A nuclear Iran would be
a clear and present threat to pro-U.S. regimes in Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf, and would lead to a regional and global slippery slope of
violence that would severely undermine the U.S. economy and national
security.
A top official from
Bahrain told me, at the office of a senior member of the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee, that “Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
expect the U.S. to alter its policy and resort to steps which are
required to remove the Iranian nuclear threat.” A national security
adviser to a senior member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
shared with me that “Pro-U.S. Persian Gulf leaders are panicky about the
rising Iranian nuclear threat.”
Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf regimes, which are considered apostates by Teheran’s ayatollahs,
are aware that, unlike nuclear Pakistan and North Korea, Iran’s leaders
have imperialistic, megalomaniac aspirations to dominate the Persian
Gulf, the Middle East and, at the very least, the entire Muslim world.
The Gulf states realize
that “effective sanctions” is a contradiction in terms, since Russia
and China, as well as India and Japan, and probably parts of Europe, do
not cooperate with the U.S. Forty years of diplomacy and sanctions have
paved the road to a nuclear North Korea and are paving the road to a
nuclear Iran.
Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states presume that the current multilateral policy on Iran leads
to a lethal slippery slope, featuring a belligerent nuclear Iran, a
meltdown of pro-U.S. Gulf regimes, a breakdown of the oil supply system,
a collapse of global economies, an escalation of nuclear proliferation
in the Middle Eat and beyond, a radicalization of Islamic terrorism
against traditional Muslim regimes and Western democracies, and an
eruption of local, regional and possibly global wars, or, a submission
by pro-U.S. Gulf regimes and Western democracies to Iranian demands.
The Gulf states are
convinced that a unilateral U.S. policy is required to prevent the
slippery slope. They want massive military pre-emptive action to
devastate Iran’s nuclear, air defense and missiles infrastructures,
minimize Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, and preclude the calamitous
ripple effects of a nuclear Iran.
The Gulf states are
concerned that avoiding pre-emptive action would further erode the U.S.
posture of deterrence and military power projection that constitutes the
backbone of their national security, would fuel fanaticism on the Arab
street, and would doom pro-U.S. Saudi and Gulf regimes.
They assume that a
decisive pre-emptive military strike – with no ground troops – is a
prerequisite to a regime change in Iran, which failed in 2009 due to
Western vacillation. One cannot expect the domestic opposition to defy
the ayatollahs while the U.S. and Israel refrain from defiance.
In 1978 and 2011, the
U.S. deserted the shah of Iran and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
respectively, facilitating anti-U.S. regime change. In 2012, pre-emptive
military action would expose the vulnerability of the ayatollahs,
providing a significant tailwind to a pro-U.S. regime change.
During the 1960s, the
U.S. failed in its attempt to appease then Egyptian President Gamal
Abdel Nasser and snatch him from the Soviet bloc. It was the 1967 Six
Day War, and not U.S. diplomacy, which devastated Nasser and aborted his
efforts to topple the pro-U.S. regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
In 2012, Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf states expect the U.S. to recoup its posture of deterrence
and avoid past critical errors which have jeopardized their survival and
have advanced the nuclearization of North Korea and Iran.
Will the U.S. fulfill
such expectations by altering its policy? Or will it sustain the failed
policy of sanctions and diplomacy, which will force Israel to take
pre-emptive action to avert a clear and present danger to global sanity?
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An attempt is made to share the truth regarding issues concerning Israel and her right to exist as a Jewish nation. This blog has expanded to present information about radical Islam and its potential impact upon Israel and the West. Yes, I do mix in a bit of opinion from time to time.
Sunday, June 24, 2012
Yoram Ettinger
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