Doc's Talk: Hyperinflation stalks Iran, Israel wavers

Tuesday, October 09, 2012

Hyperinflation stalks Iran, Israel wavers

By Victor Kotsev

The freefall of Iran's currency, the rial, has triggered fears of hyperinflation in the Islamic Republic. It offers context to the comments of Israeli officials, especially Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the United Nations last week, who have hinted that the international sanctions are producing an effect and they would be willing to postpone a military strike on Iran's nuclear program until next year. Meanwhile, speculation about two alternative options - a surprise attack or early elections in Israel, which would give Netanyahu an opportunity to compromise further with his militant rhetoric - has increased.

about two alternative options - a surprise attack or early elections in Israel, which would give Netanyahu an opportunity to compromise further with his militant rhetoric - has increased.

The collapse of Iran's currency, coupled with rising discontent of workers inside the country, is by far the biggest recent news in that respect. In the last few days, the rial lost 30% to 50% of its street value - 15% on Monday alone - sparking riots and clashes between police and protestors in Tehran Wednesday. Over the past year, the Iranian currency has depreciated by about two-thirds, severely affecting imports and financial stability in the country. American officials were quick to capitalize on the debacle, pointing to it as proof that the sanctions designed to curb the Iranian nuclear program were producing an effect.

Amid soaring food and other prices - even before these latest developments, the annual inflation rate in the country was close to 30% - the threat of hyperinflation and the effective destruction of the Iranian economy looms. In another sign of protest, a petition reportedly signed by over 10,000 Iranian workers adds pressure on the Tehran leadership.

As the Associated Press put it, "Iran's factory workers and laborers have provided the tipping points at pivotal moments. They gave vital populist backing to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and generally sided with the ruling clerics when they were under threat by riots after [current Iranian President] Mr Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election in 2009." [1]

The Iranian elite, meanwhile, is engaged in an intense power struggle between several different factions. Iran's president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who has another eight months to go before his second term expires and cannot run for re-election, blamed the crisis on the sanctions and on "psychological warfare" by Western powers and domestic "speculators." His opponents, on the other hand, pointed to problems with his own financial policies, including mismanagement of the economy over the last years and a failed recent attempt to stabilize the exchange rate by opening a government-regulated currency exchange center.

In a sign of just how far the internal political intrigue in the country has gone, rumors circulate that the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is considering abolishing the office of the president altogether.

These developments help explain also the recent shift of rhetoric on the part of Israeli leaders. Several days ago, for example, the controversial foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman predicted "an Iranian-style Tahrir revolution" in the coming months, which would presumably halt Tehran's nuclear program.

"[The Iranian economy] is not collapsing, but it is on the verge of collapse," Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz chimed in. "The loss of income from oil there is approaching $45-50 billion by the year's end."

Netanyahu's own speech at the UN General Assembly last week, featuring the now-famous cartoon bomb drawing, was widely interpreted as a softening of his stance. The Israeli prime minister proclaimed his determination to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon but told the Assembly that Tehran would likely not cross his red line before the next spring or summer.

While the simplistic drawing attracted considerable criticism from pundits, it arguably accomplished its main objectives - to draw attention, to convey a clear ultimatum to both Iran and US President Barack Obama, and to prepare global public opinion for a possible military campaign in the future. Domestic Israeli commentators, moreover, have picked up on another possible goal of Netanyahu's speech: to set the tone for an early elections campaign in Israel.

As the veteran political analyst Yossi Verter wrote in an article in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz,

Thursday's speech also had political ramifications that presumably were not lost on the speaker: If, at the start of the Knesset's [parliament's] winter session in around two weeks, Netanyahu calls for early elections (probably in February) it's clear that the election campaign will be centered on the Iranian threat. In an election campaign that has a security-diplomatic, even existential character, less experienced politicians or political wannabes like Labor's Shelly Yacimovich and Yesh Atid's Yair Lapid, who are pushing a socio-economic agenda, will find themselves in terra incognita, with little to sell the public. [2]

Netanyahu is having trouble getting the 2013 budget approved, which could serve as a trigger for early elections. Incidentally, such a vote would likely happen before his nuclear deadline expires, which could save the Israeli prime minister's political fortunes should he back down from his aggressive rhetoric.

For his part, the Iranian president hinted in recent interviews that a breakthrough in the nuclear negotiations could happen after the US presidential election next month.

Still, the war chatter has not subsided. On Tuesday, a senior Iranian lawmaker threatened in an interview with the Iranian English-language channel Press TV that if the talks with world powers failed, Tehran would increase uranium enrichment to 60% purity of the fissile material uranium-235, up from the current 20% enrichment and only a short technological leap away from the 90% level required for a bomb.

In comments published by the Times of Israel, an anonymous Iranian nuclear technician said that 30% purity had already been achieved, and "by next year, we hope to reach up to 50 or even 60%". He also shared that "More and more young graduates and people are brought in [the nuclear program] every day. ... We have been working non-stop." [3]

Meanwhile, a comprehensive recent report in Foreign Policy Magazine offers new perspectives on the Israeli military option against Iran and the US-Israeli relationship. Besides straight-forward air strikes, US planners have been concerned about two possibilities that have not received much attention so far, journalist Mark Perry reveals. One is regime decapitation, which "would almost certainly trigger an Iranian response targeting US military assets in the region, as it would leave the Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces in charge of the country".

The other one is an "extremely dangerous" commando raid against the nuclear facilities, broadly similar to the one in Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976, where Netanyahu's brother died in the operation to free Israeli hostages. An estimated 400 commandos would storm the main Iranian facilities, take the enriched uranium with them, and blow them up.

"There aren't three divisions near [the underground enrichment facility at] Fordow, there's one, and it's dug in," an American military source told Perry. "It wouldn't take the Iranians three hours to respond, it would take them three days." [4]

Since, as the Israeli experts and leaders have acknowledged, Israel can only delay Iran's nuclear program by a few years, for now it has an interest to wait. While Iranian currency reserves are getting depleted and unrest is on the rise, every week brings a palpable decrease in Iran's ability to rebuild its facilities. On the other hand, a strike now could spell the end of the sanctions regime.

There may be, therefore, a sliver of hope for the nuclear talks, as well as a few extra months on the Israeli military clock. Unfortunately, recent developments such as the Iranian threats to up enrichment and the US removing the Mujahadin-e-Khalq, a militant Iranian anti-government organization, from its terror list, do not point in a very conciliatory direction. The hope may well be short-lived.

1. Thousands of Iranians display rare protest over economy, AP, October 1, 2012.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk