Doc's Talk: An explanation-you decide

Monday, June 25, 2012

An explanation-you decide

Netanyahu and Mofaz: Broadening the Middle Eastern Perspective?

By Yisrael Ne'eman

While Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu may be seen as a strong virtually irreplaceable leader he certainly faces overwhelming challenges. As daunting as domestic issues appear the full existential threat is erupting on the outside in the form of the Iranian nuclear threat and the Islamic Awakening in the Arab World. On the local level, the continuing stand offs with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the potential instability in the PA/Fatah ruled West Bank (Judea and Samaria) produce daily conflicts. Add in the continued economic deterioration of Israel's largest trading partner in the Euro zone and the future is at best unsure. Here are just a few more reasons why Netanyahu preferred Shaul Mofaz's Kadima faction at his side and did not want to be dependent on the ultra-orthodox factions for coalition stability.

As concerns EU economic relations Israel has a small economy and a fair amount of flexibility in finding other markets. Since the mid 2000s Israeli entrepreneurs with government support are opening markets in the world's two most populous countries, mainland China and India. Israeli exports need to be and are being redirected for a more balanced trade picture.

The security issues are far more dire. All may be coming to a head by July first when full European sanctions are expected to go into effect against the Khomeinist Shiite Iranian regime should they not halt their nuclear weapons program. Recent negotiations between Tehran and the West came to nothing and even should there be an agreement, the Iranians will follow the North Korean example and violate all commitments. It is well known Pres. Ahmedinejad & Co. are committed to Israel's destruction and are only buying time. The Israeli dilemma remains in place: When does the West knock out the Iranian nuclear potential? If the West delays to the point of Iranian nuclear armament at what point does Israel take matters into its own hands and strike? And what will be the political – diplomatic price to be paid by Jerusalem? What will be Tehran's rocket response? As declared "centrists" Netanyahu wants Kadima's consent to whatever policy decisions must be implemented. Let's recall that Kadima leader Mofaz is against attacking the Iranian facilities but this too can change as everything is a matter of timing.

Here Iran's Syrian and Lebanese Hezobllah allies/proxies come into play when ordered to drop rockets on Israel. As for Syria, Israel needs to prepare for the fall of Assad, but no one knows which Syrian opposition will replace his Baath Party. The best bet is the Muslim Brotherhood, meaning a worse option than the present reality. The Lebanese cannot take on Hezbollah and win. Only a complete Iranian demise will end that threat.

The Islamic Awakening and removal of Arab secular regimes is the most serious long term concern for Israel and the West. Egypt's military is attempting to hold off a full Muslim Brotherhood election sweep but in the end they will be forced to concede defeat. It appears that Gen. Tantawi and the SCAF military rulers were hoping for some form of hybrid arrangement with the Brotherhood in an attempt to hold back a much more fanatical Islamic takeover by the Salafists and Al Qaeda down the road. Mohammed Morsi may have taken the presidential elections but his declared moderation cannot be expected to last. The street will speak and the military, despite the amount of force used, will fail in the long run. Israel faces a low intensity conflict (LIC) on the Negev border in the short term as Islamic terror groups increasingly operate in Sinai to the detriment of Egyptian security forces. The Egyptian military brass view the 1979 peace treaty as a strategic pillar for national security and are not willing to initiate a full scale war in the name of Jihad, Allah or anyone else. To do so means to break ties with the West and get crushed on the battlefield. The smoldering border conflict with Gaza is moving south and spilling over onto the Egyptian frontier. Israel needs a measured response not endangering the already fragile relations with Cairo while simultaneously damaging Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and/or Al Qaeda terrorists in Sinai. To win, the Egyptian army needs to regain control of the region. It is here that Netanyahu wants to hear from former army chief of staff and ex-defense minister Mofaz in the hope of outmaneuvering the more right wing elements in his government.

Much worse is the long term forecast. The revolution may peak with a Salafist extremist push replacing a "cold peace" with a very hot border, if not a war. But should they only try and fail, deeper turmoil in Egypt can be expected with no positive outcome in sight. It just might take longer for an extremist victory.

Turning to the Palestinians Kadima is once again part of the larger picture. To retain calm on the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) front Netanyahu needs at least the semblance of negotiations and someone to take the blame whether they succeed or not. The issue here is less one of keeping Palestinian Authority PM Mahmud Abbas happy and more of satisfying the Americans and Europeans. Any agreement with the Fatah led West Bank administration will ignite an anti-government reaction by the settler activists who enjoy support in the Likud's right wing.

Netanyahu needs bolstering from the center, meaning Kadima, to ensure any advancement on the peace front. No major shifts are to be expected, rather there may be a broadening into Stage II of the Bush Road Map whereby an interim Palestinian State is formed but without permanent borders.
Netanyahu is consistent in first demanding an "economic peace" whereby there is Palestinian state-in-the-making development and something to lose should such a future regime prove belligerent. This may very well be the "price" the Likud must pay not only to stay in power but to ensure US and EU support in the continuing confrontation with Iran. The West wants to prove that not all the Arab/Muslim world will go Islamist. The Abbas regime is to be an example of a secular western leaning Arab nationalist regime bringing development, security and peace to its people. Such an option is to stand in full contradiction to the Hamas Gaza radicals.

Speaking of Gaza, every three months there is another round of shelling into the Negev and counter attacks by Israel - so here we are again. Israel has every interest in a quiet border but cannot take major action until the Iranian contest is solved and that may take until the end of summer. Afterwards Israel will have a much freer hand, in particular with Kadima in the government and even more so should there be a "peace process" on the Fatah/West Bank front.

Netanyhu moved towards the middle to allow more room for maneuver. Any price to be paid especially as concerns the Palestinians or containing of the settlement movement will be blamed on Kadima. Any credit for "success" on these fronts will be claimed by Mofaz. Each side will take credit or appropriate blame for their own advantage. Behind closed doors both are seeking similar policies and outcomes. With the Likud as the front runner by far the pressure is more on Mofaz to prove Kadima can impact policies by shifting them more middle road.

On the foreign policy front there are far too many factors completely beyond Israel's control to predict any sort of direction. One aspect appears fairly sure, European sanctions will intensify against Iran as of July. The Iranian reaction will determine much of what happens this summer, at least as a first step. What that response will be nobody knows. Quite possibly it is here where the dominoes will begin to fall.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk