No. 592 November-December 2012
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During the fighting in Gaza in November 2012, Iran took pains to highlight its own supply of weapons and means of manufacturing them to the Palestinians, contrasting the feebleness of the Arabs with its own potency. Tehran in particular flaunted its role in the supply of rockets, especially the Fajr-5, that was fired at Tel Aviv. Iran also sought to boost its status in Arab and Islamic public opinion as the actor that no longer fears Israel and the Western powers.
- The widening rift between the Shiite camp (Iran, Syria, Hizbullah) and the Sunni camp (led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and with Egypt’s role in the Gaza ceasefire) is evident in the conflict arenas in the Middle East (Syria, the Palestinian arena, Bahrain, Jordan) and stands to greatly influence the landscape of the region. Egypt, playing a central role in determining the new regional order, will likely find itself in confrontation with Iran. Turkey is already confronting Iran over regional hegemony and influence, with Syria as a front line.
- The regional and international dynamic that accompanied the crisis, along with Israel’s successful deflections of Iranian missiles fired at its cities, puts Iran in a problematic position of growing isolation. Iran’s negative role in the region again emerged and its ongoing attempts to win the hearts and minds of the Arab street are failing due to its role in militarily supporting the repressive Assad regime.
- The latest round between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza did not occur in isolation from the dramatic changes that are reshaping the Middle East. It also became clear that the different arenas of change – both those that have already changed and those in the process of doing so – have tight interlinkages that reinforce and influence each other.
- On the strategic level, the forces acting in these arenas are the same ones that are organizing into camps along national and religious lines – a Shiite camp versus a Sunni camp. The more the Iranian threat and influence on the loci of conflict grows, the more the outlines of each camp emerge. The profound gaps between Arabs and Persians, Sunnis and Shiites, only grow deeper as the threat from Iran mounts.
- Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, like the ongoing crisis in Syria, constitutes a sort of microcosm of the processes of change reshaping the Middle East. Certain veteran players of weighty historical and cultural backgrounds aspire to hegemony and have consolidated their capabilities and leverage for the battle.
Iranian Involvement in Gaza
Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense, during which hundreds
of rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza, clearly revealed Iran’s key
role in providing weapons and the means for their production to
Palestinian organizations in Gaza. It was also the first time that
senior Iranian spokesmen have openly and proudly acknowledged that Iran
is channeling military aid, including advanced Fajr-3 (Dawn) and Fajr-5
rockets, to these groups. The deputy secretary-general of Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ziad Nakhle, told Hizbullah’s Al-Manar TV
that “the weapons in the hands of the Palestinian resistance are Iranian
from the individual bullet to the missiles and their production
plants.”1 The PIJ website posted a video of the launching of a
Fajr-3 at the Israeli city of Bat Yam. Moreover, Gaza residents have
started naming children born during and after the operation “Fajr-3” and
“Fajr-5” to express their esteem and gratitude to Iran for supplying
these missiles and others to Gaza.2
Launching of Fajr-3 (Dawn) Missile at Bat Yam
Palestinian Islamic Jihad website
http://www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=25114
Palestinian Islamic Jihad website
http://www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=25114
Pillar of Defense, like Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in
2008-9 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006, gave Iran another opportunity
to demonstrate its commitment to the struggle against Israel. Yet the
operation, the most extensive Israeli campaign in Gaza since the Arab
Spring, also revealed Iran’s problematic regional position and
limitations amid the dramatic changes occurring in the Middle East,
particularly its growing isolation and negative impact on regional
processes.
Iran’s behavior during the crisis, along with its ongoing,
active assistance to President Bashar Assad in militarily suppressing
the rebellion in Syria, again illustrates Iran’s great sense of
confidence amid the disintegration of the Arab camp. Iranian spokesmen
have harshly criticized the behavior of Arab countries and the Arab
League that “meet and condemn” without really helping Palestinians
defend themselves. In that context, Iran took pains to highlight its own
supply of weapons to the Palestinians, contrasting the feebleness of
the Arabs with its own potency. In the past, Iran has responded to
accusations about its weapons supplies to the Palestinians by claiming
that it only supports the Palestinians morally. This time Tehran made a
point of its assistance to the Palestinians and no longer bothered
trying to conceal it.
Thereby Iran – having been sidelined by the involvement of
Egypt, Turkey, and the United States – tried to show that without its
participation there will be no possibility of advancing any settlement
in the region. Iran also sought to boost its status in Arab and Islamic
public opinion as the actor that no longer fears Israel and the Western
powers, but it failed mainly due to its ongoing support for the Assad
regime.
Emergent Camps
The regional and international reactions to Pillar of
Defense also afforded a special glimpse into the camps and coalitions
forming in the region in the context of the Arab Spring, particularly
the emergent division between Sunni and Shiite camps. The pattern of
reactions and policies toward the Gaza operation is largely similar to
the case of Syria. On one side, Qatar and Saudi Arabia call for Assad’s
overthrow; on the other, Iran says Assad is “fighting for his survival”
and accuses Qatar and Saudi Arabia of trying to topple him and
activating terror groups against him. Iran leveled similar accusations
at Qatar during the Gaza operation, claiming Israel’s campaign against
Hamas came hard on the heels of the emir of Qatar’s visit to Gaza and
was even coordinated with him.
The widening rift between the Shiite camp (Iran, Syria,
Hizbullah) and the Sunni camp (led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar) is evident
in the conflict arenas in the Middle East (Syria, the Palestinian
arena, Bahrain, Jordan) and stands to greatly influence the landscape
of the region. Egypt, playing a central role in determining the new
regional order, will likely find itself in confrontation with Iran,
where there are already insinuations about Morsi and his ties with the
United States. Iran will probably keep supporting anti-Morsi elements in
Egypt in an effort to weaken him, especially if he acts to monitor and
curtail the flow of Iranian weapons to Hamas and the key Iranian proxy
in Gaza – Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
In the short and medium term, Iran is also on a path of
full confrontation with Turkey over regional hegemony and influence. As
noted, Iran was not involved in ending the Gaza crisis and its efforts
to send its foreign minister and a parliamentary delegation to Gaza to
express support were apparently blocked by Egypt’s refusal to approve
passage through Rafah during the fighting.3 The Turkish
foreign minister, however, was able to visit. Nevertheless Iranian
officials maintain that their request for a visit to Gaza is being
processed by Egypt.
New Equations
For Iran, which finds itself outside the regional power
equations for resolving crises, nothing is left but to influence them
negatively – through military aid, subversion, and terror (as in the
recent revelation of Hizbullah involvement in a terror attack in
Bahrain). Iran thereby seeks to prove that it is a player that must be
taken into account in the regional arena; nuclear progress is meant to
give Iran greater room to maneuver in this context. The assistance to
Palestinian organizations during the Gaza operation served as a
smokescreen aimed at deflecting international concern about the latest
IAEA report with its grave findings about Iran’s nuclear program.4
In the military sphere, notwithstanding the large number of
missiles Iran has succeeded to smuggle into Gaza (an achievement in
itself), the impressive feats of Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense
system in intercepting missiles aimed at population centers places a
large question mark over the Iranian asymmetrical-war doctrine to which
Iran devotes so much effort. The stationing of similar systems in the
Gulf States, or their addition to staging areas in case of a military
operation against Iran, could undermine the response Iran is planning
for a possible conflict and/or attack on its nuclear facilities. In this
regard Yadollah Javani, former Politburo Chief of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has termed Turkey’s decision to deploy
Patriot missiles along its border with Syria “another strategic
mistake.”5
Iran Calls to Arm the Palestinians
Many senior Iranian spokesmen have fully acknowledged that
Iran supplied rockets of different types, including Fajr-3s and Fajr-5s,
and other military assistance to the Palestinians in Gaza and have
expressed preparedness to join the Palestinians in the fight “until
Israel is destroyed.” The commander of the IRGC, Mohammad Ali Jafari,
said Iran had transferred technologies for the production of Fajr-5s to
Gaza and that these missiles were being manufactured there.6
The commander of the Basij – the volunteer arm of the IRGC – said that
“the Basij forces are counting the moments until the order is given to
liberate Jerusalem, and on this matter we are only waiting for an order
from the [Supreme] Leader….Have no doubt at all, the destruction of the
Israeli regime is very near.”7
The chairman of the Majlis (Iranian parliament), Ali
Larijani, said Iran proudly supported the Palestinian people and Hamas
and had provided them with military and financial aid. He promised: “You
should rest assured that the Zionist regime (of Israel) has harder days
ahead.”8 He added that the Arab states that hold gatherings
and conferences should know that the Palestinians do not need lectures
and summits but rather military assistance.9
IRGC Quds Force commander Qasam Suleimani said that, in one
way or another, the roots of all the resistance movements currently
active in the region and the world lie in the era of the Iran-Iraq War.
He added that extraordinary events can occur in any war, as seen in the
Second Lebanon War and in Operation Cast Lead, and that “the outcomes of
the operation [Pillar of Defense] that the occupying regime [Israel] is
conducting against Gaza are known beforehand.”10
Broadly hinting at Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Larijani called
on Arab states to dispatch forces, weapons, and equipment to the
Palestinians for use against Israel, and not to Syria for use in clashes
between the different Muslim groups there. Larijani also criticized
U.S. president Barack Obama, who “has honored his preelection promises
to support Israel.”11
The deputy chairman of the Majlis, Hujjat al-Islam Abu
Torabi, referred to Iran’s capabilities in the region and said, “There
can be no doubt that it is the power of the armed forces of Iran that is
on display today in Gaza and is trampling the Zionist regime into the
sand of failure and shame.”12
Along with the public declarations, a long series of
articles were published in Iran praising the Fajr missiles provided to
the Palestinians and their great effectiveness. Caricatures also
reflected the mood in the country; many of these (see Appendix) also
exalted the Iranian missiles, condemned the timorous Arab and Turkish
position and the United States’ indifference to the “slaughter in Gaza,”
purported to show the penetrability of the Iron Dome system by Iranian
and Palestinian missiles, and lauded the steadfastness of the
Palestinians.
Perfect for Asymmetric Wars
Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency published an
editorial titled “Fajr-5, World Class Rockets for Asymmetric Warfare.”
It stated, among other things, that
Israel was shocked and later pushed to reassess its calculations after Palestinian groups responded…with a stunning retaliation….Israel was surprised when Palestinians in Gaza targeted Tel Aviv, 70 km. away from the foremost Palestinian territories, for the first time….Things grew worse…when Hamas later on targeted Herzliya (11 km. north of Tel Aviv). The strategic weapon which has changed the scene of the war between Israel and Palestinians is a rocket known as Fajr-5 (Dawn 5)…described by the world military experts as a weapon system appropriate for asymmetric wars, where the military power of the conflicting sides differs significantly….The Fajr-5 is a solid fuel, non-fixed-wing 333 mm. rocket designed and optimized for artillery missions to hit the enemy’s command and control, logistic, radar, communication, economic and political centers. It is a rocket with a 75 km. range, a payload of 178 kg. and a speed of 1009 meters per second. The two-stage version of Fajr-5 rockets are the most effective and longest range of the Fajr-class rockets….Fajr-3 is an optimized version of 240 mm. Fajr-2 rockets but with a range of 43 km. and a 85 kg. payload.13
Dissenting Voices in Iran
In Iran, some voices (not many) criticized the
glorification of the supply of Fajrs to the Palestinians. Some tried to
play down the support, as a foreign ministry spokesman said: “Iran has
always announced that it sides with the Palestinian nation spiritually
and has voiced its preparedness to send humanitarian, medical and
reconstruction aid.”14 Yet criticism has been leveled at the
sizable aid Iran gives to the Palestinians and to Syria at the expense
of the Iranian people, whose lot has deteriorated with the tightening of
sanctions. An editorial on the Asr-e Iran website asks why
Iran is insisting that the Fajr-5s are of its own make. It cites
numerous headlines and reports in the Iranian media boasting that
“Iranian missiles found their way to the heart of Tel Aviv” and the like….Undoubtedly many of the citizens of Iran, including the media, support the “oppressed and unfortunate” and these revolutionary headlines [according to which Fajr-5 is an Iranian missile] can perhaps soothe the heart in the face of the Israeli army’s crimes in Gaza and stir Iranian pride, but one must note that there are also two main downsides here: characterizing the missiles as Iranian compromises the efforts and valor of the Palestinian resistance fighters and arrogates to Iran the pride of the struggle against Israel; and there are legal and political implications of headlines of this kind – at the moment dozens of court cases are pending against Iran in the United States, Europe, and other Western countries, and in some of the rulings already given Iran was required to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation to the injured and the victims of events in Lebanon and Palestine. The excuse used in these rulings was Iran’s support and arming of groups such as Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas. Hence, even if Fajr-5 missiles were really sent to Hamas by Iran…there is no need to proclaim this publicly and in the media since, while these things may sound good to us today, tomorrow they could have legal implications for the regime on the international level.
Claims of Ineffectiveness for the Iron Dome
Along with the emphasis on the decisive role of the Fajr-3s
and Fajr-5s during Pillar of Defense, various Iranian spokesmen
underscored the penetrability and ineffectiveness of the Iron Dome
interception system. Basij commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza
Naqdi termed as a “media campaign” Israel’s claims about Iron Dome’s
interceptions and said the Palestinians’ successful rocket and missile
attacks revealed the system’s vulnerability and uselessness, adding that
“even a hand-made Palestinian rocket penetrates Iron Dome.” Brigadier
General Massoud Jazzayeri, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian Armed
Forces, dismissed Iron Dome’s importance, saying that “the rockets fired
by the Palestinian resistance forces can hit any target desired.”15
The Emir of Qatar’s Pro-Israeli Stance
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305935&st=630535
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305935&st=630535
Iranian Criticism of Arab Countries
In the context of Pillar of Defense, there was also harsh
criticism in Iran of Arab countries that, even under the new conditions
fostered by the Arab Spring, continue to remain passive. Abdollah Haji
Sadeqi, representative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the IRGC,
asserted that Israel’s operation in Gaza and the Western support it
received were actually intended to cover up and divert public attention
from the failure in Syria, and that the operation had received a
go-ahead from some of the Arab states. Sadeqi strongly reproved the
heads of Arab states for their silence and said it was tantamount to
“indifference toward Islam itself and toward their citizens.”16
Amid the growing hostility, tension, and mudslinging
between the emergent Shiite and Sunni camps in the region, a notable
item was published by the Fars News Agency, which is associated with the
IRGC. It quoted a knowledgeable source who claimed that the homes and
offices of senior Hamas officials had been identified during the
historic visit to Gaza of the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al
Thani, and subsequently served as targets for Israeli attacks. The same
source also pointed out that during his visit the emir gave watches and
pens as gifts to heads of Hamas; these, allegedly, sent low-frequency
signals to Israeli satellites that helped locate Hamas leaders during
the operation.17
Conversely, the Gulf and pan-Arab media highlighted Iran’s
key role in pushing for a campaign in Gaza and its ongoing efforts to
undermine regional stability through subversion and terror in Yemen,
Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, and “Palestine.”18 Iran, for its
part, claimed that the European countries’ shutdown of its satellite
channels was an effort to boost Israel’s operation, given their fear of
coverage by Iran’s English-language Press TV as during Operation Cast
Lead, when Press TV broadcast images of Israel’s alleged use of
nonconventional weapons. In the course of Pillar of Defense, Press TV
claimed that its reporters and broadcasters had several times served as
targets for Israeli attacks “because of its objective coverage.”19
“Only Death Suits Israel”
During the Gaza operation, editorials and commentaries were
published in Iran that well reflect Tehran’s belligerent ideological
mood and growing self-confidence. These reviled Israel and claimed that
the saying “Only death suits it” was justified by its barbaric behavior.
The editor of Kayhan, Hasin Shriatmadari, who usually reflects
Khamenei’s view and serves as his representative on the newspaper,
wrote in an editorial during the operation headlined “It’s Not for
Sale!”:
They say that in the not-so-distant past, a villager brought his donkey to the bazaar and called out that he wanted to sell it. But whoever took an interest in the donkey and got close to it received a kick for his efforts and fled. A few people who had watched this told the villager that he should take his donkey away from the place because no one would buy it. The villager responded: “I didn’t bring this wild donkey to sell it! I just wanted everyone to see what I suffer from this donkey so that if one day you hear that I beat him to death, no one will accuse me or start some animal-rights campaign or UN commission in protest!”
Shriatmadari goes on to equate the donkey with Israel and
asserts that Hamas’ military, and particularly missile, capability has
grown many times over since 2008 and that, furthermore, Hamas now has
new missiles with a range of tens – and possibly, eventually, hundreds –
of kilometers. The Muslim peoples of the region, Shriatmadari claims,
are counting the minutes toward a direct confrontation with Israel. He
stresses that, if in previous decades the Israeli regime could inspire
fear with its fierceness, today, amid the mounting tide of the Islamic
awakening that stems from Iran’s Islamic Revolution, this wild dog only
barks without scaring anyone. Shriatmadari concludes by saying “all
evidence indicates that the wild, rabid dog, or wild donkey, has proved
more than ever with this latest attack on Gaza that death is the only
means of purifying the region’s political geography of this regime,
particularly now when the Muslim peoples are counting the seconds to
fight face to face and take revenge on this bacterium of corruption and
destruction.”20
In an editorial on the website of Press TV, which is
directly subordinate to Khamenei, Mohyeddin Sajedi discussed Tehran’s
broader regional perspectives on the war under the headline “War on Gaza
and Change in Equations.” The article settled scores with all of Iran’s
Arab opponents in the regional and international system including the
external leadership of Hamas, who, unlike those directly engaged in the
struggle with Israel, sit in “ventilated palaces in the Gulf states.” As
Sajedi writes:
Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing war on Gaza…Israel’s deterrence power has never been completely reconstructed since the 2006 war. [This is] despite the enormous amount of money that the U.S. and Israel have spent for manufacturing missile shields.…On the contrary, the power of the missiles of the Palestinian resistance has cemented Gaza’s deterrence power….After the Hizbullah leader threatened to retaliate [against] any strike against Beirut with a counterstrike against Tel Aviv, the Palestinian resistance has become able to put forth the Gaza-Tel Aviv equation.…The change in the regional balance of power has been the most substantial development since the Gaza war four years ago. At that time, Egypt was the key U.S. ally…the situation enabled the U.S. and its allies to oppose any initiative by the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements. Therefore, it was natural for the incumbent governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to establish overt or clandestine alliances with Israel….Now the situation has changed. The old Middle East order has been replaced with a nascent one.…The new governments in Egypt and Tunisia – and in a weaker sense in Yemen and Morocco – have ideological roots….Israel seeks to test the role of “political Islam” in the newly reformed Arab countries by attacking Gaza and assess the level of sensitivity in those countries.…The crushing response of the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli attack has even left the Turkish and Qatari governments in a predicament. These governments spared no efforts to overthrow the Syrian government and supply the insurgents with military and financial support. But when it came to Gaza, Doha and Ankara merely called on the U.S. to take immediate measures to call [a] truce. The predicament also exists for the Hamas leaders overseas. Those who continue resistance in Gaza and fire missiles at Israel are much closer to the Lebanese resistance than those who reside at the ventilated palaces in Doha.21
Syria Affects Hamas-Iran Relations
It is worth emphasizing that the turn for the worse in
Iranian-Hamas relations (especially with regard to Hamas’ external
leadership and its headquarters in Damascus) unfolded gradually after
the rise of the Arab Spring and the Assad regime’s violent repression of
the revolt (over forty thousand dead so far). The Alawite regime in
Damascus, which in the past was “certified” to be part of the Shiite
sect, tried to harness Hamas to the fight against the rebels. The Hamas
leadership, however, in contrast to Hizbullah, refused to take part and
eventually was forced to leave its headquarters in Damascus and take
refuge in Qatar and Egypt, to Iran’s consternation. Although Iran and
the Hamas leadership exchanged recriminations, Iran continued to supply
the “field,” that is, the military leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
(an organization totally subordinate to Tehran), with missiles and aid.
After taking over Gaza in 2007, Hamas fell into regional and pan-Arab
isolation and drew close to Iran. Now, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s
rise in Egypt, Hamas’ leadership – or at least its external leadership –
sees a need to warm up relations with Egypt at Tehran’s expense.
Some Iranian media outlets have criticized Hamas’ ungrateful behavior towards Iran following the Gaza operation. The hard-line Tabnak
website, close to Expediency Council secretary and former IRGC
commander Mohsen Reza’i, criticized Cairo-based Mousa Abu Marzook, the
deputy chief of Hamas’ political bureau: “Iran’s position in the Arab
world, it’s no longer a good position….It has to address its position,
so as not to lose public opinion….Iran asked Hamas to adopt a position
closer to Syria. Hamas refused, and this has affected our relationship
with Iran.”22
Tabnak published another article under the
headline: “Why Have the Leaders of Hamas Become Forgetful?” maintaining
that from the outset “the problem of forgetfulness day by day is
becoming more acute among the Hamas authorities.” The article then
tackles Abu Marzook personally. “These comments come when immediately
after the ceasefire between the Zionist regime [Israel] and the
resistance forces, Khaled Meshal, Hamas’ political bureau chief, and
Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of the Palestinian government in
Gaza, in the course of separate statements, while thanking Iran’s action
in support of Palestine, emphasized the pre-eminent role of Iran in the
victory of the resistance front….The leaders of Hamas…have shown that
their (political) stance in the calm of Egypt has pronounced differences
with their position during the war and in Gaza!…Nevertheless, these
people shouldn’t forget the difference between the action of Arab
countries and Turkey in the recent crisis in Gaza and the action of
Iran….These individuals admit that, if not for the military support of
Iran, Hamas’ “diplomacy” and the actions of Arab and Turkish friends
couldn’t solve the problem.”23 Ahamadinejad held separate phone calls with the heads of Hamas and the PIJ urging unity among Palestinian groups.24
A Mixed But Negative Balance for Iran
The war’s end left Iran with a mixed balance sheet. On the
positive side (from its standpoint), the advanced Fajr rockets enabled
the Palestinians to strike “the heart of Tel Aviv.” Iran sees this as an
achievement consistent with its national-security concept that its
first line of defense runs along Israel’s southern and northern borders.
Furthermore, it showed that despite the irresolution of the Arabs and
amid the changing conditions of the Middle East, Iran translates its
willingness to assist into action. It does not settle for verbiage,
meetings, and condemnations, but instead extends military and other
assistance to the Palestinians, while not being deterred by Israeli and
U.S. reactions.
Pillar of Defense served, in reality, as a sort of
rehearsal for another possible scenario – an attack on Iran’s nuclear
facilities and a response in the south and north of Israel. As Tehran
sees it, even if problematic Hamas does not come through, the fully
obedient Islamic Jihad can fill in and inflame the area. It was, in
fact, Islamic Jihad fighters who fired a Kornet missile at an Israeli
jeep before the operation began.
Still on the positive side, if Iran ponders the violent
clashes between Israel and its neighbors to the south and north, then
from its standpoint – as the one that inspires, arms, trains, and funds
Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad – these groups honorably passed
difficult tests and bested Israel. As Iranian defense minister Ahmad
Vahidi said immediately upon the end of the war:
The victory of the Gazans in the 8-day war [Operation Pillar of Defense] constitutes a continuation of the victories of the 22-day war [Operation Cast Lead] and the 33-day war [the Second Lebanon War]….These victories indicate the fragility of the Zionist entity….The Palestinians strengthened their power of deterrence and created the equation Gaza-Tel Aviv and caused Israel to hesitate over whether to continue the war.
Vahidi also likened the Hizbullah drone that penetrated
Israeli air space to the Hamas missiles that got through Iron Dome, and
asserted that jihad and martyrdom had again proved the effectiveness of the struggle against Israel.25
In addition, a recent grave report on Iran’s nuclear program published
by the secretary-general of the IAEA was pushed to the media sidelines
and overlooked in the international arena.
Yet apart from these positive aspects from Iran’s
standpoint, the regional and international dynamic that accompanied the
current crisis, along with Israel’s successful deflections of Iranian
missiles fired at its cities, puts Iran in a problematic position of
growing isolation:
● Iran stands more and more by itself: Iran’s problematic relations and tensions with
its Arab neighbors in the Gulf (Qatar and Saudi Arabia), and with
Turkey on the background of the crisis in Syria, were also manifested
during Pillar of Defense. As in its involvement in Syria, Iran pours oil
on a bonfire that its neighbors want to snuff out. Iran did not take
part in the talks leading to the end of the fighting.
● There is still no clear end in Syria: Operation
Pillar of Defense did not, as Iran hoped, succeed to divert attention
from what is happening in Damascus, and in fact highlighted Iran’s
negative involvement in sensitive crisis areas. Tehran’s continuing
insistence on supporting the Syrian president’s violent suppression of
dissent is deepening and isolating Iran in the Arab world and is likely
to seriously harm its standing in the period following Assad’s fall.
● Iran’s negative role in the region again emerged:
Iran’s flaunting of its supply of advanced rockets and attempts to
further inflame the situation linked it, in the eyes of some actors in
the regional and international arenas, to the “axis of evil” along with
its subversive activity in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and North African
countries. The exposure of Hizbullah’s involvement in a terror attack in
Bahrain has only intensified the trepidation surrounding Iran.
● The peoples of the Arab Spring (or Islamic Awakening) behaved as in the past:
The “Arab street’s” response to the IDF operation in Gaza was no
different from such responses before the Arab Spring. Iran’s calls for
greater involvement are no less shrill in the Arab Spring era,
indicating that, notwithstanding the sweeping changes in the region,
there remain profound gaps between Arabs and Persians, Sunnis and
Shiites, which only grow deeper as the threat from Iran mounts.
● The sense of threat from Iran’s nuclear program has only intensified: Even though the
IAEA secretary-general’s report was relegated to the margins, the Gaza
hostilities pointed to the danger of an escalating conventional clash in
the region in scenarios where Iran would have nuclear weapons and might
use them, whether on the Syrian, Lebanese, or Palestinian fronts.
● A question mark hovers over the asymmetric-warfare doctrine: Iron Dome’s proven effectiveness against missile
attacks will likely cause Iran to rethink the efficacy of asymmetric
warfare, which has been its preferred doctrine in light of its
technological inferiority to Western armies. This pertains particularly
to missile fire at different ranges on economic, military, and civilian
targets in future campaigns in Iran’s vicinity, including its threats to
oil facilities and foreign bases in the Gulf States.
Interlinkage Typifies the Middle East
In sum, the latest round between Israel
and the Palestinians in Gaza did not occur in isolation from the
dramatic changes that are reshaping the Middle East. It also became
clear that the different arenas of change – both those that have already
changed and those in the process of doing so – have tight interlinkages
that reinforce and influence each other. On the strategic level, the
forces acting in these arenas are the same ones that are organizing into
camps along national and religious lines – a Shiite camp versus a Sunni
camp. The more the Iranian threat and influence on the loci of conflict
grows, the more the outlines of each camp emerge.
Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, like the ongoing
crisis in Syria, constitutes a sort of microcosm of the processes of
change reshaping the Middle East. Certain veteran players of weighty
historical and cultural background aspire to hegemony and have
consolidated their capabilities and leverage for the battle.
The Diplomatic Hourglass
Meanwhile, in another arena, the international diplomatic
effort – sterile so far – to contain Iran’s nuclear program continues.
The sand in the diplomatic hourglass is running out as Iran advances (as
the latest IAEA report reveals) in its nuclear program, particularly
regarding the aspects of enrichment (with all the centrifuges now
installed at Fordo) and the quantity of enriched uranium.
Iran will have to
decide between a revolutionary ideology that strives for nuclear weapons
and seeks to dye the Middle East in Islamic colors of the
revolutionary, Khomeinist variant, and responsible political behavior.
Iran’s conduct during the Gaza crisis, particularly its flaunting of its
missile supply and role in escalating the situation in the face of all
efforts to calm it, show that Tehran has already decided that it is
prepared to pay any price in the fight for its revolutionary ideology.
Appendix
Iranian Cartoons on the Pillar of Defense Operation
Erdogan’s Silence over the Israeli Attack on Gaza
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=306900&st=632092
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=306900&st=632092
Fajr-5 over Tel Aviv’s Skies
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305193&st=629075
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305193&st=629075
The West’s Support for Israel
* * *
Notes
3. http://old.irna.ir/News/Politic/Iranian-MPs-waiting-for-Egyptians-permission-to-visit-Gaza/80424361
4. http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran_safeguards_report_November_2012.pdf
9. http://ir.voanews.com/content/iran-hamas-larijani/1550224.html; http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305193&st=629075
17. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107119940; http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=305935&st=630535
21. http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/11/20/273404/war-on-gaza-and-change-in-equations/; http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=308604&st=634999
23. Tabnak, http://tinyurl.com/ckfwvgv
24. http://president.ir/fa/43508; http://president.ir/fa/43507
25. http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&id=366928
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