Hamas can hit Tel Aviv, Jerusalem with dozens of rockets
Salvos on central Israel constitute an unprecedented threat, while Gaza’s Islamist rulers have also built sprawling underground network to move troops, fire rockets, maintain communications in future conflict
The Gaza Strip’s Islamist rulers have invested heavily in producing their own M-75 rockets, with a range of 75 kilometers and more, and now have an arsenal of dozens of the rockets, The Times of Israel has learned. They will have dozens more by the end of this year.
Hamas realized after Pillar of Defense that firing on central Israel immensely bolstered its prestige, and the Hamas prime minister in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, was recognized and hailed as only the second Arab leader, after Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, to have hit central Israel.
Since that conflict, therefore, Hamas has focused on improving its capacity to build such rockets, establishing a domestic production capacity rather than relying on smuggling rockets and components into the strip. Domestic production of the M-75 has become Hamas’s flagship project.
At the same time, Hamas has also committed considerable resources to the construction of a substantial network of tunnels — dozens of miles of underground networks in key areas of the Strip — which will immensely complicate future military confrontations for Israel, The Times of Israel has learned.
Hamas’s investment in tunnels dug toward and under the border with Israel, in order to carry out terror attacks, is longstanding. It was through such a tunnel that Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped, and two of his colleagues were killed, in a 2006 infiltration that ultimately led to the release of some 1,000 Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for Shalit’s freedom five years later. Hamas remains committed to attempting further kidnapping operations, both to bolster its prestige and to secure additional prisoner releases. The kidnap threat is considered acute both from Gaza and in the West Bank.
Beyond this, however, Hamas in Gaza has moved far ahead with an underground military network inside the Strip — a subterranean network with several significant benefits for the Islamic extremist group: Hamas will use the tunnels to plant mines targeting Israeli land forces, the Israeli military believes. It will use the network of tunnels to move its gunmen undetected from place to place during warfare. The Israeli military further anticipates that Hamas will fire rockets from underground launchers, making them far harder to detect and target. Moreover, the Hamas command and communication facilities will be located underground, enabling it to seek to maintain effective control out of reach of Israeli air power. Finally, the Hamas leadership, which the Israeli army said in the past had taken refuge in underground bunkers beneath hospitals and other civilian facilities, will also utilize these more-sophisticated underground facilities.
In terms of its regional status, Hamas is perceived by Israel to be relatively weak, notably because of the ouster of its Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Egypt. The ongoing crackdown by Egypt on the cross-border smuggling tunnels has devastated Gaza’s economy. Water supplies are dwindling, and water quality is extremely poor. Electricity is available in some areas for only a few minutes a day. Unemployment is high. And public dissatisfaction with the Hamas government is widespread, in the Israeli assessment.
For now, Hamas is not perceived to be ready for a further round of conflict with Israel, in part because of a concern about how the consequent devastation would be received by Gazans. At the same time, however, Hamas’s practical capacity to prevent rocket fire on Israel by rival groups is on the wane. Iran is constantly prodding the rival Islamic Jihad group to attack Israel, and Islamic Jihad is indeed behind much of the recent intermittent rocket fire on Ashkelon and southern Israel. Hamas has made efforts to thwart such attacks, but is ridiculed by Islamic Jihad for trying to keep the peace with Israel, and in some cases is hamstrung by such basic factors as a lack of fuel for its vehicles as they patrol to try to thwart the rocket-launch squads.
For now, Hamas’s governance in Gaza is secure, Israel believes. Hamas fears a Tahrir Square-style popular uprising, but is proving highly effective in cracking down on occasional small public signs of dissent and is not currently facing wide scale efforts at public protest.
Ultimately, however, Israel’s military assessment is that another round of conflict is simply a matter of time. Some in the security hierarchy believe that a substantial Israeli ground offensive, possibly even a long-term operation, may be unavoidable, but there is no consensus on this.
What is clear, The Times of Israel has learned, is that when the next round of conflict does come, the IDF and the home front will be facing a Hamas with immensely greater capabilities to fire on central Israel, thanks to its domestic rocket production, and a much-enhanced capacity to defend itself against Israeli air and ground capabilities by virtue of its new underground networks.