PJ Media
One reason the term "Arab Spring" is a
misnomer is because of the participation of non-Arabs, including Kurds
in Iraq and Syria as well as Berbers in Morocco and Libya. While both of
these non-Arab groups are Muslims, they tend to oppose Islamism both
because they see it as tantamount to Arabization and because their
observance of religion is often more flexible due to their own customs
and history.
Berbers, who often prefer to call
themselves Amazigh, constitute between 5% and 10% of Libya's population.
But they are more important politically than those numbers imply. They
are highly concentrated in the country's northwest, and provided a
relatively important proportion of the fighters in the war that
overthrew the regime of Muammar Gaddafi.
Six months since the revolt succeeded, the
Berbers are largely disappointed with the result. Despite playing a key
role in fighting in the western Nafusa Mountains during the Libyan civil
war, no ministerial posts
in the interim government were allocated to Berbers. This provoked
protests from Berber activists that were simply ignored by the National
Transitional Council (NTC).
It is also clear that significant tensions exist with neighboring Arab tribes in Libya's northwest. Earlier this month,
heavy fighting emerged between Berber militiamen from the coastal town
of Zuwarah and Arab militiamen from the nearby town of Ragdalein.
The latter was traditionally supportive of
Gaddafi's regime, and apparently provoked the clashes with the capture
of 34 men from Zuwarah's local militia in response to "abuses." The
abuses likely entailed reprisal attacks against Ragdalein on account of
its long-standing pro-Gaddafi stance. Dozens were killed in the fighting
that followed, and a truce declared by NTC authorities did not even last 12 hours.
That said, it would be wrong to think there have been no positive changes in Libya for the Berbers. Back in November 2011,
for example, the predominantly Berber town of Kabaw saw unhindered
celebrations of Berber culture, with many expressing delight at the free
opportunity to speak Tamazight and to fly the Amazigh flag.
Indeed, as the first article of the interim constitution states:
The State shall guarantee the cultural rights for all components of the Libyan society and its languages shall be deemed national ones.
While some Amazigh activists appear to be
keen to portray Berbers as more liberal and anti-Islamist than their
Libyan Arab counterparts (a picture eagerly promoted in a Wall Street Journal op-ed), it is far from certain that this portrait corresponds to reality. One report in The Atlantic in December last year illustrated a case-in-point:
Miloud is convinced that there is something distinctly feminist in Amazigh culture … but admits that her experience has not always lived up to her vision of Amazigh equality. When she approached the local council to ask for funding for the center to teach women basic working skills and literacy, she says they dismissed her offhand.
It follows from all this that there is
nothing to suggest that Berbers are likely to be targeted collectively
by Islamists, although there is the ongoing risk of further clashes with
Arab militias.
One of the key problems facing Amazigh activists in the country is that the community as a whole does not have a unified and coherent conception of its own identity. As Ayoub Sufyan puts it: "We don't know who we are. Am I a Libyan or Amazigh or Muslim?"
The situation is analogous to Christians in
the Middle East, where one finds a range of conflicting conceptions of
identity from Arabism (common among Melkites and Antiochian Greek
Orthodox) to Aramaean nationalism (e.g., the Syriac Orthodox) to
Assyrian nationalism (mainly the Assyrian Church of the East). This has
partly been responsible for preventing the formation of a viable
Christian polity in the region.
Interestingly, some Berber activists are keen to launch an effort to convince the rest of the Libyan population that they are in fact all Berbers.
Ultimately, this enterprise is unlikely to
gain much ground. While it is true that Berbers inhabited North Africa
prior to the Arab conquests, and that strictly speaking the Libyan Arabs
are mostly just an Arabized population, the fact is that Arabization
(especially in tandem with Islamization) has become a key foundation of
Arab identity. In Egypt, an Arabist conception of identity has prevailed
among the Muslim population over the Pharaonism promoted by the liberal
intellectual Taha Husayn.
In any case, how far back in history would
these Berber activists like to go, if the argument focuses on genetics?
After all, North Africa has seen a degree of mixing of ethnic groups,
including the East Germanic tribe known as the Vandals, who established a
kingdom around Carthage in the Fifth Century as the Western Roman
Empire declined.
To round off, it is worth noting the recent announcement
by the NTC banning parties based on religion, tribe, and ethnicity.
This prohibition is unlikely to apply to the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamist parties at least on the ground level given the NTC's dalliances
with Islamism, but it will almost certainly apply to any parties
claiming to stand for Berber interests, since the Amazigh have already
been excluded from interim ministerial posts.
In short, this confirms that the emerging picture appears to be one of political rather than cultural marginalization for Libya's Berbers.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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