Many options for direct military action in Syria have been on the
table, ranging from token strikes with small numbers of weapons to much
broader operations such as attacks on leadership targets or the
imposition of no-fly and no-drive zones. In addition, the United States
could respond indirectly by providing truly significant military
assistance to the rebels. The recent chemical warfare attack, however,
has rendered urgency to a considered U.S. response. Despite the Obama
administration’s aversion to using military power in Syria and the
difficulty of forging allied consensus on goals and methods, the Assad
regime must be held accountable.
Nevertheless, the risk-benefit calculus for any decision depends, at the very least, on a thorough understanding of the disparate ideologies that drive the Syrian opposition, their military inadequacies, and their ability to create a unified political structure. To clarify these issues, Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin, all respected experts on Syria, present their findings in this Washington Institute Policy Focus, which has been updated to accommodate the most recent developments in this ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Sample from pdf:
Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in the Institute's Program on Arab Politics and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria.
Aaron Y. Zelin, the Institute's Richard Borow Fellow, maintains the website Jihadology.net.
Nevertheless, the risk-benefit calculus for any decision depends, at the very least, on a thorough understanding of the disparate ideologies that drive the Syrian opposition, their military inadequacies, and their ability to create a unified political structure. To clarify these issues, Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin, all respected experts on Syria, present their findings in this Washington Institute Policy Focus, which has been updated to accommodate the most recent developments in this ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Sample from pdf:
Conclusion
There are many potential options for direct military action in Syria, ranging from token strikes with small numbers of weapons to much broader operations such as attacks on leadership targets or the imposition of no-fly and no-drive zones. In addition, the United States could respond indirectly by providing truly sig- nificant military assistance to the rebels. All of these options have potential benefits and risks, yet some options seem more likely, given the Obama administration’s aversion to using military power in Syria and the difficulty of forging allied consensus on goals and methods. A punishing strike linked to CW use seems to balance potential benefits and risks.
In any case, one thing is clear: given the regime’s near-certain culpability for the August 21 CW attack, the United States should strike it, and strike it hard. This does not entail regime removal or a massive operation to “fix” Syria; allied action can be limited in scale. But it should still be strong, with telling effects. It should also hold the promise of potentially stronger strikes if the regime uses, or even threatens to use, chemical weapons again.
There are many potential options for direct military action in Syria, ranging from token strikes with small numbers of weapons to much broader operations such as attacks on leadership targets or the imposition of no-fly and no-drive zones. In addition, the United States could respond indirectly by providing truly sig- nificant military assistance to the rebels. All of these options have potential benefits and risks, yet some options seem more likely, given the Obama administration’s aversion to using military power in Syria and the difficulty of forging allied consensus on goals and methods. A punishing strike linked to CW use seems to balance potential benefits and risks.
In any case, one thing is clear: given the regime’s near-certain culpability for the August 21 CW attack, the United States should strike it, and strike it hard. This does not entail regime removal or a massive operation to “fix” Syria; allied action can be limited in scale. But it should still be strong, with telling effects. It should also hold the promise of potentially stronger strikes if the regime uses, or even threatens to use, chemical weapons again.
THE AUTHORS
Jeffrey White is a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute and a former senior defense intelligence officer.Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in the Institute's Program on Arab Politics and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria.
Aaron Y. Zelin, the Institute's Richard Borow Fellow, maintains the website Jihadology.net.
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