A briefing by Gary C. Gambill
Gary Gambill holds a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and is A.B.D. from N.Y.U. He is a former editor of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin and the Middle East Monitor, a former employee of the Middle East Forum, and is now an independent editor. Gambill has been a country editor on Syria and Lebanon for Freedom House and has written extensively on Syria and Lebanon. On February 27, 2012, he briefed the Middle East Forum via conference call about US policy options in Syria.
Bashar Assad "can't win," Gambill argued,
because he now lacks the power to pacify his opposition—something he had
in abundance until last year. His position is made ever more tenuous by
his Alawite origin, viewed as heretical by Syria's majority Sunni
population.
Gambill attributed the Assad regime's
ability to seize and hold power for forty-one years to several primary
strengths. First, it has established a brutal police state that
slaughtered dissidents by the thousands, notably in Hama in 1982 by
Bashar's father, Hafez, and Homs today. Second, it has been highly
effective at penetrating all walks of Syrian society. Third, its embrace
of a virulently anti-Zionist and anti-American foreign policy succeeded
in both splitting the opposition and lending it an aura of legitimacy.
Fourth, both the West and the predominantly Sunni Arab world have
appeased Assad's regime and ignored the abuses of his rule. Lastly,
Assad's ability to retain the support not just of Alawites but also of
other non-Sunni minorities, mainly the Christians, has proved crucial.
Most of these factors no longer apply, not least since the "barrier of
fear" has been crossed.
Should the U.S. seek to stop the
bloodletting and accelerate Assad's fall through direct military
intervention? Gambill's answer is a resounding no.
The status quo is untenable because the
other Arab countries, including those that have urged Washington to
confront Iran, and even Turkey, will not allow continued instability and
bloodshed on their borders. Any confrontation between Tehran and the
Arab states should be allowed to run its course. If Assad is fated for
defeat, and his fall would remove Iran from "Syria's orbit," there is no
rationale for U.S. intervention.
Nor should Israel be unduly alarmed by
Assad's demise, though the likely Islamist domination of the successor
regime. Bashar's diversionary anti-Zionist foreign policy and rhetoric
was just that—a diversion from his Alawite origin—and an unnecessarily
radical stance for any Sunni-dominated government to assume.
Assad's willingness to murder his own
people is an albatross for both his regime and his Iranian allies. If
America can do nothing to decisively improve the situation, it is in our
best interests to stand by and watch Iran struggle with the very same
dilemma.
Summary account by Alex Berman.
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