It is estimated that about 140 kg of 19.75% enriched UF6 is required to
yield enough 93.5% enriched uranium for a bomb. Even assuming trial and
error into the process, Iran has enough medium-enriched UF6 for one bomb, and
may have enough for two. This website lays out the numbers using
calculation factors supplied by URENCO, a European uranium-enrichment
consortium:
Note that the time factor calculated at this website to 93.5% enriched
uranium assumes the use of older-generation IR-1 centrifuges to complete the
enrichment process. The shorter 2-week estimate offered by Olli Heinonen
(long-time IAEA expert) is what Iran could achieve by performing the higher
enrichment using new-generation IR-2 centrifuges, which are just coming
online. I alluded to this estimate in my post from 2 Nov:
http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2013/11/02/yet-another-reminder-iran-still-closing-in-on-bomb/
Regarding the plutonium reactor at Arak, the Iranians said in August that
they won’t be able to bring it online as scheduled in the first quarter of
2014. It will be obvious when it is online, so that event itself is not
something they can really lie about. That said, the Arak reactor is
similar to the one at Osirak in Iraq – also a plutonium reactor – and the path
to a bomb is more direct with a plutonium, or heavy-water, reactor. So the
possibility that Israel will try to attack the Arak reactor just before
it goes critical is much higher than it was with the light-water reactor at
Bushehr. The probability that Iran will try to deceive foreign governments
about the Arak reactor’s progress is commensurately higher. Iran is very
likely to lie about when the Arak reactor is to be brought online.
It is laughable to suggest that anyone can be certain what Iran is able to
do to process plutonium for use in a bomb. Doing so is a different thing from
making a bomb using uranium (U-235). But there are AOEI technical
facilities in Parchin and central Tehran that IAEA hasn’t been inside for
years. Numerous reports have indicated, meanwhile, that Iranian scientists
have been present for nuclear tests in North Korea, which of course has
developed a plutonium-based bomb. This is just one of the most
recent:
Iran and North Korea signed a science/technology cooperation pact in
September 2012 virtually identical to the one Pyongyang signed with Syria in
2002, when construction began on the plutonium reactor there, which the IAF
struck in 2007:
Iran’s 40-megawatt plutonium reactor design would produce plutonium at a
faster rate than North Korea’s 5-megawatt design, probably fast enough for two
bombs’ worth per year. On the shortest feasible timeline, assuming she is
already working with plutonium-processing technology, Iran might get from
reactor light-off to a plutonium bomb in about 18 months.
J.E.Dyer
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