Along
with the nationalist radicalization, widespread support for Hamas and
widespread clashes, less predictable dynamics are afoot.
A
year ago, for the first time, the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israel
postal service established a post office in the village of Isawiyah,
which lies below Mount Scopus, within the municipal
boundaries. Along with the opening of the new branch − part of a plan to
improve postal services in East Jerusalem − the village streets were
given names and the houses received numbers. These developments followed
a petition to the High Court of Justice, submitted
by residents with the aid of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel.
But the municipality could not find a site for the post office, since
most of the buildings in the village were illegal structures, so their
future was thus in question.
“I visited the
village dozens of times looking for a location,” says Itay Tsachar, an
adviser to Mayor Nir Barkat and his project director for East Jerusalem.
“We wanted to put the post office
in the community administration building, until we discovered that it
too is the subject of a demolition order.” Finally, a site for the post
office was improvised between the support pillars of the neighborhood
sports center.
However, on the
night before the scheduled festive dedication of the new branch, which
the mayor was to attend, the site was torched and slogans against
normalization and collaboration with the
municipality were scrawled on the walls.
“In the morning I
get an urgent call from the residents,” Tsachar says. “They say: ‘Don’t
ask − people tried to burn down the place.’ When I got there I found
20-30 people milling around and
cursing: ‘Look what the sons-of-bitches did.’ I told them it was not a
problem, because the structure was made of iron. ‘It’s just scorched a
little. We can clean it up and go ahead with the ceremony,’ I told them.
They organized and cleaned it up, and to this
day the post office is operating just fine.”
Barkat showed up
that day as scheduled to dedicate the site. His convoy was subjected to
some stone-throwing on the way, but the local mukhtar, Darwish Darwish,
joined a group of villagers who
positioned themselves near the car to protect the mayor and the other
officials.
The story of
Isawiyah’s post office is a microcosm of the contrasting trends
unfolding in East Jerusalem. Along with the nationalist radicalization,
widespread support for Hamas and violent clashes
reported in the media, far-reaching changes are taking place among the
local Palestinians. These processes can be described as “Israelization,”
“normalization” or just plain adaptation. The Israeli authorities, with
the Jerusalem Municipality at the forefront,
are encouraging and in some cases fomenting this process, and displaying
surprising bureaucratic flexibility along the way.
Examples of this
trend are legion. They include: increasing numbers of applications for
an Israeli ID card; more high-school students taking the Israeli
matriculation exams; greater numbers enrolling
in Israeli academic institutions; a decline in the birthrate; more
requests for building permits; a rising number of East Jerusalem youth
volunteering for national service; a higher level of satisfaction
according to polls of residents; a revolution in the
approach to health services; a survey showing that in a final settlement
more East Jerusalem Palestinians would prefer to remain under Israeli
rule, and so on.
But dry statistics
tell only a small part of the story; other elements are not
quantifiable. For example, there is the pronounced presence of
Palestinians in the center of West Jerusalem, in
malls, on the light-rail train and in the open shopping area in Mamilla,
adjacent to the Old City’s Jaffa Gate. These people are not street
cleaners or dishwashers, but consumers and salespeople. Another
phenomenon is the growing cooperation between merchants
in the Old City and the municipality.
Everyone involved in
developments in East Jerusalem agrees that a tectonic shift is
occurring, the likes of which has not been known since the city came
under Israeli rule in 1967. Opinion is
divided about the source of the change. Some believe it sprang from
below, propelled by the Palestinians’ feelings of despair and their
belief that an independent state is not likely to come into being.
Others think it is due to a revised approach to the eastern
part of the city by Israeli authorities, spearheaded by the
municipality. Everyone mentions the separation barrier, which abruptly
cut off Jerusalem from its natural hinterland − the cities and villages
of the West Bank − as a factor that compelled the Palestinians
in Al Quds (“the holy sanctuary”) to look westward, toward the Jews.
The huge light-rail
project, which cuts across the city and greatly facilitates access from
the eastern neighborhoods to the city center, is also contributing to
the transformation. Most of these
changes are occurring below the radar of the Israeli public, but their
consequences could be dramatic, particularly with regard to the
possibility of dividing Jerusalem − and the country. It is very possible
that Jerusalem has already chosen the binational
solution.
1. Education
Three months after Israel captured East Jerusalem in the Six-Day War, the new school year began. The government, which by then had already annexed the eastern part of the city, sought to implement the Israeli curriculum in its public schools. However, the teachers, parents and principals adamantly refused. They launched a strike that became the symbol of the struggle by the Arabs of East Jerusalem against Israeli attempts to normalize the occupation. The strike persisted for two full years, until Israel finally capitulated and agreed to allow the Arab schools in Jerusalem to continue teaching according to the Jordanian curriculum. In time, that was superseded by the curriculum of the Palestinian Authority.
Three months after Israel captured East Jerusalem in the Six-Day War, the new school year began. The government, which by then had already annexed the eastern part of the city, sought to implement the Israeli curriculum in its public schools. However, the teachers, parents and principals adamantly refused. They launched a strike that became the symbol of the struggle by the Arabs of East Jerusalem against Israeli attempts to normalize the occupation. The strike persisted for two full years, until Israel finally capitulated and agreed to allow the Arab schools in Jerusalem to continue teaching according to the Jordanian curriculum. In time, that was superseded by the curriculum of the Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinians
view that victory as a milestone in their resistance to Israel’s
annexationist thrust. However, the triumph has begun to erode of late.
Increasing numbers of parents now want
their children to obtain an Israeli matriculation certificate, and more
and more high-school graduates are attending special colleges that
prepare them to enter the Israeli academic world. At present, there are
three schools in East Jerusalem geared toward
Israeli matriculation, while in others special programs are being
launched with the same aim.
A school in Sur
Baher, for example, initiated a track for Israeli matriculation last
year. The school expected about 15 students to register, but 100 signed
up − and the number is likely to grow
in the years ahead.
According to
Education Ministry data, the number of East Jerusalem high school
students who took Israeli matriculation exams rose from 5,240 in 2008 to
6,022 in 2011. Another 400 people sat for
external matriculation exams (that is, outside the formal school
framework). The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and colleges in the city
and elsewhere in the country report an increase in the number of Arab
students from Jerusalem. For example, there are 63
Arab students enrolled in the Hebrew University’s preparatory course
this year, up from 39 last year. Other academic institutions that are
popular among East Jerusalem residents are David Yellin Teachers’
College and Hadassah College, both in Jerusalem, and
Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education in Baka al-Garbiyeh, in Galilee.
Jaffa-born Amal Ayub
is the founder and principal of Promise, a school in the Palestinian
neighborhood of Beit Hanina in Jerusalem, which adopted the Israeli
curriculum three years ago.
“I came to Jerusalem
15 years ago, but what is happening in the city now is something
completely new,” she says. “First of all, there is openness. We are a
coed school, which at one time was
taboo. When parents visit the school I see in their eyes why they don’t
want their children to do the tawjihi [Palestinian matriculation]. They
think it is not relevant for them, because since the separation barrier
was built, it is harder to register in Bethlehem
or Bir Zeit, so they aim for the Hebrew University, David Yellin College
or Hadassah College, and the tawjihi is of no use there. And the recent
events in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world do not encourage them to
attend universities there.”
In addition to
internal changes in secondary schools, there are now about 10 colleges
in East Jerusalem that specialize in preparing students for Israeli
universities and colleges. One of the
biggest is the Anta Ma’ana (“You are with us”) Institute on Al-Zahara
Street. Students of various ages crowd into a small classroom to receive
help in preparing for the Israeli matriculation exams and mandatory
pre-university psychometric test.
“It used to be
unacceptable. People would make comments − ‘Why are you going to school
with the Jews?’ − but now we are closed in and we have to stay in
Jerusalem,” says Abdel Gani, the institute’s
director. To which Eid Abu Ramila, who teaches civics, adds, “And then
you see that the Hebrew University is just five minutes away. If you go
to school in Bethlehem or to Al-Quds University, the only place you’ll
be able to find work after you graduate is
at the PA, for NIS 2,000 a month. So everyone is now flocking to
Israel.”
Another reason for
the rush to complete an Israeli matriculation − in fact, the main
reason, according to most of the college’s students − is fear of the
tawjihi, which is considered very tough.
We met some students when we visited the college recently. Rawan, from
Beit Hanina, wants to study psychology at Hebrew University; Aboud, from
Beit Hanina, is interested in communications; and Azhar, from Ras al
Amud, is considering nursing or law.
None has encountered a hostile reaction from family and friends for deciding to take the Israeli matriculation exams.
“It’s easier to integrate into society and to find work with a matriculation certificate [from Israel],” says Aboud.
“Civics is the
hardest subject,” Abu Ramila, the teacher, adds. “I teach them about the
principles of democracy, about equality, and they ask me: ‘Where’s the
equality?’”
Some local
Palestinians have been trying to fight this phenomenon by persuading the
PA to revise the tawjihi exams. Hatam Hawis, the spokesman for the
united parents’ committee of East Jerusalem,
terms the Israelization phenomenon “appalling,” because it undermines
the residents’ Palestinian identity. “Israel deliberately weakened the
schools in the city in order to push people to Israeli matriculation,”
he says.
2. Housing and water
There are hardly any
water meters in East Jerusalem, because most of the homes were built
without a permit, and it is prohibited to supply water or install a
meter in an illegal structure. About
two years ago, again after an appeal by ACRI, the municipal water
corporation, Hagihon, came up with a creative legal solution. Instead of
calling it a “water meter,” it’s now called a “control device.”
The change of name
made it possible to circumvent the law and install water meters and a
water supply system in thousands of homes − and to start charging for
the service. About 10,000 of the
devices have been installed in the past two years. Hagihon has also
received hundreds of requests from families that want to disconnect from
the Palestinian water network, which still supplies water to some of
the northern sections of East Jerusalem, and tap
into the Israeli grid. The reason: The water supply by the Palestinian
company is sometimes erratic.
“We received so many
requests from residents to be connected to the Israeli system,”
Tsachar, the mayor’s adviser, says. “Let’s say I am an incorrigible
Palestinian nationalist, but I also want
to shower. What can I do? In that case, [asking to be supplied with]
Israeli water is legitimate and pragmatic, and it will also be available
all the time. I can fly a Palestinian flag next to the water container
on the roof, but I would rather get the water
on a regular basis. Now think about the ‘tower and stockade’ settlements
[of the 1930s and 1940s]. Do you think they would have said, ‘We will
not build a tower but will hook up to the Jordanian network, because
it’s more practical’? Obviously not. So there
is a process underway here. It’s something that cannot be ignored.”
The matter of
issuing building permits provides another example of the authorities’
administrative flexibility in East Jerusalem. The main problem is that
most residents cannot get a building
permit because they do not have documents attesting to their ownership
of property. To solve this problem, the municipality devised the
so-called “Barkat procedure.”
“The problem is that
if you don’t have confirmation of land ownership, the whole judicial
system is stuck,” says Barkat. “We therefore created a mechanism in
which the mukhtars, community directorate
and municipality meet, and if they reach the conclusion that there is no
reason not to believe someone who says the land is his, he gets a
temporary permit.
After 20 years, if
no one else claims ownership, it becomes permanent. This is a city in
which legal creativity is a must. I would rather be right and smart than
right and dumb.”
Barkat, who locates
himself to the right of the political center, has played a crucial role
in the story of East Jerusalem in recent years. The data may not show
dramatic changes in budgetary
allocations for East Jerusalem, but even his political foes admit he is
making efforts to change the situation. From his perspective, the
struggle to improve the lot of the city’s Arab population is part and
parcel of his effort to eliminate plans to partition
the city.
“I am determined to
improve the quality of life of all the city’s inhabitants,” Barkat says.
“That is precisely how I am unifying the city: by making things better
for everyone. Jerusalem will
not be divided. Period. It will not be able to function if it is
divided, because of something very deeply ingrained in the city’s
essence.” He adds, “But in Jerusalem each tribe has its own place, so I
have no problem with the Arabs coming out to vote. My
job will be easier if they have representatives on the city council.”
The key question is
whether these developments will in fact induce Palestinians in Jerusalem
to vote in municipal elections, which they have not done in any
meaningful numbers since 1967. Constituting
36 percent of Jerusalem’s population, the Palestinians have the
potential electoral power to change the political composition of the
city council dramatically. There are voices in East Jerusalem calling
for the Palestinians to vote, as part of a strategy to
seek a one-state solution instead of the vaunted two-state concept.
However, most experts believe that even if this eventually comes about,
it will not affect the next municipal elections, which are about a year
away.
“There is no doubt
that Barkat has changed his strategy,” says city councilman Meir
Margalit (Meretz), who holds the East Jerusalem portfolio. “He is not a
political person and not a great ideologue.
He is pursuing a businessman’s strategy: buying people rather than
forcing his rule on them. Why bring in bulldozers and demolish things if
you can get people to leave of their own free will? He is creating a
situation in which people feel they have something
to lose.”
A few weeks ago,
Barkat convened a meeting to discuss children at risk in East Jerusalem.
About 20 Palestinians from neighborhoods and villages came to the
meeting in the luxurious council room
at City Hall, most of them with complaints aimed at the municipality and
the social affairs and education ministries. According to Barkat, they
came because they feel that someone is listening to them.
“In the past, they
would come and talk and see that nothing came of it, and no one knew
whether it was ideology, lack of desire or impotence,” Barkat says.
“Suddenly, when they see things happening,
they realize it is ideology and that there is no lack of desire and no
impotence.”
Among the
achievements Barkat lists: investments in infrastructure and
transportation, planning of neighborhoods, building of schools and more.
To illustrate the altered perception on the Palestinian
side, he recalls the events surrounding the city-sponsored Festival of
Light in the Old City and the behavior of the merchants there. The
festival, which focuses on sculptures and performances relating to the
theme of light, was held for the third time this
year.
“The first year we
had a pilot program, only in the Jewish Quarter, and 100,000 people
showed up,” Barkat says. “In the second year we held it in the Jewish
Quarter and the Christian Quarter,
and 200,000 people came. This year it was in all the quarters and there
were 300,000 visitors. At first the merchants were afraid to open up for
the event, because they got threats. But then they saw that one store
opened and then another, and before you knew
it they were all open. Everyone made a killing and people got used to
the idea.”
3. Health
Make no mistake:
Despite what Barkat says, the boundary between the two parts of the city
is still very sharp. The roads in the eastern city are still strewn
with potholes and twist and turn
at impossible angles. Uncollected garbage continues to pile up. By every
yardstick − number of garbage bins, public parks, number and quality of
school facilities, number of lampposts, well-child clinics, budgetary
investment per resident or per schoolchild,
and so on − the east is disadvantaged compared to the western city.
Likewise the Palestinians, compared to their Jewish neighbors.
A detailed study
conducted by councilman Margalit found that, at best, only 13.68 percent
of the city’s budget is invested in the 36 percent of its Arab
residents who live in East Jerusalem.
Moreover, the Arab population there suffers from rampant unemployment
and poverty, and is more likely than the Jewish population of the city
to be subjected to police violence. Jewish settlers hire private guards
to operate in Arab neighborhoods, and the Shin
Bet security service still has a say in the appointment of school
principals.
Still, in one area,
the gap between the Jews in the west and their neighbors in the east has
almost closed: public health. The past decade witnessed something of a
mini-revolution in this sphere
in Jerusalem. Until about 15 years ago, the Arabs of East Jerusalem were
severely disadvantaged in terms of health care, mainly when it came to
the health maintenance organizations. There were few clinics, physicians
were unqualified, services were lacking.
In the wake of the enactment of the National Health Law, which rewards
the HMOs according to the number of members they have and their
upgrading of various medical indices − none other than Leumit HMO, which
is identified with the Revisionist Zionist movement
− decided to enter the market in the eastern city. A major draw was the
fact that the East Jerusalem population is young.
Around the same
time, whether by chance or not, the Leumit logo also underwent a
transformation: The long-time Star of David morphed into a flower.
Within a few years, unbridled competition broke
out between HMOs in the eastern city, which are run by local
concessionaires − for the most part physicians, but in some cases
businessmen.
The competition and
privatization generated protests by organizations such as Physicians for
Human Rights and ACRI. Their concern was that there was substandard
supervision by the HMOs and a
preference for making a profit instead of improving medical care. In the
end, the process brought about a situation in which almost every
neighborhood now has a number of clinics that boast advanced equipment.
Following a number of cases in which ambulance
drivers refused to enter Arab neighborhoods, some of the clinics now
have their own forward ER units. In some cases the residents get free
transportation to the clinics, free subscriptions to health clubs or
free dental care, to ensure that they don’t switch
to a rival HMO. The directors of the HMOs in the city still shudder when
they recall how, three years ago, one concessionaire got tens of
thousands of people to switch to a different HMO by reaching a better
agreement with the competition.
Fuad Abu Hamed, a
businessman and community leader from Sur Baher, runs the Clalit
branches in his village and in Beit Safafa. He proudly shows off his
clinic, which has an advanced ER unit,
an X-ray center and a dental clinic. He speaks of extraordinary
achievements in the realm of preventive medicine.
“When the need arose
to perform mammograms, we got 95 percent of the women, which is
unprecedented. That’s because I know the community, and if a woman
refuses we talk to her husband or sister,
and I send a car to bring her. We don’t give in.”
Prof. Yosef Frost,
director of the Jerusalem district of Clalit, describes the health
developments in East Jerusalem over the past few years as an
international record.
“Take the quality
indices, which are objective and universal, and examine the quality of
medical service,” he says. “Four years ago, the indices were extremely
low, whereas now they are almost
equal to the Israeli national average. Some of the clinics in East
Jerusalem are the leaders in the whole district; I could easily put them
in the center of Tel Aviv.”
According to Frost,
the health quality indices in East Jerusalem rose from a grade of 74 in
2009 to 87 today. That is the same grade the clinics in West Jerusalem
receive, and just one point
below the national average of Clalit clinics.
4. ID cards
The most advanced
phase of the Israelization process appears in the requests for an
Israeli ID card. In contrast to the territory in which they live, which
was fully annexed to Israel, the residents
themselves were annexed only partially; nearly all of them hold only a
residency card. Residency status denies them many rights, including the
right to vote in Knesset elections. But more important, it deprives them
of the right to live wherever they wish.
Unlike citizens who
can live in the territories or anywhere else, a Palestinian Jerusalemite
who moves to the territories (or if the municipal boundary places his
home across the line), or who
goes abroad to study for too many years, is liable to lose his residency
status − and thereby also the right to return to his native city.
The road to
obtaining full citizenship is seemingly open, but in practice Israel
heaped obstacles in the way of those who sought citizenship. In any
event, applicants for citizenship were few,
as they were considered “traitors” who accepted the occupation. However,
that barrier too has apparently been breached. Interior Ministry data
show that several hundred Palestinians from East Jerusalem received
Israeli citizenship in each of the past few years.
Lawyers who are involved in this process say the queue of applicants is
getting longer all the time.
“The shame barrier
has fallen,” says attorney Amnon Mazar, who specializes in applications
for citizenship. “People have reached the conclusion that the PA will
not be their salvation and that
Israel is a cornucopia. So they do it for their personal benefit. People
who obtain Israeli citizenship are no longer necessarily considered
traitors to their nation. It’s the trend. They don’t feel they have
anything to be ashamed of.”
The fall of the
shame barrier was also discernible in a survey conducted among East
Jerusalem residents by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy −
an independent think tank − last January.
The results were dramatic. One question was, “In the event of a
permanent two-state solution, which state would you prefer to live in?”
No fewer than 35 percent of the respondents chose Israel, 30 percent
opted for Palestine and 35 percent refused to answer.
“It was a surprise,”
admits Dr. David Pollock, who conducted the survey. “We thought people
would not want to say or admit it, but they did. You can see from the
large number of people who declined
to answer that it is a highly sensitive issue. So I would say that these
figures are the minimum.” In reply to the question, “What would your
neighbors prefer in that case?”, 39 percent replied that their neighbors
would prefer to live in Israel.
What’s the explanation? The number of explanations for the processes
being undergone by Jerusalem and by its Palestinian residents is equal to the number of experts one asks.
being undergone by Jerusalem and by its Palestinian residents is equal to the number of experts one asks.
Some cite the
separation fence, which cut off East Jerusalem from the West Bank, its
natural market and hinterland, and drove the residents into the arms of
the Israelis. Others point to the
deadlocked peace process and the attendant despair of change that has
gripped the East Jerusalem Palestinians. There are experts who think the
Arab Spring and general instability in the Arab world are pushing the
Palestinians in Jerusalem to search for a future
in the unified city. Another cause sometimes mentioned is the ongoing
crisis and division within the PA. Or it may be simply due to the fact
that, after so many years of occupation, a generation that was born into
the situation prefers to look for its material
future rather than raise the national flag. But everyone agrees that the
driving force behind these developments is not love of Israel, but a
desire to survive.
“The Israeli ID card
is part of my summud,” says a Palestinian who obtained an ID card,
referring to the concept of steadfastness. The Israeli attorney Adi
Lustigman, who represents residents
in the naturalization process, believes that requesting Israeli
citizenship actually empowers Palestinian identity. “It’s what makes it
possible for them to preserve their land and their rights in the place
where they live,” she says. “They are still Palestinians;
the fact that they are granted citizenship does not make them settlers.
On the contrary: it gives them more freedom of movement and the
possibility to stay in touch with the Palestinians in the West Bank, to
work in Ramallah and live wherever they want without
having to account to anyone.”
Tsachar: “A habit
becomes natural, and this habit too will ultimately become natural. It
doesn’t matter whether it’s Israelization or pragmatism. The farther you
move along the axis of time,
the more the disparity between 1948 and 1967 is reduced. There are many
new milestones on the axis. It’s human nature.”
According to Israel
Kimchi, a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, it’s vital to remember that more than half the population of
East Jerusalem “was born into this
situation [of Israeli rule]. Things are moving toward greater
moderation, more of an acknowledgment of the existing situation, of
living the day-to-day as long as that’s possible. What interests them is
having a playground for the children, like in the western
city.”
“Survival” is also
the word used by Dr. Asmahan Masry-Herzalla, a researcher in the
Jerusalem Institute, to describe the behavior of East Jerusalem
Palestinians. She too agrees that, contrary
to expectations, the current process will actually bolster the Jerusalem
Arabs’ Palestinian identity.
“It’s sheer
survival. It doesn’t mean they want to become Israelis. They want to
walk between the raindrops,” she says. “But when a young Palestinian man
engages in study, it will heighten his
awareness and reinforce his identity. Look what happened to the Arabs in
Israel: the more they integrated, the more aware they became of their
Palestinian identity.”
Jawad Siyam, from
the village of Silwan, which abuts the Old City, is a prominent
political leader in East Jerusalem. He is at the forefront of the
struggle against the Jewish settlers in his
village, and has been arrested many times. “Our life in East Jerusalem
is complex,” he says. “We are Palestinians and need to belong to a place
where we feel we have respect, and that is not Israel. In the meantime,
we have an Israeli [residence] card and have
to deal with the Israeli authorities, and I understand that some people
are taking out an ID card in order to make life easier. But in the
meantime, everything Israel and the settlers are doing only makes the
Palestinians feel more Palestinian.”
Kimchi, who for
years produced proposals for political solutions to divide the city,
doesn’t think this process will affect the partition option. “In the
end, the decision will be a political
one. Nothing will help them,” he says, referring to the Arab residents.
“No one will ask them.”
According to
Margalit − who made these remarks before the United Nations General
Assembly granted Palestine nonmember observer-state status − “More and
more Palestinians have despaired of the
Palestinian Authority. They do not believe partition will happen. They
see what is happening between Hamas and Fatah, and within Fatah, and
they say ‘No thanks. We have enough problems of our own, so why should
we step into that mess? We would rather be under
Israeli rule.’ For someone like me, that is a truth that is hard to
accept.”
Indeed, for
Margalit, a veteran activist on behalf of the Palestinians’ rights in
Jerusalem, the new situation creates vexing dilemmas. “There is daily
soul-searching here between the humanistic
consideration and the political consideration. It’s true that things are
a little better for the Arabs of East Jerusalem,” he says, “but in the
long term, we as Jews, and all of us together, will pay a higher price.
That’s because what’s underway is destroying
the foundation of the two-state solution.”
“I went through the
period of whining, when we said ‘only the Jews are to blame.’ I do not
say they are not responsible, but I also want to look after myself,”
adds Abu Hamed, who, in addition
to being the director of HMO branches, chairs a volunteer committee to
promote education in Sur Baher. Both roles bring him into constant
contact with the Israeli authorities. What drives him, he says, is the
feeling of discrimination.
“It’s a harsh
feeling. It burns me up when I drive through Armon Hanatziv [a post-1967
Jewish neighborhood next to Sur Baher] and see that they are scraping
the old asphalt in order to repave
the road, and you say to yourself, ‘Dear God, I wish we had even the old
asphalt.’ The expectations of the people in East Jerusalem extend to
banal services like roads and sewage disposal. It’s not their fault that
the Six-Day War happened. Let them at least
let us live with honor, whether it’s 40 years or 400 years. When the
political solution comes, then we will see.”
After this article
went to press, there was another clash between Palestinians and police
in Isawiyah. Eighteen youths were arrested. The post office was not
attacked.
Islands of anarchy
The undeniable
processes by which the eastern part of Jerusalem is being unified with
the western side do not incorporate all the residents of East Jerusalem.
They include mainly the more established
neighborhoods, and, more specifically, the people of means in those
neighborhoods. These processes are completely absent in the Palestinian
neighborhoods that are outside the separation fence. In fact, the
situation in those areas is almost the reverse.
Some 70,000
Palestinians, almost one-third of all the Arab residents of Jerusalem,
now live on the other side of the separation fence. Their neighborhoods
have become islands of complete anarchy
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The police, the
municipality, the infrastructure companies and the other Israeli
authorities barely operate in these neighborhoods, and the PA is barred
from entering them under the terms of the Oslo Accords. The
result is that their inhabitants are doomed to a life of hardship,
lacking even the most basic services, and with a constantly diminishing
connection to their city, which has left them on the wrong side of the
checkpoints.
For the past few
years, mayor Nir Barkat has been trying to get these neighborhoods
placed under the responsibility of the army’s Civil Administration,
which controls the West Bank. Barkat wants
“to adjust the municipal boundary to conform with the fence,” adding, “I
cannot operate when a fence crosses the municipal boundary. The fence
is a real barrier in terms of supplying services.”
Redrawing the
municipal boundary on this scale would of course be a dramatic move.
Some would say it signals the start of Israel’s relinquishment of East
Jerusalem. In the meantime, the political
decision makers at the state level are refusing to consider Barkat’s
idea.
The King’s Garden
Two years ago, a
political storm was unleashed over a plan to develop the area of East
Jerusalem known as the “King’s Garden.” Under the plan, which mayor
Barkat supports, a new tourist area
would be created on the lower slopes of the village of Silwan, below the
City of David. The plan calls for the demolition of 22 of the 88
illegally built homes in the neighborhood of Al-Bustan, with the
residents being moved to new housing in another part of
the neighborhood.
The plan drew
widespread condemnation. Local residents erected a protest tent that
became a rallying point for months of violent demonstrations.
Governments across the world spoke out against
the plan, and Meretz left the municipal coalition in protest. (The party
reentered the coalition about a year later.)
In the meantime, the
mayor and his staff continued to visit the area and discuss with the
residents the possibility of their voluntary departure. Barkat says many
of them have already agreed
to the plan, even if they are unwilling to say so publicly. “I come to
them with a win-win approach. What goes on in Abu Ghosh on Saturdays is
nothing compared to what can be done here,” the mayor says, referring to
the droves of Israeli Jews who flock to the
Arab village west of Jerusalem (and inside Israel) to eat and shop on
the weekend.
“The plan will
upgrade their assets to a level they can only dream of,” Barkat
continues, “and they now take a completely different view of it. In the
end, they will understand that it’s a serious
proposition and they themselves will request it.”
Attorney Ziad Kawar,
who represents most of the tenants involved, and Morad al-Sana, a
neighborhood resident, vehemently deny that negotiations are underway
with the municipality. “Maybe one
person out of a hundred signed off on the plan, but that means nothing,”
says Sana.
However, councilman
Meir Margalit of Meretz, who holds the East Jerusalem portfolio and is
closely acquainted with the developments, believes that, below the
surface, negotiations have reached
an advanced stage.
“There are
increasing indications that some residents have arrived at
understandings, even if things have not yet been signed,” Margalit says.
“I say this with
great sorrow, because politically, this plan must not go ahead,” he
continues. “I am convinced that the Elad organization will have a
foothold,” he says, referring to the controversial,
ultranationalist group that runs the nearby, City of David site. “But if
I had a house of 40 square meters without ownership papers and I could
get a house twice that size and with papers − well, I can’t really blame
them.”
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