Khalil al-Anani
One of the features of the Islamist scene following the Arab Spring
is discord and fragmentation, due to an unprecedented rise in the degree
of competition, polarisation and conflict within that movement. Egypt offers
a unique window into the tensions between Islamist groups whose
relationships are shifting around the clock as the result of the
political decisions one faction or another might make.
It is possible to speak in terms of four dynamics to the conflict
between and within Islamist movements. The first plays out on a purely
political game board and is totally focused on attaining mundane
interests that have no connection with religion or ideology. The most
visible political conflict in Egypt now (apart from the conflict with
the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) is between the two
largest Islamist forces. The Muslim Brotherhood with its Freedom and
Justice Party
(FJP) and the Salafist Calling together with its Nour Party have locked
horns over control of the state, society and public space, and their
struggle has grown fiercer with every hurdle of the transitional phase,
the latest being the presidential elections. The Salafist Calling's
decision to throw its weight behind Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh was a
purely political decision that reflected the Salafis' fears of Muslim
Brotherhood control over all the institutions of government.
Surprisingly, a similar political logic led other Salafi leaders and
sheikhs to reject Abul-Fotouh and back Mohamed Mursi (the Brotherhood's
candidate), on the grounds that he had a "project for national revival",
not because he was more religious or pious than Abul-Fotouh.
If the differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have not yet reached the point of open
conflict, they nevertheless reflect the anxieties each have about the
other. Since the revolution, the Muslim Brothers have treated the
Salafis as their political subordinates. The Salafis needed the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Muslim Brothers thought, not only because they were
organisationally and politically weak and inexperienced, but also
because, even if they had no great love for the Muslim Brotherhood, they
would at least want to align with it in a front against the secularists
and liberals. The Muslim Brothers' condescension towards the Salafis
reached such a peak during the last parliamentary elections that the
Salafis suddenly decided to break away from the Muslim Brotherhood-led
list, which did not feature many Salafi candidates, and instead formed
their own list. The results that the Salafis achieved in the
parliamentary polls startled the Muslim Brothers more than other
political forces.
The Salafis, for their part, tried to co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood
for their own purposes. They gave it the lead in areas where they knew
they lacked sufficient expertise, such as in parliament or in
negotiations with SCAF, but they never allowed themselves to fall into
the Muslim Brotherhood's pocket. At the same time, the Salafis deftly
averted becoming the "sacrificial lamb" in the conflict between the
Muslim Brothers and SCAF over the questions of the dismissal/formation
of a government and the formation of the Constituent Assembly tasked
with writing a new constitution. The Salafis best demonstrated their
astuteness at the political game during the presidential nominations
when they decided to back Abul-Futouh. Judging by subsequent statements
issued by El-Nour and Salafist Calling leaders, there is little doubt
that this move was primarily aimed against the Muslim Brotherhood rather
than prompted by any particular fondness for -- or conviction in --
their candidate of choice.
But what is truly amazing is that Salafi leaders and preachers would
then market Abul-Fotouh in conservative Salafist circles. In a lecture
to his fellow Salafis, Sheikh Yasser Burhami, the religious ideologue
and spiritual leader of El-Nour Party, sought to persuade his audience
that the Salafist Calling and Nour Party took the politically and
religiously correct position in declaring their support
for Abul-Fotouh. Was it Abul-Fotouh's persuasiveness and negotiating
brilliance that won over the Salafis, or was the realism and pragmatism
that the Salafis adopted since the revolution that was key to their
choice of him as their candidate? The question is difficult to answer.
What is certain is that this move exposed the tensions seething beneath
the surface. The Brotherhood-Salafist conflict is now out in the open,
splashed across the front pages of the newspapers and blaring over the
satellite television stations. Mahmoud Ghazlan, a prominent Brotherhood
hardliner, launched a scathing attack against Salafi leaders such as
Sheikh Abdel-Moneim El-Shahat, a Salafi hardliner, accusing them of
deviating from the "Islamic interest" by supporting Abul-Fotouh. Salafi
leaders returned the fire and the two sides have since been exchanging
barrages of accusations and invective, hurling at each other charges of
treachery, betrayal of fixed principles, and sinfulness.
The second dynamic of inter-Islamist conflict has to do with spheres
of activity and influence. Rivalries between the Islamists have begun to
spread through both the religious and non-religious satellite
television programmes, and each side is racing to expand its political
and ideological umbrella beyond the boundaries of its organisational and
religious bases. Take, for example, the intensive religious
sloganeering in FJP candidate Mursi's campaign, which far outstrips the
Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary campaigns in this regard. True, the
use of religion in political propaganda is one of the Muslim
Brotherhood's trademarks, but their use of it in the current elections
has been unprecedented since the 1990s. Of particular note, today, is
the heavy emphasis the Mursi campaign places on the application of
Islamic law, which seems intended to win over the hardliners in Salafist
circles and other Islamist conservatives. As though to confirm this,
the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood have been parading a number of
prominent Salafi figures who have come out in favour of Mursi in
campaign rallies and conferences. Prime among these figures are Sheikh
Mohammed Abdel-Maqsoud and Safwat Higazi (who recently likened voting
for Mursi to an Islamic re-conquest of Egypt).
The Salafis are aware that the field is more open to them now than
ever before, and they are taking advantage of this to expand their
presence in the public sphere and to broaden the base of their calling,
which they have steadily built up over the past three decades. A large
portion of the Salafist camp believes that the time has come to "come
out into the open" and to do battle with the Muslim Brotherhood's
proselytising machine, which has been steadily eroding since the late
1990s as the Muslim Brotherhood poured more and more of its energies
into politics at the expense of proselytising. Whether or not this
assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities is correct, it has
become the premise on which many Salafis are now operating.
At the civil level, the rivalries and conflicts between Islamists are
more blatant and more vicious yet. The Muslim Brotherhood's push for
the presidency cannot just be explained by the mounting crisis between
it and SCAF. It has very much to do with their resolve not to waste the
historic opportunity that opened to them following the revolution, a
resolve that blends with a determination to avert the reproduction of
the Mubarak regime in any form whatsoever. The Muslim Brothers seem to
have recently wakened to the realisation that SCAF had deceived them by
ensuring that the parliament they inherited is "lame" and without real
powers, and that the keys to the country still remain firmly in the
hands of the generals and of the old networks of vested interests and
influence that remain deeply entrenched in the Egyptian state and that
have been lurking beneath the surface since the fall of Mubarak, waiting
to make a comeback. Some months ago, when the Muslim Brotherhood tried
to expand their influence in government bodies, they were taken by
surprise by the stiff resistance they met from those networks of
interests and from an array of groups within the bureaucratic
establishment that were not ready to move aside and sacrifice the power
and influence they had built up over the decades.
Since the revolution, the civil sphere has also afforded the Salafis a
golden opportunity to expand their influence and develop a more
prominent public profile. The Salafis now make daily entrances into the
Egyptian political diaries, and many of their religious leaders have
taken advantage of this to extend their social influence beyond their
customary circles. If the Muslim Brotherhood's tactics are to bite and
grab, the Salafis seem more intent upon subtle and gradual infiltration
with the ultimate aim of "Salafising" government and the law. Many
Salafi leaders believe that time is on their side and against their
rivals in both the Islamist and liberal camps.
The third and most salient dynamic is unfolding at the level of what
we can term intra-Islamist politics, now that many Islamist
organisations and movements no longer have the same degree of internal
political and ideological cohesion and personal commitment. True, some
movements and parties continue to enjoy a relatively high degree of
internal cohesion; however, the realities and complexities of political
calculations have increasingly become a source of internal tension and
dispute that is difficult to cap. For example, within the Salafist camp
there is little consistency of opinion on many political issues, not
least of which the current presidential elections. In spite of the
efforts on the part of some Salafi leaders, it is impossible to speak of
a single candidate that all Salafis support. Indeed, the Salafist vote
will probably be split among several candidates. Moreover, internal
discord sometimes flared beyond acceptable limits, as was the case when
some branches of the Salafist Calling defied the organisation's decision
to back Abul-Fotouh and held a conference in support of Mursi. Salafi
preacher Higazi went further and accused Salafist Calling leaders of
being "agents for state security". A similar situation arose in the
highest echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood, when some members of the
Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau and even some members of the
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP came out in favour of
Abul-Fotouh instead of Mursi, the Brotherhood candidate. In other words,
the Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi tensions have spilled over into internal
rifts within each side.
The fourth dynamic involves the conflict over the "Islamist project".
All Islamist factions, from the Muslim Brothers to the Salafis, to
independent Islamists and Islamists of the revolutionary camp, are now
claiming to speak in the name of this project and of working towards its
realisation. Yet instead of serving as the pivotal calling around which
all Islamists rally, this project has become a source of contention and
division. Moreover, some Islamists have begun to suggest that they no
longer even favour this project. I have met many Salafis who have told
me that they believe that the Muslim Brotherhood has abandoned the
"Islamist project" (regardless of what the actual nature of the project
is and what it means to Islamists). Meanwhile, many Muslim Brothers
praise Abul-Fotouh for keeping a distance from this project and perhaps
even opposing it.
Against the backdrop of such disarray, the question of the moment is
no longer who speaks in the name of Islam but rather who speaks in the
name of the Islamists.
No comments:
Post a Comment