotov bombs using alcohol bottles. Street committees started coordinating themselves. Every major crossroad had now groups of citizens stopping all passing cars checking their ID cards and searching the cars for weapons. Machine guns were in high demand and were sold in the streets.
I do not aim to turn this into a personal story, but those people are my friends and family. It is a personal story to me. My neighbors were all stationed in my father-in-law's house with men on the roof to lookout for possible attackers. A friend of mine was shot at by a gang of thieves and another actually killed one of them to defend his house and wife. Another friend's brother arrested 37 thieves that day. The army's only role in all of this was to pass by each area to pick up the arrested thieves. Army officers informed the street committees that anyone with an illegal weapon should not worry and should use it. Any death of one of the thieves would not be punished.
On the political front the story was evolving. More troops were pouring into Cairo. Mubarak decided to appoint Omar Suliman as Vice President and Ahmed Shafik as Prime Minister. Both are military men, Suliman being the Chief of the Egyptian Intelligence Service and Shafik being the former commander of the Air Forces. To understand the moves one has to understand the nature of the ruling coalition in Egypt and the role of the army in it.
The Egyptian regime has been based since 1952 on a coalition between the army and the bureaucrats. In this regard it fits perfectly into O'Donnell's Bureaucratic Authoritarian model. The army is fully in control of both actual power and the economy. Ex-army officers are appointed to run state enterprises and high level administrative positions. More importantly the army has an enormous economic arm that runs enterprises as diverse as construction companies and food distribution chains. In the late 90's this picture began to change.
It is no news for anyone following Egyptian politics that Gamal Mubarak, the President's son was being groomed to follow his father. In reality, the elder Mubarak was never fully behind that scenario. Whether it was a real assessment of his son's capabilities or of the acceptance of the army to such a scenario, Mubarak was hesitant. It was his wife who was heavily pushing that scenario. Gamal, step by step started rising inside the ruling NDP party. With him he brought two groups to the ruling coalition. First were the Western educated economic technocrats trained in international financial institutions they shared what is generally described as neo-liberal economic policies labeled the Washington Consensus. Secondly was the growing business community that was emerging in Egypt. Together they started the process of both restructuring the Egyptian economy and the ruling party.
For the technocrats it was the fiscal and economic policy that was their domain and they performed miracles. The Egyptian economy under the Nazif government showed unprecedented growth. The currency was devalued, investment was pouring in, and exports were growing. Even the economic crisis did not dramatically effect Egypt. The real disaster in all of this however is that no one actually rationalized or defended those policies to the Egyptian public. The country was moving towards a full capitalist system but no explained why that was needed or why it was ultimately beneficial. While such restructuring is naturally painful for a population that was dependent on the government for all its needs, the people were fed the same socialist rhetoric nonetheless. It mattered very little that the country was improving economically, people did not see that. It is not that the effects were not trickling down, they were. It is that the people were used to the nanny state for so many years that they could not understand why the government was no longer providing them with those services.
Businessmen greatly benefited from the economic improvement. Business was good and political aspirations started to emerge for them. First it was a Parliament seat that they desired. It offered immunity from prosecution after all. With Gamal however, they suddenly had a higher opportunity. Gamal wanted to recreate the ruling NDP party. The NDP, never actually a real party and more of a mass valueless organization of state operation was suddenly turning into a real party. Businessmen like Ahmed Ezz, the steel tycoon saw a golden opportunity. They took full control with Gamal of the party and with it power.
The army never liked Gamal or his friends. Gamal had never served in the military. To add insult to injury his friends were threatening the dominance of the army. The technocrat's neo-liberal policies were threatening the army's dominance of the closed economy and the party was becoming step by step an actual organization that competes with the army officers in filling administrative positions. Suddenly the doors to power in Egypt were not a military career but a party ID card. As long as the President was there however, the army was silent. The army is 100% loyal to the President. He is an October War hero and their Commander in Chief. He is seen as an Egyptian patriot by them who has served his country well. Moreover Gamal Abdel Nasser having conducted his own military coup in 1952 put mechanisms in the army to ensure that no one else would do the same and remove him.
With the unfolding events the army was finally able to put its narrative to the President and have his support behind it. The army's narrative is that Gamal and his friends ruined it. Their neo-liberal policies alienated people and angered them with talks of subsidies removal, while his party gang destroyed the political system by aiming to crush all opposition. Mubarak in the past had mastered the art of playing the opposition. The opposition was always co-opted. Sizes in Parliament differed in various elections, but there was always a place there for the opposition. The last elections in 2010 were different. No opposition was allowed to win seats. By closing the legitimate political methods of raising grievances, the opposition chose the illegitimate ones in the form of street demonstrations.
Today the Egyptians are scared. They have been given a glimpse of hell and they don't like what they see. Contrary to Al Jazeera's propaganda, the Egyptian masses are not demonstrating anymore. They are protecting their homes and families. The demonstration last night had 5,000 political activists participating and not 150,000 as Al Jazeera insists. At this moment, no one outside of those political activists cares less now if the President will resign or not. They have more important concerns now; security and food.
So where are we today? Well the answer is still not clear, yet a couple of conclusions are evident.
1. The Gamal inheritance scenario is finished.
2. Mubarak will not run for another Presidential term. His term ends in October and either he will serve the rest of his term or will resign once things cool down for health reasons, which are real. He is dying.
3. The army is in control now. We are heading back to the "golden age" of army rule. The "kids" are no longer in charge. The "men' are.
4. Until the economy fails again, the neo-liberal economic policies are over. Forget about an open economy for some time.
Immediately the task of the army is to stabilize the situation and enforce order. The security forces have been ordered to reappear in the streets starting tonight. The next task will be to deal with the political activists and the Muslim Brotherhood which now dominates the scene. It is anyone's guess how that will be done, but in a couple of days the Egyptians will probably be begging the army to shoot them. Third stage will be to return to normal life again with people going back to their jobs and somehow food being made available. Later on however will come the political questions.
The long term challenges are numerous. First you have a huge economic loss in terms of property destroyed. The minute the banks will be reopened, there will be a run on them and capital flight will be the key word in town. It is of course quite natural that for some time no one in his sensible mind will invest in Egypt.
Politically, the army will aim at returning to the pre-Gamal ruling formula. People will be appeased by raising salaries and increasing subsidies with the hope of silencing them. Will it be enough? That is doubtful. The Egyptians have realized for the first time that the regime is not as strong as it looked a week ago. If the army did not stop them, how will they ever be silenced? Moreover they are greatly empowered. Egyptians today feel pride in themselves. They have protected their neighborhoods and done what the army has failed to do. This empowerment will not be crushed easily.
Security wise the situation is a disaster. It might take months to arrest all those criminals again. Moreover no one has a clue how the weapons that were stolen will ever be collected again or how the security will ever regain its necessary respect to restore public order after it was defeated in 4 hours. More importantly, reports indicate that the borders in Gaza were open for the past few days. What exactly was transferred between Gaza and Egypt is anyone's guess.
You seem to wonder after all of this where El Baradei and the Egyptian opposition are. CNN's anointed leader of the Egyptian Revolution must be important to the future of Egypt. Hardly! Outside of Western media hype, El Baradei is nothing. A man that has spent less than 30 days in the past year in Egypt and hardly any time in the past 20 years is a nobody. It is entirely insulting to Egyptians to suggest otherwise. The opposition you wonder? Outside of the Muslim Brotherhood we are discussing groups that can each claim less than 5,000 actual members. With no organization, no ideas, and no leaders they are entirely irrelevant to the discussion. It is the apolitical young generation that has suddenly been transformed that is the real question here.
Where Egypt will go from here is an enigma. In a sense everything will be the same. The army that has ruled Egypt since 1952 will continue to rule it and the country will still suffer from a huge vacuum of ideas and real political alternatives. On the other hand, it will never be the same again. Once empowered, the Egyptians will not accept the status quo for long.
On the long run the Egyptian question remains the same. Nothing has changed in that regard. It is quite remarkable for people to be talking about the prospect for a democratic transition at this moment. A population that was convinced just two months ago that sharks in the Red Sea were implanted by the Israeli Intelligence Services is hardly at a stage of creating a liberal democracy in Egypt. But the status quo cannot be maintained. A lack of any meaningful political discourse in the country has to be addressed. Until someone actually starts addressing the real issues and stop the chatterbox of clichés on democracy, things will not get better at all. It will only get worse.
Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/02/the_story_of_the_egyptian_revo.html at February 02, 2011 - 02:39:51 PM CST
Wednesday, February 02, 2011
ElBaradei’s Ultimatum to Mubarak: 48 Hours to Leave the Country
Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu
A7 News
Egyptian uprising idol Mohammed ElBaradei has ordered Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to leave the country by Friday – or he will be a “dead man walking” and not just a lame-duck president.
The aging Egyptian leader, reportedly suffering from cancer, insists he will remain in power. He said Tuesday night, “This dear country is my country ... and I will die on its land." Mubarak dramatically announced he will not run in September’s presidential elections, but shortly afterwards, U.S. President Barack Obama dealt him a stinging slap, stating that a transition to a new government should begin “now.”
In addition, he sent a senior diplomat to meet with ElBaradei.
Massive rallies that took place in Cairo and in Alexandria on Tuesday were free of the police brutality that had killed anywhere between 70 and 300 people, depending on whose estimate is believed, in the early days of the rioting. Addressing Mubarak’s speech, ElBaradei told the crowds that a huge protest to be held on Friday, the Muslim day of rest, will become “the Friday of departure” for Mubarak.
He rejected the president’s announcement as "too little too late," and is counting on a continuation of the momentum that has swept the country, spread to Jordan, Yemen and Syria and worries the Palestinian Authority.
The radical Muslim Brotherhood has become more vocal in its calls for Mubarak’s resignation, drowning out several opposition groups that have accepted an offer by newly-appointed vice president Omar Suleiman to negotiate.
ElBaradei, who won the Nobel Peace prize while heading the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency despite his defense of Iran’s nuclear development, accused Mubarak of trying to deceive the country by not resigning immediately. ElBaradei has said that he is not necessarily interested in replacing Mubarak.
Although the president said he will not run for re-election, he did not mention the name of his son Gamal, who has been groomed to be his successor. Gamal and his family reportedly fled the country last week when it was clear that the protest movement was becoming a threat to his father’s regime.
Working against Mubarak is President Obama’s decision to instruct U.S. ambassador to Egypt Margret Scobey to speak with ElBaradei. The move was "part of our public outreach to convey support for an orderly transition in Egypt," according to U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley.
President Obama earlier said in reaction to Mubarak’s speech that an “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”
He also sent former ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner, a personal friend of Mubarak, to Cairo to report back on the situation.
Comment: This is a prelude to how the near future events are going to escalate-and our response is what?
A7 News
Egyptian uprising idol Mohammed ElBaradei has ordered Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to leave the country by Friday – or he will be a “dead man walking” and not just a lame-duck president.
The aging Egyptian leader, reportedly suffering from cancer, insists he will remain in power. He said Tuesday night, “This dear country is my country ... and I will die on its land." Mubarak dramatically announced he will not run in September’s presidential elections, but shortly afterwards, U.S. President Barack Obama dealt him a stinging slap, stating that a transition to a new government should begin “now.”
In addition, he sent a senior diplomat to meet with ElBaradei.
Massive rallies that took place in Cairo and in Alexandria on Tuesday were free of the police brutality that had killed anywhere between 70 and 300 people, depending on whose estimate is believed, in the early days of the rioting. Addressing Mubarak’s speech, ElBaradei told the crowds that a huge protest to be held on Friday, the Muslim day of rest, will become “the Friday of departure” for Mubarak.
He rejected the president’s announcement as "too little too late," and is counting on a continuation of the momentum that has swept the country, spread to Jordan, Yemen and Syria and worries the Palestinian Authority.
The radical Muslim Brotherhood has become more vocal in its calls for Mubarak’s resignation, drowning out several opposition groups that have accepted an offer by newly-appointed vice president Omar Suleiman to negotiate.
ElBaradei, who won the Nobel Peace prize while heading the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency despite his defense of Iran’s nuclear development, accused Mubarak of trying to deceive the country by not resigning immediately. ElBaradei has said that he is not necessarily interested in replacing Mubarak.
Although the president said he will not run for re-election, he did not mention the name of his son Gamal, who has been groomed to be his successor. Gamal and his family reportedly fled the country last week when it was clear that the protest movement was becoming a threat to his father’s regime.
Working against Mubarak is President Obama’s decision to instruct U.S. ambassador to Egypt Margret Scobey to speak with ElBaradei. The move was "part of our public outreach to convey support for an orderly transition in Egypt," according to U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley.
President Obama earlier said in reaction to Mubarak’s speech that an “orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”
He also sent former ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner, a personal friend of Mubarak, to Cairo to report back on the situation.
Comment: This is a prelude to how the near future events are going to escalate-and our response is what?
Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Special Report
Stratfor
With Egypt’s nearly 60-year-old order seemingly collapsing, many are asking whether the world’s single-largest Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), is on the verge of benefiting from demands for democracy in Egypt, the most pivotal Arab state Western fears to the contrary, the MB is probably incapable of dominating Egypt. At best, it can realistically hope to be the largest political force in a future government, one in which the military would have a huge say.
The MB and the Egyptian State
The fear of Islamism for years allowed the single-party state to prevent the emergence of a secular opposition. Many secular forces were aligned with the state to prevent an Islamist takeover. Those that did not remained marginalized by the authoritarian system. As a result, the MB over the years has evolved into the country’s single-largest organized socio-political opposition force.
Even though there is no coherent secular group that can rival the MB’s organizational prowess, Egypt’s main Islamist movement hardly has a monopoly over public support. A great many Egyptians are either secular liberals or religious conservatives who do not subscribe to Islamist tenets. Certainly, the bulk of the people out on the streets in the recent unrest are not demanding that the secular autocracy be replaced with an Islamist democracy.
Still, as Egypt’s biggest political movement, the MB has raised Western and Israeli fears of an Egypt going the way of Islamism, particularly if the military is not able to manage the transition. To understand the MB today — and thus to evaluate these international fears — we must first consider the group’s origins and evolution.
Origins and Evolution of the MB
Founded in the town of Ismailia in 1928 by a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna, the MB was the world’s first organized Islamist movement (though Islamism as an ideology had been in the making since the late 19th century). It was formed as a social movement to pursue the revival of Islam in the country and beyond at a time when secular left-leaning nationalism was rising in the Arab and Muslim world.
It quickly moved beyond just charitable and educational activities to emerge as a political movement, however. Al-Banna’s views formed the core of the group’s ideology, which are an amalgamation of Islamic values and Western political thought, which rejected both traditional religious ideas as well as wholesale Westernization. The MB was the first organizational manifestation of the modernist trend within Muslim religio-political thought that embraced nationalism and moved beyond the idea of a caliphate. That said, the movement was also the first organized Islamic response to Western-led secular modernity.
Its view of jihad in the sense of armed struggle was limited to freedom from foreign occupation (British occupation in the case of Egypt and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land). But it had a more comprehensive understanding of jihad pertaining to intellectual awakening of the masses and political mobilization. It was also very ecumenical in terms of intra-Muslim issues. Each of these aspects allowed the movement to quickly gain strength; by the late 1940s, it reportedly had more than a million members.
By the late 1930s, there was great internal pressure on the MB leadership to form a military wing to pursue an armed struggle against the British occupation. The leadership was fearful that such a move would damage the movement, which was pursuing a gradual approach to socio-political change by providing social services and the creation of professional syndicates among lawyers, doctors, engineers, academics, etc. The MB, however, reluctantly did allow for the formation of a covert militant entity, which soon began conducting militant attacks not authorized by al-Banna and the leadership.
Until the late 1940s, the MB was a legal entity in the country, but the monarchy began to view it as a major threat to its power — especially given its emphasis on freedom from the British and opposition to all those allied with the occupation forces. The MB was at the forefront of organizing strikes and nationalist rallies. It also participated, though unsuccessfully, in the 1945 elections.
While officially steering clear of any participation in World War II, the MB did align with Nazi Germany against the United Kingdom, which saw the movement become involved in militancy against the British. MB participation in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war further energized the militants. That same year, the covert militant entity within the movement assassinated a judge who had handed prison sentences to a MB member for attacking British troops.
It was at this point that the monarchy moved to disband the movement and the first large-scale arrests of its leadership took place. The crackdown on the MB allowed the militant elements the freedom to pursue their agenda unencumbered by the movement’s hierarchy. The assassination of then-Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha at the hands of a MB militant proved to be a turning point in the movement’s history.
Al-Banna condemned the assassination and distanced the movement from the militants but he, too, was assassinated in 1949, allegedly by government agents. Al-Banna was replaced as general guide of the movement by a prominent judge, Hassan al-Hudaybi, who was not a member of the movement but held al-Banna in high regard. The appointment, which conflicted with the MB charter, created numerous internal problems and exacerbated the rift between the core movement and the militant faction.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian government’s October 1951 decision to abrogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty set off nationwide agitation against British rule. Armed clashes between British forces and Egyptians broke out. The MB’s militant faction took part while the core movement steered clear of the unrest. It was in the midst of this unrest that the 1952 coup led by Gamal Abdel Nasser against the monarchy took place. The MB supported the coup, thinking they would be rewarded with a political share of the government. The cordial relationship between the new Free Officers regime and the MB did not last long, however, largely because the military regime did not want to share power with the MB and, like the monarchy, saw the MB as a threat to its nascent state.
Initially, the new regime abolished all political groups except the MB. The Nasser regime, in an attempt to manage the power of the MB, asked it to join the Liberation Rally — the first political vehicle created by the new state. Unsuccessful in its attempts to co-opt the MB, the Nasser regime began to exploit the internal differences within the movement, especially over the leadership of al-Hudaybi. The MB leader faced mounting criticism that he had converted the movement into an elite group that had reduced the movement to issuing statements and had taken advantage of the notion of obedience and loyalty to the leader to perpetuate his authoritarian hold. Al-Hudaybi, however, prevailed and the MB disbanded the covert militant entity and expelled its members from the movement.
In 1954, the regime finally decided to outlaw the MB, accusing it of conspiring to topple the government and arresting many members and leaders, including al-Hudaybi. Meanwhile, the military regime ran into internal problems with Nasser locked in a power struggle with Gen. Muhammad Naguib, who was made the first president of the modern republic (1953-54). Nasser succeeded in getting the support of al-Hudaybi and the MB to deal with the internal rift in exchange for allowing the MB to operate legally and releasing its members.
The government reneged on its promises to release prisoners and the complex relationship between Nasser and al-Hudaybi further destabilized the MB from within, allowing for the militant faction to regain influence. The MB demanded the end of martial law and a restoration of parliamentary democracy. Cairo in the meantime announced a new treaty with London over the Suez Canal, which was criticized by the al-Hudaybi-led leadership as tantamount to making Egypt subservient to the United Kingdom.
This led to further police action against the movement and a campaign against its leadership in the official press. The Nasser government also tried to have al-Hudaybi removed as leader of the MB. Between the internal pressures and those from the regime, the movement had moved into a period of internal disarray.
The covert militant faction that was no longer under the control of the leadership because of the earlier expulsions saw the treaty as treasonous and the MB as unable to confront the regime, so it sought to escalate matters. Some members allegedly were involved in the assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954, which allowed the regime to engage in the biggest crackdown on the MB in its history. Thousands of members including al-Hudaybi were sentenced to harsh prison terms and tortured.
It was during this period that another relative outsider in the movement, Sayyid Qutb, a literary figure and a civil servant, emerged as an influential ideologue of the group shortly after joining up. Qutb also experienced long periods of imprisonment and torture, which radicalized his views. He eventually called for the complete overthrow of the system. He wrote many treatises, but one in particular, Milestones, was extremely influential — not so much within the movement, as among a new generation of more radical Islamists.
Qutb was executed in 1966 on charges of trying to topple the government, but his ideas inspired the founding of jihadism. Disenchanted with the MB ideology and its approach, a younger generation of extremely militant Islamists emerged. These elements, who would found the world’s first jihadist groups, saw the MB as having compromised on Islamic principles and accepted Western ideas. Further galvanizing this new breed of militant Islamists was the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel and the MB’s formal renunciation of violence in 1970.
Anwar Sadat’s rise to power after Nasser’s death in 1970 helped the MB gain some reprieve in that Sadat gradually eased the restrictions on the movement (but retained the ban on it) and tried to use it to contain left-wing forces. After almost two decades of dealing with state repression, the MB had been overshadowed by more militant groups such as Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which had risen to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. Close ties with Saudi Arabia, which sought to contain Nasserism, also helped the organization maintain itself.
While never legalized, the MB spent the years after Sadat’s rise trying to make use of the fact that the regime tolerated the movement to rebuild itself. Its historical legacy helped the MB maintain its status as the main Islamist movement, as well as its organizational structure and civil society presence. Furthermore, the regime of Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, was able to crush the jihadist groups by the late 1990s, and this also helped the MB regain its stature.
The MB thus went through different phases during the monarchy and the modern republic when it tried to balance its largely political activities with limited experiments with militancy, and there were several periods during which the state tried to suppress the MB. (The first such period was in the late 1940s, the second phase in the mid-1950s when the Nasser regime began to dismantle the MB and the third took place in the mid-1960s during the Qutbist years.)
MB beyond Egypt
Shortly after its rise in Egypt, the MB spread to other parts of the Arab world. The Syrian branch founded in the late 1930s to early 1940s grew much more radical than its parent, wholeheartedly adopting armed struggle — which sparked a major crackdown in 1982 by Syrian President Hafez al Assad’s regime that killed tens of thousands. In sharp contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in the early 1940s very early on established an accommodationist attitude with the Hashemite monarchy and became a legal entity and founded a political party.
Until the Israeli capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 war, the Palestinian and Jordanian branches constituted more or less a singular entity. The Gaza-based branch was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which Israel used to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Those elements went on to form Hamas in 1987, which has pursued its activities on a dual track — political pragmatism in intra-Palestinian affairs and armed struggle against Israel. Hamas also emerged in the West Bank though not on the same scale as in Gaza.
Similarly, in the Arabian Peninsula states, Iraq and North Africa, there are legal opposition parties that do not call themselves MB but are ideological descendants of the MB. The parent MB, by contrast, was never legalized and has never formed a political party per se. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the parent body and there is a lot of coordination among the various chapters in different countries, each branch is an independent entity, which has also allowed for a variety of groups to evolve differently in keeping with the circumstances in the various countries.
Despite dabbling in militancy, Egypt’s MB always remained a pragmatic organization. Egypt’s true militant Islamists in fact represent a rejection of the MB’s pragmatism. Decades before al Qaeda came on the scene with its transnational jihadism, Egypt was struggling with as many as five different jihadist groups (born out of a rejection of the MB approach) fighting Cairo. Two of them became very prominent: Tandheem al-Jihad, which was behind Sadat’s assassination, and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which led a violent insurgency in the 1990s responsible for the killings of foreign tourists. The jihadist movement within the country ultimately was contained, with both Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah renouncing violence though smaller elements from both groups joined up with al Qaeda-led transnational jihadist movement.
Global perceptions of the MB and of political Islamists have not distinguished between pragmatist and militant Islamists, especially after the 9/11 attack and rising fears over Hamas and Hezbollah’s successes. Instead, the MB often has been lumped in with the most radical of the radicals in Western eyes. Very little attention has been paid to the majority of Islamists who are not jihadists and instead are political forces. In fact, even Hamas and Hezbollah are more political groups than simply militants.
There is a growing lobby within the United States and Europe, among academics and members of think tanks, that has sought to draw the distinction between pragmatists and radicals. For more than a decade, this lobby has pushed for seeking out moderates in the MB and other Islamist forces in the Arab and Muslim world to better manage radicalism and the changes that will come from aging regimes crumbling.
Assessment
Because Egypt has never had free and fair elections, the MB’s popularity and its commitment to democracy both remain untested. In Egypt’s 2005 election, which was less rigged than any previous Egyptian vote, given the Bush administration’s push for greater democratization in the Middle East, MB members running as independents managed to increase their share of the legislature fivefold. It won 88 seats, making it the biggest opposition bloc in parliament.
But the MB is internally divided. It faces a generational struggle, with an old guard trying to prevent its ideals from being diluted while a younger generation (the 35-55 age bracket) looks to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a role model.
The MB also lacks a monopoly over religious discourse in Egypt. A great many religious conservatives do not support the MB. Egypt also has a significant apolitical Salafist trend. Most of the very large class of theologians centered around Al-Azhar University has not come out in support of the MB or any other Islamist group. There are also Islamist forces both more pragmatic and more militant than the MB. For example, Hizb al-Wasat, which has not gotten a license to operate as an official opposition party, is a small offshoot of the MB that is much more pragmatic than the parent entity. What remains of Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which renounced violence and condemned al Qaeda, are examples of radical Islamist groups. And small jihadist cells inspired by or linked to al Qaeda also complicate this picture.
Taken together, the MB remains an untested political force that faces infighting and competitors for the Islamist mantel and a large secular population. Given these challenges to the MB, confrontation with the West is by no means a given even if the MB emerged as a major force in a post-Mubarak order.
The MB is also well aware of the opposition it faces within Egypt, the region and the West. The crumbling of the Mubarak regime and perhaps the order that damaged the MB for decades is a historic opportunity for the movement, which it does not wish to squander. Therefore it is going to handle this opportunity very carefully and avoid radical moves. The MB is also not designed to lead a revolution; rather, its internal setup is such that it will gradually seek a democratic order.
The United States in recent years has had considerable experience in dealing with Islamist forces with Turkey, under the AKP, being the most prominent example. Likewise in Iraq, Washington has dealt with Islamists both Sunni (Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashmi for many years was a prominent figure in the Iraqi chapter of the MB called the Iraqi Islamic Party) and Shiite (Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Muqtada al-Sadr, etc.) as part of the effort to forge the post-Baathist republic.
That said, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is viewed as a very opaque organization, which increases U.S. and Israeli trepidations. Neither of these powers are willing to place their national security interests on the assumption that the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a benign force (as it appears to be) in the event that it came into power. Concerns also exist about potential fissures within the organization that may steer the movement into a radical direction, especially when it comes to foreign policy issues such as the alliance with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel.
The possible looming collapse of the 60-year Egyptian order presents a historic opportunity for the MB to position itself. Even though the movement has remained pragmatic for much of its history and seeks to achieve its goals via constitutional and electoral means and has opted for peaceful civil obedience and working with the military as a way out of the current impasse, its commitment to democratic politics is something that remains to be seen. More important, it is expected to push for a foreign policy more independent from Washington and a tougher attitude toward Israel.
At this stage, however, it is not clear if the MB will necessarily come to power. If it does, then it will likely be circumscribed by other political forces and the military. There are also structural hurdles in the path of the MB taking power. First, the ban on the movement would have to be lifted. Second, the Constitution would have to be amended to allow for religious parties to exist for the MB to participate as a movement. Alternatively, it could form a political party along the lines of its Jordanian counterpart. Being part of a future coalition government could allow the United States to manage its rise. Either way, the MB — an enormously patient organization — senses its time finally may have come.
Comment: I appreciate this brief introduction to the MB; however much of the critical information about its stated intentions, its entry into Western countries and its infiltration of academia, government, law enforcement and even the media has been left out of this report. The MB is the most dangerous terrorist group on the planet. It is indeed patient, all one has to do is to read its 100 year plan, examine what is currently in place in one's own country and the fact, not speculation, the fact they also engage in violent actions causes all of us to take notice. Allow me one to suggest that the MSA is allegedly a front organization for the Brotherhood and yet across the USA the MSA has attained a group in good standing-I say to ths, good grief.
With Egypt’s nearly 60-year-old order seemingly collapsing, many are asking whether the world’s single-largest Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), is on the verge of benefiting from demands for democracy in Egypt, the most pivotal Arab state Western fears to the contrary, the MB is probably incapable of dominating Egypt. At best, it can realistically hope to be the largest political force in a future government, one in which the military would have a huge say.
The MB and the Egyptian State
The fear of Islamism for years allowed the single-party state to prevent the emergence of a secular opposition. Many secular forces were aligned with the state to prevent an Islamist takeover. Those that did not remained marginalized by the authoritarian system. As a result, the MB over the years has evolved into the country’s single-largest organized socio-political opposition force.
Even though there is no coherent secular group that can rival the MB’s organizational prowess, Egypt’s main Islamist movement hardly has a monopoly over public support. A great many Egyptians are either secular liberals or religious conservatives who do not subscribe to Islamist tenets. Certainly, the bulk of the people out on the streets in the recent unrest are not demanding that the secular autocracy be replaced with an Islamist democracy.
Still, as Egypt’s biggest political movement, the MB has raised Western and Israeli fears of an Egypt going the way of Islamism, particularly if the military is not able to manage the transition. To understand the MB today — and thus to evaluate these international fears — we must first consider the group’s origins and evolution.
Origins and Evolution of the MB
Founded in the town of Ismailia in 1928 by a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna, the MB was the world’s first organized Islamist movement (though Islamism as an ideology had been in the making since the late 19th century). It was formed as a social movement to pursue the revival of Islam in the country and beyond at a time when secular left-leaning nationalism was rising in the Arab and Muslim world.
It quickly moved beyond just charitable and educational activities to emerge as a political movement, however. Al-Banna’s views formed the core of the group’s ideology, which are an amalgamation of Islamic values and Western political thought, which rejected both traditional religious ideas as well as wholesale Westernization. The MB was the first organizational manifestation of the modernist trend within Muslim religio-political thought that embraced nationalism and moved beyond the idea of a caliphate. That said, the movement was also the first organized Islamic response to Western-led secular modernity.
Its view of jihad in the sense of armed struggle was limited to freedom from foreign occupation (British occupation in the case of Egypt and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land). But it had a more comprehensive understanding of jihad pertaining to intellectual awakening of the masses and political mobilization. It was also very ecumenical in terms of intra-Muslim issues. Each of these aspects allowed the movement to quickly gain strength; by the late 1940s, it reportedly had more than a million members.
By the late 1930s, there was great internal pressure on the MB leadership to form a military wing to pursue an armed struggle against the British occupation. The leadership was fearful that such a move would damage the movement, which was pursuing a gradual approach to socio-political change by providing social services and the creation of professional syndicates among lawyers, doctors, engineers, academics, etc. The MB, however, reluctantly did allow for the formation of a covert militant entity, which soon began conducting militant attacks not authorized by al-Banna and the leadership.
Until the late 1940s, the MB was a legal entity in the country, but the monarchy began to view it as a major threat to its power — especially given its emphasis on freedom from the British and opposition to all those allied with the occupation forces. The MB was at the forefront of organizing strikes and nationalist rallies. It also participated, though unsuccessfully, in the 1945 elections.
While officially steering clear of any participation in World War II, the MB did align with Nazi Germany against the United Kingdom, which saw the movement become involved in militancy against the British. MB participation in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war further energized the militants. That same year, the covert militant entity within the movement assassinated a judge who had handed prison sentences to a MB member for attacking British troops.
It was at this point that the monarchy moved to disband the movement and the first large-scale arrests of its leadership took place. The crackdown on the MB allowed the militant elements the freedom to pursue their agenda unencumbered by the movement’s hierarchy. The assassination of then-Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha at the hands of a MB militant proved to be a turning point in the movement’s history.
Al-Banna condemned the assassination and distanced the movement from the militants but he, too, was assassinated in 1949, allegedly by government agents. Al-Banna was replaced as general guide of the movement by a prominent judge, Hassan al-Hudaybi, who was not a member of the movement but held al-Banna in high regard. The appointment, which conflicted with the MB charter, created numerous internal problems and exacerbated the rift between the core movement and the militant faction.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian government’s October 1951 decision to abrogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty set off nationwide agitation against British rule. Armed clashes between British forces and Egyptians broke out. The MB’s militant faction took part while the core movement steered clear of the unrest. It was in the midst of this unrest that the 1952 coup led by Gamal Abdel Nasser against the monarchy took place. The MB supported the coup, thinking they would be rewarded with a political share of the government. The cordial relationship between the new Free Officers regime and the MB did not last long, however, largely because the military regime did not want to share power with the MB and, like the monarchy, saw the MB as a threat to its nascent state.
Initially, the new regime abolished all political groups except the MB. The Nasser regime, in an attempt to manage the power of the MB, asked it to join the Liberation Rally — the first political vehicle created by the new state. Unsuccessful in its attempts to co-opt the MB, the Nasser regime began to exploit the internal differences within the movement, especially over the leadership of al-Hudaybi. The MB leader faced mounting criticism that he had converted the movement into an elite group that had reduced the movement to issuing statements and had taken advantage of the notion of obedience and loyalty to the leader to perpetuate his authoritarian hold. Al-Hudaybi, however, prevailed and the MB disbanded the covert militant entity and expelled its members from the movement.
In 1954, the regime finally decided to outlaw the MB, accusing it of conspiring to topple the government and arresting many members and leaders, including al-Hudaybi. Meanwhile, the military regime ran into internal problems with Nasser locked in a power struggle with Gen. Muhammad Naguib, who was made the first president of the modern republic (1953-54). Nasser succeeded in getting the support of al-Hudaybi and the MB to deal with the internal rift in exchange for allowing the MB to operate legally and releasing its members.
The government reneged on its promises to release prisoners and the complex relationship between Nasser and al-Hudaybi further destabilized the MB from within, allowing for the militant faction to regain influence. The MB demanded the end of martial law and a restoration of parliamentary democracy. Cairo in the meantime announced a new treaty with London over the Suez Canal, which was criticized by the al-Hudaybi-led leadership as tantamount to making Egypt subservient to the United Kingdom.
This led to further police action against the movement and a campaign against its leadership in the official press. The Nasser government also tried to have al-Hudaybi removed as leader of the MB. Between the internal pressures and those from the regime, the movement had moved into a period of internal disarray.
The covert militant faction that was no longer under the control of the leadership because of the earlier expulsions saw the treaty as treasonous and the MB as unable to confront the regime, so it sought to escalate matters. Some members allegedly were involved in the assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954, which allowed the regime to engage in the biggest crackdown on the MB in its history. Thousands of members including al-Hudaybi were sentenced to harsh prison terms and tortured.
It was during this period that another relative outsider in the movement, Sayyid Qutb, a literary figure and a civil servant, emerged as an influential ideologue of the group shortly after joining up. Qutb also experienced long periods of imprisonment and torture, which radicalized his views. He eventually called for the complete overthrow of the system. He wrote many treatises, but one in particular, Milestones, was extremely influential — not so much within the movement, as among a new generation of more radical Islamists.
Qutb was executed in 1966 on charges of trying to topple the government, but his ideas inspired the founding of jihadism. Disenchanted with the MB ideology and its approach, a younger generation of extremely militant Islamists emerged. These elements, who would found the world’s first jihadist groups, saw the MB as having compromised on Islamic principles and accepted Western ideas. Further galvanizing this new breed of militant Islamists was the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel and the MB’s formal renunciation of violence in 1970.
Anwar Sadat’s rise to power after Nasser’s death in 1970 helped the MB gain some reprieve in that Sadat gradually eased the restrictions on the movement (but retained the ban on it) and tried to use it to contain left-wing forces. After almost two decades of dealing with state repression, the MB had been overshadowed by more militant groups such as Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which had risen to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. Close ties with Saudi Arabia, which sought to contain Nasserism, also helped the organization maintain itself.
While never legalized, the MB spent the years after Sadat’s rise trying to make use of the fact that the regime tolerated the movement to rebuild itself. Its historical legacy helped the MB maintain its status as the main Islamist movement, as well as its organizational structure and civil society presence. Furthermore, the regime of Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, was able to crush the jihadist groups by the late 1990s, and this also helped the MB regain its stature.
The MB thus went through different phases during the monarchy and the modern republic when it tried to balance its largely political activities with limited experiments with militancy, and there were several periods during which the state tried to suppress the MB. (The first such period was in the late 1940s, the second phase in the mid-1950s when the Nasser regime began to dismantle the MB and the third took place in the mid-1960s during the Qutbist years.)
MB beyond Egypt
Shortly after its rise in Egypt, the MB spread to other parts of the Arab world. The Syrian branch founded in the late 1930s to early 1940s grew much more radical than its parent, wholeheartedly adopting armed struggle — which sparked a major crackdown in 1982 by Syrian President Hafez al Assad’s regime that killed tens of thousands. In sharp contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in the early 1940s very early on established an accommodationist attitude with the Hashemite monarchy and became a legal entity and founded a political party.
Until the Israeli capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 war, the Palestinian and Jordanian branches constituted more or less a singular entity. The Gaza-based branch was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which Israel used to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Those elements went on to form Hamas in 1987, which has pursued its activities on a dual track — political pragmatism in intra-Palestinian affairs and armed struggle against Israel. Hamas also emerged in the West Bank though not on the same scale as in Gaza.
Similarly, in the Arabian Peninsula states, Iraq and North Africa, there are legal opposition parties that do not call themselves MB but are ideological descendants of the MB. The parent MB, by contrast, was never legalized and has never formed a political party per se. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the parent body and there is a lot of coordination among the various chapters in different countries, each branch is an independent entity, which has also allowed for a variety of groups to evolve differently in keeping with the circumstances in the various countries.
Despite dabbling in militancy, Egypt’s MB always remained a pragmatic organization. Egypt’s true militant Islamists in fact represent a rejection of the MB’s pragmatism. Decades before al Qaeda came on the scene with its transnational jihadism, Egypt was struggling with as many as five different jihadist groups (born out of a rejection of the MB approach) fighting Cairo. Two of them became very prominent: Tandheem al-Jihad, which was behind Sadat’s assassination, and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which led a violent insurgency in the 1990s responsible for the killings of foreign tourists. The jihadist movement within the country ultimately was contained, with both Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah renouncing violence though smaller elements from both groups joined up with al Qaeda-led transnational jihadist movement.
Global perceptions of the MB and of political Islamists have not distinguished between pragmatist and militant Islamists, especially after the 9/11 attack and rising fears over Hamas and Hezbollah’s successes. Instead, the MB often has been lumped in with the most radical of the radicals in Western eyes. Very little attention has been paid to the majority of Islamists who are not jihadists and instead are political forces. In fact, even Hamas and Hezbollah are more political groups than simply militants.
There is a growing lobby within the United States and Europe, among academics and members of think tanks, that has sought to draw the distinction between pragmatists and radicals. For more than a decade, this lobby has pushed for seeking out moderates in the MB and other Islamist forces in the Arab and Muslim world to better manage radicalism and the changes that will come from aging regimes crumbling.
Assessment
Because Egypt has never had free and fair elections, the MB’s popularity and its commitment to democracy both remain untested. In Egypt’s 2005 election, which was less rigged than any previous Egyptian vote, given the Bush administration’s push for greater democratization in the Middle East, MB members running as independents managed to increase their share of the legislature fivefold. It won 88 seats, making it the biggest opposition bloc in parliament.
But the MB is internally divided. It faces a generational struggle, with an old guard trying to prevent its ideals from being diluted while a younger generation (the 35-55 age bracket) looks to Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a role model.
The MB also lacks a monopoly over religious discourse in Egypt. A great many religious conservatives do not support the MB. Egypt also has a significant apolitical Salafist trend. Most of the very large class of theologians centered around Al-Azhar University has not come out in support of the MB or any other Islamist group. There are also Islamist forces both more pragmatic and more militant than the MB. For example, Hizb al-Wasat, which has not gotten a license to operate as an official opposition party, is a small offshoot of the MB that is much more pragmatic than the parent entity. What remains of Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which renounced violence and condemned al Qaeda, are examples of radical Islamist groups. And small jihadist cells inspired by or linked to al Qaeda also complicate this picture.
Taken together, the MB remains an untested political force that faces infighting and competitors for the Islamist mantel and a large secular population. Given these challenges to the MB, confrontation with the West is by no means a given even if the MB emerged as a major force in a post-Mubarak order.
The MB is also well aware of the opposition it faces within Egypt, the region and the West. The crumbling of the Mubarak regime and perhaps the order that damaged the MB for decades is a historic opportunity for the movement, which it does not wish to squander. Therefore it is going to handle this opportunity very carefully and avoid radical moves. The MB is also not designed to lead a revolution; rather, its internal setup is such that it will gradually seek a democratic order.
The United States in recent years has had considerable experience in dealing with Islamist forces with Turkey, under the AKP, being the most prominent example. Likewise in Iraq, Washington has dealt with Islamists both Sunni (Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashmi for many years was a prominent figure in the Iraqi chapter of the MB called the Iraqi Islamic Party) and Shiite (Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Muqtada al-Sadr, etc.) as part of the effort to forge the post-Baathist republic.
That said, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is viewed as a very opaque organization, which increases U.S. and Israeli trepidations. Neither of these powers are willing to place their national security interests on the assumption that the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a benign force (as it appears to be) in the event that it came into power. Concerns also exist about potential fissures within the organization that may steer the movement into a radical direction, especially when it comes to foreign policy issues such as the alliance with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel.
The possible looming collapse of the 60-year Egyptian order presents a historic opportunity for the MB to position itself. Even though the movement has remained pragmatic for much of its history and seeks to achieve its goals via constitutional and electoral means and has opted for peaceful civil obedience and working with the military as a way out of the current impasse, its commitment to democratic politics is something that remains to be seen. More important, it is expected to push for a foreign policy more independent from Washington and a tougher attitude toward Israel.
At this stage, however, it is not clear if the MB will necessarily come to power. If it does, then it will likely be circumscribed by other political forces and the military. There are also structural hurdles in the path of the MB taking power. First, the ban on the movement would have to be lifted. Second, the Constitution would have to be amended to allow for religious parties to exist for the MB to participate as a movement. Alternatively, it could form a political party along the lines of its Jordanian counterpart. Being part of a future coalition government could allow the United States to manage its rise. Either way, the MB — an enormously patient organization — senses its time finally may have come.
Comment: I appreciate this brief introduction to the MB; however much of the critical information about its stated intentions, its entry into Western countries and its infiltration of academia, government, law enforcement and even the media has been left out of this report. The MB is the most dangerous terrorist group on the planet. It is indeed patient, all one has to do is to read its 100 year plan, examine what is currently in place in one's own country and the fact, not speculation, the fact they also engage in violent actions causes all of us to take notice. Allow me one to suggest that the MSA is allegedly a front organization for the Brotherhood and yet across the USA the MSA has attained a group in good standing-I say to ths, good grief.
Marwan Barghouti on Israel: "The worst and most abominable enemy known to humanity and modern history"
Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik
Marwan Barghouti is serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison for orchestrating suicide terror attacks against Israeli civilians. After he was convicted and imprisoned, he was re-elected member of the Palestinian Authority parliament. When he was arrested in 2002 he was the head of Fatah's military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Last week Marwan Barghouti sent a letter to the International Conference for Palestinian Prisoners in Morocco, expressing his views on the Palestinian conflict with Israel.
He referred to Israel as "the worst and most abominable enemy known to humanity and modern history," while calling the Palestinian people "the great Palestinian nation, initiator of revolutions and Intifadas."
He advocated that Palestinians "continue on the path of resistance," and said that "the national independence of nations is seized, through sacrifice, resistance, resolve, and struggle. National independence is seized; one does not wait for it."
Barghouti also encouraged a full boycott of all Israeli products: "We must continue to act to isolate Israel further on the international, official, and popular level, and on all levels and in all spheres, as well as continuing the campaign to boycott all Israeli goods, not limiting it to settlement goods exclusively."
Barghouti is popular as a leader among Palestinians. Asked who they would vote for president, 19.1 % of the Palestinians polled would vote for Barghouti - almost as many as the 20.2 % who said they would vote for Abbas, who received the most votes in a poll from October 2010.
[Arab World for Research and Development,
http://www.awrad.org/pdfs/English_tables-Ocotober2010.pdf ,
poll from Oct. 2010]
In a poll asking Palestinians how they would vote if the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, leader of Hamas, Barghouti received 65% of the votes and Haniyeh 31%. The poll found that if the choice was between current PA Chairman Abbas and Haniyeh, Abbas would only have received 56% of the votes.
[The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38epressrelease.html, Dec. 20, 2011]
The following is an excerpt of Marwan Barghouti's letter:
Marwan Barghouti: "I address special greetings to the great Palestinian nation, initiator of revolutions and Intifadas, with a legendary history of resolve facing the worst and most abominable enemy known to humanity and modern history; the enemy which does not refrain from carrying out massacres, continuing aggression, theft of land, establishment of settlements and expanding them, and to Judaize Jerusalem - the city of cities and the jewel in the crown of the [Arab] nation - and continues with a policy of detention against the members of a defenseless people. I take this opportunity to emphasize once again what we have always said: Israel and its various governments have never made a strategic decision about peace, and the wait to achieve national independence with the approval of the Israeli government is nothing but an illusion. The national independence of nations is seized, through sacrifice, resistance, resolve, and struggle. National independence is seized; one does not wait for it. The gamble on the US will be of no benefit, because it [the US] is not the patron of peace, but rather the patron of the Israeli occupation, aggression, and settlement. In order for our people to be able to seize our national rights, the first step must be an end to the destructive, shameful and wretched split [between Fatah and Hamas]... We must continue on the path of resistance, and act for further achievements and recognition for the establishment of the state. We must continue to act to isolate Israel further on the international, official, and popular level, and on all levels and in all spheres, as well as continuing the campaign to boycott all Israeli goods, not limiting it to settlement goods exclusively."
[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Jan. 24, 2011]
The following are the excerpts of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll relating to Marwan Barghouti and Abbas:
"If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated,
Abbas would receive the vote of 56% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those
participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach
59%. Three months ago, Abbas received 57% and Haniyeh 36%. In the Gaza
Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 43% and in the West Bank Abbas
receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%."
"If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and IsmailHaniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 31% ofthe participants' votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach69%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37% and in theWest Bank Barghouti receives 68% and Haniyeh 27%. These results are similarto those obtained three months ago."
"Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents froma list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27%of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (16%) Mustafa Barghouti(11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%)."
[The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38epressrelease.html, Dec. 20, 2011]
Marwan Barghouti is serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison for orchestrating suicide terror attacks against Israeli civilians. After he was convicted and imprisoned, he was re-elected member of the Palestinian Authority parliament. When he was arrested in 2002 he was the head of Fatah's military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Last week Marwan Barghouti sent a letter to the International Conference for Palestinian Prisoners in Morocco, expressing his views on the Palestinian conflict with Israel.
He referred to Israel as "the worst and most abominable enemy known to humanity and modern history," while calling the Palestinian people "the great Palestinian nation, initiator of revolutions and Intifadas."
He advocated that Palestinians "continue on the path of resistance," and said that "the national independence of nations is seized, through sacrifice, resistance, resolve, and struggle. National independence is seized; one does not wait for it."
Barghouti also encouraged a full boycott of all Israeli products: "We must continue to act to isolate Israel further on the international, official, and popular level, and on all levels and in all spheres, as well as continuing the campaign to boycott all Israeli goods, not limiting it to settlement goods exclusively."
Barghouti is popular as a leader among Palestinians. Asked who they would vote for president, 19.1 % of the Palestinians polled would vote for Barghouti - almost as many as the 20.2 % who said they would vote for Abbas, who received the most votes in a poll from October 2010.
[Arab World for Research and Development,
http://www.awrad.org/pdfs/English_tables-Ocotober2010.pdf ,
poll from Oct. 2010]
In a poll asking Palestinians how they would vote if the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, leader of Hamas, Barghouti received 65% of the votes and Haniyeh 31%. The poll found that if the choice was between current PA Chairman Abbas and Haniyeh, Abbas would only have received 56% of the votes.
[The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38epressrelease.html, Dec. 20, 2011]
The following is an excerpt of Marwan Barghouti's letter:
Marwan Barghouti: "I address special greetings to the great Palestinian nation, initiator of revolutions and Intifadas, with a legendary history of resolve facing the worst and most abominable enemy known to humanity and modern history; the enemy which does not refrain from carrying out massacres, continuing aggression, theft of land, establishment of settlements and expanding them, and to Judaize Jerusalem - the city of cities and the jewel in the crown of the [Arab] nation - and continues with a policy of detention against the members of a defenseless people. I take this opportunity to emphasize once again what we have always said: Israel and its various governments have never made a strategic decision about peace, and the wait to achieve national independence with the approval of the Israeli government is nothing but an illusion. The national independence of nations is seized, through sacrifice, resistance, resolve, and struggle. National independence is seized; one does not wait for it. The gamble on the US will be of no benefit, because it [the US] is not the patron of peace, but rather the patron of the Israeli occupation, aggression, and settlement. In order for our people to be able to seize our national rights, the first step must be an end to the destructive, shameful and wretched split [between Fatah and Hamas]... We must continue on the path of resistance, and act for further achievements and recognition for the establishment of the state. We must continue to act to isolate Israel further on the international, official, and popular level, and on all levels and in all spheres, as well as continuing the campaign to boycott all Israeli goods, not limiting it to settlement goods exclusively."
[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Jan. 24, 2011]
The following are the excerpts of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll relating to Marwan Barghouti and Abbas:
"If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated,
Abbas would receive the vote of 56% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those
participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach
59%. Three months ago, Abbas received 57% and Haniyeh 36%. In the Gaza
Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 43% and in the West Bank Abbas
receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%."
"If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and IsmailHaniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 31% ofthe participants' votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach69%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37% and in theWest Bank Barghouti receives 68% and Haniyeh 27%. These results are similarto those obtained three months ago."
"Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents froma list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27%of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (16%) Mustafa Barghouti(11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%)."
[The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38epressrelease.html, Dec. 20, 2011]
Egypt: Revolution or a "Correction"?
MidEast on Target
Yisrael Ne'eman
Massive demonstrations are rocking Egypt for over a week already – with the single agreed upon demand that Pres. Hosni Mubarak must resign. No doubt the Mubarak administration was downright oppressive. Sparked by the Tunisian example forcing Pres. Ben Ali from power the Egyptian public collected the courage needed to confront Mubarak's dictatorship where elections are rigged (the last one just this past November) and the regime is propped up by the Muhbarat internal security police and the military. This regime is a continuation of the 1952 Free Officers Revolution led by the famed Gamal Abdul Nasser. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser and Mubarak was Vice President when Sadat was assassinated in 1981. None allowed for democracy and the regime became more unpopular over the years, in particular as corruption abounded and socio-economic reforms failed. Nasser originally came into power promising the people power and a better life and now almost sixty years later Mubarak represents the colossal failure of the Arab nationalist movement. ssentially in the Arab world there are two forms of rule, neither democratic. We are either speaking of a form of secular military dictatorship as we see in Egypt, and let's remember that Mubarak was commander of Egypt's air force before entering politics, or rule by Islamists. One might counter that monarchies exist such as in Jordan and Morocco, but here too they are dependent on the military and an assortment of police forces, secret or otherwise.
The question of "the will of the people" has been raised constantly over the past few weeks, whether in relation to Tunisia, Egypt or other Arab countries likely to be affected by the revolt on the Nile. The people are united in demanding the fall of the present regime led by Mubarak and there appears little doubt the scenario will be completed. The question is, "What next?"
Watching the protests on AlJazeera one gets the impression that it is all about freedom, liberty and democracy. True there are certain educated youth who understand these concepts but they are far from indicative of the whole. Organizing through "Facebook," "Twitter" and the internet they were the first to protest, but they themselves are not an integral political movement. Small ideological cadres bent on forcing socio-economic and of course political change make revolutions and in the ensuing upheaval remove the previous power, bringing their own ideals to the fore. Hence it was with the French (1789), Russian-Bolshevik (1917), Moaist Chinese (1949) and Iranian (1979) Revolutions just to name a few. All were ideologically driven by "purist" understandings whether it be rationalism, communism or religion – Islam in this case.
Destroying the old regime is the first step, but how does one rally around the new one? More often than not there are varying ideologies and loose coalitions assembled to oust the former oppressors. Representatives of these differing perspectives form alliances to rule in the glow of victory, after all, they were shoulder to shoulder battling the old regime. But this is only the beginning. One of the groups may appear dominant but allows for joint process during the transitional, moderate period. The most solidified of the ideological hard line groups will garnish popular support and turn on the others. This often leads to a reign of terror and destruction of all other opposition forces whether they be remnants from the old guard or previous allies hailing from the grand coalition responsible for the fall of the government. The Iranian Revolution as of late was an excellent example of such events.
As far as the Egyptians are concerned there is no multi-ideological forum to choose from. The call for democracy may be bantered about, but the only solidified deep rooted ideological understandings are those of Islam, or in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, begun in Egypt in 1928 under Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Liberal democracy is not a realistic option, as much as the West wants it to be. It is understood to clash with Islam and is often condemned as paganism or idolatry. "Islam is the Answer" is a well known slogan. Islam is not only a religion but an entire lifestyle and value system. Humans are responsible for liberal democracy while Islam is ordained by Allah. There is no comparison especially if one did not grow up in reverence of rational thinking and individual human rights.
Human rights and democracy can be slogans for overthrowing the regime, as is most likely, however they will not be the foundations of the next Egyptian government. Some ask whether the Islamists would be adverse to using a democratic apparatus to gain power. Opinions are split, but it appears they would. The precedent setting alliance with the West and in particular the US when working to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s is given as an example. Nowadays Islamists speak of defeating those temporary liberal democratic allies of yesteryear.
Those who are truly dedicated to democracy are first loyal to that system of self-rule, the political party – whether of a religious nature or not, is subservient to the democratic state and not vice-versa. Devout Muslims understand Islam itself to be the state and not just one variation or political perspective within the national elective structure. Islam is not to be voted into power or out of power – Islam is the power, an eternal one. Anything else is a contradiction of the Koran and Sharia law as given by Allah. From an Islamist point of view democracy is a tool to be used to the reigns of state and then one liquidates the tool. Using democracy can give one a tactical advantage if one does not have the backing necessary to attain power immediately. It also can be legislated out of existence (see the German example of the 1930s) or limited to the point of elimination where only approved Islamic candidates can run for public office – just ask the Iranians.
The military is not interested in a democratic system either, but can go through the pretenses of having one, rigging elections as Egypt and the Arab world have done until now. Or you can take your example from Hezbollah and shoot your way into power as happened in 2008 or take a softer approach and only threaten to use force like Hassan Nasrallah did this past month resting on his reputation of being good to his word.
The democratic option is barely viable. Most likely we are looking at a "correction" with the removal of Mubarak, at least in the short run. The military will impose its will while gaining the support of the people and some sort of reforms will take place allowing for more Islamic influence. Whether it will be a transitional regime or become solidified in place is impossible to know at this stage.
On the other hand, should the Muslim Brotherhood gain control of the Egyptian State either through street power or elections their loyalty will not be to democracy. We could be looking at a rerun of the Iranian revolution, even if somewhat less intense. Should that be the case relations with the West will be very difficult and the litmus test will be whether Egypt cancels its peace agreement with Israel, something the Muslim Brotherhood has promised to do should they attain office.
No doubt the West wants to see a "correction" whereby the military remains in control but allows for more freedoms and a gradual move towards a more democratic framework. Add to this the grand hopes of secular liberalism. In all scenarios Mubarak is finished along with much of the old guard. The West and Israel in particular just hope that the international stability projected by Egypt since the mid-1970s is not overthrown with Mubarak & Co. the man and regime so completely identified with those policies.
Egypt is the lynchpin to the Middle East. Whatever happens in Cairo reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. To ensure stability the West wants a step by step process, not a revolution.
Yisrael Ne'eman
Massive demonstrations are rocking Egypt for over a week already – with the single agreed upon demand that Pres. Hosni Mubarak must resign. No doubt the Mubarak administration was downright oppressive. Sparked by the Tunisian example forcing Pres. Ben Ali from power the Egyptian public collected the courage needed to confront Mubarak's dictatorship where elections are rigged (the last one just this past November) and the regime is propped up by the Muhbarat internal security police and the military. This regime is a continuation of the 1952 Free Officers Revolution led by the famed Gamal Abdul Nasser. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser and Mubarak was Vice President when Sadat was assassinated in 1981. None allowed for democracy and the regime became more unpopular over the years, in particular as corruption abounded and socio-economic reforms failed. Nasser originally came into power promising the people power and a better life and now almost sixty years later Mubarak represents the colossal failure of the Arab nationalist movement. ssentially in the Arab world there are two forms of rule, neither democratic. We are either speaking of a form of secular military dictatorship as we see in Egypt, and let's remember that Mubarak was commander of Egypt's air force before entering politics, or rule by Islamists. One might counter that monarchies exist such as in Jordan and Morocco, but here too they are dependent on the military and an assortment of police forces, secret or otherwise.
The question of "the will of the people" has been raised constantly over the past few weeks, whether in relation to Tunisia, Egypt or other Arab countries likely to be affected by the revolt on the Nile. The people are united in demanding the fall of the present regime led by Mubarak and there appears little doubt the scenario will be completed. The question is, "What next?"
Watching the protests on AlJazeera one gets the impression that it is all about freedom, liberty and democracy. True there are certain educated youth who understand these concepts but they are far from indicative of the whole. Organizing through "Facebook," "Twitter" and the internet they were the first to protest, but they themselves are not an integral political movement. Small ideological cadres bent on forcing socio-economic and of course political change make revolutions and in the ensuing upheaval remove the previous power, bringing their own ideals to the fore. Hence it was with the French (1789), Russian-Bolshevik (1917), Moaist Chinese (1949) and Iranian (1979) Revolutions just to name a few. All were ideologically driven by "purist" understandings whether it be rationalism, communism or religion – Islam in this case.
Destroying the old regime is the first step, but how does one rally around the new one? More often than not there are varying ideologies and loose coalitions assembled to oust the former oppressors. Representatives of these differing perspectives form alliances to rule in the glow of victory, after all, they were shoulder to shoulder battling the old regime. But this is only the beginning. One of the groups may appear dominant but allows for joint process during the transitional, moderate period. The most solidified of the ideological hard line groups will garnish popular support and turn on the others. This often leads to a reign of terror and destruction of all other opposition forces whether they be remnants from the old guard or previous allies hailing from the grand coalition responsible for the fall of the government. The Iranian Revolution as of late was an excellent example of such events.
As far as the Egyptians are concerned there is no multi-ideological forum to choose from. The call for democracy may be bantered about, but the only solidified deep rooted ideological understandings are those of Islam, or in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, begun in Egypt in 1928 under Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Liberal democracy is not a realistic option, as much as the West wants it to be. It is understood to clash with Islam and is often condemned as paganism or idolatry. "Islam is the Answer" is a well known slogan. Islam is not only a religion but an entire lifestyle and value system. Humans are responsible for liberal democracy while Islam is ordained by Allah. There is no comparison especially if one did not grow up in reverence of rational thinking and individual human rights.
Human rights and democracy can be slogans for overthrowing the regime, as is most likely, however they will not be the foundations of the next Egyptian government. Some ask whether the Islamists would be adverse to using a democratic apparatus to gain power. Opinions are split, but it appears they would. The precedent setting alliance with the West and in particular the US when working to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s is given as an example. Nowadays Islamists speak of defeating those temporary liberal democratic allies of yesteryear.
Those who are truly dedicated to democracy are first loyal to that system of self-rule, the political party – whether of a religious nature or not, is subservient to the democratic state and not vice-versa. Devout Muslims understand Islam itself to be the state and not just one variation or political perspective within the national elective structure. Islam is not to be voted into power or out of power – Islam is the power, an eternal one. Anything else is a contradiction of the Koran and Sharia law as given by Allah. From an Islamist point of view democracy is a tool to be used to the reigns of state and then one liquidates the tool. Using democracy can give one a tactical advantage if one does not have the backing necessary to attain power immediately. It also can be legislated out of existence (see the German example of the 1930s) or limited to the point of elimination where only approved Islamic candidates can run for public office – just ask the Iranians.
The military is not interested in a democratic system either, but can go through the pretenses of having one, rigging elections as Egypt and the Arab world have done until now. Or you can take your example from Hezbollah and shoot your way into power as happened in 2008 or take a softer approach and only threaten to use force like Hassan Nasrallah did this past month resting on his reputation of being good to his word.
The democratic option is barely viable. Most likely we are looking at a "correction" with the removal of Mubarak, at least in the short run. The military will impose its will while gaining the support of the people and some sort of reforms will take place allowing for more Islamic influence. Whether it will be a transitional regime or become solidified in place is impossible to know at this stage.
On the other hand, should the Muslim Brotherhood gain control of the Egyptian State either through street power or elections their loyalty will not be to democracy. We could be looking at a rerun of the Iranian revolution, even if somewhat less intense. Should that be the case relations with the West will be very difficult and the litmus test will be whether Egypt cancels its peace agreement with Israel, something the Muslim Brotherhood has promised to do should they attain office.
No doubt the West wants to see a "correction" whereby the military remains in control but allows for more freedoms and a gradual move towards a more democratic framework. Add to this the grand hopes of secular liberalism. In all scenarios Mubarak is finished along with much of the old guard. The West and Israel in particular just hope that the international stability projected by Egypt since the mid-1970s is not overthrown with Mubarak & Co. the man and regime so completely identified with those policies.
Egypt is the lynchpin to the Middle East. Whatever happens in Cairo reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. To ensure stability the West wants a step by step process, not a revolution.
Administration is Supporting the Muslim Brotherhood
Ted Belman
U.S. ‘held secret meeting with Muslim Brotherhood’
Discussed fall of Egypt with group dedicated to Islam’s global spread
By Aaron Klein
WorldNetDaily
JERUSALEM – The Egyptian government has information a diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Cairo secretly met yesterday with a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, the nation’s major Islamist opposition group, WND has learned.
The topic of the meeting was the future of Egypt following the “fall” of President Hosni Mubarak, an Egyptian intelligence official told WND.
The claim comes amid charges from Cairo that the Obama administration has been encouraging the protests rocking Egypt and targeting the rule of Mubarak, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.
The Egyptian intelligence official told WND his government has information of a meeting that took place yesterday between Issam El-Erian, a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Frank Wisner, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt.
The Obama administration dispatched Wisner to Egypt this past weekend to report to the State Department and White House a general sense of the situation in the embattled country.
The Egyptian intelligence official speaking to WND said the meeting took place inside the American embassy in Cairo
The U.S. State Department would neither confirm nor deny the report.
The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to spread Islam around the world, in large part using nonviolent means. Hamas and al-Qaida are violent Brotherhood offshoots.
The latest information is not the first charge by the Egyptian government that the Obama administration has been working with or encouraging the opposition to Mubarak.
Last week, a senior Egyptian diplomat stated the Egyptian government suspects elements of the current uprising there, particularly political aspects, are being coordinated with the U.S. State Department and Obama administration.
The senior Egyptian diplomat told WND the Mubarak regime suspects the U.S. has been aiding protest planning by Mohamed ElBaradei, who is seen as one of the main opposition leaders in Cairo.
ElBaradei, former International Atomic Energy Agency chief, has reinvented himself as a campaigner for “reform” in Egypt. He is a candidate for this year’s scheduled presidential elections.
ElBaradei arrived in Cairo just after last week’s protests began and is reportedly being confined to his home by Egyptian security forces.
He is seen as an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood This past weekend, the London Telegraph reported the U.S. embassy in Cairo in 2008 helped a young dissident attend a U.S.-sponsored summit for activists in New York, while working to keep his identity secret from Egyptian state police.
The Telegraph would not identify the dissident, but said he was involved in helping to stir the current protests. The report claimed the dissident told the U.S. embassy in Cairo that an alliance of opposition groups had a plan to topple Mubarak'sgovernment.
The disclosures, contained in U.S. diplomatic dispatches released by the WikiLeaks website, show American officials pressed the Egyptian government to release other dissidents who had been detained by the police.
The White House has been almost openly championing the unrest in Egypt.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for an "orderly transition" to democracy in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood is the main opposition group.
Obama reportedly voiced support for an "orderly transition" in Egypt that is responsive to the aspirations of Egyptians in phone calls with foreign leaders, the White House said.
Deputy National Security Adviser Denis McDonough, speaking in a White House webcast, also urged the government and protesters in Egypt to refrain from violence.
Egyptian officials speaking to WND, however, warned the Muslim Brotherhood has the most to gain from any political reform.
Read more: U.S. 'held secret meeting with Muslim Brotherhood' http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=258405#ixzz1Cofvp5bx
U.S. ‘held secret meeting with Muslim Brotherhood’
Discussed fall of Egypt with group dedicated to Islam’s global spread
By Aaron Klein
WorldNetDaily
JERUSALEM – The Egyptian government has information a diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Cairo secretly met yesterday with a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, the nation’s major Islamist opposition group, WND has learned.
The topic of the meeting was the future of Egypt following the “fall” of President Hosni Mubarak, an Egyptian intelligence official told WND.
The claim comes amid charges from Cairo that the Obama administration has been encouraging the protests rocking Egypt and targeting the rule of Mubarak, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.
The Egyptian intelligence official told WND his government has information of a meeting that took place yesterday between Issam El-Erian, a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Frank Wisner, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt.
The Obama administration dispatched Wisner to Egypt this past weekend to report to the State Department and White House a general sense of the situation in the embattled country.
The Egyptian intelligence official speaking to WND said the meeting took place inside the American embassy in Cairo
The U.S. State Department would neither confirm nor deny the report.
The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to spread Islam around the world, in large part using nonviolent means. Hamas and al-Qaida are violent Brotherhood offshoots.
The latest information is not the first charge by the Egyptian government that the Obama administration has been working with or encouraging the opposition to Mubarak.
Last week, a senior Egyptian diplomat stated the Egyptian government suspects elements of the current uprising there, particularly political aspects, are being coordinated with the U.S. State Department and Obama administration.
The senior Egyptian diplomat told WND the Mubarak regime suspects the U.S. has been aiding protest planning by Mohamed ElBaradei, who is seen as one of the main opposition leaders in Cairo.
ElBaradei, former International Atomic Energy Agency chief, has reinvented himself as a campaigner for “reform” in Egypt. He is a candidate for this year’s scheduled presidential elections.
ElBaradei arrived in Cairo just after last week’s protests began and is reportedly being confined to his home by Egyptian security forces.
He is seen as an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood This past weekend, the London Telegraph reported the U.S. embassy in Cairo in 2008 helped a young dissident attend a U.S.-sponsored summit for activists in New York, while working to keep his identity secret from Egyptian state police.
The Telegraph would not identify the dissident, but said he was involved in helping to stir the current protests. The report claimed the dissident told the U.S. embassy in Cairo that an alliance of opposition groups had a plan to topple Mubarak'sgovernment.
The disclosures, contained in U.S. diplomatic dispatches released by the WikiLeaks website, show American officials pressed the Egyptian government to release other dissidents who had been detained by the police.
The White House has been almost openly championing the unrest in Egypt.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for an "orderly transition" to democracy in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood is the main opposition group.
Obama reportedly voiced support for an "orderly transition" in Egypt that is responsive to the aspirations of Egyptians in phone calls with foreign leaders, the White House said.
Deputy National Security Adviser Denis McDonough, speaking in a White House webcast, also urged the government and protesters in Egypt to refrain from violence.
Egyptian officials speaking to WND, however, warned the Muslim Brotherhood has the most to gain from any political reform.
Read more: U.S. 'held secret meeting with Muslim Brotherhood' http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=258405#ixzz1Cofvp5bx
WIKILEAKS: FBI Hunts 9/11 Gang That Got Away
A group of Qataris suspected of conducting surveillance on the targets of 9/11, and providing "support" to the plotters of the atrocities, were due to fly to Washington on the eve of the attacks, the Daily Telegraph can reveal.
Steven Swinford, Robert Winnett and Nick Allen in Los Angeles 9:39AM GMT 02 Feb 2011
The disclosure, in US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks, has raised suspicions that the three men were preparing to be a fifth suicide team, but aborted their attack at the last minute. Instead of boarding a domestic flight to the US capital they instead returned to Doha, via London.
Secret documents reveal that the men flew from London to New York on a British Airways flight three weeks before the attacks and allegedly carried out surveillance at the World Trade Centre, the White House and in Virginia, the US state where the Pentagon and CIA headquarters are located. They later they flew to Los Angeles, where they stationed themselves in a hotel near the airport which the FBI has now established was paid for by a “convicted terrorist”, who also bought their airline tickets.
Hotel staff have told investigators they saw pilot uniforms in their room along with computer print outs detailing pilot names, flight numbers and times and packages addressed to Syria, Afghanistan, Jerusalem and Jordan.
On September 10 they were booked on an American Airlines flight from Los Angeles to Washington, but failed to board. The following day the same Boeing 757 aircraft was hijacked by five terrorists and crashed into the Pentagon.
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DEMARCHE IN SUPPORT OF U.S.CANDIDACY FOR IMO
01 Feb 2011
But, instead of boarding the American flight, the Qatari suspects – named as Meshal Alhajri, Fahad Abdulla and Ali Alfehaid - flew back to London on a British Airways flight before returning to Qatar. Their current location is unknown and the FBI have wlaunched a manhunt for them.
Investigators are also hunting a fourth man, Mohamed Al Mansoori, who they say supported the alleged terrorist cell while they were in the US.
The man, who is from the United Arab Emirates, previously lived in Long Beach, Los Angeles. His current location is also unknown, and US officials recommended that he is put on an international terror watch list because he “may pose a threat to aviation in the US and abroad”.
The details of the secret 9/11 team have emerged in a secret American government document obtained by the Wikileaks website and passed to The Daily Telegraph. It was sent between the American Embassy in Doha and the Department for Homeland Security in Washington.
The document, sent on 11th February 2010, states: “Mr Al Mansoori is currently under investigation by the FBI for his possible involvement in the 11 September 2001 attacks. He is suspected of aiding people who entered the US before the attacks to conduct surveillance of possible targets and providing other support to the hijackers.”
Details of the unknown 9/11 alleged plotters has never previously been disclosed. An official inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people, indicated that the hijackers may have received assistance in Los Angeles but investigators did not publicly provide more details.
The 9/11 Commission report, published in July 2004, states that at least two of the hijackers previously visited Los Angeles but, at the time, investigators appeared to have little information on their movements. The report states they had a "brief stay in Los Angeles about which we know little".
Only one person – Zacarias Moussaoui - has been tried and convicted over involvement in the 9/11 attacks as all the terrorists died in the crashed planes. Moussaoui, accused of being the twentieth hijacker, was sentenced to life in prison.
The secret American document contains detailed information about the movements of the three alleged Qatari plotters.
They took BA flight 185 from London to New York on 15th August, 2001, and the memo alleges that they subsequently conducted “surveillance” on potential targets ahead of the 9/11 attacks. It states: “They visited the World Trade Centre, the Statue of Liberty, the White House and various areas in Virginia.”
They then flew on an American Airlines flight from Washington to Los Angeles, arriving on 24th August and checking into a single room at a hotel near the airport. They paid for the room with cash and during the last few days of their stay requested that their room should not be cleaned.
The cable states: “Hotel cleaning staff grew suspicious of the men because they noticed pilot type uniforms, several laptops and several cardboard boxes addressed to Syria, Jerusalem, Afghanistan and Jordan in the room on previous cleaning visits.
“The men had a smashed cellular phone in the room and a cellular phone attached by wire to a computer. The room also contained pin feed computer paper print outs with headers listing pilot names, airlines, flight numbers, and flight times.”
While in the US, they were aided by Mohamed Ali Mohamed Al Mansoori. The secret document also states that the three Qatari men spent a week travelling with Mr Al Mansoori to “different destinations in California”.
The Qatari men were scheduled to board American Airlines Flight 144 on September 10th from Los Angeles to Washington but did not turn up.
They instead boarded a British Airways flight to London, before flying back to Doha on another BA flight.
The following day the same American Airlines aircraft, flying on route AA77, was hijacked as it returned from Washington and crashed into the Pentagon, killing 184 people.
The fact that the Qataris flew to and from America via London throws the spotlight back on Britain's role in the 9/11 attacks.
Three of the hijackers, including the ringleader, Mohammed Atta, had watched videos of speeches by the London-based cleric Abu Qatada while Moussaoui worshipped at the Fnsbury Park Mosque when it was controlled by the notorious preacher Abu Hamza.
It is not known whether the FBI believe that the men were simply assisting the hijackers or were a fifth cell who pulled out at the final moment. Alternatively, they may have been planning an attack on the West Coast of America or even London which was abandoned or went wrong.
Mr Al Mansoori has never been publicly named in connection with the 9/11 attacks. The three Qatari men were included on an FBI list of more than 300 people who were wanted for questioning in connection with the 9/11 attacks, which was leaked in 2002.
At the time, the FBI stressed it was not a list of suspects, but merely parties they thought might have information useful to the investigation.
The US embassy cable obtained by the Daily Telegraph was written by Mirembe Nantongo, the deputy chief of mission in Doha. It was marked “priority” and sent to the office of Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and the CIA.
Mr Al Mansoori’s visa was revoked after the information about him came to light, but “his name was not watchlisted in the class system”, suggesting he may have managed to leave America.
A spokesman for the FBI declined to comment.
Obama, Not Egypt, is Biggest Threat to U.S. Energy Prices
Heritage Foundation
Last Friday on a conference call with reporters about the Obama Administration’s long-term energy proposals, Energy Secretary Steven Chu responded to a question about the situation in Egypt, saying: “Certainly any disruption in the Middle East means a partial disruption in the oil we import. It’s a world market and [a disruption] could actually have real harm of the price. The best way America can protect itself against these incidents is to decrease our dependency on foreign oil, in fact to diversify our supply.” This is a nice sentiment. Unfortunately, everything the Obama Administration is doing is only increasing our dependence on foreign sources of oil. Secretary Chu is right: Oil does sell on a world market. But transportation and other distribution factors do segment oil markets somewhat. In fact, the United States is currently paying about $10 less for a barrel of oil than European and Asian nations are. Why? Because of U.S. access to oil refined from Canadian oil sands. Access to these vast natural resources is a great diversification of our oil supply. But now the Obama Administration is trying to make it harder for American consumers to get Canadian oil. The Obama Environmental Protection Agency is stonewalling approval for the Keystone pipeline, which would increase the amount of oil the U.S. receives from Canada by over a million barrels per day. And that is not the only oil the Obama Administration is trying to keep out of American consumers’ hands.
Offshore, the Obama Interior Department has blocked access to 19 billion barrels of oil in the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and the eastern Gulf of Mexico—and another 10 billion barrels estimated in the Chukchi Sea off the Alaskan coast. Onshore, federal leasing of oil and gas exploration in the western United States has dropped significantly in the past two years. According to data compiled by the Western Energy Alliance, the Bureau of Land Management offered 79 percent fewer leases for oil and natural gas development in Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming in 2010 than in 2005. And then there is the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, where an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil lie beneath a few thousand acres that can be accessed with minimal environmental impact.
Allowing Americans to develop these resources could easily produce at least 1 million new barrels of oil a day. The Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis estimates that, if the United States managed to increase its domestic oil production by 1 million barrels a day, it would create an additional 128,000 jobs and generate $7.7 billion in economic activity.
As bad as these existing energy policies are, President Obama’s planned energy policies are even worse. Today, the President is meeting with Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D–NM) to plot passage of a clean energy standard (CES) bill. CES is just another cap-and-trade, energy-tax-like policy, except it’s all cap and no trade. A CES would mandate that all electricity providers generate a certain percentage of energy from carbon-free sources. Just like cap and trade, this policy is fundamentally just an energy tax that would drive up everyone’s electricity prices. Ironically, this would make electric vehicles even more expensive to operate, but we’re sure the Obama Administration would offer another round of taxpayer-funded subsidies to fix that problem.
Government policies that ban economically feasible energy development while subsidizing economically unsustainable ones only raise energy costs rather than lowering them. What the U.S. economy really needs is a truly free-market energy approach, one that includes (1) real nuclear energy reform, not more loan guarantees; (2) predictable and sensible coal regulations; (3) reduced regulation on renewable energy; (4) an end to all energy subsidies; and (5) common-sense limits to environmental litigation.
Congress should not let unrest in the Middle East scare them into energy policies that would make all our energy only more expensive. More bans on energy development, more subsidies for economically unproven technologies, and expensive new alternative energy production mandates are not the answer. America needs a true free-market approach to energy, and we need it now.
Quick Hits:
* Senate Republicans will push ahead with a vote to repeal Obamacare today.
* According to Gallup, for the fourth consecutive month, job creation was essentially flat.
* Governor Susana Martinez (R–NM) declared this week that New Mexico is no longer a sanctuary state.
* A spokeswoman for Aetna confirmed Monday that, thanks to Obamacare, the insurer will stop selling new individual health policies and will cancel existing ones in 2012.
* After yesterday’s ruling finding the law void, Wisconsin Attorney General J. B. Van Hollen has declared the Badger State free of any obligations imposed by Obamacare.
Last Friday on a conference call with reporters about the Obama Administration’s long-term energy proposals, Energy Secretary Steven Chu responded to a question about the situation in Egypt, saying: “Certainly any disruption in the Middle East means a partial disruption in the oil we import. It’s a world market and [a disruption] could actually have real harm of the price. The best way America can protect itself against these incidents is to decrease our dependency on foreign oil, in fact to diversify our supply.” This is a nice sentiment. Unfortunately, everything the Obama Administration is doing is only increasing our dependence on foreign sources of oil. Secretary Chu is right: Oil does sell on a world market. But transportation and other distribution factors do segment oil markets somewhat. In fact, the United States is currently paying about $10 less for a barrel of oil than European and Asian nations are. Why? Because of U.S. access to oil refined from Canadian oil sands. Access to these vast natural resources is a great diversification of our oil supply. But now the Obama Administration is trying to make it harder for American consumers to get Canadian oil. The Obama Environmental Protection Agency is stonewalling approval for the Keystone pipeline, which would increase the amount of oil the U.S. receives from Canada by over a million barrels per day. And that is not the only oil the Obama Administration is trying to keep out of American consumers’ hands.
Offshore, the Obama Interior Department has blocked access to 19 billion barrels of oil in the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and the eastern Gulf of Mexico—and another 10 billion barrels estimated in the Chukchi Sea off the Alaskan coast. Onshore, federal leasing of oil and gas exploration in the western United States has dropped significantly in the past two years. According to data compiled by the Western Energy Alliance, the Bureau of Land Management offered 79 percent fewer leases for oil and natural gas development in Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming in 2010 than in 2005. And then there is the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, where an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil lie beneath a few thousand acres that can be accessed with minimal environmental impact.
Allowing Americans to develop these resources could easily produce at least 1 million new barrels of oil a day. The Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis estimates that, if the United States managed to increase its domestic oil production by 1 million barrels a day, it would create an additional 128,000 jobs and generate $7.7 billion in economic activity.
As bad as these existing energy policies are, President Obama’s planned energy policies are even worse. Today, the President is meeting with Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D–NM) to plot passage of a clean energy standard (CES) bill. CES is just another cap-and-trade, energy-tax-like policy, except it’s all cap and no trade. A CES would mandate that all electricity providers generate a certain percentage of energy from carbon-free sources. Just like cap and trade, this policy is fundamentally just an energy tax that would drive up everyone’s electricity prices. Ironically, this would make electric vehicles even more expensive to operate, but we’re sure the Obama Administration would offer another round of taxpayer-funded subsidies to fix that problem.
Government policies that ban economically feasible energy development while subsidizing economically unsustainable ones only raise energy costs rather than lowering them. What the U.S. economy really needs is a truly free-market energy approach, one that includes (1) real nuclear energy reform, not more loan guarantees; (2) predictable and sensible coal regulations; (3) reduced regulation on renewable energy; (4) an end to all energy subsidies; and (5) common-sense limits to environmental litigation.
Congress should not let unrest in the Middle East scare them into energy policies that would make all our energy only more expensive. More bans on energy development, more subsidies for economically unproven technologies, and expensive new alternative energy production mandates are not the answer. America needs a true free-market approach to energy, and we need it now.
Quick Hits:
* Senate Republicans will push ahead with a vote to repeal Obamacare today.
* According to Gallup, for the fourth consecutive month, job creation was essentially flat.
* Governor Susana Martinez (R–NM) declared this week that New Mexico is no longer a sanctuary state.
* A spokeswoman for Aetna confirmed Monday that, thanks to Obamacare, the insurer will stop selling new individual health policies and will cancel existing ones in 2012.
* After yesterday’s ruling finding the law void, Wisconsin Attorney General J. B. Van Hollen has declared the Badger State free of any obligations imposed by Obamacare.
Red Carpet for Islamists
Stephen Brown
All signs from Egypt and U.S. leadership now point to an increased role for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egyptian politics — a terrifying reality that has just been given a blessing by the Obama administration, no less. In a highly disturbing departure from American foreign policy, Washington officially accepted a Muslim Brotherhood presence in a new Egyptian government, meaning that a U.S. president has publicly embraced a faction in Egypt that is intent on establishing a Khomeini-like Islamic Republic. The consequences of this move are horrifically catastrophic. The Obama administration’s embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood came within the context of a chaotic chorus of dramatic events: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak acquiesced on Tuesday to the demands of Egypt’s roiling streets and announced that he will decline to run for presidency in September, although he wishes to oversee the transition to a new government until that time. Most don’t expect him to last that long. In his television appearance, made the evening of the day that hundreds of thousands took to the streets demanding his resignation, the 82-year-old Egyptian president stated that maintaining stability in the country would now be his main priority. “I am now absolutely determined to finish my work for the nation in a way that ensures handing over its safekeeping and banner,” Mubarak said. “I will work in the remaining months of my term to ensure the peaceful transfer of power.”
But it is what happens during and after that “peaceful transfer” that constitutes the greatest concern in the region, especially in Israel. For among the hundreds of thousands of jubilant Egyptians, no one is happier with Mubarak’s retreat from power than Egypt’s fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s best organized opposition group. Officially banned under Mubarak, it is no secret that the MB wants to establish an extremist Islamic regime in Egypt similar to the one Khomeini set up in Iran after that country’s 1979 revolution. And, like all revolutions fired by extremist views, a Muslim Brotherhood insurrection will involve vicious violence — and a lot of it.
But instead of taking a visible and concrete stand against a force that seeks a Khomeini-style theocracy, the Obama administration, through its voice of Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, said as early as Monday that a post-Mubarak government had to include “a whole host of non-secular actors,” clearly an allusion to the Islamist political forces that pervade Egypt’s government and society. Obama adviser Robert Malley, meanwhile, noted that Obama’s openness to the MB being part of a ruling coalition in Egypt was a “pretty clear sign that the U.S. isn’t going to advocate a narrow form of pluralism, but a broad one.”
What kind of “pluralism” Islamists can bring to a post-Mubarak Egypt remains highly questionable. Tragically, however, the Muslim Brotherhood also has the blessing and support of informal opposition leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, who is almost assured to play a significant (if not leading) role brokering a new coalition government. He views the MB as a legitimate element of Egyptian politics and has flatly said accusations that the MB is a violent extremist group are “bogus.” Instead, ElBaradei likens the group, believe it or not, to evangelical Christians in the U.S. and Israeli Orthodox Jews. ElBaradei, who the MB supported to lead the opposition against Mubarak, is a Nobel Prize laureate and has had amicable relations with President Obama in the past due to the duo’s mutual opposition to the Bush administration’s tough stance on Iran and its nuclear weapons ambitions. The MB, in other words, will face little opposition in its mission to become a fixture of Egyptian democracy.
Strategically, the MB knows it can’t reveal its true intentions right now amidst the euphoria of the people’s street victory over the unlamented Mubarak. During the run-up to the expected free elections for regime change, the MB will also have to restrain itself. But the Islamists in Egypt have already demonstrated their political ruthlessness and readiness to use violence: prisons were attacked in recent days to free MB members and other Islamic extremists. Along with thousands of other violent religious fanatics already at large in Egyptian society, they will pose a serious threat to Egypt’s stability if they decide to revive their terror campaign of the 1980s and 1990s that reached its high point with the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
The MB and other Islamic extremist groups will make Egypt’s future political road a dangerous one. One can expect, just like in Pakistan, the brutal face of death to become an everyday sight in the form of bombings, assassinations and other politically-motivated acts of violence against anyone who gets in the way of the Islamists’ utopian goal. Founded in 1928, the MB has waited a long time for this opportunity and does not intend to squander it.
Among the first to experience the MB’s true face will be the democratic Egyptian opposition groups that helped force Mubarak to step down. They will be tolerated as long as the MB needs them to establish itself in power. The situation in Egypt resembles, in some respects, Russia after the fall of the tsar. Until they seized power by force several months later, the extremist Bolsheviks played at being democrats, calling for free elections to a national assembly and seducing the impoverished, uneducated masses with the powerful slogan: “peace, land, bread.” But instead of freedom, democracy and prosperity, Russia’s downtrodden classes instead got the Red Terror and murderous totalitarianism.
Like the Bolsheviks, the MB also has a lot of uneducated and impoverished people in Egypt it can manipulate. More than one third of the country’s population, and almost half of the women, can’t read, while many Egyptians are destitute, existing on less than two dollars a day. Ignorance and backwardness is widespread, and female genital mutilation is still a common practice, as well as honor killings.
No country was more shaken by Mubarak’s Tuesday announcement than Israel. Almost feverishly, the Israelis had been asking other governments to stop criticizing Mubarak and give him their support. Israel knows that the Egyptian president, despite his faults, was instrumental in keeping the fragile peace in the Middle East intact and in opposing radical Islamic entities like Hamas and Iran. Without Mubarak as a regional stabilizer and mediator with other Arab countries, Israel can only view prospects for peace in the Middle East with deep foreboding.
And with good reason. The MB has never recognized Israel and opposes the peace agreement signed more than 30 years ago between Egypt and Israel. But while MB sympathizers say the Islamist organization only wants the peace deal renegotiated, in reality, it wants Israel destroyed. So, it was no surprise when it was reported that Mohamed Ghanem, an Egyptian MB member, speaking recently on Iranian television, revealed in plain language the MB’s true feelings about the Jewish State when he said: “Prepare for war with Israel.” One can rest assured the Israeli general staff is reviewing its old war plans for Egypt.
The Middle East Crisis Part III - Syrian Facebook Pages Calling for Demonstrations on Saturday, February 5, 2011
Y. Yehoshua*
MEMRI
Introduction
In the past week, Syrian activists have been using Facebook to call for mass protests in Syria on Saturday, February 5, 2011, dubbing it the "Day of Rage." In Facebook pages created specifically for this purpose, members have called on the Syrian public to take to the streets on that date and stage peaceful demonstrations and rallies in all parts of the country, as well as in front of Syrian embassies in Arab and European capitals, in protest of the oppressive Syrian regime. These Facebook pages also feature images and videos slamming Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and supporting protest against his rule. The organizers of the Syrian protests have expressed support for the demonstrators in Tunisia and Egypt, and have adopted their methods:[1] opening special Facebook pages on which information is posted regarding the place and time of the planned protests, and creating a special profile picture, associated with the protests, to be used by all Facebook members sympathizing with the cause. However, it seems that the scope of their activity is limited compared to that of the Tunisian and Egyptian activists. So far, the number of people who have registered as members on these Facebook pages is relatively small, and some of the members reside outside the country.
Among those promoting the "Day of Rage" protests is the Independent Islamic Bloc – part of the "Damascus Declaration" opposition movement – which has called upon Syrians to attend a "sweeping protest and mass rally" in front of the Parliament house in Damascus on February 5. In its announcement, the organization praised the protests in Tunisia and Egypt and warned the Syrian regime against continuing its oppression, corruption and political arrests.[2] Websites have also published a message by "the Popular Committees in Aleppo Province" announcing a February 5 protest rally in the center of Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria.[3]
The organizers of the planned demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo have listed their demands: an improvement in living standards, respect for human rights, freedom of speech for all Syrian citizens, and greater influence for Syrian youth. They requested that the protesters come equipped with nothing more than Syrian flags and signs expressing their demands.[4]
Syria is on the alert for the possible spread of protests to its territory. On January 29, 2011, the Syrian authorities prevented the holding of a demonstration in solidarity with the Egyptian protesters in front of the Egyptian embassy in Damascus, fearing a conflagration.[5] It was also reported that Syrian security chief 'Ali Mamlouk has met with province governors and police commanders in order to prepare for possible protests in the country.[6]
There are conflicting reports regarding the accessibility of Facebook, which has played a crucial role in mobilizing the public for the current wave of protests in the Arab world. According to a January 25, 2011 report on Alarabiya.net, the Syrian authorities have restricted access to Facebook in a bid to keep the protests from spreading to Syria, but some users are managing to access the site through proxies. [7] The Syrian news agency SANA has denied this, saying that access to the Internet is unrestricted throughout the country.[8]
Following is a review of the preparations on Facebook for the February 5 protests in Syria:
Facebook Pages Created to Advertise February 5 Protests
In advance of the anticipated events, several Facebook pages have been launched, such as the pages titled "Syrian Day of Rage," "The Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad," and "Towards Popular Action in Syria: The February 5, 2011 Day of Rage." As of this writing, these three pages have some 5,000 registered members, but more are joining every hour.
Facebook page launched in advance of the protests, with 1,500 members
http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf
The "Popular Action" page, with 1,000 members
http://www.facebook.com/pages/nhw-hrak-shby-fy-swryt-ywm-alghdb-5-shbat-2011/175027102541306
Page titled "Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad"
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=136763013004194#!/Syrian.Revolution
Calls to join the "Day of Rage" Facebook groups and participate in the protests were also spread via Twitter:
Twitter account dedicated to Syrian Day of Rage:
http://twitter.com/AngrySyriaDay
Special Facebook pages have also been created for users to confirm their participation in the protests. For example, a page titled "Syrian Day of Rage – Popular Action in Syria," calling for demonstrations in Syria and abroad, includes 127 confirmations, and a page advertising a planned demonstration in Sa'd Allah Al-Jabiri Square in Aleppo has 194 confirmations.
"Popular Action" page, with 127 confirmations
http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=175308452510885#!/event.php?eid=149985825055327
Page dedicated to demonstration in Aleppo, with 194 confirmations
http://www.facebook.com/pages/dd-wqft-5-shbat-w-dd-ywm-alghdb-alswry-w-swrya-allh-hamyha/160085677377630#!/event.php?eid=175308452510885
Communiqué Circulated on Facebook: The Day of Rage – an Apolitical Protest to Transform Our Bitter Situation
A communiqué posted on various Facebook pages and websites, titled "Syrian Day of Rage on February 5, 2011," stated: "The protests staged by the other Arab peoples were not motivated by a will greater than our own or [enabled by] capabilities greater [than our own]. The regimes [in Egypt and Tunisia] are no less cruel and violent than the regime in our country, but the [Egyptian and Tunisian] people raised the banner of liberty and honor, and stuck to their course. The Syrian Day of Rage is a national call that has nothing to do with any particular political bloc or stream. It [expresses] the will of the people, which aspires to freedom and wishes to rise up against its bitter situation and transform the poor economic situation that is deteriorating from day to day." The Facebook pages called to spread the communiqué on as many sites and platforms as possible.
The communiqué
http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674
Ad calling for demonstrations: "On Saturday, February 5, [Protest] throughout Syria, in every street, against oppression and corruption"
http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf#!/photo.php?fbid=147362948655482&set=a.147230262002084.27852.147151028676674
Day of Rage Profile Picture
As in previous protest campaigns, many Facebook users adopted the special profile picture designed for the occasion, consisting of the Syrian flag and the legend "Syrian Day of Rage – February 5, 2011."
"Day of Rage" profile picture
http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf#!/photo.php?fbid=147230265335417&set=a.147230262002084.27852.147151028676674
Numerous members use the special profile picture:
Anti-Assad Images on Syrian Facebook Pages
The Syrian Facebook pages also featured anti-Bashar Assad images, such as the one below, showing the Syrian president sharing the fate as Saddam Hussein.
The caption beneath the image says "very soon"
http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=175308452510885#!/photo.php?fbid=1821234888256&set=o.420796315726
A similar picture featuring Mubarak appeared on an Egyptian Facebook page.
http://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed?ref=mf
Images from "Syrian Day of Rage" page:
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=501159&o=all&op=1&view=all&subj=147151028676674&aid=-1&id=100000717707772&oid=147151028676674#!/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?v=photos
Syrian Counter-Campaign in Support of Regime
Naturally, Facebook pages were also created in support of the Syrian regime and opposing the February 5 protests.
Page titled "Against the February 5 Rage Day Rally – Allah Is the Protector of Syria"
http://www.facebook.com/pages/dd-wqft-5-shbat-w-dd-ywm-alghdb-alswry-w-swrya-allh-hamyha/160085677377630
Page devoted to organizing a march in support of Assad on February 15
http://www.facebook.com/pages/msyrt-mhbt-lqayd-alwtn-wlswrya-alhbybt-fy-15-shbat/126060727462044?v=wall#!/pages/msyrt-mhbt-lqayd-alwtn-wlswrya-alhbybt-fy-15-shbat/126060727462044?v=wall
Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] See also MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 3521, "Arab and Iranian Reactions to the Tunisia Uprising," http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/254/0/4926.htm; and MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 659, "Social Networks Harnessed by Protest Movement in Egypt," http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4949.htm .
[2] Syriahr.com, January 27, 2011.
[3] Elaph.com, January 28, 2011.
China's View of the Unrest in Egypt and the Middle East
Sratfor
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Jan. 31 that Beijing hopes Egypt will return to “social stability and normal order” soon. China is watching the unrest in Egypt with interest. The protests have created economic concerns for Beijing, in that they could make shipping through the Suez Canal problematic and could affect overall stability in the region. Beijing has also taken its usual actions to censor politically sensitive material on the Internet.
China hopes Egypt will return to “social stability and normal order” as soon as possible, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Jan. 31. China is watching the situation in Egypt primarily out of concern for its economic interests in the Suez Canal and in wider stability in the Middle East. China’s censorship of Internet discussion and coverage of the protests has so far been standard practice, but Beijing is deeply concerned about social unrest within its borders and about the prospect that foreign powers could facilitate dissent in China.
China’s Economic Concerns
The most direct concern for China is that its growing investments in Egypt (reportedly totaling from $300 million to $500 million) could be jeopardized or that its trade through the Suez Canal could be affected. Social unrest that has intensified in Egypt since Jan. 25 began to disrupt port operations in Said, Alexandria and Domiat on Feb. 1 — Alexandria, which handles 80 percent of Egypt’s traffic, has stopped all shipments, apparently due to striking workers. China’s exports to Europe amount to roughly 20 percent of its total exports, and China accounted for about 20 percent of northbound traffic through Suez in 2009. The canal is the preferred route for ships heading from the Malacca Strait to Europe. At the moment the canal is still functioning, though some ships have avoided stopping in Egypt on their way through, and some shipping companies have halted operations at ports. South Korea’s Hanjin Shipping, for example, announced that it has rerouted some of its container vessels to avoid stopping at Egyptian ports for resupply while going through Suez, even though traffic through the Suez Canal has not been interrupted, according to news reports Feb. 1. But as protests grow in size and intensity there remains the possibility that Suez could see disruptions that would convince more shippers to avoid the risks entirely, though the United States claims it would intervene to prevent a total closure.
For China, while the threats to Suez are the most immediate, they are also the most easily avoided. The alternative to Suez, heading south around the Cape Peninsula of South Africa, adds an additional roughly 3,500 nautical miles to the trip, making a round trip take around 43 days instead of 34 days. Generally, Cape transit is preferred when fuel costs are not too high and when Suez tolls push the total Suez transit cost higher than that of the additional fuel and time (including costs of chartering a ship to make a longer trip) required to make the Cape transit — not to mention the advantage of avoiding piracy risks by taking the Cape route. But the political instability in Egypt clearly can affect the usual calculations over whether to take the Suez or Cape routes, making the Cape more attractive despite rising fuel costs. The costs vary considerably, and the two routes are used interchangeably based on circumstances, but the Baltic and International Maritime Council estimates the combined fuel and opportunity costs of going around the Cape at about $4 million more than Suez for container ships (and, less relevant for China, $8 million for very large crude oil carriers).
Threats to Internal Stability?
Beyond direct threats to China’s material interests, there is a murkier threat emanating from the spectacle of popular uprising and the potential that it could inspire dissatisfied social groups in China to take to the streets. To be clear, there is no concrete connection between Egypt’s unrest and China’s unrest, despite an abundance of tenuous comparisons in Western (especially U.S.) media. There is no evidence of substantial coordination between Egyptian protesters and Chinese dissidents. However, there is an abstract connection relating to a high degree of social dissatisfaction and relative lack of representative government, hence the fear of governments around the world, including China, that the unrest could prove contagious.
China has taken actions to suppress information relating to the Egypt protests, notably by blocking references to Egypt in popular micro-blogging websites like the one hosted by Sina.com. But so far the moves have been consistent with standard practice — China routinely censors Internet traffic and denies access to social networking services like Twitter and Facebook, and Beijing shut down Internet access to the Xinjiang region during the 2009 riots in Urumqi. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia (November 2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 2004-January 2005), the Saffron Uprising in Myanmar (August-October 2007), the Twitter Revolution in Moldova (April 2009), the Green movement in Iran (June and December 2009), Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 reversal of the 2005 Tulip Revolution, rolling unrest in Thailand and the recent revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, China has become fairly familiar with handling the domestic perception of foreign instability. To do so, the central government uses a combination of blocking the flow of information, tightening domestic security and activating state press organs to denounce the misguided political liberalism and foreign (usually American) meddling that purportedly leads countries to such civil discord.
Nevertheless incidents of social unrest have become more frequent in China throughout the past decade, peaking most recently in large riots in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009. Moreover, inflation — the galvanizing force behind the Tiananmen Square democracy protests in 1989 — has re-emerged as a challenge after recovery from the global economic crisis. Inflation is hitting food, fuel and housing prices especially hard and generating considerably higher social frustration than usual, according to sources on the ground in China. Moreover, China is reaching a juncture of sorts as its economic model shifts, its current leaders approach retirement and internal divisions sharpen. During such a sensitive period domestically, Beijing is unlikely to relent in its suppression of information that could fuel the desire of some groups to act on their social, political and economic grievances.
Ultimately what is most concerning for China about the Egyptian situation is the danger that popular protests could have political ramifications that would increase instability in the Middle East. This could happen, for instance, through a regime change in Egypt, which would send waves across the region and beyond (though at the moment the military appears prepared to maintain its central place in, and control over, the regime). Or it could result from unforeseen developments in other countries. Since Tunisia’s president was toppled, protests have broken out in Jordan (where King Abdullah II sacked his Cabinet on Feb. 1 in anticipation of opposition protests), Yemen and Algeria. Protests could also erupt in Syria, Morocco, Bahrain, Iran and Pakistan. China, like many other major economies, imports the bulk of its oil from the Middle East and views instability in the region with anxiety, but unlike the United States, China lacks the ability to affect the outcome of political change in the region (and even the United States is limited in this regard).
Comment: The above is one explanation, I offer another. The USA Administration has made some incorrect assumptions based upon the beliefs that in the ME they hold the same values and thus motivations as we hold in the USA. The end result will be to offer 2-3 billion dollars in new aide to the ?next? Egyptian government, regardless of the fact the Muslim Brotherhood, a terrorist organization more evil than any other on the planet. Meanwhile China, anxious to solidify its ravenous need for oil and a desire to stop the escalation of oil prices will make its move to offer financial assistance to the "next" government. Russia, desiring to emerge once again as a ME player, s also making its move to capture the attention of the "incoming government"-the power vacuum created by the fall of Mubarak will be filled by enemies of the USA and anything Western. The decades old treaty between Egypt and Israel will be dismantled, the "new " government will go to the UN declare a new state of Palestine must be immediately created, the Obama Administration, unprepared to deal effectivly with this new power composition will "make deals" with all of Israel's enemies that will create a situation that places us in a "checkmate" posture. All bets are off when this occurs.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Jan. 31 that Beijing hopes Egypt will return to “social stability and normal order” soon. China is watching the unrest in Egypt with interest. The protests have created economic concerns for Beijing, in that they could make shipping through the Suez Canal problematic and could affect overall stability in the region. Beijing has also taken its usual actions to censor politically sensitive material on the Internet.
China hopes Egypt will return to “social stability and normal order” as soon as possible, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Jan. 31. China is watching the situation in Egypt primarily out of concern for its economic interests in the Suez Canal and in wider stability in the Middle East. China’s censorship of Internet discussion and coverage of the protests has so far been standard practice, but Beijing is deeply concerned about social unrest within its borders and about the prospect that foreign powers could facilitate dissent in China.
China’s Economic Concerns
The most direct concern for China is that its growing investments in Egypt (reportedly totaling from $300 million to $500 million) could be jeopardized or that its trade through the Suez Canal could be affected. Social unrest that has intensified in Egypt since Jan. 25 began to disrupt port operations in Said, Alexandria and Domiat on Feb. 1 — Alexandria, which handles 80 percent of Egypt’s traffic, has stopped all shipments, apparently due to striking workers. China’s exports to Europe amount to roughly 20 percent of its total exports, and China accounted for about 20 percent of northbound traffic through Suez in 2009. The canal is the preferred route for ships heading from the Malacca Strait to Europe. At the moment the canal is still functioning, though some ships have avoided stopping in Egypt on their way through, and some shipping companies have halted operations at ports. South Korea’s Hanjin Shipping, for example, announced that it has rerouted some of its container vessels to avoid stopping at Egyptian ports for resupply while going through Suez, even though traffic through the Suez Canal has not been interrupted, according to news reports Feb. 1. But as protests grow in size and intensity there remains the possibility that Suez could see disruptions that would convince more shippers to avoid the risks entirely, though the United States claims it would intervene to prevent a total closure.
For China, while the threats to Suez are the most immediate, they are also the most easily avoided. The alternative to Suez, heading south around the Cape Peninsula of South Africa, adds an additional roughly 3,500 nautical miles to the trip, making a round trip take around 43 days instead of 34 days. Generally, Cape transit is preferred when fuel costs are not too high and when Suez tolls push the total Suez transit cost higher than that of the additional fuel and time (including costs of chartering a ship to make a longer trip) required to make the Cape transit — not to mention the advantage of avoiding piracy risks by taking the Cape route. But the political instability in Egypt clearly can affect the usual calculations over whether to take the Suez or Cape routes, making the Cape more attractive despite rising fuel costs. The costs vary considerably, and the two routes are used interchangeably based on circumstances, but the Baltic and International Maritime Council estimates the combined fuel and opportunity costs of going around the Cape at about $4 million more than Suez for container ships (and, less relevant for China, $8 million for very large crude oil carriers).
Threats to Internal Stability?
Beyond direct threats to China’s material interests, there is a murkier threat emanating from the spectacle of popular uprising and the potential that it could inspire dissatisfied social groups in China to take to the streets. To be clear, there is no concrete connection between Egypt’s unrest and China’s unrest, despite an abundance of tenuous comparisons in Western (especially U.S.) media. There is no evidence of substantial coordination between Egyptian protesters and Chinese dissidents. However, there is an abstract connection relating to a high degree of social dissatisfaction and relative lack of representative government, hence the fear of governments around the world, including China, that the unrest could prove contagious.
China has taken actions to suppress information relating to the Egypt protests, notably by blocking references to Egypt in popular micro-blogging websites like the one hosted by Sina.com. But so far the moves have been consistent with standard practice — China routinely censors Internet traffic and denies access to social networking services like Twitter and Facebook, and Beijing shut down Internet access to the Xinjiang region during the 2009 riots in Urumqi. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia (November 2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 2004-January 2005), the Saffron Uprising in Myanmar (August-October 2007), the Twitter Revolution in Moldova (April 2009), the Green movement in Iran (June and December 2009), Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 reversal of the 2005 Tulip Revolution, rolling unrest in Thailand and the recent revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, China has become fairly familiar with handling the domestic perception of foreign instability. To do so, the central government uses a combination of blocking the flow of information, tightening domestic security and activating state press organs to denounce the misguided political liberalism and foreign (usually American) meddling that purportedly leads countries to such civil discord.
Nevertheless incidents of social unrest have become more frequent in China throughout the past decade, peaking most recently in large riots in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009. Moreover, inflation — the galvanizing force behind the Tiananmen Square democracy protests in 1989 — has re-emerged as a challenge after recovery from the global economic crisis. Inflation is hitting food, fuel and housing prices especially hard and generating considerably higher social frustration than usual, according to sources on the ground in China. Moreover, China is reaching a juncture of sorts as its economic model shifts, its current leaders approach retirement and internal divisions sharpen. During such a sensitive period domestically, Beijing is unlikely to relent in its suppression of information that could fuel the desire of some groups to act on their social, political and economic grievances.
Ultimately what is most concerning for China about the Egyptian situation is the danger that popular protests could have political ramifications that would increase instability in the Middle East. This could happen, for instance, through a regime change in Egypt, which would send waves across the region and beyond (though at the moment the military appears prepared to maintain its central place in, and control over, the regime). Or it could result from unforeseen developments in other countries. Since Tunisia’s president was toppled, protests have broken out in Jordan (where King Abdullah II sacked his Cabinet on Feb. 1 in anticipation of opposition protests), Yemen and Algeria. Protests could also erupt in Syria, Morocco, Bahrain, Iran and Pakistan. China, like many other major economies, imports the bulk of its oil from the Middle East and views instability in the region with anxiety, but unlike the United States, China lacks the ability to affect the outcome of political change in the region (and even the United States is limited in this regard).
Comment: The above is one explanation, I offer another. The USA Administration has made some incorrect assumptions based upon the beliefs that in the ME they hold the same values and thus motivations as we hold in the USA. The end result will be to offer 2-3 billion dollars in new aide to the ?next? Egyptian government, regardless of the fact the Muslim Brotherhood, a terrorist organization more evil than any other on the planet. Meanwhile China, anxious to solidify its ravenous need for oil and a desire to stop the escalation of oil prices will make its move to offer financial assistance to the "next" government. Russia, desiring to emerge once again as a ME player, s also making its move to capture the attention of the "incoming government"-the power vacuum created by the fall of Mubarak will be filled by enemies of the USA and anything Western. The decades old treaty between Egypt and Israel will be dismantled, the "new " government will go to the UN declare a new state of Palestine must be immediately created, the Obama Administration, unprepared to deal effectivly with this new power composition will "make deals" with all of Israel's enemies that will create a situation that places us in a "checkmate" posture. All bets are off when this occurs.
Democracy of Cannibals
Daniel Greenfield
The chaos in Egypt has brought forth pious praises of democracy. "So what if the Muslim Brotherhood seizes power," the pundits ask, "as long as there are democratic elections." But what is the virtue of democracy anyway?
The one fundamental virtue of democracy is that it is the widest possible means of distributing power within a system. And that leads to a system that is only as good and bad as the sum of its voters. It is possible to have a democracy of cannibals, so long as the majority agrees that's the way to go. Or a democracy in which a quarter of the population has no legal or civil rights whatsoever. So long as that is the expressed will of the majority.
Democracy is a tool. It is a means, not the end. During the Bush Administration, democracy was treated as an end. The embedded assumption was that the average Arab-Muslim wanted the same things we did. A condensed version of the American Dream with jobs and freedom for everyone. And when given a chance at a voting booth, tyranny and terrorism would blow away like smoke, as a liberated electorate would choose leaders who would give them these things.
That universalization of the American Dream is part of the immigration narrative. It's a powerfully appealing idea complicated by an uncomfortable reality. The reality that much of the rest of the world may not see things the way we do. They may want the same things, but they don't want the same way or on the same terms. Our narrative tangles material success with political freedom. Theirs associates material success with honor and public order. The American Dream is not the same thing as the Muslim Dream. The conflict is apparent in the Clash of Civilizations. If we use our democracy to protect the American Dream, they will use theirs to protect the Muslim Dream.
As a means, democracy is only a tool for distributing power. And even our own country is torn apart by deep divisions over how that power should be distributed. The entire ObamaCare debate, the gap between rights and entitlements, is a continuation of an ongoing 20th century debate over what the 'end' of government should be. Such debates are fairly rare outside of a handful of Western countries. The assumption throughout most of the world is that the role of government is to regulate everything for the benefit of the public. Even the current unrest in the Middle East is driven less by human rights, and more by frustration over the failure of regional governments to maintain low food and fuel prices. (It seems like quite a contrast when compared with the Tea Party, which protests to demand less regulation.)
Those for whom the distribution of power is a means not an end, will exploit democratic elections as a means, while still imposing authoritarian rule. Islamist movements have exploited populism to get to power, but their philosophy of power is not populist, it is still top-down rule. That is the problem with democracy, you do not need to believe it in order to make use of it. It is not a covenant or a philosophy, only a means to an end.
Like most tools, democracy is only as good as those who use it. The bloc vote undermines the distribution of power, and as common as it has become in the United States, it is far more common in tribal societies where families vote as they are told to by their leader. You can give people the vote, but you can't make them think for themselves. And the celebrations of democracy in the region have had less to do with the individual exercise of the franchise, than the power of the collective group the voter is there to support, the tribe and the religious faction. Not all Americans vote as individuals, but the individual vote is far rarer in the Muslim world, where the group identity has a way of smothering any inkling of individualism.
In such a system, parliaments boil down to glorified tribal councils. Their function has more to do with grandstanding, than legislating. The actual decisions are made behind the scenes by power brokers who solicit the support of the leading factions, and then give their marching orders to the legislators. Parliamentarians in the Muslim world deliver impassioned speeches, denounce each other and fight for their party. Rather than elected representatives, their role is to serve as the cheerleaders for the powerful families who make the actual decisions. You can witness that same sound and fury in Pakistan. Turkey or Russia, men who have no decision-making power working themselves into a lather to retain their place in the 'mafia' that actually runs the country.
What does democracy mean in such a system? A power shift. The general public can never rule and doesn't want to. What it wants is cheap food and fuel, jobs and security, and for things to be the way they were in their grandfather's time. When the government stops giving them those things, it will rise up long enough to replace it with another. It will still be a tyranny, but like almost every tyranny, it still needs public support to stay in power. The uprisings are a reminder that if people don't have food or money, they can always replace one government with another. Or at least die trying. Democratic elections allow them to accomplish this with a minimum of violence. That is one other virtue of democracy. But the end result is still tyranny.
The American system makes it very difficult for even democratic elections to undo Constitutional rights. But the Constitution of the Muslim world is the Koran. And it can only be temporarily repressed, not undone. It is always waiting around the corner, promising an answer to everything. The Koran is not that old by the standards of Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism or Hinduism-- but it is still far older than Arab nationalism. It is younger than the tribes and the families, but older than their collective memory. The Koran with its narrative of tribalism in the service of Islam defines the Muslim, as much as the 4th of July with its narrative of armed independence against government authority defines the American. In times of turmoil, it is to Mohammed, and the Koran's narrative of him as a religious visionary fighting against a corrupt leadership, that the Muslim turns to. Is it the model that is embedded in his culture and will always be there in his politics.
The idea is simple enough. Hand over power to the right divinely chosen leader and sit back and watch society get put in proper order and the infidels cower. In societies with widespread illiteracy and deep rooted cynicism about politicians, the Islamists always seem like a good solution. Figuring out what political parties actually stand for is difficult, especially if you can barely read. But all the Islamists have to do is wave a copy of the Koran. Even if the average Egyptian has hardly read the Koran, he is for it. How could he not be for it, it is his religion. Given a choice between a tangle of Arab Socialist parties and the Koran, it's not much of a competition. The Socialists and the Islamists both promise family benefits, and the usual bread and circuses. But the Islamists also promise to restore morality and honor by putting everyone from independent women to Christians to Israel and America in their place. That's how the Koran spells a winning ticket.
Like all tools, democracy is defined by its users. Give a gun to a maniac and he will shoot up a store. Give it to a responsible man, and he will use it guard his home. The difference is not in the gun, but in the values of the wielder. Offering democracy to the Muslim world will not reform it. Its tyrannies are not the problem, but a symptom of the problem. If the Muslim world were truly ready to reform, it would have already reformed itself by now. And all the Soros front groups and US and EU funded grass roots organizations won't change that. Their 0.001 percent of angry college students will provide the impetus and legitimacy for what will turn into an Islamist takeover. That's democracy for you.
Governments are defined by the values of their people. No tyranny that is completely at odds with the values of the people it rules over can remain in power for long. Alexander the Great was one of the first world conquerors to understand that. His generals did not just conquer, they integrated. Foreign kings could rule over countries, but only so long as they integrated into the values of the country they governed. A dynasty that failed to do so was doomed. Whether it was the line of Herod, the Holstein Czars or the Muhammad Alis of Egypt. Democracy accelerates the process by which unwanted rulers are removed, but does not profoundly change it, unless it is accompanied by the conscious exercise of representative rights by the electorate.
The Bush Administration was far too enchanted with democracy as an end, to realize that it was only a means. In the hands of a people who believe that all men are created equal, it can be a tool of ownership. But in the hands of those who only use it to protest or as a shovel to direct the flow of money to their group, it has no moral standing. It is not inherently any better than tyranny, only slightly different.
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