Doc's Talk: Turkey, Israel, and Syria: Why Things are Going Wrong

Friday, May 31, 2013

Turkey, Israel, and Syria: Why Things are Going Wrong

I was interviewed by Radikal, possibly the best Turkish newspaper today.

What is your assessment of the current state of relations between Turkey and Israel?

Relations will remain bad because Prime Minister Erdogan wants it to be that way. No matter what Israel does—as we have just seen—he will find excuses to do so.

Are relations as tense as they seem or both parties play the tough guy before the cameras whereas they enjoy better relations behind the scenes?

Relations are as tense as they seem because Israel DID compromise before the cameras and Erdogan—for domestic reasons—is still playing tough guy both in public and behind the scenes.

--Have you followed Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent visit to the US? Does it seem to you that Erdogan has been convinced by President Obama and will adopt a more multilateralist and moderate stance on Syria?

I’m not sure what this question means. If Obama becomes more multilateralist that means he will go to the UN and Russia will veto any action. So being more multilateralist means nothing will happen and that’s not what Erdogan wants.

As for “moderate” what does that mean? Does Erdogan want to give less aid and support to the rebels? I don’t think so.

While Turkish officials were having talks with their American counterparts, the CIA Chief John Brennan has visited Israel. Is there any connection between these two visits? Could we say that Turkey, Israel and the US have already or may in the near future start coordinating their efforts towards Syria?

They have already been coordinating their efforts but because of Israeli interests in not taking either side in the civil war that doesn’t mean a huge amount. The coordination has been mainly over sharing assessments and Israeli attacks to ensure that the Syrian regime’s advanced weapons do not get sent to Hizballah in Lebanon.

What is the current Israeli policy on Syria?

Neutrality. Defending itself against the transfer to Lebanon of advanced arms by the Syrian government. Israel will 100 percent definitely not get involved in the war on either side.

Do the developments in Syria bring Turkey and Israel closer or take them further apart?

Israel and Turkey share a common interest in that they do not want al-Qaida to take over Syria. It is not clear whether they agree on the radical Salafists not taking power. They both do not want to see a wider area destabilized. But Erdogan wants the Muslim Brotherhood to win and perhaps doesn’t care about the Salafists winning also. Israel simply doesn’t want to be attacked from Syria by the regime or the rebels. The answer is it should bring them closer together but Erdogan doesn’t want that and has announced he won’t even consult with Israel on Syria. As far as I can see that statement is true.

Turkey, though, is in great danger for not only is it involved in a proxy war with Iran, which supports the regime, but also now with Russia which is escalating its support for the regime. The Turkish government’s “no enemies” policy is clearly gone since it has now made three major enemies by its own choice: Iran, Israel, and Russia, to which could be added Hizballah, a group that Erdogan courted.

But there is more than that regarding the problems for Turkey. What few people recognize is that the “Arab Spring” means the end of the regime’s regional ambitions. Whatever people think within Turkey the Sunni Islamists, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood, don’t want Turkish influence because Turks are not Arabs. In addition they think they don’t need Turkey anymore. True, Erdogan became briefly popular in the Arab world when they didn’t have anyone else to turn to but now they have their own new revolutions. Do you really think that a radical Islamist government in Syria will be friendly toward Turkey? And now, remarkably, the Turkish government has helped install a PKK regime on its border in northeastern Syria!

This policy is not working very well.

Do you think Israel and Turkey may have started coordinating their efforts on Syria?

Definitely not.

If Israel suspects that Hezbollah received advanced weapons from Syria, will it intervene into Lebanon again?

Definitely yes.

Is there any solution to the Syrian quagmire in the near future?

No. There is no real diplomatic solution. People can hold conferences and give speeches but the only way this will be settled is by one side’s victory over the other and that is not likely to happen in less than two years and perhaps not even then.

Is it coincidence that the Israeli air attacks on Syria and the Israeli apology to Turkey have overlapped during the first half of this year?

Yes it is a coincidence.

Why do you think Israel apologized from Turkey?

Because President Obama asked it to do so; because Israel’s action was what the Turkish government had been offered by it for two years, because Israel wants good relations with Turkey. And finally because Israel didn't apologize--despite the media spin--but expressed regrtet and made a deal on the basis of the same terms it had been offering the Turkish government for about two years.

Do the Israeli decision-makers trust Erdogan and Davutoglu?

No, especially now after the rejection of attempted conciliation.

There were reports in the Turkish media some time ago that Israeli intelligence officials were uneasy with the appointment of Hakan Fidan to the post of the head of Turkish intelligence agency, MIT, as they feared that Fidan may be too close to some anti-Israeli players in the region. Is there any truth in these speculations?

What’s important is Turkish government policy, not personnel. With the current government in Ankara’s policy, it doesn’t matter who the officials are.

What does the Israeli government think about Erdogan’s visit to Palestine?

Actually, remember this. If Erdogan was going to the West Bank to visit the Palestinian Authority nobody would be annoyed. Israel would probably be pleased. But he has never supported the Palestinian Authority because he has backed Islamist Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is as angry as Israel is and has said so publicly. Instead of backing Palestine, Erdogan is helping a rebel area which openly seeks genocide against Jews and the destruction of Israel, a group that has also killed members of the ruling group in the Palestinian Authority, Fatah.

Does Israel want Turkey to reconcile Hamas and El Fatah?

I don’t think that’s what he is doing. He is supporting Hamas against Fatah and everyone in Fatah knows it.

Last week Sunday Times published some remarks of an unnamed Israeli official who said that Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were forming a Sunni block in the Middle East and Israel would actually like to be a part of this partnership. What do think about such scenarios?

Never believe anything that appears in the Sunday Times. I’m not joking as it has a record of making stuff up and all their `scoops' never materialize. Obviously, Israel will not be part of this partnership. Inasmuch as Israel views Iran as its main enemy, defeats for Iran by a Sunni bloc are viewed as positive. But Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are not delivering a moderate government in Syria but a revolutionary Islamist one. They may all mourn the day they made that error. They could have supported more moderate forces, got rid of Bashar al-Assad, and enjoyed far more Western help in doing so.

Put simply, who are the friends of Israel in the region and who are the foes?

Israel would like to have Turkey as a friend, as happened for many years. The foes are Iran, the current Lebanese government (led by Syrian puppets and Hizballah) and the current Syrian government, as well as Hamas. The potential foes are the Muslim Brotherhood regimes—Egypt, Tunisia, and a rebel-ruled Syria. The rest are neither. Even Egypt has been cautious in practice despite its harsh rhetoric. Any Arab factor that wants to can become a neutral party simply by not attacking Israel.

What are the chances for Israel to strike Iran in the near future? If Israel activates such a scenario what role would it expect Turkey to play?

No and no.

Do you think there will be any changes after the elections in Iran?

No because even if the rhetoric is cooler the regime will be controlled by the same faction, that of Supreme Guide Khamenei, and it will continue efforts to achieve nuclear weapons.

When government officials talk about the present process with the PKK, they keep emphasizing that if Turkey reconciles with her Kurds she will become greater. Some suspect that these statements refer to quasi-irredentist motivations. How do you read such statements?

I understand that this is a difficult issue to solve and it is an internal Turkish matter.

--Would Israel support the creation of an independent Kurdistan? There are many conspiracy theories in Turkey around this question. Many people believe that Israel would support such a Kurdish state as it would be yet another actor against Iran.

Well, it isn’t true. I don’t think even the Kurds aim at an independent Kurdistan. In Iraq and Syria they have the benefits of independence without stirring massive Turkish and Iranian opposition. Turkey is getting along well with the Iraqi Kurds. Why should the Kurds take such a tremendous risk? I think they understand the situation. I know there are many conspiracy theories but they aren’t true. Remember this: In a previous term of office, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared the PKK a terrorist group at Turkey’s request! This involved a real risk of Israel—that the PKK might launch terrorist attacks against it—and some loss of potential freedom of action. It might be good to remember such cooperation, including cooperation against Armenian terrorism, mutual economic benefits of the bilateral relationship, and aid during the earthquake.

Israel is not Turkey's enemy though, regrettably, Islamist Turkish politicians are Israel's enemies, and perhaps a democratic and free Turkey's enemy as well.

Here is an article by me on Turkish-Israel relations that might be of interest.

This article is published on PJMedia.

Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org

Forthcoming Book: Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Yale University Press)

The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org

Editor Turkish Studies, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20#.UZs4pLUwdqU

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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