Michael Singh
Foreign Policy
To view this article on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/1dZv37w
******************************
President Obama should use Moscow's gambit as an opportunity to turn
international and domestic momentum back in his favor on Syria, even
while recognizing it for the cynical feint that it assuredly is.
******************************
That Russia has intervened at the last moment in an effort to halt a
U.S. military operation in the Middle East should come as little
surprise. Moscow engaged in similar last-ditch efforts prior to the
first and second Gulf wars, likely in pursuit of twin objectives:
preserving an ally, and thus Russian influence, in the region; and
derailing the use of force by the United States and thus defending the
principle of noninterference, which Moscow rigorously applies to other
powers but disregards in its own conduct, especially in its own
neighborhood.
While Russia's motivations today may be the same as those in these
previous cases, however, the situation facing President Barack Obama is
quite different from those facing his predecessors. With a U.S. military
operation lacking much international support and Obama's request for
authorization facing an embarrassing defeat in the House of
Representatives and perhaps the Senate, the Russian initiative may be
viewed as a veritable godsend by the White House. Obama will claim
Moscow's offer is the result not only of tough diplomacy toward Russia,
having canceled a planned summit with President Vladimir Putin just last
week, but also of "credible military threats" toward Syria.
In reality, however, the credibility of American military threats was
fading fast as congressional defeat loomed for Obama's request for
authorization to strike Syria. What the Russian gambit truly provides
the White House, therefore, is an opportunity to gain some room for
maneuver and to attempt to shift the momentum on Syria back in its
favor. Turning Moscow's offer to the U.S. advantage, however, will take
realism and diplomatic savvy.
On its face, the Russian proposal is wildly impractical. Even if Bashar
al-Assad's regime cooperated with chemical weapons (CW) inspectors,
locating and gaining access to Syria's CW amid a civil war, in which
control of territory is contested by a variety of armed groups and
Damascus's authority is limited, would be near impossible, and
destroying those CW would take a long time. But Assad's track record
suggests that he will not cooperate. He has blocked the efforts of U.N.
weapons inspectors to date and has also failed to provide the
International Atomic Energy Agency access to suspected Syrian nuclear
weapons sites. Just like Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, Assad could be
expected to make every effort to preserve his CW capabilities and evade
inspectors.
More fundamentally, Syria's conflict is not about chemical weapons,
their use, or their disposal. Obama chose to identify CW use as a red
line for U.S. intervention and has perplexingly made the elimination of
Assad's CW capabilities a goal that is apparently independent from
broader U.S. goals in Syria, such as the "political solution" that the
administration frequently asserts is necessary.
But Assad's CW use is just one way in which the Syrian conflict has spun
out of control and threatened U.S. national security interests. The
conflict has yielded a shocking toll of fatalities and refugees, has
threatened to destabilize Syria's neighbors, has amplified the terrorist
threat in the region, and has placed an enormous economic and security
strain on countries like Jordan and Turkey. It has also exacerbated
tensions between regional powers and strains between the United States
and its regional allies.
Even if the Russian plan succeeded beyond all expectations in
eliminating Syria's CW stockpiles, in its current (admittedly inchoate)
form it holds little prospect for addressing the broader strategic and
humanitarian threats posed by the Syrian conflict. Indeed, the fact that
it has drawn quick support from Assad's key allies -- Russia and Iran
-- suggests that it is judged by them as a means to rescue Assad rather
than hold him accountable.
Despite these flaws, the Obama administration can attempt to turn the
Russian proposal to its advantage. The American response should not
focus on Moscow's position, but the interest in avoiding U.S. military
intervention implicit in that position. To that end, the United States
should insist that the elimination of CW not take place amid the
conflict, but be part and parcel of a satisfactory resolution of that
conflict. Such a resolution must include accountability for President
Assad and key members of his inner circle for the use of CW and their
brutalization of Syria's civilian population. It is of little purpose,
after all, to deter or punish CW use if by implication we excuse the
slaughter of tens of thousands of Syrian civilians. It must also include
an international mechanism to protect those civilians going forward.
Meanwhile, Obama should ask Congress to authorize him to use military
force if this diplomacy fails to produce a satisfactory result, while
not overly restricting that authorization in a way that puts the
president in a weak position vis-a-vis Moscow and Damascus. This would
not only put some real credibility behind U.S. military threats, but it
would offer an approach more likely to attract support. The Obama
administration's previous proposal was so narrowly focused in an effort
to gain domestic and allied support that, ironically, it was also easy
to reject, being connected not to vital strategic interests but rather
to abstract "international norms" that the international community was
nevertheless unready to enforce.
The Russian proposal may indeed be a product of an off-the-cuff remark
by Secretary of State John Kerry, just as Obama's original "red line"
proclamation may not have been preplanned or well thought through. It is
also a disappointment to the Syrian opposition and some U.S. allies in
the region, who hoped a U.S. strike would turn the tide against Assad.
But the reality was that prospects for such a strike were diminishing,
and U.S. policy on Syria was careering toward a nadir. Obama should thus
seek to use Moscow's gambit as an opportunity to turn the international
and domestic momentum back in his favor on Syria, even while
recognizing it for the cynical feint that it assuredly is. Doing so will
require diplomatic forethought and skill that the administration has
not so far demonstrated and must now produce.
******************************
Michael Singh is managing director of The Washington Institute.
No comments:
Post a Comment