By Barry Rubin
The
victory in the referendum on the Constitution is the fourth straight
Muslim Brotherhood success—including the overthrow of President Husni
Mubarak’s regime with army assistance, the parliamentary election and
the presidential election--in the process of taking over Egypt for the
long-term and fundamentally transforming it into a radical Islamist
state. This last one should be sufficient to go all the way.
This event is also producing a new stage of Western rationalizations that whitewash the Muslim Brotherhood and rationalize support for Islamists being in power.
It isn’t that the constitution, as many Salafists would have liked, explicitly mandates a revolutionary Sharia state. Rather, the constitution sets up a framework that will allow the Brotherhood to do so. Between the president and the constitution, the Brotherhood will now march through every institution and remake it. Judges will be appointed; school curricula rewritten; army generals appointed; and so on. As the Brotherhood shows patience in carrying out this process of gaining total, permanent control, many in the West will interpret that as moderation.
This event is also producing a new stage of Western rationalizations that whitewash the Muslim Brotherhood and rationalize support for Islamists being in power.
It isn’t that the constitution, as many Salafists would have liked, explicitly mandates a revolutionary Sharia state. Rather, the constitution sets up a framework that will allow the Brotherhood to do so. Between the president and the constitution, the Brotherhood will now march through every institution and remake it. Judges will be appointed; school curricula rewritten; army generals appointed; and so on. As the Brotherhood shows patience in carrying out this process of gaining total, permanent control, many in the West will interpret that as moderation.
"The
problem with [President] Morsi isn’t whether he is Islamist or not, it
is whether he is authoritarian,” said a Western diplomat in Cairo. Wow,
talk about Western misunderstanding of the importance of ideology.
Perhaps whether or not he is an Islamist—and of course he is--has
something to do with his being authoritarian? Since his goal is a Sharia
state then that is an authoritarian destination for which authoritarian
means are considered acceptable and are in fact a necessity. One might
as well insert the words Communist, fascist, or radical Arab nationalist
for Islamist.
There
are three factors involved here in setting Western policy: ignorance, a
desire to avoid crises, and a foolish belief that having a radical
regime in Egypt will moderate the extremists.
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To add insult to injury—literally—the New York Times,
which has continually portrayed the Brotherhood in glowing terms, now
explains to its readers that the opposition has nothing to offer:
“The
leading opposition alternatives appeared no less authoritarian [than
the Brotherhood]: Ahmed Shafik, who lost the presidential runoff, was a
former Mubarak prime minister campaigning as a new strongman, and
Hamdeen Sabahi, who narrowly missed the runoff, is a Nasserite who has
talked of intervention by the military to unseat Mr. Morsi despite his
election as president.
“`The
problem with `I told you so' is the assumption that if things had
turned out differently the outcome would be better, and I don’t see
that,’ the diplomat said, noting that the opposition to the draft
constitution had hardly shown more respect than Mr. Morsi has for the
norms of democracy or the rule of law. `There are no black hats and
white hats here, there are no heroes and villains. Both sides are using
underhanded tactics and both sides are using violence.`”
This
is disgraceful, a rationalization for either failure or worse. The idea
is that it really didn’t matter who won because they are all the same
so why not a Muslim Brotherhood government with a powerful Salafist
influence? Any leader of Egypt is going to be a strongman. The question
is a strongman for what causes? And if people were talking about
unseating the democratically elected Mursi that’s because they view him
as the equivalent for Egypt of some new Khomeini, a man who will drag
Egypt into decades of repressive dictatorship and war.
I’ve
often written of the weakness and political incompetence of the
anti-Islamist forces but these are courageous people fighting for a good
cause. True, their side includes leftist and nationalist extremists but
should that be used to discredit them all when the Islamists are
constantly whitewashed?
And
for U.S. interests it certainly does matter who wins. Extend this
wrong-headed analogy: the Iranian Islamists are no worse than the shah;
Saddam Hussein was no worse than the oligarchs who ran Iraq before it
went radical in 1958; the current Islamist regime in Turkey is no worse
than the high-handed Kemal Ataturk? One might have well had Communist
regimes in South America rather than military dictatorships?
It might not sound nice to some people but the main task of Western diplomats is not to worship democracy but to try to promote behavior in other governments favorable to their own country's interests. In those terms, Mubarak or Shafik is better than Mursi. And since Mursi doesn't even stand for real democracy the choice is even more obvious.
And there is a dire implication here: If there is no real democratic opposition then the United States doesn't have to help it. Is this principle thus extended to Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia? Are Islamists the only alternative or, to put it in a slightly less obviously objectionable way, should we accept and even help Islamists because everyone is the same?
It might not sound nice to some people but the main task of Western diplomats is not to worship democracy but to try to promote behavior in other governments favorable to their own country's interests. In those terms, Mubarak or Shafik is better than Mursi. And since Mursi doesn't even stand for real democracy the choice is even more obvious.
And there is a dire implication here: If there is no real democratic opposition then the United States doesn't have to help it. Is this principle thus extended to Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia? Are Islamists the only alternative or, to put it in a slightly less obviously objectionable way, should we accept and even help Islamists because everyone is the same?
Wow,
has the Western elite lost its way. There is so little sense of who is a
friend and who is an enemy; the lesser of two evils; the strategic
interests of their own country that one can only despair of any lessons
being learned from experience.
It's
ironic that Obama has spent so much time talking about how past U.S.
support for pro-American dictators has been a mistake that led to a
legacy of crisis when he is now supporting an anti-American dictator.
The
argument presented by U.S. officials that compromise is in the
Brotherhood's interest is laughable. Do people in Washington know what
the Brotherhood wants and conditions in Egypt better than the
Brotherhood leadership? We have seen this same mistake made many times
before by Western governments and editorial writers, lecturing a radical
regime that it would accomplish more by being totally different.
What
is most disturbing is not that the Obama Administration is supporting
this regime--which is bad enough--but that its not even suspicious of
the Egyptian government’s intentions and behavior. It thinks the
Brotherhood is going to curb the Salafists while it actually uses them
as storm troops. And so in the coming months we will see more
obfuscations and apologies about Cairo’s behavior.
The
sad truth is that it is too late for U.S. leverage—which the Obama
Administration doesn’t want to use any way—to have an impact. The
Brotherhood is already in power. If the United States gives it money and
support, the Brotherhood will use that to consolidate its rule while
mobilizing the people against the United States; if Washington doesn't,
the Brotherhood will then mobilize the people even more effectively in
that way. A U.S. policy coddling the regime will be seen as the weak and
stupid response of enemies; a tougher policy will be portrayed as
hostile.
True,
if Obama doles out money and military equipment to the regime with
conditions and slowly, Morsi has an incentive to go slower and more
carefully yet it also strengthens the regime's ability to fulfill its
goals and entrench itself in power. But the army isn’t going to do
anything against the regime even though, at this point, it will not
repress the opposition for Morsi. The Islamists aren’t going to be won
over by the United States. And Obama isn’t going to be serious about
using pressure except for meaningless statements and phone calls. The
administration will speak nice language about protecting women’s and
minority (Christian) rights while it looks the other way when these are
violated.
Understandably,
the democratic opposition—like its counterparts in Lebanon, Syria,
Turkey, and Iran—it has leared that the United States will not help
them. As one sign at a demonstration put it: Obama: Our dictator is your
bitch. One day, decades in the future, an American president might be
apologizing to Egyptians for a U.S. policy that backed a repressive
Islamist regime in their country.
What
are the next steps for Morsi? To out-wait the opposition
demonstrations, which might well diminish since the constitution is now
an established fact, begin the transformation of Egypt’s institutions,
and figure out how to handle the problem of parliament. Can he reinstate
the results of the earlier election—with a 75 percent Islamist
majority—or will he have to hold a new vote next year that might yield a
much smaller majority?
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
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