Tuesday, November 12, 2013

ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report

Iran has enough uranium for at least one bomb in 19.75% enriched form.  The latest tally by IAEA inspectors (as of August 2013) is 373 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium hexafluoride, produced at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and the facility at Fordo.  ISIS summarizes the information at this report:
It is estimated that about 140 kg of 19.75% enriched UF6 is required to yield enough 93.5% enriched uranium for a bomb.  Even assuming trial and error into the process, Iran has enough medium-enriched UF6 for one bomb, and may have enough for two.  This website lays out the numbers using calculation factors supplied by URENCO, a European uranium-enrichment consortium:
Note that the time factor calculated at this website to 93.5% enriched uranium assumes the use of older-generation IR-1 centrifuges to complete the enrichment process.  The shorter 2-week estimate offered by Olli Heinonen (long-time IAEA expert) is what Iran could achieve by performing the higher enrichment using new-generation IR-2 centrifuges, which are just coming online.  I alluded to this estimate in my post from 2 Nov:
Regarding the plutonium reactor at Arak, the Iranians said in August that they won’t be able to bring it online as scheduled in the first quarter of 2014.  It will be obvious when it is online, so that event itself is not something they can really lie about.  That said, the Arak reactor is similar to the one at Osirak in Iraq – also a plutonium reactor – and the path to a bomb is more direct with a plutonium, or heavy-water, reactor.  So the possibility that Israel will try to attack the Arak reactor just before it goes critical is much higher than it was with the light-water reactor at Bushehr.  The probability that Iran will try to deceive foreign governments about the Arak reactor’s progress is commensurately higher.  Iran is very likely to lie about when the Arak reactor is to be brought online.
It is laughable to suggest that anyone can be certain what Iran is able to do to process plutonium for use in a bomb. Doing so is a different thing from making a bomb using uranium (U-235).  But there are AOEI technical facilities in Parchin and central Tehran that IAEA hasn’t been inside for years.  Numerous reports have indicated, meanwhile, that Iranian scientists have been present for nuclear tests in North Korea, which of course has developed a plutonium-based bomb.  This is just one of the most recent:
Iran and North Korea signed a science/technology cooperation pact in September 2012 virtually identical to the one Pyongyang signed with Syria in 2002, when construction began on the plutonium reactor there, which the IAF struck in 2007:
Iran’s 40-megawatt plutonium reactor design would produce plutonium at a faster rate than North Korea’s 5-megawatt design, probably fast enough for two bombs’ worth per year.  On the shortest feasible timeline, assuming she is already working with plutonium-processing technology, Iran might get from reactor light-off to a plutonium bomb in about 18 months.
 J.E.Dyer

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