Doc's Talk: JCPA poll of Israelis: 76%:22% Full withdrawal will not bring peace

Monday, December 31, 2012

JCPA poll of Israelis: 76%:22% Full withdrawal will not bring peace

Poll- PA Can’t Be Trusted to Keep a Deal

A new poll by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs shows that the vast majority of Israelis are opposed to an Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. The poll, taken in November, showed that 76% of all Israelis (83% of Israeli Jews) do not believe that a withdrawal to the 1948 armistice lines will bring Israelis a secure peace.

The Palestinian Authority has repeatedly declared that it will not compromise on its demand that Israel withdraw from all land liberated in the 1967 Six Day War. In addition, the PA is demanding that Israel compensate it for its losses, and admit hundreds of thousands of Arabs to Israel, so they can return to homes their ‘ancestors’ abandoned in the 1948 War of Liberation.

The poll was conducted by Dr, Mina Tzemach of the Dahaf Institute, one of Israel’s most respected polling organizations. The poll was conducted among a scientifically-determined representative group of 500 Israelis, and was conducted during the height of media discussion on the upgrading of the PA delegation by the UN General Assembly in November.

One of the questions asked participants whether they would change the vote if it became clear that the party they had planned to support would agree to an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley and surrender Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem. The large majority of all Israelis said they would – 53% if a party proposed leaving the Jordan Valley, 69% for Jerusalem. Among Israeli Jews, the figures were 59% and 79% respectively.

Perhaps most surprisingly, Israelis who said that they planned to vote for a left or left of center party are also largely against leaving Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley[=J&S]. Among those voters, 50% said that they would not vote for a party advocating withdrawal from the Jordan Valley, and 67% from Jerusalem.

The PA has consistently said that it would not accept any deal in which Israel did not fully withdraw from the Jordan Valley, and give the PA full sovereignty over the Old City of Jerusalem.

Participants were also asked if they trusted the PA, without Hamas, to observe any treaty it signs with Israel. Sixty seven percent of the general population and 75% of the Jewish population said they did not.

’67 Borders will not End Dispute”
According to this poll, A high percentage of left-to-center voters would vote right wing if their original party intended to make such significant land concessions.
Views of the Israeli Public on Israeli Security and Resolution of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Survey No. 3 in a series)
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/Dahaf Institute Survey
December 2012
Would a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the division of Jerusalem bring
about an end of the conflict?
Believe that it would: 22% (15% of Jews)
Believe that it would not: 76% (83% of Jews)
Main Points
- 76% of Israelis (83% of Jews) believe that a withdrawal to the 1967
lines and a division of Jerusalem would not bring about an end of the
conflict.
- 61% of the Jewish population believes that defensible borders are more
important than peace for assuring Israel’s security (up from 49% in 2005).
- 78% of Jews indicated they would change their vote if the party they
intended to support indicated that it was prepared to relinquish sovereignty
in east Jerusalem. 59% of Jews said the same about the Jordan Valley.

The findings of the present survey are based on representative-sample
responses of the adult population of Israel (N=500). The interviews were
conducted by telephone at the end of November 2012.
The main findings are presented below. Bear in mind the following points:
- For each question that was presented to the interviewees, a segmentation
of the answers is presented, excluding the percentage of interviewees who
did not respond to the question (these constitute the percentage that rounds
out the data to 100%).
- The numbers outside the parentheses represent the entire sample; the
numbers within the parentheses represent the Jewish sector.
1. Attitudes toward the issue of a peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians
a. Preconditions and perceptions of the chances of their being accepted
1) Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state
77% (79% of Jews): it is important that the Palestinians recognize Israel’s
right to exist as a
Jewish state.
Only 33% (27% of Jews) believe that this will happen.
2) Renouncing the Palestinian right of return
30% believe that the Palestinians will renounce it; 64% do not believe so.
3) Peace in stages or a comprehensive peace in one stage
Peace in stages: 34% (32% of Jews)
A comprehensive peace, gradual implementation: 46% (47% of Jews)
Neither: 10% (10% of Jews)
b. Assessments of the chances of reaching a peace agreement
1) Is the Palestinian leadership (Fatah and Hamas) capable of making binding
decisions on this issue?
Capable: 26% (17% of Jews)
Incapable: 68% (77% of Jews)
2) Would a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the division of Jerusalem
bring about an end of the conflict?
Believe that it would: 22% (15% of Jews)
Believe that it would not: 76% (83% of Jews)
c. Can one rely on a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority without
Hamas?
One can rely on it: 28% (21% of Jews)
One cannot rely on it: 67% (75% of Jews)
d. Perceived implications of the developments in Arab countries for the
chances for a permanent settlement with the Palestinians and for how long
such a settlement would last
1) Implications for the possibility of relying on a peace agreement
Strengthening of the belief that one could rely on it: 15% (7% of Jews)
No effect: 41% (44% of Jews)
Weakening of the belief: 37% (41% of Jews)
2) Effect of the Egyptian experience with changes in the demilitarization of
Sinai on belief in the demilitarization of the West Bank
Undermines: 51% (49% of Jews)
Does not undermine: 34% (35% of Jews)
3) Conclusions about a peace agreement in light of developments in Arab
countries
Intensify the effort to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians: 21%
(16% of Jews)
No connection with what occurs in the Arab world: 25% (26% of Jews)
Territories vital to security should not be returned: 51% (55% of Jews)
2. Returning territories to the Palestinians in the framework of a permanent
settlement
a. What is preferable–defensible borders or a peace agreement?
1) Which is preferable for ensuring security–defensible borders or peace?
Peace: 36% (26% of Jews)
Defensible borders: 52% (61% of Jews)
Both: 6% (7% of Jews)
Impossible to ensure security: 3% (3% of Jews)
2) Importance of strategic depth
It has security value: 74% (72% of Jews)
It has no security value: 21% (23% of Jews)
3) Returning territories that have security value
Territories that overlook Ben-Gurion Airport Road
Can be returned 18% (11% of Jews
Should not be returned 73% (83% of Jews)
443 between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem
Can be returned 22% (16% of Jews)
Should not be returned 67% (75% of Jews)
4) The withdrawal from the Philadelphi Route between Egypt and Gaza (in
retrospect)
A wise step: 36% (29% of Jews)
An unwise step: 40% (44% of Jews)
b. Willingness to return territories
1) Withdrawal to the 1967 borders in return for a peace agreement
No mention of an end of the conflict
The territories should be returned 26% (18% of Jews)
The territories should not be returned 68% (76% of Jews)
All Arab states declare an end of the conflict
The territories should be returned 29% (19% of Jews)
The territories should not be returned 66% (76% of Jews)
2) Attitudes toward different territorial segments
Agree/Disagree
The Jordan Valley
31 (32)/65 (73)
Gush Etzion
30 (19)/62 (72)
Ariel and western Samaria
28 (17)/68 (79)
50% of the West Bank
42 (34)/52 (59)
95% of the West Bank
33 (22)/52 (62)
Withdrawal to the ’67 borders with minor adjustments
34 (24)/63 (72)
Rachel’s Tomb, the Machpela Cave, and the Western Wall in Israel’s hands
36 (28)/61 (68)
The Temple Mount under international rule, the Western Wall in Israel’s
hands
51 (47)/46 (49)
The Temple Mount under Palestinian rule, the Western Wall in Israel’s hands
33 (25)/64 (71)
All the East Jerusalem neighborhoods except the Old City
33 (27)/65 (71)
3. The status of the settlements
Leave the settlement blocs in Israel’s hands
Should 72% (75% of Jews) Should not 22% (18% of Jews)
Dismantle the settlements outside the large settlement blocs
Should 48% (43% of Jews) Should not 45% (50% of Jews)
4. Attitudes toward safe passage for Palestinians between Gaza and the West
Bank; preserving security and the rights of Jews if territories are returned
in a peace agreement
.
a. Can one rely on foreign forces in matters connected to security?
1) Preserving security after withdrawal from the Jordan Valley
One can rely on foreign forces: 26% (16% of Jews)
Security only in the hands of the IDF: 68% (78% of Jews)
2) Can one rely on foreign forces to prevent arms smuggling?
From Egypt to Gaza (relying on the Egyptian army)
One can rely on them 15% (9% of Jews)
One cannot rely on them 83% (90% of Jews)
From Jordan to the West Bank (relying on the Jordanian army)
One can rely on them 30% (23% of Jews)
One cannot rely on them 67% (74% of Jews)
b. The implications of a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank
1) Weapons smuggling into Gaza
A concern: 85% (86% of Jews)
Not a concern: 14% (13%) of Jews
2) Can one rely on the Palestinian Authority to prevent the smuggling of
arms and terrorists into the West Bank?
Yes: 21% (14% of Jews)
No: 76% (73% of Jews)
3) Should the passage of goods be allowed between Gaza and the West Bank?
Yes: 46% (39% of Jews)
No: 46% (52% of Jews)
c. Ensuring freedom of worship for Jews
Can one rely on the Palestinians?
Yes 27% (19% of Jews)
No 68% (77% of Jews)
Can one rely on an international force?
Yes 53% (50% of Jews)
No 43% (46% of Jews)
5. Overall assessments of Operation Pillar of Defense
Israel won: 44% (36% of Jews)
Hamas won: 24% (28% of Jews)
Neither side won: 24% (28% of Jews)
6. How should Israel react to the Palestinians’ upgrade to a non-member
state at the UN?
Not react: 30%
Take measures, but not annexation of territories: 24%
Take unspecified steps: 6%
Annex territories: 22%
Don’t know: 18%
7. Israeli responses to the nuclear issue
a. The effect of sanctions on Iran
They will stop Iran’s nuclear-weapons development: 27% (21% of Jews)
They will not stop Iran’s nuclear-weapons development: 68% (75% of Jews)
b. Can one rely on the United States?
1) In general
One can rely on it: 39% (42% of Jews)
Israel has to defend itself: 57% (54% of Jews)
2) To prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear capability
One can rely on the U.S.: 39% (31% of Jews)
One cannot rely on the U.S.: 53% (60% of Jews)
c. An Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites
1) Will such an attack succeed in preventing Iran from developing nuclear
weapons?
It will succeed: 21% (16% of Jews)
It will only succeed to delay the program: 49% (53% of Jews)
It will not have an effect: 23% (24% of Jews)
2) Are you for or against an Israeli attack?
For: 53% (53% of Jews)
Against: 37% (36% of Jews)
d. Fears of Iran attacking Israel with nuclear weapons
1) Does the West have the necessary means to deter Iran?
Yes: 55% (53% of Jews)
No: 39% (41% of Jews)
8. The weight of security issues on voting intentions
a. The survey gauged the level of influence of different issues on voting
intentions. Below is a list of the issues in order of the percentage of
interviewees who chose the issue as having the most influence on their
decision about which party to vote for.
Security policy
29% (30%)
The territorial issue (withdrawal to ’67 borders)
9% (8%)
Economic and social issues
26% (26%)
The person who heads the party
11% (11%)
The status of religion and state
10% (12%)
The party’s chances of joining the government
2% (2%)
The party’s chances of forming the government
2% (1%)
The makeup of the list of candidates
1% (1%)
The number of women on the list
1% (–)
** At the time the survey was conducted, Tzipi Livni had not yet announced
her intention to run in the elections. Hence, the data does not include her
Hatnuah party.
b. A considerable percentage of the interviewees declare that they will
change their vote if the party they intend to vote for expresses willingness
to return territories in the Jordan Valley (53%) or relinquish sovereignty
in east Jerusalem (69%). For Jews, the corresponding percentages are 59% and
78%.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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