What
might well be the most significant election in Middle East history is
about to happen yet the situation and its implications are simply not
understood abroad. On May 23-24, with a probable run-off on Jun 16-17,
the most important country in
the Arabic-speaking world is almost certainly going to choose a
revolutionary transformation that will ensure continuous earthquakes of
war, suffering, and instability for decades to come.
Of the dozen candidates only three are important and the question is which of them will end up in the run-off.
--Muhammad Mursi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.
--Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who resigned to run for president.
--Amr
Musa, a radical nationalist who combines being an anti-American,
anti-Israel demagogue with some real experience in government and some
sense of realism and restraint.
There
are also, among the more serious of the also-rans, a leftist, an old
regime supporter, three liberals, and another Islamist.
The
mainstream Western view of the election is bizarre and very damaging.
In this fantasy, Aboul Fatouh is portrayed as the liberal candidate. If
he wins, everything will be just fine and dandy. You can go back to
sleep.
What
evidence is adduced for this picture? Basically, none. The idea is that
his moderation was proven because he defied the Brotherhood to
run for the office. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. The
Brotherhood refused to run a candidate at a time when it was following a
cautious strategy, wanting to show that it wasn’t seeking total power
and could co-habit—at least for five years—with a non-Islamist
president.
By
declaring his candidacy, Aboul Fatouh was in fact taking a more radical
approach. Later, when the Brotherhood felt more confident after winning
almost half the parliamentary seats it became more aggressive.
Most
important of all, Aboul Fatouh is the candidate endorsed by Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based anti-American, antisemitic hardliner.
Qaradawi would never endorse anyone who was actually “moderate” must
less “liberal.”
There are
three factors likely to determine the first round:
--What
proportion of Muslim Brotherhood (parliamentary) voters will support
Mursi? Perhaps a quarter or more of the Brotherhood voters backed the
group not so much because they wanted an Islamic state but because they
thought the Brotherhood was more honest, would govern better, and so on.
Will they stick with the Brotherhood for the presidency or will they go
for Aboul Fatouh or even Musa?
--Having
no candidate of their own who will the Salafi support? Since there goal
is to provide a more radical alternative to the Brotherhood, some—but
not all—of the leaders will probably go for Aboul Fatouh. But what about
their voters who have almost no organizational loyalty—in contrast to
the Brotherhood voters—and will presumably support the man they see as
the one with the most radical Islamist vision. Few of these people will
back Musa.
---Who
will support Musa? There is no nationalist bloc in Egypt today. Might
Musa emerge as the secularist candidate uniting those voters (only 25
percent we should remember) who don’t want Islamism? No. The Christians
and liberals don’t look at Musa as their man and will probably split
their vote among three competing liberal candidates who don’t have a
chance.
The
result may well be an Islamist versus Islamist run-off. In any event,
it is likely that by the end of the year Egypt will have an Islamist
president, parliament, and Constitution. Laws will be drastically
altered, women’s rights disappear, and Hamas would be backed up if it
attacked Israel.
Once
in power, an Islamist government would eventually appoint similar
people to run the military, the religious establishment, the schools,
and the courts. Those who don’t like it will head for the West in
droves.
The
alliance with America would be over (whatever cosmetic pretense of
friendship remained and despite how much money the Obama Administration
pumped in. And the whole region will be sent a signal that this is the
era of revolutionary Islamism and jihad at a time when America is weak
or even—as many moderate Arabs believe—siding with the Islamists.
In
the West, no one in power is prepared for this revolution, an upheaval
that will rival or exceed the 1979 one in Iran for its impact.
Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
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